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ABSTRACT
"THINKING GLOBALLY": POLITICAL MOVEMENTS ON THE LEFT IN
MASSACHUSETTS, 1974-1990
SEPTEMBER 2003
ROBERT E. SURBRUG, JR., B.S., RUTGERS UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Kevin Boyle
This dissertation examines activist movements on the left in Massachusetts in the
decade and a half after the end of United States involvement in the Vietnam War. The
study focuses on three movements that were particularly strong in Massachusetts: the
movement against nuclear energy in the latter halfof the 1970s; the campaign for a
nuclear weapons freeze between the United States and the Soviet Union in the early
1 980s; and the Central American solidarity movement which campaigned against United
States intervention in Central America during the 1 980s. Massachusetts became a
stronghold of all three of these movements and played an important role in transforming
them into national movements.
The movements against nuclear energy, nuclear weapons and U.S. intervention in
Central America demonstrate an altered continuity from the radical protest movements
of the 1 960s and challenge the notion that activism on the left faded away with the end
of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, soldiering on only in fragmented "identity" politics.
The movements against nuclear power, the arms race and U.S. intervention in Central
iv
America grew out of the radical politics of the 1960s and sought to learn from the
successes and excesses of that decade. In varying degrees, these movements sought to
blend the radical perspectives of the New Left, the moral witness and non-violent direct
.
action ofthe civil rights movement, and the new values and lifestyle ofthe
counterculture. New movements growing out ofthe 1960s such as feminism and
environmentalism further shaped the trajectory of these post- 1960s movements, which
sought to go beyond the self-destructive revolutionary militancy of the late 1960s
student New Left to create broader based movements which pursued the universal vision
of the 1 960s left through community based activism In so doing, these movements had a
significant impact on mainstream liberals in Massachusetts, such as Senator Edward
Kennedy, Speaker of the House Thomas "Tip" O'Neill and Governor Michael Dukakis.
The confluence of strong activist movements and powerful liberal politicians in
Massachusetts made it certain the state would have a significant impact on national
politics in the 1970s and 1980s.
v
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INTRODUCTION
The End of an Era?
The explosion of radical activism in the 1960s profoundly altered the political
and cultural landscape of the United States. The 1950s' movement for racial freedom
and equality was the spark that set off a chain reaction that swept across America in the
1 960s The civil rights movement awoke a renewed idealism and commitment to
democratic change that intersected with a swelling "baby boom" generation and rising
prosperity to create a decade of almost unprecedented cultural and political
transformation 1 The civil rights struggle helped reawaken a radical pacifist movement
against the cold war, the arms race and nuclear testing. A student "New Left" emerged,
as Maurice Isserman has shown, from remnants of the "Old Left", which handed down a
radical tradition from the 1930s.
2
In an age of affluence, the New Left sought to
transcend the Old Left's orthodox Marxism and labor focus for a more existential search
for authenticity and commitment White college students returned from their
participation in southern sit-ins, Freedom Rides and voter registration drives to lead a
rebellion against in loco parentis rules on college campuses and organize the poor in
northern slums. By the second half of the 1960s, Black Nationalism and other minority
empowerment movements grew alongside a rising tide of opposition to the war in
Vietnam. Increasingly, the political movements of the Sixties' generation fused into
1
Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1953-1963 (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1988); Claybornc Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981).
2
Maurice Isserman, If 1 Had a Hammer: The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left (Urbana
and Chicago. University oflllinois Press, 1987).
1
what contemporaries simply called "The Movement", a sweeping challenge to what
many saw as the materialism, racism, cultural repression, alienation and social
disconnectedness of modern American life. The Movement also led a frontal assault on
U.S. cold war ideology and policies, which it denounced as "militarism" and
"imperialism". Running parallel to the overtly political "Movement" was a rapidly
expanding counterculture, which promised personal and social transformation through
experimentation with sex, drugs, music, meditation, communal living and a myriad of
other radical changes in lifestyle. As the 1960s progressed, political and cultural
movements increasingly merged in a Utopian assault on the "old order". 3
By 1968, America seemed to reach a revolutionary breaking point as the United
States became polarized over the stalemated war in Vietnam, campus unrest spread
rapidly and five summers of urban disorders exploded again with the riots following the
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. For many, the old order seemed teetering on the
verge of collapse Revolutionary movements abroad only confirmed this sense of
momentum and inevitability. For decades, anti-colonial revolutions in the "Third World"
seemed to presage some kind of world historic change In 1968, "First" and "Second"
World rebellions like the Paris worker-student strike, and the "Prague Spring" uprising
in Communist Czechoslovakia, seemed to signal a new stage in the global revolution.
These simultaneous uprisings convinced many living through that tumultuous year that
J
Terry Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Alexander
Bloom and Wini Breines, Takin , It to the Streets: A Sixties Reader (New York: Oxford Press, 1995);
Morris Dickstein, Gates of Eden: American Culture in the Sixties ((New York: Basic Books, 1977); David
Farther, The Age of Great Dreams (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994); Todd Gitlin, Sixties: Years ofHope,
Days of Rage (New York: Bantam Books, 1987); James Miller, Democracy is in the Streets: From Port
Huron to the Siege of Chicago (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987); Douglass Rossinow, Politics of
Authenticity . Liberalism, Christianity and the New Left in America (New York. Columbia University
Press, 1998); Kirkpatrick Sale, SDS (New York: Random House, 1973); Irwin Unger, The Movement: A
History of the American New Lea 1959-1972 ( New York. Dodd, Med, 1974).
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the world was on the brink of momentous change that would surely sweep away the old
order, with its racism, exploitation and social repression, and inaugurate a new epoch of
freedom and equality. 4
When the revolution failed to materialize, much of the "Movement" seemed to
shatter. Some joined desperate underground guerrilla groups like the Weathermen,
whose extremism seemed to grow in proportion to the diminishing prospects for
revolution. Others embraced an increasingly nihilistic drug lifestyle that seemed to lose
sight of the counterculture's earlier ideals of positive personal transformation. Some of
those burnt out by the political failures of the Movement turned "from slogans to
mantras" by embracing various forms of eastern mysticism, in some cases joining
authoritarian religious cults. The killings at Kent State and Jackson State and the
national student strike of 1970 seemed for many, to be the last gasp of the Movement
that once seemed on the verge of inevitable triumph. 5
What defined the death of the "Sixties" was in many ways the end of an
existential mood marked by an exhilarating sense of promise. The mood stemmed from a
rejection of the past, an immersion in the present and an optimistic faith the future would
4
Ronald Frascr, ed., 1968: A Student Generation in Revolt: An International Oral History (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1988).
5
Terry Anderson, The Sixties (New York: Longman, 1999); Stephen A. Kent, From Slogans to Mantras:
Social Protest and Religious Conversion in the Late Vietnam Era (New York: Syracuse University Press,
200 1 ). Kent's work underscores how widespread was the trajectory from protest politics to mystical
religions and cults. He argues that as many activists found the revolutionary political routes to social
transformation exhausted by the late 1960s, they looked to religious movements to usher in the Utopian
society earlier sought through political activism, and thus posits a certain continuity between the protest
movements of the 1960s and the religious movements of the late 1960s and 1970s Max Elbaum,
Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao and Che (London; New York: Verso, 2002).
Elbaum disputes what he describes as the "good early sixties/bad late sixties" dichotomy of most
historians and argues the sectarian revolutionary movements of the late 1960s and 1970s were the logical
outgrowth of the earlier New Left movements, and strove earnestly to link the revolutionary struggle in the
United States to Third World Movements abroad and racial empowerment movements at home
3
usher in the "New Age". After the apocalyptic Zeitgeist reached its zenith in 1968, it
seemed for many the generation ofthe 1960s would never recapture the magical sense of
hope. Obituaries for the "Movement", and thus "the Sixties", poured in during the late
1960s and early 1970s. Journalist Michael Herr, who covered the war in Vietnam, wrote
of the decade's cultural exhaustion, "Out on the street I couldn't tell the Vietnam
veterans from the rock 'n' roll veterans. The Sixties had made so many casualties, its
war and its music had run power off the same circuit for so long they didn't even have to
fuse. .
.
The year [1968] had been so hot that I think it shorted out the whole decade. . ."6
Perhaps the most memorable post-mortem for the decade was that of counterculture
journalist Hunter S. Thomson, who in his 1971 novel, Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas
.
wrote of his time in San Francisco halfa decade earlier:
Strange memories on this nervous night in Las Vegas. Five years later?
Six? It seems like a lifetime, or at least a Main Era - the kind of peak that
never comes again. San Francisco in the middle sixties was a very special
time and place to be a part of Maybe it meant something. Maybe not, in
the long run. . . but no explanation, no mix of words or music or memories
can touch that sense of knowing that you were there and alive in that
corner of time and the world. Whatever it meant. . . There was madness in
any direction, at any hour. . . You could strike spark anywhere. There was
a fantastic universal sense that whatever we were doing was right, that we
were winning. . . And that I think was the handle - that sense of inevitable
victory over the forces of Old and Evil. Not in any mean or military
sense; we didn't need that. Our energy would simply prevail. There was
no point in fighting - on our side or theirs. We had all the momentum; we
were riding the crest of a high and beautiful wave. . . So now, less than
five years later, you can go up on a steep hill in Las Vegas and look West,
and with the right kind ofeyes you can almost see the high-water mark -
that place where the wave finally broke and rolled back.
7
6 Michael Herr, Dispatches (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).
7
Hunter S. Thompson, Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas: A Savage Journey to the Heart of the American
Dream (New York: Random House, 1971).
4
These early obituaries have helped reinforce the notion of a dramatic disjunctive
between the 1960s and 1970s that obscures the continuities between the 1960s and
subsequent decades. In this view, while environmentalism, feminism and gay liberation
soldiered on as the last surviving heirs ofthe Movement, the rest of America sank into
the drift and apathy of the "Me Decade" until the conservative ascendancy begun with
Nixon's election in 1968, and temporarily interrupted by Watergate, resumed in 1980
with the election of Ronald Reagan. 8
Post-Vietnam Movements: Altered Continuity
This image of a dramatic disjunctive obscures what might better be described as
an altered continuity between the movements of the 1960s and subsequent decades. In
many ways, the political and cultural rebellion of the 1960s only began to be felt in
much of the country in the 1970s. The impact of the movements was like a concentrated
ink drop on a napkin, whose circle expands ever wider as the ink dilutes Opposition to
the war in Vietnam and re-evaluation of cold war premises only moved into the
mainstream of American society in the very late 1960s and 1970s. The clothing,
hairstyles, music, sexual experimentation and drug use of the counterculture spread into
8 Two 1970s works have especially reinforced the gulf between the 1960s and 1970s. One is Tom Wolfe's
famous, 'The Me Decade and the Fourth Great Awakening", in Mauve Gloves and Madmen. Clutter and
Vine, and Other Stories, Sketches and Essays (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1976). The other is
Christopher Lasch's The Culture of Narcissim: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations
(New York: Warner Books, 1979). Both are penetrating works that illuminate a good deal of American
culture in the 1970s, but downplay continuities with the 1960s, and virtually ignore post- 1 960s activism.
For this view, see also Edwin Schur, The Awareness Trap: Self Absorbtion Instead of Social Change (New
York: Quadrangle, 1976). Peter Clecak refutes their views in America s Quest for the Ideal Self: Dissent
and Fulfillment in the 60s and 70s (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1983). Clecak
emphasizes the themes that unify the 1960s and 1970s both culturally and politically. He argues the
pursuit of personal fulfillment and social justice are two themes that unify both decades. His appraisal of
the 1970s is far more generous than Wolfe's or Lasch's. Peter Carroll shares Clecak s more positive
assessment of the 1970s in It Seemed Like Nothing Happened: America in the 1970s (New Brunswick,
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1982).
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Small tOWM across AmBtka as thfl 1970s progressed. Television programs such as "All
in the Family", -The Jeflfersons", and \ food Times" took up themes such as racism,
feminism and the sexual revolution in a way (hat would have only rarely passed censors
in the 1960s. The persistent antiwar themes ofthe 1970s' most popular television
program "MASir, is testament to the degree to which the changed attitudes ofthe 1960s
continued (o permeate the popular culture ofthe 1970s.
The new movements ofthe 1970s and 1980s likewise derived inspiration and a
sense oflegitimacy from the movements ofthe 1960s, and sought to learn from the
previous era and adapt those lessons to the changed environments ofthe 1970s and
1980S. Indeed, there is a dnecl movement progression gTOWUlg OUt of (he l»K>()s through
the subsequent two decades, By the mid 1970s, the feminist and environmentalist
movements converged in the movement against nucicai power, winch soup.hi to create a
new movement thai employed New Left ideas of"direct action" and 'participatory
democracy', hut that elevated the role ol women in s way the antiwar movement never
did. The "No Nukes" movement likewise pursued a community Strategy that
represented a continuation ofthe antiwar movement's trajectory, which hy the late 1960s
SOUght tO lake Ihc movement oil the campuses and root it in inamslicain communities
The movement aeainsl nuclear power rejected the campus hased antiwar movement's
violent rhetoric and vanguard politics loi a return to the gT8SS roots organizing and
bottom up approach ofthe Student Non Violent ( !oordinating ( lommfttee (SN( !< ) in the
South during tiic early 1960s The movement against nuclear powei also attempted to
''
TlW proniinciKf ol wiumn m the aiilmiu Icai itmgglfli ol the 1970s was a unit nutation ot •» lTlj« UN v
begun mi the movements ol the 1960s See Sara livans, Personal Politics I hc Roots ot Women's
Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and (lie New I oil (New Yoik Vintage Hooks. I"'/ 1 ')
incorporate the communal, agrarian lifestyle of the counterculture into its effort not only
to stop nuclear power, but also create new forms ofcommunity and democracy in what
historian Barbara Epstein has called "pre-figurative politics". 10
Many antinuclear activists of the 1970s were veterans of the civil rights and anti-
war struggles of the 1960s. Activists saw the new technology as part and parcel of the
impersonal corporate technocracy that created the war in Vietnam and subordinated the
people's welfare and citizen democracy to the imperatives of power, profit and an ever-
expanding consumer society. 1
1
The movement against nuclear power that began to grow
around 1974 reached critical mass in 1977, when 1,414 members of the antinuclear
Clamshell Alliance were arrested during an occupation of the site of a proposed nuclear
power plant in Seabrook, New Hampshire. 12 It was one of the largest mass-political
arrests of the 1960s or 1970s, surpassing the 800 plus protestors arrested during the
Berkeley Free Speech Movement in 1964 or the Columbia University uprising of 1968.
Indeed, only the mass arrests of the Birmingham protests of 1963 or the mass detentions
of over 10,000 antiwar radicals in Washington, D.C. during the May Day protests of
1971 surpassed the mass arrests at Seabrook. 13
10
Barbara Epstein, Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Non-Violent Direct Action in the 1970s and
1980s (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991). Wini Breines argues the
importance ofcommunity organizing in the New Left in Community and Organization in the New Left,
1962-1968; The Great Refusal (New York: Praeger; South Hadley, Massachusetts: J.F. Bergin, 1982).
11
For the 1960s counterculture and technology, see Theodore Roszake, The Making of a Counterculture:
Reflections on the Technocratic Society and its Youthful Opposition (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1969).
12
Epstein; also, for a direct witness account, Harvey Wasserman, Energy War: Reports from the Front
(Westport, Connecticut: L. Hill, 1979).
13 Diane McWhorter, Carry Me Home: Birmingham, Alabama: The Climactic Battle of the Civil Rights
Revolution (New York: Simon and Schuster, 200 1 ). For an account ofthe mass detentions of 1 97 1 , see the
last chapter in Lucy Barber, Marching on Washington: The Forging of an American Political Tradition
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
7
The movement against nuclear power continued to sweep the nation, peaking in
1979 when the near meltdown at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station in
Pennsylvania effectively ended the era of nuclear expansion in the United States.
Although the crusade against nuclear power began to wane, it had helped reawaken the
movement against nuclear weapons, which grew as the next of the mass movements of
the post-Vietnam era. Like the movement against nuclear power, the movement to
"freeze" the arms race of the 1980s was deeply rooted in the activism of previous
decades. The disarmament movement that had grown so dramatically in the late 1950s
and early 1960s had largely gone into abeyance after the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty,
and was soon further eclipsed by the escalating war in Vietnam. 14 But by 1980, the
movement was reborn, and with the breakdown ofdetente during the late Carter years
and the arms build up under conservative Republican President Ronald Reagan creating
fears of Armageddon, the nuclear weapons freeze movement swept the United States.
Freeze activists pursued a moderate political strategy in pursuit of a radical agenda by
downplaying the countercultural influences so prominent in the movement against
nuclear power and pursuing a strategy of respectability that won mainstream public and
political support within a few short years. By 1982 polls revealed an overwhelming
majority of Americans supported a nuclear weapons freeze by the United States and
Soviet Union. In June of 1982, over 750,000 Americans attended a nuclear weapons
freeze rally in New York's Central Park. The numbers surpassed all but one of the mass
14
Paul Boyer discusses the cycles of the movement against nuclear weapons in "Epilogue: From the H-
Bomb to Star Wars: The Continuing Cycles of Activism and Apathy", in By the Bomb's Early Light:
American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (Chapel Hill and London: University of
North Carolina Press, 1994).
8
gatherings of the 1960s.' 5 In a campaign reminiscent of Senator Eugene McCarthy's
"Clean for Gene" presidential campaign of 1968, freeze activists, many from old-line
radical pacifist organizations, sought to make ending the nuclear arms race as
mainstream as apple pie. The movement succeeded in winning passage of a freeze
resolution by the House of Representatives in 1983, and challenged the dominance of the
Reagan administration' martial, cold war rhetoric. 16 Although the freeze movement
never accomplished its stated goals, by shifting the terms of debate, Frances Fitzgerald
suggests the movement forced the Reagan administration to downplay the strategy and
rhetoric of limited nuclear war coming from the "war winners" in the administration, and
ultimately helped lay the ground work for the serious negotiations that took place in the
age of Mikhail Gorbachev. 17
Just as the freeze movement followed quickly in the wake of the antinuclear
i
energy movement, the Central American solidarity movement, which grew in the
shadow of the freeze movement in the early 1980s, exploded as the freeze movement
declined in late 1983. The year 1979 saw revolutionary movements sweep across Central
America, as the leftist Sandinistas of Nicaragua overthrew the U.S.-supported
Nicaraguan dictator, Anastasio Somoza, and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (FMLN) threatened to topple HI Salvador's U.S.-supported military junta and
right-wing oligarchy. Ronald Reagan campaigned for president on a promise to push
15 Approximately 900,000 attended the march in Washington, D.C. against the war in Vietnam that
occurred on November 15, 1969.
16
David S. Meyer, A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics (New York:
Praeger, 1990).
17
Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).
9
back what conservatives saw as a rising tide of communist-backed revolution in Central
America. Once in office, Reagan sought to covertly destabilize and overthrow the
Sandinista government in Nicaragua and vastly increased U.S. military aid, including
military advisors, to El Salvador, amidst a dramatic rise in right-wing death squad
killings.
18
For those on the U.S. left, events in Central America portended a replay of
Vietnam and an effort to resurrect early cold war ideology. A vigorous and eclectic
opposition to U.S. policies emerged and grew throughout the 1980s. Young militants
gravitated toward groups like the Committee in Solidarity with the People in El Salvador
(CISPES), which hearkened back to the Third World Revolution supporters of the late
1960s. Like their predecessors who traveled to Cuba as part of the Veneeramos brigades
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Central American solidarity radicals of the 1980s
traveled to Nicaragua and EI Salvador to show "solidarity" with Central American
revolutionaries' efforts to build new, egalitarian societies.
19 Many church organizations
became heavily involved in efforts to stop U.S. intervention and to support popular
movements in Central America. In the wake of the Second Vatican Council in the early
1 960s, with its calls for peace and social justice, a growing number of Catholics spoke
out in opposition to the war in Vietnam and remained politically active in subsequent
decades. The emergence of "liberation theology", an amalgam of Marxist and Christian
doctrine, as a driving force in the revolutionary movements in Central America, assured
18 William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Robert Kagan, A Twilight Struggle: American Power and
Nicaragua, 1977-1990 (New York: Free Press, 1996); Thomas Walker, ed., Reagan versus the Sandinistas:
The Undeclared War on Nicaragua (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987).
19
For the roots of Latin American solidarity movements in the 1950s and 1960s, see Van Gosse, Where
the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War and the Making ofthe American Left (London; New York: Verso, 1993).
10
the political participation ofNorth American Catholic activists in the Central American
solidarity movement, alongside other historically active peace churches such as the
Quakers, Mennonites, Unitarians and others. The highly visible role of faith-based
activists continued a trend begun by the civil rights movement in the 1950s and
expanded with the growth of clerical activism against the war in Vietnam and the 1980s
nuclear weapons freeze movement.20
Central American solidarity activists pursued a number of activities to prevent a
U.S. invasion ofNicaragua or El Salvador, and to curtail U.S. support for right-wing
forces in the region. The movement carried out a heavy lobbying campaign in Congress
to cut U.S. military aid to conservative forces in the region as well as "material aid"
campaigns to help those affected by war and poverty. The faith-based wing of the
movement undertook a "sanctuary" campaign by providing church asylum to Central
American refugees fleeing persecution in El Salvador and Guatemala. Many activists
joined "internationalists" from Europe and Canada in Nicaragua to help with the coffee
harvest. The movement pursued a national campaign to have universities become "sister
universities" to universities in Central America and to have U.S. cities declare
themselves "sister cities" with cities in Central America. Others joined a national
"Pledge of Resistance", pledging to take part in massive civil disobedience should U.S.
military forces invade a Central American country. Thus, like the movements against
nuclear power and nuclear weapons, the Central American solidarity movement
represented a direct outgrowth of the political movements of the 1960s. By keeping alive
20
Daniel L. Migliore, Called to Freedom: Liberation Theology and the Future of Christian Doctrine
(Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1980); Margaret Randall, Christians in the Nicaraguan Revolution
(Vancouver: New Star Books, 1983); Phillip Berryman, Liberation Theology: Essential Facts About the
Revolutionary Movement in Latin America - And Beyond (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
11
the specter of Vietnam, the movement sought to contain and roll back the resurgent cold
war doctrines of the Reagan administration. 21
The post-Vietnam movements against nuclear power, the nuclear arms race and
U.S. intervention in Central America comprise the focus of this study. Chronologically,
they succeeded each other in an undulating wave that saw one emerge as the preceding
one declined. These movements were by no means the only heirs to 1960s radicalism
mid activism. They were joined by other post-Vietnam movements such as the campaign
for divestment from the apartheid government in South Africa, a powerful gay
movement to promote AIDS awareness and combat government apathy to the epidemic,
a nationwide campaign to fight homelessness, and the efforts by Rev. Jesse Jackson to
bring minorities and progressive whites together in a national "Rainbow Coalition". The
1970s and 1980s constituted an age of ongoing activism, rooted in the 1960s, but
transformed by the changing economic and political landscape of subsequent decades.
What made these activist movements so relevant in the post-Vietnam era was their
important impact on mainstream liberalism, which, like radical and left-leaning activism
underwent significant transformations rooted in the politics of the 1960s.
Liberalism: The 1960s and Beyond
The mid-1960s witnessed the apex of post-World War II liberalism. Rooted still
in the New Deal coalition of urban ethnics, labor, northern African Americans, liberal
academics and to a lesser degree the white South, the Democratic Party during the era of
Van Gosse, '"The North American Front': Central American Solidarity Activism in the Reagan Era" in
Mike Davis and Michael Sprinker, Reshaping the U.S. Lett: Popular Struggles in the 1980s (London, New
York: Verso, 1988).
12
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(SDS), the nation's foremost student New Left organization took up the slogan "part of
the way with LBJ".24
The productive but often fragile ties between the activist left and mainstream
liberalism in the first halfof the 1960s was torn asunder by divisions over the speed of
implementing the civil rights agenda and most of all by differing attitudes toward the
cold war, brought painfully to the fore with the war in Vietnam. Members of the Student
Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Congress of Racial Equality
(CORE) often felt the Kennedy administration moved too hesitantly to support the
movement during the early 1 960s.25 Relations initially improved under Johnson but were
again strained during the 1964 Democratic Convention in Atlantic City, when the
Democratic leadership refused to replace the segregationist Mississippi delegation with
the integrated delegation from the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.26
The breach opened up between the activist left and mainstream liberalism in
Atlantic City widened dramatically as Johnson rapidly expanded U.S. military
involvement in the Vietnam War after the 1964 election. Radical politics spread across
American campuses as protests swelled year after year. By 1967, the radical wing of the
antiwar movement announced a shift from "protest to resistance" resulting in
confrontational actions at the University of Wisconsin, the Pentagon and the Oakland
draft induction center. As tear gas and pitched battles between students and police and
National Guard became commonplace on major U.S. campuses, the New Left, heavily
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influenced by the militant turn in the civil rights movement toward black power,
increasingly shifted its focus to calls for revolution. New Left radicals now denounced
"corporate liberalism" and "cold war liberalism" as the prime engine behind "U.S.
imperialism", class inequality and the war in Vietnam. By 1968, many on the led had
come to consider mainstream liberalism to be among the outworn institutions of the old
order that needed to be swept away by the rising revolutionary tide around the world. 27
As was the case with civil rights in the early 1 960s, antiwar activism had a
profound impact on late 1960s liberalism. From only two members of Congress
opposing the 1964 GulfofTonkin resolution, by 1968, the Democratic Party was deeply
divided over the war in Vietnam. The divisions came to a head at the 1968 Democratic
convention in Chicago. While Mayor John Daley's police tear-gassed antiwar radicals in
the streets ofChicago, inside the convention hall, fist fights broke out between "hawks"
and "doves" in the party. 28
The divided Democratic Party limped out of Chicago to face a united Republican
Party and increasingly disaffected American electorate. The white South had already
abandoned the Democrats over civil rights, and now some feared the party's ethnic and
urban base would begin to hemorrhage. Many middle and working class Americans were
incensed at the campus unrest, urban riots and cultural rebellion that seemed to be
inundating America. Strenuous efforts by organized labor kept most union workers in
the Democratic fold, but many middle class voters who had helped hand Johnson a
landslide in 1964 abandoned the Democrats for the "Law and Order" appeals of Richard
27
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Nixon. Southern whites and some northern urban ethnic groups contributed to the 1 3.5%
of the popular vote received by independent former Alabama governor George Wallace.
Nixon's presidency hardly ended liberal politics in America, however. As
Johnson's war became Nixon's war, many Democrats found themselves free to join the
ranks of those opposed to the war. Opposition to the war in Congress grew throughout
the Nixon years. Meanwhile, Congress turned back Nixon's efforts to put conservative
former segregationists on the Supreme Court and Nixon signed several important pieces
of liberal legislation such as the Environmental Protection Act, the Endangered Species
Act, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.29
The major issue of the early Nixon years remained the war in Vietnam. Antiwar
activism exploded in late 1969 and made wide inroads into mainstream America as
witnessed by the October Moratorium and November Mobilization against the war. 30 By
1972, however, Nixon's Vietnamization policy had reduced draft calls and U.S.
casualties in Vietnam significantly, and his visits to the People's Republic of China and
the Soviet Union, ushered in the era ofdetente. Meanwhile, radical activists slowly
drifted toward mainstream politics while elements of the Democratic Party embraced
much of the New Left's perspective. The 1968 convention had created a system of
proportional representation for the next convention that set aside a percentage of seats
lor minorities, youth and women. The Miami convention witnessed a stark changing of
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the guard. Alongside "hawks" like Washington Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson and
AFL-CIO president George Meeney assembled feminists, environmentalists, peace
activists, civil rights crusaders, gay rights advocates and counterculture libertarians.
Although some unions like the United Auto Workers and the American Federation of
State, Municipal and County Employees embraced the changes, AFL-CIO president
Meeney, surveying the extremely liberal New York delegation, fumed, "What kind of
delegation is this? They've got six open fags and only three AFL-CIO people on that
delegation... Representative? This party seems to have an instinct for suicide." 11
Richard Nixon's landslide victory over (ieorge McOovern in 1972 seemed to
represent a repudiation of any return to the radical and divisive days of the 1960s, and a
consolidation of the conservative backlash begun in 1968. Yet, once again, the backlash
also seemed tentative. Nixon's coattails remained short and Republicans made little
headway in Congress. And in 1974, liberal Democrats exploited the aftermath of the
Watergate scandal and racked up impressive gains in Congress. During the 1970s,
Democrats in Congress challenged what they saw as the excesses of the national security
state revealed during the Vietnam War by passing the War Powers Act and conducting
the Senate hearings by f rank Church that led to significant restrictions on U.S.
intelligence agencies' ability to conduct a shadow foreign policy, and outlawed
assassinations by any U.S. agencies. As America entered the post-Vietnam War era, a
significant number of the Democrats were determined to move the United States beyond
the cold war ideology they believed had led to Vietnam. They further brought the
influences of environmentalism, feminism and minority empowerment into the
31 Theodore White, The Making ofthe President: 1972 (New York; Bantam, 1973); Hunter S. Thompson,
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mainstream ofAmerican political discourse.32 During the 1970s and 1980s, as activists
on the left undertook crusades against nuclear power, the arms race and U.S.
intervention in Central America, their movements resonated inside the liberal wing of
the Democratic Party.
The influence of the activist left inside mainstream liberalism during the post-
Vietnam era coincided with an uneven but growing ascendancy of the New Right in
American politics. The roots of the conservative ascendancy can be traced back to Barry
Goldwater's 1964 campaign when the right wing of the Republican Party won control
from the moderate wing of the party, calling for the roll back of the New Deal social
welfare state and more aggressive conduct of the cold war. In 1966, Ronald Reagan
became among the first to capitalize on 1960s backlash politics by winning the
( alifornia governorship in a campaign that blasted Berkeley radicals, the Watts riot and
emerging San Francisco counterculture. Supreme Court decisions on school prayer,
classroom Bible reading and abortion helped mobili/c ;i politicized evangelical Christian
movement.
11
In the 1970s, "nco liberals" centered around the hard-line conservative
Committee on the Present Danger challenged the direction of detente and called for a
renewal of all out cold war.
M
'Die cold warriors, free marketers, and religious
conservatives of the New Right made inroads throughout the 1960s and 1970s by
exploiting the backlash polities of social alienation. By 1980, a decade of economic
decline, de-industrialization, the waning of American power evidenced by the Iranian
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hostage crisis, and the drill of Ihc ( Inner udn stration created Ihc opening for the New
Right to bring about a majoi realignmem In American politics.33
i hc rise of the righl in lasl quarter oi the twentieth ccnlnry luis heen Ihc locuj oi
much important historical work Thomas Ixlsall's Chain Reaction: The Impact o I Race,
Kighls and Taxes on American Politics and Jonathon Ricder's ( 'anarsie: Jews and
Italians ol Brooklyn Against Liberalism u veal the importance ol cultural and racial
[factors in turning a large segment of the New Deal coalition on the road tO becoming
"Reagan Democrats" I hc emphasis on the rise ol the right, however, has tended to
downplay the importance o
I post Vietnam activism and liberalism as at lx-sl an
irrelevant postscript to Ihc 1960s, and at worst as fueling Ihc i
i
r ht wing asccndaiu y by
furl her alienating the Democratic Tarty from mainstieain American society. Yet, as this
woik hopes to show, the activist lell and Democratic liberals of the 1970s and l (>XOs
played an important role in defining Ihc terms of debute and the course of history in the
post Vietnam en by holding forth an alternative vision and vigorously contesting the
rightward trajectory ofthe country, Antinuclear activists mighl oof have ended the
nation's reliance on nuclear power, but by the end ol lhe 1970s, the movement had
raised so many questions in tin- public mind and added lo the costs ol nuclear expansion,
thai Ihc near meltdown at Three Mile Island spelled the end ollhe age of nuclear
expansion. The nuclear freeze movement likewise vigorously contested the re
emergence ol "( old War II" in the early Reagan years Although the movement failed
(
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to halt the arms build up, it revealed deep anxiety among the American public towards
the arms race and helped blunt the trajectory of the Reagan administration's cold war
policies and arguably paved the way for a new detente Whereas 1980 was not a good
year for politicians to be for arms control, 1982 was not a good year to be against it.
Lastly, the determined movement against U.S. intervention in Central America kept
alive the "Vietnam syndrome" and constrained the Reagan administration's ability to
intervene more directly in Central America Indeed, the administration's efforts to
circumvent congressional limitations on its covert war against the Sandinista
government in Nicaragua led to the series of illegal arms sales to Iran to fund the
Nicaraguan contras soon known as the "Iran-Contra scandal". 37 To be sure, this
represented a mixed record Yet activism and liberal politics in the post-Vietnam era was
far more dynamic than has often been depicted, and represented far more than speed
bumps on the conservative's road to political ascendancy During the 1970s and 1980s,
no state in the union represented the alternative road to that conservative ascendancy
more than Massachusetts
"Don't Blame Me, I'm From Massachusetts"
As President Richard M Nixon's presidency unraveled from the Watergate
scandal in 1973 and 1974, a bumper sticker began to appear on Massachusetts
automobiles that read, "Don't Blame Me, I'm From Massachusetts". Implicit in the
reminder that Massachusetts was the only state to vote for George McGovern in 1972,
37 Lawrence E. Walsh, Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover Up (New York: Norton, 1997);
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was the reproach that the rest of the country had taken the wrong fork in the road that
year The sense of America taking wrong turns seems deeply ingrained in
Massachusetts' politics in the decades after President John F. Kennedy's assassination
The idea that President Kennedy's death interrupted a trajectory that held the promise of
leading the United States to a brighter future, rather than the disastrous detour into
Vietnam taken by Lyndon B. Johnson, remains a powerful idea in the national psyche,
and especially so in Massachusetts The myth of aborted promise, ofthe road not taken,
continued to give post- 1960s Massachusetts liberalism a sense of legitimacy as the
executor of John Kennedy's legacy and the unfulfilled hopes and ideals of the 1960s.
Massachusetts liberals would frequently invoke President Kennedy's name in support of
policies far to the left of anything embraced by the president while he was alive None
would lay claim to being the heir of the martyred president's legacy more than his
younger brother, Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy, who became for the rest of
the nation the embodiment of "Massachusetts liberalism" Many other Massachusetts
liberals invoked President Kennedy's legacy from Thomas P. ("Tip") O'Neill, who rose
to be Speaker of the House in 1976, to three term governor Michael Dukakis, who
frequently sought to conjure up associations with JFK during his ill-fated presidential
campaign, to Vietnam veteran, Lieutenant Governor then Senator John Forbes Kerry,
who sought to strike a Kennedyesque pose throughout his career As the political center
drifted to the right in the wake of the 1960s, Massachusetts liberals, by associating
themselves with nostalgia for "Camelot", continued to put themselves forward as the
trustees of the uncompleted road set out upon by John Kennedy.
21
The post- 1960s liberalism of Massachusetts politicians may have legitimated
itself by reference to John Kennedy, but in many ways it was the radical activism of the
1 960s that most shaped Massachusetts liberalism in the post-Vietnam era. The civil
rights and antiwar movements were especially strong in Massachusetts Massachusetts
colleges and churches comprised a powerful incubator for the civil rights movement,
producing a disproportionate share of northern civil rights activists who headed south as
the "new abolitionists" in SNCC and CORE. Although the campus based New Left and
antiwar movements had their origins in the Midwest (the "Third Coast") and in the San
Francisco Bay area, by the late 1960s Massachusetts had become a stronghold of "the
Movement" The 1967 draft card burning in Boston was one of the largest in the nation,
and the demonstration of over 250,000 in the Boston Commons during the October 15,
1969 moratorium against the war in Vietnam was likewise among the largest to take
place across America. By 1970, the inroads of the New Left into mainstream liberalism
made itself dramatically felt in Massachusetts when the state legislature became the first
in the nation to pass a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of United States
military forces from the war in Vietnam
Although Massachusetts radicalism grew out of the same baby boom, prosperity
and cold war dynamics that produced the youth rebellion nationwide, coming out of the
1 960s, radical activists in Massachusetts traced their lineage not to John Kennedy but the
Commonwealth's revolutionary heritage, from the Boston Massacre of 1770, the Tea
Party of 1774, Shay's Rebellion in 1786, the abolitionist movement and Utopian politics
of the nineteenth century, the campaign to save Sacco and Vanzetti in the 1 920s, all the
way down to the modern civil rights and peace movements. The degree to which
22
Massachusetts radicals sought to lay claim to America's revolutionary heritage emerges
from a close examination ofBay Stale activism in the 1960s and beyond When in 1974,
antiflUClear energy activist Sam Lovejoy toppled a weather tower in Montague,
Massachusetts to protest a nuclear power station to be constructed there, he chose
Febniaiy 22, George Washington's birthday, as the day to do so When Randy Kehlei
,
Judith Scheckel and olhei Massachusetts activists launched the nuclear weapons freeze
movement in 19X0, t hey repeatedly invoked the legacy of nineteenth century
abolitionists and proclaimed thai just as their predecessor had abolished slavery, Ihey
too would abolish nuclear weapons And in the 1980s, Massachusetts Central American
solidarity activists repeatedly compared Central American revolutionaries to the (North)
American revolutionaries of 1 776 Although laying claim to symbols of America s
revolutionary past was not the exclusive domain of Massachusetts radicals, such r hetoric
was woven into their rhetoric far more than one would find among activists elsewhere,
and seemed to give Hay Stale radicals a unique sense of historical continuity and
legitimacy
iX
Massachusetts was not the only state with a special sense of identity, but it was
one that played a disproportionately influential role in the national politics of the 1970s
and l9S()s Massachusetts was the birthplace ol two of the major posl- Vietnam activist
movements to sweep the United States The direct action campaign against nuclear
*K
Qai) Gentle has described various ly|>es ol Americanism, from a Dfltionalistic variant to what he calls
progressive Americanism Ihat draws Inspiration from America s revolutionary heritage and progressive
mOVOmontfl and symbols throughout U S history (ierslle argues lhal in the 1930s, the Poplllai Ironl made
jvcat headway by embracing progressive Americanism, symboli/ed in (he slogan, "Communism is
Twentieth Cental? Americanism" The activists in this Study very much draw on a progressive view of
Americanism, which sought legitimacy in presenting itself as pari of a continuous simple for peace
justice and equality in American history See (ierslle. Working (lass Americanism The Politics of Labor
in a Textile City, 1914-1960 (Cambridge, England; New York Cambridge University Prow, 1989)
23
power began in western Massachusetts in 1974 when an antiwar activist, Sam Lovqoy
committed a dramatic act of sabotage against a proposed nuclear plant s weather tower
and sparked a mass movement against nuclear energy, which in a few short years spread
throughout New lingland, culminating in the mass protests in Seabrook, New I lampshire
in 1977 and 1978 By the late 1970s, Massachusetts exported activists like Lovejoy,
Anna (iyorgy and activist-journalist Harvey Wasserman to the lest of the count iy,
helping to mobilize a national movement In 1980, western, Massachusetts peace
activists took the idea of a nuclear weapons freeze and put it on the ballot as a non-
binding referendum in three western Massachusetts counties Similarly, Massachusetts
freeze activists became apostles of the new movement throughout the United States
Within two years, the freeze movement swept the United Stales to become the largest
peace movement of the post-Vietnam era Although opposition to US intervention in
Central America originated on the West Coast, when the "solidarity" movement came to
Massachusetts, the Hay State became a stronghold of the movement Massachusetts
activists were disproportionately represented on the first Witness for Peace mission to
the Nicaraguan-llonduran border in 1983. In 1985, when mass civil disobedience swept
the country in protest of the Reagan administration's embargo of Nicaragua, the single
largest number of arrests, over 500, took place in Boston
The pioneering role of grassroots radicalism in Massachusetts percolated up to
shape the Commonwealth's mainstream politics, which was mirrored in the profound
influence the state's politicians had on national politics in the 1970s and 1980s
Foremost among the Democratic heavyweights from Massachusetts was Senator Edward
19
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Kennedy. Unlike his brothers John and Robert, who saw the Senate as a stepping-stone
to the White House, "Ted" ranks among such masters of the Senate as Lyndon Johnson
and Daniel Webster. Kennedy's ability to use his power in the Senate to advance a
liberal agenda has been profound. In Massachusetts, Kennedy was able to straddle the
blue-collar, union, ethnic, "Old" Democratic Party of the New Deal with the activist,
college educated, middle class "New" Democratic Party.40 Kennedy became an early
critic of nuclear power, and in the 1980s championed a nuclear weapons freeze, drafting
a Senate freeze resolution and co-authorizing a book with maverick Republican senator
Mark Hatfield of Oregon entitled, Freeze: Or How You Can Help Prevent Nuclear
War.
41
As one Massachusetts antinuclear activist stated of Kennedy, "He has defined
what is legitimate. His presence did not allow anyone to move the political center to the
right. I think the stability and direction he has provided has given an umbrella under
which a lot of things could be done [on the left] "42
The influence of Massachusetts liberalism was magnified by another titan of
Massachusetts politics, Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill, whose Cambridge district
embraced both the activist elements of academia and the old ethnic neighborhoods of
Cambridge Like Kennedy, O'Neill, who moved rapidly from whip to Majority leader to
Speaker of the House in the 1 970s, was a master parliamentarian who bridged the gap
between New Deal Democrats and the younger generation of"New Democrats" growing
40
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out ofthe activist politics of the 1960s O'Neill helped set the agenda in the I louse and
in the L9808 the burly Irishman became for many Americans the personification of
liberal opposition to Ronald Reagan O'Neill's position in the House assured the
influence of Massachusetts liberals in the nat.onal debate on the nuclear weapons freeze
and U S policy in Central America 43
Young Hay Slate firebrands complimented the influence of Massachusetts
powerhouses like Kennedy and O'Neill In the early 1980s, Congressman (Jerry Studds,
from the district encompassing Cape Cod. became synonymous with outspoken
opposition to the Reagan administration's policies in Central America Mis 1980 "Skidds
Report" was an influential document in delineating a left-liberal position in Congress on
Central America By mid-decade, newly elected Senator, John l< Kerry, a Vietnam
Veteran and former antiwar activist, took up the mantle ofoutspoken opposition to
Reagan's Central American policies, traveling to Nicaragua on a peace mission in I98S
and Conducting a series of hearings into drug smuggling by the I J S supported contras
later in the decade
,
Another ofthe Young lurks from Massachusells was Congressman
lidward Markey, representing a mixed blue collar and professional district north of
Boston In the late 1970s, Markey developed a reputation as an ardent opponent of
nuclear power and was the only member ofCongress invited to speak at a mass 1979
rally against nuclear power in New York City In the 1980s, Markey spearheaded the
Campaign in Congress to pass a nuclear weapons freeze resolution, becoming to the
nuclear freeze issue what (Jerry Studds was lo Central America
11
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The influence of Massachusetts Young Turks like Markey and Studds, and party
stalwarts like Kennedy and O'Neill, was further enhanced by the influence of less high
profile veteran politicians like Senator Paul Tsongas and Congressman Edward Boland
from western Massachusetts Both enjoyed national reputations for integrity that helped
cement Massachusetts influence in Congress As chair of the House Intelligence
Committee, Boland lent a great deal of legitimacy to efforts to contain the Reagan
administration's more adventurist policies in Central America. In 1983 and 1984,
Congress passed a series of"Boland Amendments" designed to end covert U.S. support
for the right-wing contras trying to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. It
was the Reagan administration's illegal efforts to circumvent the Boland amendment that
led to the worst scandal of the Reagan years, when the administration's covert arms for
hostages deals blew up into the "Iran-Contra Affair".
Lastly, the state's lone Republican in Congress, moderate Silvio Conte from
western Massachusetts, greatly augmented the influence of the state's delegation.
Elected to Congress in the 1950s, Conte had a reputation for independence, in 1968
becoming one of the first members of Congress from Massachusetts to speak out against
the Vietnam War. His good nature and earthy sense of humor made him a popular
member of Congress with influence in both parties. By the 1 980s, Conte represented one
of the most activist districts in the nation, western Massachusetts, which was a pioneer
of both the movement against nuclear energy and the freeze movement, as well as a
stronghold of Central American activism. Conte thus became an advocate of the nuclear
weapons freeze and an outspoken defender of human rights in Central America, lending
a bipartisan imprimatur to the state delegation's work on these issues
27
By the early 1980s, the Massachusetts delegation became the flagship in
Congress leading the fight for a nuclear weapons freeze and opposing U.S. intervention
in Central America. While other states like New York and California had immensely
influential liberal members of Congress, no state, liberal or conservative, had as unified
a delegation as Massachusetts' eleven Democrats and one moderate Republican.
Through the united and unusually affective Massachusetts delegation, Bay State activists
enjoyed a special influence on mainstream national politics. That influence was often felt
first at the state level. In the 1980s, Massachusetts freeze, antinuclear and Central
American solidarity activists were particularly active in state politics, which they viewed
as the springboard to having a national impact. Massachusetts activists had a strong
impact on governor Michael Dukakis, especially during his two terms in the 1980s.
More a good government progressive than a New Deal liberal or post- 1960s
"McGovern" Democrat, Dukakis nevertheless embraced causes dear to the activist left.
In 1977, Dukakis was the only New England governor to refuse New Hampshire's
request for state police to arrest the 1 ,4 1 4 occupiers at the Seabrook nuclear power plant
site. Throughout his two terms in the 1980s, Dukakis delayed the Seabrook nuclear
power station from going on line by refusing to submit a federally mandated evacuation
plan for Massachusetts communities falling within the ten-mile "Emergency Planning
Zone" (EPZ). He likewise defied the federal government by refusing to participate in
"Crisis Relocation Planning" (CRP), a civil defense measure pushed by the Reagan
administration as part of its efforts to prepare the nation for possible nuclear war.
Dukakis became an early advocate of a nuclear weapons freeze and commissioned a
state group to study the impact of the arms race on Massachusetts and to find ways for
28
the state to promote disarmament. In 1985, Dukakis became among the first governors to
refuse to allow the state's National Guard to participate in military exercises in Central
America. He later joined other governors in fighting the Honduras exercises in federal
court.
During his 1988 campaign, Republican candidate George Bush sought to make
the election a national referendum on Massachusetts liberalism by tying Dukakis as
closely as possible to his past support for activist causes. By 1988, the two issues that
helped breathe so much life into the left in the early 1 980s, war in Central America and
the nuclear arms race, faded from the national radar screen. The Bush campaign worked
to distance itself from the Reagan administration's unpopular Central American policies,
and the administration pursued serious negotiations on nuclear weapons with President
Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. The ugly but effective campaign to tar Dukakis
as an unpatriotic member of the American Civil Liberties Union who furloughed
convicted black rapists and allowed school children to skip the Pledge of Allegiance set
the stage for a resounding defeat. To many, the 1988 Dukakis presidential campaign was
a swan song for post- 1 960s Massachusetts liberalism, which paved the way for the
emergence of centrist southern Democrat Bill Clinton.45
In examining post-Vietnam activism and liberal politics in Massachusetts, I have
decided to narrow my focus to three movements: the movement against nuclear power,
the nuclear weapons freeze movement and the Central American solidarity movement.
Many postscripts to the 1 960s emphasize personal liberation and "identity politics" as
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the major forces on the left to survive from the 1970s through the present. As important
as feminism, gay liberation and many ethnic and racial empowerment movements have
been, the focus on such movements in the era ofthe "culture wars" has obscured the
importance of issue-centered political movements on the left. The movements in this
study sought to take on economic and military institutions in a way that challenged the
premises of U.S. capitalism and the cold war national security state. They all embraced a
perspective that pursued the late 1960s vision of global change, but through a return to
the community-based politics of the early 1960s. For these reasons, I regard them as the
closest successors of the civil rights and peace movements of the 1960s. For my
purposes, the issues of nuclear power, the arms race and U.S. intervention in Central
America also allowed for a more focused study than the more amorphous issues of
feminism, gay rights, civil rights or even a general focus on environmentalism. Further,
my focus on these issue-centered movements by no means precludes a consideration of
identity politics. As will be seen, feminism, in particular, played an immensely important
role in reshaping the activist left in the 1970s and 1980s
I also chose to focus on the movement against nuclear power, the freeze
movement and Central American solidarity activism because of their special prominence
in Massachusetts activism and politics in the 1970s and 1980s. The movement against
nuclear power and nuclear weapons grew out of the early work by Massachusetts
activists, demonstrating how the community politics ofthe post-Vietnam era worked
their way up to impact first state, then national politics. In the case of Central American
solidarity activism, it struck such strong roots in the state that it likewise was an ideal
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topic. I decided to limit myself to these three movements so as to explore activist politics
in greater depth than I could have if I had broadened the study.
This study hopes to build on several important works. Most importantly is
Barbara Epstein's Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Nonviolent Direct Action in
the 1970s and 1980s.46 Epstein argues that the community organizing and consensus
democracy in the direct action movements of the 1970s and 1980s represented a return
to the early New Left's community organizing and "participatory democracy" that was
eclipsed by the sectarian, vanguard revolutionary groups of the late 1960s and early
1970s. Epstein argues that these efforts constituted a "prefigurative politics" that sought
to anticipate the liberated society of the future within the movements themselves.
Epstein chronicles how these attempts at "cultural revolution" sometimes clashed with
the countervailing movement dynamic of efficacy.
There are several important works dealing with the movement against nuclear
power. Two contemporary chronicles come from activists Anna Gyorgy and Harvey
Wasserman who figure prominently in this study. Gyorgy' s No Nukes: Everyone's
Guide To Nuclear Power is an encyclopedic work covering local movements throughout
the U.S.
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Wasserman's Energy War: Reports from the Front , is a collection of his
essays for numerous left-liberal magazines during the 1970s. Jerome Price's, The
Antinuclear Movement offers an excellent general overview of the movement in the
Epstein.
47 Anna Gyorgy and Friends, No Nukes: Everyone's Guide to Nuclear Power (Boston: South End Press,
1979).
48 Wasserman.
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1 970s into the 1 980s. The best work on Seabrook is Henry F. Bedford, Seabrook:
Citizens- Politics and Nii(.lear_Power. 50 Bedford's work focuses on the legal interveners
far more than the direct action movement of the Clamshell Alliance, taking the inverse
focus to Epstein's treatment of Seabrook. Christian Joppke's Mobili/.inu Against
Nuclear Energy: A Comparison ofGermany and the United States supports the findings
of this study. 5 ' Joppke argues that Germany's antinuclcar movement took on an anti-
stale identity making it far more radical than the American movement. Joppke linds thai
American antinuclcar activists were very much influenced by the country's
revolutionary heritage and the "promise-performance gap" of American democracy. He-
adds that the centralization of power in Germany and the diffusion of power between the
state and federal government in the U.S. likewise shaped the respective movements.
Two works are especially crucial to understanding the nuclear weapons freeze
movement of the 1980s. David Meyer's Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and
American Politics is a perceptive examination of the freeze movement and its impact on
American society. Meyer especially focuses on relations between the national freeze
movement and the media and U.S. politics. He also concentrates on the tensions between
a movement's base and the leadership's desire to win mainstream acceptance. C.
Douglass Waller's Congress and the N uclear Freeze: An I nside Look at the Politics of a
Mass Movement is an indispensable work by a former aide to Massachusetts
49
Jerome Price, The Antinuclear Movement (Boston: I wayne Publishers, 1982)
,0
Henry P. Bedford, Seabrook Station : Citizen Politics and Nuclear Power (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1990).
51
Christian Joppke, Mobilizing Against Nuclear Energy: A Comparison ofGermany and the United States
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
52 Meyer.
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Congressman Ed Markey, who led the push for a freeze resolution in Congress 53 It is an
up close account of the movement in Congress and the relations between politicians and
activists.
Van Gosse's "'The North American Front': Central American Solidarity in the
Reagan Era" in Mike Davis and Michael Sprinker's Reshaping the U.S. Left: Popular
Struggles jn the 1980s remains the best, if partisan, introduction to the solidarity
movement in the 1980s 54 Van Gosse traces the movement back to the New Left activists
who supported the Cuban Revolution in the late 1950s and 1960s, a theme he develops
in Where the Bovs Are: Cuba. Cold War and the Makinu of the American Left 55 His
article suggested the title to J Michael Waller's, The Third Current of Revolution Inside
the 'North American Front' of El Salvador's Guerrilla War 56 Waller's study of the
Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador seeks to link the solidarity
movement and its liberal supporters to international communism William LeoGrande's
Our Own Back Yard: The United States in Central America. 1977-1992 is an exhaustive
study from a liberal perspective of the issue of Central America, which focuses on the
Carter and Reagan administrations' policies and especially the battles over Central
America in the United States Congress 57
C. Douglass Waller. Congress and the Nuclear Freeze: An Insider Look a t the Polit ics of a Mass
Movement (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987).
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The movements against nuclear power, the nuclear arms race and U S
intervention in Central America generally play out in the decade and a half following the
end ofU.S. involvement in the Vietnam War It was an age when activists continued to
pursue the 1960s' internationalist vision of peace, equality and democracy through the
grass-roots activism summed up in the 1970s and 1980s' slogan, "Think Globally, Act
Locally" This work attempts to evaluate these movements by assessing their impact on
mainstream liberalism and thus on the national political agenda To be sure, as far as
activism is concerned, state borders are in many ways an artificial entity Thus, many
activists from western Massachusetts, to some degree, had more in common with other
rural activists up the Connecticut River valley in Vermont than with urban activists in
Boston. Yet, the exigencies of electoral politics forced western and eastern
Massachusetts activists to coordinate strategies in all the movements considered in this
study By working within the confines of a single state, I hope to illustrate more clearly
the manner by which local activism was able to shape liberal politics within clearly
defined electoral borders By focusing on Massachusetts, I seek to demonstrate the
manner by which the activist politics of the post- Vietnam era percolated up to have a
national impact
I have chosen to confine my study to the years between 1974 and 1990, a period I
call the "post-Vietnam era" In this view, the 1960s era ends somewhere between 1973
and 1975. One could mark that end by the termination of direct U.S. military
involvement in the Vietnam War in January 1973 Another benchmark for the end of the
1960s might be August 1974, when President Richard Nixon resigned from office,
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arguably one of the final American casualties of the Vietnam War Or one might simply
date the transition from one era to another by the March 1975 fall of Saigon For my
purposes, I have chosen February 1974, when a former antiwar radical named Sam
I -ovejoy committed an act of sabotage against a weather tower at a proposed nuclear
power plant site in Montague, Massachusetts, and set in motion the birth of the radical
movement against nuclear power, which became the bridge from the 1960s to the post-
Vietnam era
I have decided to conclude this study with 1990, the year when the Sandinistas'
defeat at the polls in Nicaragua left Central American solidarity activists deeply
disillusioned and heralded the end of the last movement of this study One could also
mark the end of what I call the post Vietnam era with the 1991 Gulf War, when
President George 1 1 W Bush proclaimed the end of the "Vietnam Syndrome" Indeed,
the war in Vietnam casts its shadow over the entire period considered here Throughout
the 1970s and 1980s, activists and politicians, left and nght, alluded to the war
constantly, der iving different lessons but seeing the war as a common fr ame of reference
nonetheless Left leaning activists and liberals derived a sense of legitimacy and
histor ical continuity from the exper ience of Vietnam, which more than the civil rights
movement, challenged the cold war consensus of post-Wor ld War II America
Two chapters are devoted to each of the three movements discussed in this study
The fust chapter of each focuses on local Massachusetts activism and politics, with the
second shilling focus to the impact of Massaehusetls activists and politicians nationally
Thus, chapter 1 focuses on Sam Love-joy' s sabotage and the movement against nuclear
power that developed in western Massachusetts Chapter II then examines the role of
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Bay State activists and liberal politicians on the controversy around the Seabrook
nuclear power station, site of the largest direct action protests against nuclear power
during the 1970s. Chapter III examines the birth ofthe nuclear weapons freeze
movement in a grass-roots referendum campaign in western Massachusetts and the
freeze movement's subsequent impact on state politics. Chapter IV follows
Massachusetts freeze activists like Randy Kehler and Frances Crowe to the national
stage, and explores the important role played by Massachusetts liberals in pushing for a
freeze resolution in Congress. The study uses a slightly different format in the final two
chapters. Chapter V discusses Massachusetts Central American activism at both the state
and national level. Besides a brief discussion of Michael Dukakis's support for their
activities, the focus is almost exclusively on the activists. The final chapter is devoted to
the Massachusetts congressional delegation, which led the opposition on Capital Hill to
the Reagan administration's policies. With the fight over Central America, post-Vietnam
liberalism came full circle. In 1964, few liberals challenged Lyndon Johnson's Gulfof
Tonkin Resolution, nor the cold war premises that led the nation into the Vietnam War.
Congressional opposition to the war mounted slowly. In the 1980s, by contrast,
Massachusetts liberals took the lead with other prominent national liberals like Iowa's
Tom Harkin, Connecticut's Christopher Dodd, Colorado's Patricia Schroeder,
California's Ron Dellums and Barbara Mikulski and Michael Barnes of Maryland in
vociferously opposing what they saw as a replay of the mistakes which led the United
States into Vietnam. Just as opposition to the war in Vietnam led the Nixon
administration to pursue illegal activities that ultimately led to Watergate, so too did
opposition to the Reagan administration's policies in Central America lead to the scandal
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known as the [fan-contm Affair, n is i„rc, i u.hev^ that the impacl ol port-Vietnam era
a< ,,VIS,S M «n»»™trcam literals and Ihus on national politics becomes mosl tangible, ami
i invc- thus chosen to complete this work with ;„. exclusive iocs «„, liberalism and
mainstream politicians.
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CHAPTER I
SAM LOVEJOY AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MONTAGUE TWIN
NUCLEAR POWER STATION
Crossroads February 1974
February 1974 was a mouth in which the United States seemed to be slowly
lalling apart Americans had become familiar with a new word, "stagflation", which
described the bizarre combination of simultaneous inflation and unemployment The
nation entered its fourth month of the OPEC oil embargo, compounding an already
serious energy crisis As automobiles formed lines at gasoline stations, sometimes over a
mile long and often in near freezing temperatures, indictments and convictions in the
Watergate crisis kept pace with new revelations of abuses by the Nixon administration
Richard Nixon, who had won one of the largest electoral landslides in U.S. history just
two years earlier, saw his poll numbers continue to erode ' The oil embargo and ongoing
Watergate saga were joined that February by a bizarre news story that seemed to confirm
the sense of exhaustion An obscure underground revolutionary group, the Symbionese
l iberation Army (SI.A), kidnapped newspaper heiress Patricia Hearst from her home in
Berkeley, California The press and media hung upon the tape-recorded communiques of
the SUA, each invariably ending with the slogan, "Death to the fascist insect which preys
upon the life of the people'!!" Along with lengthy denunciations of U.S. "imperialism"
and "fascism" were a series of demands, the most prominent of which was that Patricia
I learst's wealthy father, Randolph Hearst, set up a free food program for the poor in
1
Peter Carroll. II Seemed Like Nothing Happened: The Tragedy and Promise olAineriea in the 1970s
(New Brunswick, NJ Holt, Rinchart and Winston, 1990)
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Oakland Americans were gripped by this revolutionary throwback to the late 1960s and
early 1970s Hvcn the Weather Underground, the best known of the violent groups to
grow out of the revolutionary dreams and frustrations of the Vietnam War era had been
quiescent for some time If the SLA heightened the sense of helplessness, vulnerability
and drift that pervaded the country, however, few feared - or hoped - the self-styled
guerrillas would spark the revolution that was their avowed aim. 2
On February 22, 1 974 - the same date the ill-fated food distribution demanded
by the SLA ended in riots in Oakland a former antiwar activist named Sam Lovejoy
took radical political action of a different sort in the small town of Montague,
Massachusetts To protest a proposed nuclear power station in his New England
hometown, Lovejoy snuck onto the site in the middle of the night and using assorted
farm tools managed to topple most of a 550-ft. weather tower Lovejoy then hitchhiked a
ride from a passing police car to the police station, where he turned himself in to the
local police chief and issued a four-page statement on why he toppled the tower
Lovejoy took "full responsibility for sabotaging that outrageous symbol of a future
nuclear power plant."3
Both the SLA's abduction of Patricia Hearst and Sam Lovejoy's sabotage were
rooted in the radicalism of the 1960s. But whereas the SLA represented the movement at
its burnt-out extreme, Lovejoy's action melded various tendencies from the 1960s and
sought to put them to work in the changed environment of the mid-1970s Lovejoy's
sabotage incorporated the militancy of the New Left, the notion of moral witness and
' Ibid Also. David Boulton, The Making of Tania: The Patty Hearst Story (London: New English Library,
1975).
3 New York Times, March I, 1974.
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c.v.i disobedience from the civil rights movement and the alternative communal lifestyle
ofthe counterculture Lovejoy attempted to make these 1960s tendencies relevant
through a grassroots localism thai would come to define 1970s activism The si a
envisioned an apocalyptic, Utopian and violent revolution that would wipe away
capitalist structures of repression and exploitation in one tell swoop They had followed
the most revolutionary, vanguard dreams ofthe 1960s to then terminus and eventually
self-destructed in a hail ofgunfire Lovejoy took ihc more democratic radical visions of
the 1960s and helped to plant them in the new soil ofthe 1970s [fthe sia represented
end ofthe load lo. the revolutionary fervoi ofthe 1960s, Sam Lovejoy and the
movement he helped mobilize was a bridge from the 1960s to ihe 1970s and beyond
Lovejoy made that connection in an interview published in Studs Terkel's book,
American Dreams lost and I'ound Speaking of"the Movement" ofthe 1960s, Lovejoy
staled
The media is selling i is on Ihe notion ol apathy and paialysis in the
country Bullshit The movement did not die 1 1 did the most intelligent
thing it could do n went to find a home it went into the community It s
working, unnoticed, ... the neighborhood They ie stalling to blossom and
make alliances, connections I've been all ovei Ihe counliy, and I have not
been into one community whete I did nol meet people exactly like me II
Iheie's evei gonna be change m Ame.u a, it 's gonna be because eveiy
community in America's ready r<>i it and boom' 1
I ove|oy s action generated a good deal of local and regional news coverage and
won some national coverage in I he New York l imes Mis protest quickly became a
lightning lod foi Ihc region's nasc ent anlmiicleai movement Ovei the cou.se ol the next
year, Lovejoy's sabotage resulted in a highly politicized trial and a regional referendum
to ban nucleai powei A documentary entitled lovejoy's Nucleai Wai soon circulated
' Studs Tcrkcl, Anicncaii Dreams Lost and hound (New York ll.ill,inline. 1980), 460
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among the nation's proliferating antinuelcar groups. In 1976 and 1977, antinuelear
activists shook the region with mass protests in Seabrook, New I lampshire, resulting in
thousands of arrests. By 1979, the antinuelear movement had grown into the largest mass
movement of the late 1970s, with a large "No Nukes!" rally in Washington, D.C., the
star-studded "No Nukes!" concert at Madison Square Garden and the eerily prophetic
film, The China Syndrome, released just months before the near nuclear meltdown at
Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania. 5 Lovejoy's action would also provoke a backlash and
counter-offensive by the nuclear industry and organized labor, the former viewing the
dawning antinuelear movement as a threat to profits and the latter as a threat to jobs. In
western Massachusetts this resulted in an unusual corporate-labor alliance to combat the
antinuelear referendum that grew out of Lovejoy's action. The corporate-labor strategy
forged in western Massachusetts became a model for similar antinuelear campaigns,
especially the 1976 California referendum on nuclear power. The western Massachusetts
antinuelear movement galvanized by Lovejoy also put the area's liberal Democratic state
Senator John Olver on the spot, torn between his loyalty to organized labor and his
solicitation of the growing environmental vote. Thus, by forcing the issue, Lovejoy
revealed a fault line within the Democratic Party that would confront liberals nationally
throughout the decade.
Carroll; Jerome Price, The Antinuelear Movement (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1982); Anna Ciyorgy,
ed.. No Nukes: Everyone's Guide to Nuclear Power (Boston: South End Press, 1979); Harvey Wasserman,
Energy Wars: Reports from the Front (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill and Co., 1979).
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The Saboteur
Lovejoy's sabotage resulted from a massive shift toward nuclear energy
throughout the United States. The increasingly severe energy crisis, with its concomitant
fear of dependence on foreign oil, spurred the Nixon administration to accelerate the
construction of nuclear power plants. At the time ofLovejoy's action, there were forty-
two nuclear plants running in the United States, fifty-six under construction and 101 on
order 6 In New England, the Connecticut based Northeast Utilities (NU) announced on
December 3 1, 1973 its plans to build twin nuclear reactors in the quiet, rural town of
Montague, Massachusetts. New England, a region with few indigenous sources of coal,
natural gas or oil, was more dependent on foreign oil than any other region of the United
States. This dependency was compounded by New England's cold winters As a result,
New England led the way in the development of nuclear power plants, receiving twenty
percent of its energy from nuclear power as compared to five percent for the nation as a
whole.
When NU announced its plans to build its $1.5 billion, 1 150 megawatt twin
nuclear reactors in Montague, it was hardly new to the business of nuclear power. NU
customers received 33% of their energy from nuclear energy NU's investments in
nuclear energy spanned the New England region In 1974, NU already owned thirty-four
percent of the Yankee Rowe plant in Massachusetts; forty-four percent of Connecticut
Yankee, fifteen percent of Yankee Maine; twelve percent of Vermont Yankee, and 100
percent of Millstone 1 in Connecticut. Further, NU was in the process of constructing a
'Carroll. 123.
"Twin Nuclear Plants. Blessing or Curse?" Springfield Union and Springfield Republican
,
January 6 and
7, 1974
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Millstone II nuclear reactor in Connecticut and had plans on the drawing board for a
Millstone 111 Along with other New England utilities, NU was also investing in the
proposed nuclear plants at Plymouth, Massachusetts and Seabrook, New Hampshire 8
Still, NU deemed New England's constellation of nuclear power plants to be insufficient
to meet the region's energy needs Taking note of the national energy crisis and New
England's cold winters, heavy industry and dearth of energy sources, NU Director of
Research Dr Harold Lurie stated, "The only conclusion you can draw, based on the
logic of the situation, is to build more nuclear power plants in New England and to build
them as fast as you can "9
NU wasted no time in disseminating its views of the benefits of nuclear power In
pamphlets and bulletins like " The Way it Is: Talking About Nuclear Power" and
"Montague Nuclear Station Fact Sheet", NU made its case that nuclear power would
produce abundantly cheap energy, that it was a cleaner source of energy than fossil fuels,
and that the risk of an accident was negligible One such pamphlet extolling the virtues
of nuclear power had a photo on the inner flap of children wading in the ocean
silhouetted by the Millstone I nuclear power station just several hundred yards behind
them. On the back flap was a photo of a Softball game and picnic taking place on the
other side of the Connecticut River from the Yankee nuclear plant in Hadum,
Connecticut The message was clear: nuclear power was a benign source of energy,
"Basis for Northeast Utilities Commitment to Nuclear Power", NU Study, August 6. 1974 Box 7. Folder
97, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Locals 36.161, 707 and 710, Records, 1929-1985 ,
scries 1
:
Local 36, 1969-1985, Subscrics 4. Nuclear Energy, MS 107, Special Collections and Archives,
WEB Dubois Library, University of Massachusetts, Amherst (hereinafter cited as IBEW) .
9
"Twin Nuclear Plants Blessing or CurscT Springfield Union and Springfield Republican
,
January 6,
1974.
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clearly no threat to such wholesome family activities as a day at the beach or a Sunday
softball game. 10
Roughly two thirds of the 8,500 residents of Montague supported the building of
the plants in their town, enticed by the prospect ofhuge tax cuts - Yankee Rowe just 25
miles north paid 90% of that town's taxes - and racked by an unemployment rate of8%
compared to 6% for the state as a whole. 1
1
In the fall of 1973, the Valley Advocate , an
alternative weekly, interviewed local residents and found them generally receptive to the
NU plants, which had been approved by the Montague town government. A jeweler
from nearby Turners Falls stated, "They wouldn't build them ifthey weren't safe. You
can't stop progress. Besides, I'm an optimist." Jobs and taxes topped the list of reasons
to support the reactors. Said one Montague resident, "Why they're talking about work
for 4,000 people! This town could use some of that." A local businessman declared,
"Taxes. Why our taxes would go way down with something like this!" Another resident
welcomed the plants merely as something to shake up the area's sleepy rural life: "I've
been here sixty years and nothing's changed. This would shake things up a little." 12
Not all residents supported the plants, however. A science professor at the nearby
University of Massachusetts in Amherst, Dr. David Ingless, voiced concerns that soon
became hallmarks of the antinuclear movement: "I consider it irresponsible to go ahead
building new nuclear plants. .
.
Of the many dangers, the three that concern me most are
the likely diversion of plutonium to make atom bombs for terrorists, the possibility of
10
'The Way It Is", NU Information Bulletin, July, 1975; "Montague Nuclear Power Station Fact Sheet",
circa 1974; Nuclear Power: Issues and Answers", NU pamphlet. Box 7, Folder 97, IBEW .
"
"Twin Plants: Blessing or Curse?" Springfield Union and Springfield Republican
,
January 10, 1974;
Wasserman, 3 1 ; Gyorgy, 399.
12
Valley Advocate
,
September 19, 1973, 10-11
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disastrous accident at nuclear plants, and the unsolved problem of permanent storage of
high level radioactive wastes." 13
Still, opposition to the plants was small in 1973. Although local mainstream
environmental groups such as the Montague Concerns Group sought to spur debate and
oppose the plants through legal channels, the recent history of such tactics was not
encouraging. The Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group (MASSPIRG)
expressed skepticism ofthe ability of legal interventions ability to stop the Montague
plants. In a report issued a mere month before Lovejoy toppled the towers, MASSPIRG
declared:
Unfortunately, the government regulatory structure has left little room for
citizen participation in such decisions. A yearlong study supported by a
National Science Foundation grant and completed last October harshly
criticized the operation of the AEC's Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board... Citizen groups, which have entered the debate as nuclear
interveners in plant licensing processes have gained, in general, only
slight concessions in plant design, or short delays in their construction.
And nuclear opponents warn that this type of intervention may be counter
productive, diverting attention and energies from the essential moral issue
raised by nuclear power plants. 14
With mainstream antinuclear groups making little headway, opposition to the
plants soon arose from another quarter. Rural, western New England had undergone
many changes in the decade prior to 1974. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many
young people involved with the counterculture headed for the countryside to escape the
bustle of the cities and an increasingly nihilistic drug culture that was losing its
13
Ibid.
14
"Preliminary Report on Nuclear Power Plants", MASS P1RG , Frances Crowe Papers, Sophia Smith
Collection, Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts. (Hereinafter cited as The Frances Crowe Papers,
Sophia Smith Collection. The Crowe Papers in the Sophia Smith Collection will be distinguished in the
notes from the Frances Crowe Private Papers, Northampton, Massachusetts, which are still in the personal
possession of Frances Crowe and made available to the author.)
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connections to the counterculture's earlier ideals. These "hippies" sought to live out their
communitarian visions in harmony with nature in the deserts of the southwest (especially
around Taos, New Mexico), the woodlands of the northwest (which was populated by
the exodus from the San Francisco Bay area) and the farmlands ofNew England. 15 Rural
western Massachusetts, with its rolling hills and Berkshire mountains, vast woodlands,
open fields and fertile farms lining the Connecticut River valley, was comprised
predominantly of small towns, several colleges and a few aging rust-belt cities such as
Springfield, llolyoke and Chicopee. Like Vermont to the north, the area was a magnet
for the new communes of the late 1960s.
More than communes in other parts of the country, many of those in New
England tended to be populated by individuals whose background was in the New Left.
In western Massachusetts and southern Vermont, three "sister" communes played a key
role in shaping the antinuclear politics of the 1970s. The largest was the Montague Farm,
also known as the "Old Ripley farm" or the "Chestnut Hill Farm", whose fluid
population ranged anywhere from twenty to thirty people. Another commune of people
close to those in Montague grew in neighboring Wendell. Both Massachusetts
communes had close ties to the Packers Corner Farm, just over the border in southern
Vermont. These communes grew out of a split in the Liberation News Service (LNS),
the radical New Left news outlet founded by Marshall Bloom and Raymond Mungo in
the summer of 1967. The LNS had grown rapidly, attracting talented New Left
15 On the national commune movement, see Terry Anderson, The Sixties (New York: Longman, 1999)
chapters 5 and 7; Richard I airfield, Communes, USA: A Personal Tour (Baltimore: Penguin Books,
1977); Gilbert Zicklin, Countercultural Communes: A Sociological Perspective (Westport, Conn:
Greenwood Press, 1983); and Timothy Miller, The 60s Communes: Hippies and Beyond (Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press, 1999).
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journalists such as Harvey Wasserman and Marty Jezer to its staff and by the fall of
1967 acquired an enthusiastic national following. The LNS was originally located in
Washington, D C. but decided in the wake of the April 1968 riots that followed Martin
Luther King Jr.'s assassination, to relocate to New York City, which had become more
central to New Left activity. In New York, the LNS joined forces with radicals
associated with Columbia University's SDS, but before long the new LNS broke into
"Washington" and "New York" factions, with the former moving in a countercultural
direction and the latter in a sectarian Marxist direction In the summer of 1968, the
Washington faction led by LNS founder Marshall Bloom undertook a daring heist of the
LNS printing press and made off to rural western Massachusetts. Others such as
Raymond Mungo and Marty Jezer relocated to Vermont. The rural refugees had become
disgusted with urban life and New Left infighting, and now sought to usher in the "New
Age" through personal transformation and creating a new communal society far removed
from the corruptions of the old. Slowly, the rural LNS ceased printing and gradually
moved further away from activist politics. 16
The communes that grew out of the LNS fallout developed a strong sense of
community, and with their common background and strong affinity, would provide a
strong base for antinuclear activism in the mid-1970s. One activist, future leader of the
national nuclear weapons freeze movement Randy KehJer, described the people at
16 The story of the Liberation News Service is told in Raymond Mungo, Famous Long Ago: Mv Life and
Hard Times with the Liberation News Service (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970); the founding of the Packers
Corner Farm in Vermont is described in Raymond Mungo, Total Loss Farm (New York. Dutton, 1970);
the founding of the Montague Farm is recounted by Stephen Diamond in What the Trees Said: Life on a
New Age Farm (New York: Dell Publishing, 1970)
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Montague, Wendell and Packers Corner as "One family with three locations." 17 Another
activist who had just moved to the area, Vince O'Connor, recalled, "The [Montague]
Farm was the spiritual organizational center of things.
. . You have people in place who
are leading regular lives but their thinking has been transformed. They've been involved
in a whole bunch of different movements." 18 By 1974, as these communes focused on
organic farming, they were simultaneously emerging from their non-activist slumber
with a growing interest in the environmental movement. In western Massachusetts, they
would soon overshadow mainstream organizations such as the Montague Nuclear
Concerns Group as the cutting edge of the antinuclear movement. Sam Lovejoy, who
moved to the Montague Farm in 1969, recalled:
We were living in a commune... and living communally, I thought, was a
political statement. The dynamic was from 1969 to 1972, we were
building fences, repairing barns, insulating house, organizing tractors,
growing food. It took three solid years, three growing seasons, to get the
rhythm down, and it was truly 1973, which was the first time we could sit
back and say, 'O.K., we sunk our roots, we got our economic base in
place, now what's gonna happen?' 19
The New Age communes of western Massachusetts put down roots in an area
with a strong tradition of religious activism stemming from the area's historic peace
churches, which included Quakers, Unitarians and Congregationalists. Long before the
migration ofNew Left activists and hippies to the region, western Massachusetts had a
history of rural resistance to centralized power that reached back to Daniel Shay's
17
Telephone interview with Randy Kehler, May 5, 2003. Kehler himself had just moved to western
Massachusetts and became acquainted with the communes through his life long partner Betsy Corner, then
calling herself"Cornwoman" and living on the Wendell commune. According to Kehler, "I was an in-law.
Betsy was one ofthe family."
18
Interview with Vince O'Connor, May 13, 2003.
19
Interview with Same Lovejoy, May 24, 2003.
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rebellion in L787 The region had also been a rtronghold of nineteenth century
abolitioniim and experimenti w.ih Utopian communities led i>y the likes ol Sojoumei
i milt
'
1
Fuitha
.
the area waa home i<> numerous eoiiep.es and universities, many of
winch had become highly politicized m the late 1960s and early 1970s New England's
headlong rush to develop nucleai energy and the region'i mmicious pohmai mdu ais
whs a combustible combination thai made il almoal inevitable thai western
Massachusetts would he the nation's lusi majoi battleground ovei nucleai powei Vince
<> ConnOI BBid OfNU'S decision tO place Ihe Monlaf.iu- icaclois ih m. an an a thai had
such experienced acnvisis. "They had no idea what a hornet's nesl they stirred up |n
was] the woisi corporate decision an industry has evei made They put h in the wrong
plan- Sam Lovejoy remembered, "1 didn't go after the nuke The nuke came to me i
had no idea what Ihe issue would have been Bui I am positive l>V 1974 I would have
been doing something organizationally, politically whau-vei ihe issue was. I'm
Certain there was this lliiobbinp, eneipv available thai |usl needed a triggei "M
Despite the potentiullv hioad ladnal hasc in western Massachusetts, opposition
to Ihe Montague reactors icmained iclatively small pnoi to l.ovejoy'S Sabotage I he
mantle of opposition was earned largely by the respectable Montague Nucleai Concerns
Group, comprised mostly ofthose in academia and centered largely on a conventional
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strategy They were joined in the fall of 1973 by Nuclear Objectors for a Pure
Environment (NOPE), which was formed by a handful of activists on the Montague
Farm. Both of these groups, though vastly different in style, expressed similar concerns
about the environmental impact of low level radiation, the transport and storage of
nuclear waste, which had a radioactive half-life of over 100,000 years, the susceptibility
of nuclear generators to terrorist attack and, most crucially, the danger of nuclear reactor
core meltdowns and the problem of evacuation In January, 1974, in the first of a series
of articles entitled, "Twin Reactors Blessing or Curse?" one of the area s major
newspapers, the Springfield Union and Springfield Republican stated prophetically, "No
one seems sure whether the nuclear debate in Montague will become a full fledged
controversy before the year is over."25
Twenty-seven year old Sam Lovcjoy was determined to make the issue a "full
fledged controversy" Lovejoy had grown up in western Massachusetts and spent most
of his life in the region As a promising high school student in the post-Sputnik era,
Lovejoy had won a National Sciences Foundation Award He went on to graduate from
Amherst College with a degree in political science During the 1960s, Lovejoy became
deeply involved in the movement against the war in Vietnam In the late 1960s, Lovejoy
was the New Lngland regional coordinator of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
and was heavily involved with the first Venceramos Brigades to go to Cuba. Lovejoy felt
an affinity for Chile and the rising socialist movement led by Salvadore Allende
Lovejoy went to Cuba with the Venceramos Brigades in the hope of improving his
1
Wasserman, 27-32; Gyorgy, 393-5.
" Twin Plants: Blessing or Curse?" Springfield Union and Springfield Republican, January <* and 7,
1974.
50
Spanish and making contacts with Chileans in anticipation ofmoving to Chile to take
part in the socialist struggle there. In Cuba, while cutting sugar cane, Lovejoy was turned
offby the "nationalist focus" ofmany fellow brigidistas. Lovejoy, who grew up on a
farm, was struck by how few of the U.S. leftists seemed to have ever worked a day of
hard labor in their lives. The experience with middle class North American activists who
seemed out of place in tropical Cuba helped move Lovejoy from an internationalist focus
toward the local activism being embraced by much ofthe antiwar movement with its call
to "bring the war home". He recalled, "What happened in Cuba was I really did believe
that all politics is local, which Tip O'Neill said, but I think that's ultimately true. Ifyou
can't talk to your neighbors about political issues, then how are you gonna ever change
national policies?" According to Lovejoy, "While I was there, I changed my mind about
going to Chile and decided when I come home I wouldn't take six months of Spanish
classes and work my ass off to save money and everything to go to Chile, but rather stay
at the communal farm I had moved to, and sink my root here, cause I thought that was
more important than a single individual going to help the Chileans."26
In late 1 969, Lovejoy became a full-time resident of the Montague Farm,
growing organic vegetables and marijuana.27 For Lovejoy, the "social rules rebellion"
and personal transformation of the 1960s counterculture was as political as civil rights or
antiwar organizing: "There was the cultural revolution. Sex, drugs and rock 'n' roll was
a true other liberation that occurred, and affected people immensely, and cannot be
Interview with Sam I.ovejoy, May 24, 2003.
27 New York Times, March 1, 1974.
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downplayed That shared [generational] experience did reinforce a shared [political]
base."
28
By February 1974, Lovejoy had lived and worked on the farm for five years. His
friends included a nucleus of activists who would play major roles, first in the regional,
and later in the national antinuclear movement One was Anna Gyorgy, an antiwar
activist who would publish No Nukes: Everyone's Guide to Nuclear Power in 1979, an
encyclopedic guide to local antinuclear movements around the country and something of
an antinuclear bible in the movement Lovejoy's associates also included Harvey
Wasserman, a husky, good-natured journalist known to friends as "Sluggo" for his
resemblance to the character in the "Nancy" comic strips. Wasserman too was active in
the New Left He had graduated from the University of Michigan and while attending
the University of Chicago as a Wilson Fellow became one of the LNS's feature
journalists After teaching at a low-income high school in New York in 1968,
Wasserman, like his comrades, made the transition to rural life Wasserman would
emerge by 1976 as the antinuclear movement's premier activist-journalist. His series of
frontline reports for The Nation during the Seabrook protests of 1976-7, and his
numerous articles for The Village Voice. WIN . New Age and other left-liberal journals,
formed the basis of his 1979 book, Energy Wars: Reports from the Front
.
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would also become a major spokesperson for the movement throughout the 1970s,
frequently sought out for comment by such mainstream press as The New York Times
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and Boston Globe
.
Lovejoy also became friends with Randy Kehler, who had spent
eighteen months in prison for draft refusal in 1 970- 1 , became active in antinuclear
energy politics in the mid-1970s and would use lessons from that movement to launch
the nuclear weapons freeze movement in 1980. 3 ' Thus, as Lovejoy contemplated taking
action against the Montague Nuclear Power Station, individuals who later became some
of the most vocal, visible and active members of the movement surrounded him
Despite his association with such dedicated activists, Lovejoy has always insisted
he acted alone when he toppled the tower. During his trial, Lovejoy stated that the others
in his circle knew he was planning something, perhaps even toppling the tower, but were
never sure if Lovejoy was serious. Lovejoy spent three months prior to toppling the
tower researching nuclear energy, writing and rewriting a statement he planned to turn
over to the police and the press after the action, and surveying the construction site. He
planned his action to be an act of moral witness designed to galvanize the area's loose
antinuclear movement and move it toward more militant opposition to the twin reactors.
According to Lovejoy, "Environmental groups [had] no civil disobedience psychology...
1 wanted to get the movement off the ground in this area. But I also wanted to talk to
people nationally.
Lovejoy planned his action for February 22, 1974, to correspond with George
Washington's birthday. As the date approached, Lovejoy's thoughts focused less on the
broad philosophy behind his action and increasingly on the practical questions raised by
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his intended sabotage. Having scoped the site on several occasions, Lovejoy knew from
scattered beer bottles and discarded condoms that the site was a popular late night
rendezvous point for many of the area's teenagers. Lovejoy was also worried about any
possible police presence, both for the safety of the police when the tower came down
and from fear of being caught before his action was complete. Looking back a year later,
Lovejoy told an interviewer, "I was really worried that someone would get hurt, other
than myself. I was worried about getting hurt but I didn't want, under any circumstances,
anybody else to get hurt. I was really worried about the idea that in the middle of
working, say, the cops walked in on foot to just check out the thing for some routine
security check or for some weird reason. And I would have to like yell to them to get out
of the way, because something might happen that I didn't have fully in control."33
Beyond practical considerations, Lovejoy was unsure how friends and others in
the community would receive his destructive and militant form of protest. Lovejoy
recalled, "I was worried about all the hippies and all the radicals in the area. I was
worried about all the communes in the area. I was worried about all the antinuclear
people. I was worried about people who basically got along with me but were 'straight'
and I was worried about losing friends because I had done something that they would not
be able to deal with."
34
Despite these pangs of doubt, Lovejoy decided he would go
through with his action.
By the eve of his sabotage, Lovejoy was fully prepared. As he recalled, "...I had
mulled it through so much that basically the doing of the act was like just doing a
33
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rehearsal all over again."38 I Ic planned to topple the 550-fool weather tower that
eolleetecl meteorological data by releasing the taught 750-foot .suspension cable wires
anchoring the tower to the ground. This required loosening very tight turnbuckles and
removing tight-fitting pins. Lovejoy replied "... of course, the biggest problem I had was
think.,.,, about myselfgetting cut in half... like a pound ofbutter with a hoi knife ifthese
Cables let go and sprang back at me; you know there would be no Sam Lovejoy."36
I laving worked through the logistics one more time, Lovejoy set out for the
lower in the cold and crisp LS-degrce night ol l ebruary 22. Although a recent snow had
melted on the streets, there was still 6-8 inches ofsnow in the woods through which he
trekked to the construction site. Lovejoy dressed darkly in brown pants and a black
windbrcakcr, bringing with him an assortment ol tools in a tightly lied leather bag and a
penlighl with which to see in the darkness The penlighl proved unnecessary as (he moon
illuminated the snow-covered landscape. Lovejoy was surprised by the amount ol noise
that reverberated through the woods as his boots trod through the crusty snow, raising
liars ofpremature discovery. Alter a long inarch through the "scrubby and tangly"
woods, he reached the site. Lovejoy scaled a metal fence thai surrounded the base ofthe
weather tower and went to work trying to loosen the lurnbuckles that he hoped would
undo the suspension cable wires and send the lower crashing to the ground l/
The strobe light atop the meteorological lower blinked on and oil, alternately
illuminating the area around Lovejoy and then returning it lo darkness. The effect was
IJ
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surreal as Lovejoy commenced banging to loosen the buckles. "It was hypnotic,"
Lovejoy recalled. The banging "made so much noise I couldn't believe k"38 On another
occasion, Lovejoy stated, "It was so noisy out there on the Montague Plains for a
minute, I'm surprised the entire [town of] Montague didn't wake up."39 After twenty
minutes of banging, the first cable was loosed, unleashing a loud metallic "twang" as it
snapped free. Breathing hard from his exertion, Lovejoy took a break. "I sort of
bunkered down," Lovejoy recounted in 1975, "and sat there for a minute waiting for
anybody to come and nobody came and that totally blew my mind. No dogs barked,
nothing. It was like all this noise, [a] really clear night, you can hear incredibly long
ways. If someone was out there, they would have heard it for sure, miles away they
would have heard it."40 Lovejoy lit up a Kool cigarette, composed himself and took
stock of the situation. He wanted to leave no evidence connecting him to the tower so
that only he himself could prove he had committed the sabotage. Lovejoy pocketed the
cigarette filter "so that no one could find out the saboteur smoked Kools" and to remove
the evidence. 41
Lovejoy returned to work. Once again the sounds of banging and clanging
echoed through the crisp night air. After twenty to thirty minutes, the second cable broke
free. After another short break, he went to work on the final cable. When the last cable
snapped free, the top halfofthe tower wobbled precariously back and forth. Lovejoy's
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heart sank as the top lurched back into place. Then suddenly, the strobe light at the top of
the tower went dark and the top 349 feet of the 550-ft. structure came crashing down into
the nearby woods, making what Lovejoy described as "a thunderous roar. THE THING
CAME DOWN!"42 The next day when police and workers examined the fallen tower,
the clock on the meteorological recording box was stopped at 2:50 a.m.43
The saboteur surveyed his handiwork with mixed feelings. He had hoped to bring
down the entire tower and felt disappointed as he turned his gaze from the wreckage in
the woods to the 140-ft stump oftower that remained solidly planted in the ground.
Nevertheless, he knew the 349-ft. part of the tower that lay mangled in the woods
conveyed the point he had set out to make. 44
A year later, Lovejoy recounted the night in an interview with a University of
Massachusetts graduate student. He repeatedly used the term "romantic" to describe how
he felt when setting off to topple the tower He described feeling like an "environmental
Viet Cong" Lovejoy declared, "1 had set out on a mission I was the Viet Cong I was
an American revolutionary. I was the saboteur. I was a romantic idealist that was in this
Utopian action thing."45 If Lovejoy's trek to the tower was imbued with a romantic aura,
his retreat after toppling the tower would better be described as a comedy of errors with
a touch of Key Stone Cops thrown in. Lovejoy walked briskly from the site and stashed
his bag of tools in the woods about two miles away. With his statement in his pocket,
Lovejoy continued to hike through the woods toward the nearby town of Turners Falls
n
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Lovejoy then heard very aggressive barking from two dogs in the distance. From out of
the forest thicket into the small clearing where he stood emerged two snarling German
shepherds, who branched out and flanked Lovejoy to his left and right. He froze,
thinking, "German Shepherds Bad Vibes!"46 Looking back, Lovejoy recalls thinking:
"Oh my God! I've done this giant political stunt; I've taken on this whole political-
criminal reality; I've attacked this nuclear power plant thing in this total direct-action-
civil-disobedience
[ way] I got this political statement I've been formulating for
months, and [now] these dogs are chasing me, man "47 He thought what an anticlimax
it would be if his action ended with his being mauled by German shepherds in the
middle of the woods Lovejoy fantasized "dragging myself to the street and waving
down a car, exclaiming, lahhh, dogs attacked me, and (by the way] I tipped over the
tower. "'
4X
Lovejoy alternately sought to mollify the dogs "nice dogs" - and
intimidate them by growling back Both tactics only elicited more growls Lovejoy
continued to stand motionless, until having made their point or becoming bored, his
canine antagonists retreated back into the woods from whence they had come. 49
Finally, Lovejoy reached the road to Turners Falls, where he planned to turn
himself in at the local police station Hitchhiking on a dark country road in the middle of
the night proved difficult There were few cars on the roads and the first two Lovejoy
attempted to hail passed him by. He had better luck with the third car, a police cruiser.
The time was 3:55 a m Lovejoy prevailed upon the hesitant officers to give him a lift to
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<!'<• Turners I 'alls police station The Montagem Ixang sparsely populated, locals
knew most ol Ihe police ollicers who patrolled Ihe area In (he |, K k ()l „ lc po|icc
I Ovejoy recognized one ol llu- ollicers Iron, a murijuiiiui bus. a. the Monlagne lam. i..
1071. Lovejoy rememrx^dhow at that time eleven olliccrs whom he described as
l"Ks and "really sick" bursl onto the e< nunc, guns drawn, and impounded DOl only
Ihe homegrown marijuana they bund bul also large quantifies ol legal organic herbs
they had mistaken loi cannabis. I le also recognized one ol ihe olliccrs as Ihe cop who
several weeks carlici had shol a seventeen yeui old man in Ihe lirsl Montague shooting
since |959. M '
The poUee cruJiei deposited Lovejoy at the Turnen I alls police station iii A a m
On overnight duty wasSgl Richard u Cade, one ol the lew police olliccrs Lovejoy
respected Speaking ol ( ade a ycai lain. Lovejoy said, he "doesn't have a mUitant, sick
fascist viIh- to him Me I nol a 'pig'; on fl level, you know, lie's just a real decenl guy
who happens to be a policeman
1,1
Lovejoy explained ><> Sgt. < lade how he had jusl
toppled Ihe lower and was now Riffling liunsell in Cade told Lovejoy lhal he simply
didn't believe him i aken aback, i ovejoy continued 10 iiy lo persuade the police
sergeant thai he'd actually committed the crime i«> which he was confessing. ( ade then
radioed Ihe olliccrs who moments eat hei h id dropped I OVOjoy oil al Ihe slalion The
iwo officers radioed back that they'd just been by ihe construction lite and the lights on
Ihe lowei weie blinking I xaspcialcd, Lovejoy BTgUed lhal Ibis was impossible since he
had loppled (he lowei well ovei an hoUl BgO More lo salisly Lovejoy than anything cist
10
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Cade radioed back to the squad car and instructed the officers to drive by the site and
double check. Ten minutes later the officers arrived at the site and radioed back to Cade
that the lights were indeed out. Cade then ordered the officers to proceed by foot and
report back by walkie-talkie. Moments later they reported: "My God! Looks like an
airplane hit it about halfway up."52
If Lovejoy thought he'd finally proven his culpability, he was mistaken. Sgt.
Cade, refusing to believe one man could have done such damage, phoned local airports
to see ifthey reported any missing planes. At his wit's end, Lovejoy protested that ifa
plane had hit the tower halfway up, surely the plane wreckage would be nearby. When
local airports called back to report all their planes accounted for, Sgt. Cade at last placed
Sam Lovejoy under arrest and accepted his typed statement justifying his destruction of
the weather tower. As they waited for Lovejoy's lawyer, Sgt. Cade described how he
would have felled the tower. Lovejoy argued that all of Sgt. Cade's proposals for
toppling the tower were impractical. Cade chided Lovejoy, hitting him where he felt
most vulnerable: "I'd be awfully disappointed if I didn't get the whole thing down."53
Lovejoy's lawyer, Thomas Lesser, arrived by dawn. Like Lovejoy, Lesser was a
product of the counterculture. With long, pony-tailed black hair and a thick black beard,
Lesser was "a hippie lawyer" with an "Eastern mysticism orientation, a little bit
heavy."54 After consulting with Lovejoy, Lesser asked Sgt. Cade for the statement so he
could make copies of it. He promised to return the statement to Lovejoy, who in turn
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promised to turn it back over to Cade. Cade then put Lovejoy in a cold cell with an
intoxicated local youth Shortly thereafter, Cade's superior, Police Chief Edward W.
Hughes, arrived and, when apprised of the situation, sharply criticized Cade for letting
go of the statement, the only tangible evidence linking Lovejoy with the destruction of
the tower. Cade insisted that Lovejoy could be trusted to hand the statement back to the
police. Later that morning, Lesser returned the statement to his client, who defiantly
refused to hand it over to the police chief, insisting he'd only surrender the document to
Sgt. Cade. 55
Around 8 p.m., Lovejoy was transported from the Turners Falls police station to
the district court in nearby Greenfield The judge, William Ball, berated Lovejoy at
length, comparing his action to the recent terrorism of the Symbionese Liberation Army
Lovejoy recalled, "When 1 walked into court for the arraignment, the judge absolutely
Hipped out He actually brought it up and insinuated I was a terrorist as well And the
analogy between the kidnapping of Patty (Hearst], and Sam {Lovejoy] was a pretty
disturbing thought."
6
The district attorney pressed Lovejoy to name accomplices,
hoping to lodge a conspiracy charge. Lovejoy, in his own words, "went ballistic". He
insisted that although he had bandied about certain actions, even toppling the tower, with
his friends, they were never quite sure "whether that was just Sam fantasizing a little bit
too much." The eflbrt to obtain a conspiracy charge having failed, the Court stuck with
ss
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Interview with Sam Lovejoy May 24, 2001 lx>vcjoy said "The SLA was a cult [that] twisted the
rhetoric |of the movement]." Lovejoy was more favorable, however, to the Weathermen lie said that
while in Cuba he was with fifty Wcathcrpeoplc, as they then began to call themselves, when news arrived
of the police murder of Black Panther Fred Hampton in Chicago, which soon led to the announcement that
the Wcathcrpeoplc were going to become the Weather Underground
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the charges first lodged when Sgt. Cade arrested Lovejoy: "willful and malicious
destruction of personal property" The charge would play a crucial role in Lovejoy's
acquittal. As he later said, he could have been charged with trespassing, breaking and
entering, destroying a fence, burglary and tampering with utilities, "Basically they
screwed up on a lot of levels. 1 could have been charged with eleven years worth of
crimes. They could have thrown the book at me. Instead they went for broke. They went
and charged me with one crime: The strongest crime... If you really want to be 'law and
order', they blew it."58
By the time Lovejoy was asked how he pled to the charge, many of his friends
had gotten news ofLovejoy's arrest and had converged upon the Greenfield District
Court. When Lovejoy answered the charge by pleading "absolutely not guilty", a cheer
went up from his supporters in the courtroom.
51
' f inally, alter a long and eventful night,
Judge Ball released Lovejoy on his own reeogni/.nnce. Lovejoy went home, where he
"bullshitted with about 8,000 fucking reporters and then went to bed."60
News ofLovejoy's action electrified western Massachusetts, polarizing the
region into pro- and anti-Lovejoy camps. Lovejoy's action brought to the surlace not
only the political dillerences over nuclear energy, but also the fissures between more
traditional residents and the areas growing number of young people leading a
countercultural lifestyle. The (
i
reenficld Recorder, in a front-page essay later that day
entitled "f reedom Threatened," compared Lovejoy to AdolfHitler and denounced his
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sabotage as an act of "savagery" and "terrorism" 61 Montague selectman, Donald Skole
declared Lovejoy to be "a nut" and asked, "... What Mr Lovejoy would feel like if I
decided to burn down his house because I didn't like his way of living? I think they
should lock him up and throw away the key. This seems to be the whole psychosis of the
country Ifyou don't like something, you take the law into your own hands and blow it
UP " Greenfield Recorder columnist Neil R. Perry, referring to Lovejoy as
"Strangelovejoy", denounced him as a "self appointed savior ofthe people" and
compared his action and justification to the SLA, declaring, "Isn't someone called
'Cinque' in the Symbionese Liberation Army uttering similar thoughts as he tries to
explain the kidnapping of 21 -year old daughter of Randolph A. Hearst - that alleged
symbol of fascist corporatism?"63
Lovejoy's action likewise alienated the area's mainstream antinuclear movement
Portia Weiskel of Leverett, speaking for the New England Coalition on Nuclear
Pollution, stated, "This is not a tactic that we in any way approve. We were shocked to
hear about this and feel the place for debate on nuclear power is in the press, debates,
lectures and in the courts. We feel there isn't very much chance for the individual to do
much. Nonetheless we want to say this is a stupid act that we very much oppose.
"
64A
month later, Ralph Nader responded to Lovejoy's action during an antinuclear speech at
"Freedom Threatened". Greenfield Recorder. February 22, 1974, I. Also quoted in the New York
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the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, declaring that the sabotage was "not my
style. It was not the way I would have handled it "65 Lovejoy later said of Nader:
Nader had a very difficult time for a short period of time, trying to figure
out how to deal with us direct action types, but he's got a creative mind
and started figuring out ways he could assist us informationally. He was
a little bit nervous of me, he didn't want to get dragged down in the
media by hanging out with antiwar saboteurs 66
At the same time, Lovejoy' s action galvanized much of the area's activist left,
just as he had hoped. According to longtime Northampton resident and American
Friends Service Committee (AFSC) activist Frances Crowe, the antinuclear movement
"really exploded after Sam cut the tower down. . . It sent a message to everybody that this
was serious business and we better get to work.
. . [Sam] unleashed an awful lot of
67
energy." Randy Kehler received a call from Lovejoy the next day. Lovejoy asked
Kehler to look out at the horizon and see if anything looked different. For many, the
tower had become an eyesore visible for miles away, especially at night when its lights
blinked "Notice anything different over the horizon?" Lovejoy asked. As it was day, it
still hadn't registered upon Kehler. "C'mon, man! Look out the window!" Lovejoy
prodded After still registering a blank, Lovejoy exclaimed to Kehler, "The tower's
down! I knocked the tower down!" Kehler stated almost thirty years later that it was "not
until Sam knocked over the tower that I woke up to nuclear power. . . [that was] true for a
lot of people."68 According to the New York Times. "Sam Lovejoy's act has made him
somewhat of a celebrity among many of the young people in the communes sprouting up
65
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here along the Connecticut River Valley and in nearby college and university towns."69
The NevyJforicJ^ also noted, however, "It has elicited a certain queasiness among
ecology groups opposing the nuclear plant, who quickly disowned his deed "70
Lovejoy was pleased to learn his militancy resonated with much of the area's
political left and counterculture In a piece entitled "Tower Toppler Tells Why" for the
Valley Advocate, Lovejoy explicitly described his action as an effort to bridge the 1960s
and 1970s: "This is the beginning of a re-awakening. What's really happening is that the
radicals of the late 60s and 70s split to the country, to their own lives in search of a
spirituality We have now established a community base after being inward for a couple
of years and are moving out again " 71 Lovejoy described his act as intended to spark a
movement, not stop the reactor in one fell swoop, comparing the coming antinuclear
movement to the antiwar movement: "... that's not the point of radical action When
noonc else was against the Vietnam War, radicals were saying it was absurd and were
being called treasonous But only several years later, these radicals were vindicated and
the vast majority of Americans, I do believe, feel now that the war was bad Now the
revolution has turned inward Just as America attacked North Vietnam, I think Northeast
Utilities is attacking Montague "72 According to Lovejoy, the fight over nuclear power
was "... just like Vietnam, man, cause this is war This is exactly like war in every way
The people who made the war made the nukes. The people who think in those Vietnam
War Dominos Theory' terms arc the people who build the nukes It's a booger
60 New York Times
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psychology. It's an imperialist psychology. It's a capitalist psychology. It's a profit
making, greedy, unplanned, sick psychology "73 If Lovejoy cast Northeast Utilities as the
"imperialist" U.S. military, he conferred upon himselfthe part of the underdog Viet
Cong fighting off the foreign invaders: "So, you know, the Viet Cong, well I keep
making that comparison 'cause I keep making the war analogy, but you know, anytime
you're engaged in something, yes, you want the grass roots to get developed."74 Lovejoy
also articulated his philosophy in terms of a non-orthodox Marxism that was rooted in
the 1960s New Left: "I don't dig the authoritarianism ofcommunism but I sure as hell
dig the truism, the truth that's in communism, and it's a very simple theory. Economics
doesn't take care of itself."75 Elaborating on his political philosophy, Lovejoy added, "...
I am a commune-ist I'm not a Russian authoritarian communist, but I definitely believe
that people got to share their shit. Because that's the only way [human] life's gonna
survive."76
Lovejoy 's colorful countercultural language might have resonated with much of
the region's youth, but it also lent itself to those who sought to marginalize both Lovejoy
and his action The New York Times treatment of Lovejoy's sabotage offered a
somewhat bemused look at the activist, making liberal use of his colorful quotes and
stringing them together in a way that marginalized both Lovejoy and his concerns. At
one point in the New York Times piece, the reporter wrote: "Mr. Lovejoy's plethora of
objections to the nuclear power plant - including what he described as 'the safety rap',
73
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'the background radiation and eco-system rap' and the 'whole Madison Avenue dance'
led him to conclude that 'it was tower-tippin' time "'77
But Lovejoy's countercultural rhetoric masked an abiding commitment to the
American political tradition. Unlike Lovejoy's interviews, replete with counter cultural
slang, his prepared statement was carefully thought out and written in straightforward
prose. He dated his statement, "George Washington's Birthday" and quoted extensively
from the Declaration of Independence as well as the Massachusetts Bill of Rights.
Lovejoy's statement began:
In the long-established tradition of challenging the constitutionality of
particular events, I readily admit full responsibility for sabotaging that
outrageous symbol of a future nuclear plant, the N.U. meteorological
tower on the Montague Plains. The Declaration of Independence
rightfully legislates action "... whenever any form ofgovernment
becomes destructive of these ends. . . of safety and happiness.' The
Massachusetts Bill of Rights further states "... The people alone have an
incontestable unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute government;
and to reform, alter or totally change the same, when their protection,
safety, prosperity and happiness require it." With the obvious danger of a
nuclear power plant, with the biological finality of atomic radiation (and
other equally ominous problems) a clear duty was mine to secure for my
community the welfare and safety that the government has not only
refused to provide, but has conspired to destroy.
78
Denouncing "the despotism" of "elements ofgovernment" and "the nuclear
energy industry", Lovejoy quoted another section of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights
which read, "No man nor corporation, or association ofmen have any other title to
obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileged, distinct from those of the
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community " Lovejoy added, "While my purpose is not to provoke fear, I believe we
77 New York Times
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must act; positive action is the only option left open to us Communities have the same
rights as individuals We must seize back control of our communities "80 In another
image from American history, Lovejoy wrote: "Mr Charles Bragg [Vice President of
N U
| also compared the development of nuclear power plants to the western extension
of the railroads. The only possible extension of his logic is to remember the liquidation
of the American Indian, and thus realize the ominous repercussions for our own fragile
little community "8I
In his book, Working Class Americanism, historian Gary Gerstle describes
traditionalist and nationalist elements of Americanism that have lent themselves to the
political values of conservatives, but also a progressive element that holds up symbols of
American radicalism and egalitarianism and was embraced by elements of the Old Left
("Communism is 20"' century Americanism".)"2 Much of the New Left also embraced
Progressive Americanism in the 1960s Beyond the civil rights movement's use of such
imagery especially notable in the speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr many radicals,
often seen as anti-American flag-burners, also used symbols of America's revolutionary
past Yippie activist Jerry Rubin appeared before HUAC dressed in the clothing of a
revolutionary era minuteman, and antiwar radicals often spoke of Mo Chi Minh as "the
(ieorge Washington of Vietnam" The countercultural film, Lasy Rider featured two
hippies, "Captain America" (Peter Fonda) and "Billy the Kid" (Dennis Hopper) who
embodied America's true spirit of freedom (throughout the film Captain America wears
K
" tbtd
Kl
Ibid
*" Gary Gcrstlc, Working Class Americanism: The Politics of Labor in a Textile City, 19 14-1 %0
(Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1989).
68
a jacket with aU.S Big sewn to the back ) I ovejoy carried on the New i efl and
eouHteroulture'a brand of Amerit aniun in wbai mighi be described ai a type ol
alternative 01 "counteipatrlotiam" i taking the New i efl and the prograsaive tradition ol
Amerlcaniim, i ovejoy, aa noted, referred to himselfoften aa "a Viei ( long, an American
revolutionary i ie also ohoac ( teorge Waihington'i birthday, with ita obvioui allusions
to Washington's tnythioal chopping down oi the cherry tree, to topple the weathei towei
at the nucleai conatruction site The New Y«,.k Times a.t.cie stated, ' Mi Lovejoy
Mid he had selected < .<•<».,.,- Washington's iiuthdiy fbi 'aymbolic reaaoni
K
' Tm aure
( leorge ia up there in heaven," i ovejoy said, "smiling down md laying 'Thai 'a solid mii
i ovejoy'i itatement repeatedly returned to the theme ol democracy and looal
community control, both ofwhich he believed were being trampled upon i>v laigci
outside poweri Me at i ueed the nuoleai induatry ol "preying on the weakneaa <>i the lot al
citizenry", chooaing economically depressed communities to locate Hu n plants, using
tax cuta aa "bribes" in what ultimately constituted "social blackmail" M i ovejoy wrote,
When even the mOSt learned physicists in the OOUntTy continue to disagree the
cih/ens oi the town weie supposed to make a definitive judgment in a vciy lew months
on an issue thai would radically allei then lives loievei ,,M I Ir continued. "The nn* leal
industry and its support elements in government are practicing actively a form oi
despotism I hey have selected the less populated rural count tyside to answci the energy
needs ol the » ities an- we witnCBSing a < oirupl halaucc hetween population and
Nov Vnik I IIMCS. Miin h I l«'M
1
' //„,/
Statement Telia Wliv TOWOI W;is Wrecked". (Jreciihcld Roundel. February 'M''/i >
(.«)
i wr
n-.kv Noi.nu the reluctance oi piivaie msu.c.s io undcwritc Queleai powei planti,
I ovqoy added. The ,,,,, ,|u„ |«CCft „, ,, , vrn „„,„. ,„„„,,,,. fc^
ip«d "<>' ol out but in exponential numbei ol grotesque deaths and mutilations Herbert
S Denenberg, bUUrance amiiniss.onei ol Pennsylvania, Male li may he 1 1ml no 0116
but God could wnir the insurance policy we need on nucleai reai ton
Beyond the demoi ratio issues, I ovejoy focused on n.<- spe< danKeis <>i
nucleai energy n y February 1074, the public had become aware ol the .,„„„,,>„.,
problenu at the Yankee Rows plant, juH 10 mUei north ofMontague, and the frequeni
P,an1 :>lm wm "(< eaiitated by those problems Evoking Howe and com ami <>i nucleai
meltdown, Lovejoy wrote, "H was announced only recently (aiiei much leseaich. and
then and only then admitted officially) thai the relatively old Rowe nucleai reactoi had
not been the bnpeci ably safe place n has heen eagerly hilled by the avari< ion-, powei
companies; indeed, the plam had no emergency core cooling system [E( !CS] at ail until
19721 The E( ( s is a rathei simple watei cooling idea much iik< a ( n except il is
supposed io control temperatures i omparable to oui sun!"85 ( m in-, concerns oi the
possible impact ol low level radiation, Lovejoy declared, i hav< been living here in
Montague going on live years now and in the valley fbi anothei live a-, a farmei
< oncerned about the organic and the natural, i find irradiated fruit, vegetables and meat
Io he inorganic; and i can hnd no natural balance with a nucleai piani in this oi any othei
community
'
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The scientific community was indeed divided on the relative dangers of nuclear
energy. Although many nuclear physicists extolled the safety and efficiency of nuclear
power, a number of prominent physicists had expressed alarm at the dangers of nuclear
energy and the dramatic increase of nuclear generators going on line. Noting these
divisions within the scientific community, Lovejoy, toward the end of his statement
wrote:
In a society only beginning to explore the philosophical implications of
abortion, euthanasia, and genetic manipulation, do we citizens allow the
disunited and unconfident scientists to plop down heaps of high and low
radioactivity in our midst? We truly have not delved into all the
repercussions of our actions, yet we seek to proliferate the construction of
obviously lethal experiments in increasing numbers ofbackyards.91
Finally, Lovejoy's statement addressed the issue that largely spawned the
dramatic rise of nuclear plant building in the 1970s, the ongoing energy crisis.
Criticizing a corporate-dominated society guided by the imperative of growing public
consumption, Lovejoy wrote:
The energy crisis, so-called, is an obvious signal for the need for
immediate and nationwide introspection and re-evaluation. We must give
up those false and selfish notions of individual freedom where they
impinge on the freedoms necessary for a wholesome and balanced
community life. We must bring to an end the greed of the corporate state.
We must see that profit, as the modus operandi of our society, is
defunct.
92
Linking together the various themes in Lovejoy's statement was a line of
argument that would form the basis of his necessity defense at trial. Lovejoy argued that
the principles ofcommunity democracy had been traduced by the powerful nuclear
industry. The government had become, in his view, an active conspirator with the
91
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nuclear industry in usurping the community's democratic rights Given this, and the
potential dangers of the twin nuclear reactors, Lovejoy argued, he had no choice but to
violate the law to protest what he believed to be a greater evil I lis thinking was very
much informed by the philosophy of non-violent civil disobedience that had formed the
core of the civil rights movement in the first half of the 1960s Lovejoy's intention of
putting the nuclear industry on trial is outlined in the final paragraphs of his statement
We must remove the dangerous and sensitive issue of nuclear plant
development from economic and political arenas, and put the issue to a
more prudent and judicious test One of man's highest achievements is
the principle and right of trial by jury In any trial, indeed only one juror
need voice skepticism to create a hung jury and a mistrial... It is my firm
conviction that if a jury of 12 impartial scientists were empanelled, and
following normal legal procedure they were given all pertinent data and
arguments, then this jury would never give a unanimous vote for
deployment of nuclear reactors amongst the civilian population Rather, I
believe they would call for the complete shutdown of all commercially
operated nuclear plants 93
Lovejoy ended his statement, "Love and affection to all my fellow citizens "'
His act of sabotage had dramatically elevated the issue of nuclear energy in western
Massachusetts When his case went to court, he would seek to put nuclear energy on
trial 1 lis defense would hinge on convincing a jury of his peers that his law breaking
was necessitated by the greater danger to the community posed by the nuclear reactors
The Trial of Samuel l loldcn Lovejoy
The movement against nuclear energy grew dramatically in the Pioneer Valley
during the months between Lovejoy's arrest and his trial The high profile of Lovejoy's
93
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upcoming trial proved to be an invaluable tool for the movement. An antinuclear group
calling itself the Alternative Energy Coalition ("AEC" in a parody of the Atomic Energy
Commission) fanned out across the Valley, securing enough signatures - 3,800 -to put a
non-binding referendum question on the November ballot asking residents of Hamden,
Hampshire and Berkshire counties to vote on whether or not construction of the
Montague twin nuclear reactors should be stopped. 95 Members of the Montague Farm
were the driving force behind organizing the AEC, which started with twenty members
and grew to over a hundred in a few months, spanning Franklin, Hampshire, Berkshire
and Hamden counties. 96 Randy Kehler, who joined the AEC, recalls that it was Harvey
Wasserman who came up with the name "to whimsically confuse people" 97 Wasserman,
Anna Gyorgy and Lovejoy, along with others in the AEC, disseminated the group's
views in publications entitled AEC News and The Montague Muse The background of
many of the commune's members in the LNS played an important role in making the
Montague activists some of the most visible and articulate spokespeople for the
antinuclear cause throughout the 1970s. The first issue of the Montague Muse included
an editorial by Lovejoy, which showed that the group's early focus was on reaching
members of the area's counterculture:
The tower ecotage episode was a catalyst for awareness and action. But it
also surfaced an inevitable social collision between the progressive-
enlightened and the stagnant forces in Franklin County, in the United
States, and the world The background, lifestyle, the entire mindset of
myself, and countless other brothers and sisters, see the locally proposed
nuke as the cute microcosmic symbol for an enormous political-social
OS
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Official copies of the referendum questions arc loaned in Box 7, Folder 93, IBEW .
Montague Muse , No. I, Summer 1974. Frances Crowe Papers, Sophia Smith Collections.
Telephone interview with Randy Kchlcr, May 5, 2003.
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system so corrupt and so in need of change [that we should all thank]
Northeast Utilities for its focusing efforts in this regard
';x
Early on, the AliC encountered skepticism about its referendum strategy In
response, AEC member Robert Strachota sought to make the case for the efficacy of the
referendum campaign in a letter that circulated among activists in the three county area
Some people have questioned the probable impact of this referendum If
we are able to get a healthy negative vote about the plants, the
referendum will be effective in any one of several ways First, we could
force NU to reconsider their plans by the vote itself Secondly, a
referendum vote means that the Senator from this district must work
against the plants Thirdly, the national media are ready and waiting to
cover our campaign and this means both national education and
additional pressure on NU... To pull this off is going to take a big effort
NU is going to spend a lot of money to beat us. We can't match their
glossy brochures and media campaign But we can do something they
cannot. We can meet people person to person.99
The campaign got offto a good start in the spring of 1974, as the antinuclear
movement scored important victories when town meetings in three communities voted
for a moratorium on construction ofthe twin plants In May, the town of Wendell
became the first western Massachusetts community to vote for a moratorium on the
construction of the Montague reactors The towns of Lcvcrett and Shutesbury soon
followed suit
100 NU Public Information officer Bill Semanie attempted to play down the
growing opposition to nuclear energy by sounding a theme that would become more
common as debate over nuclear power heated up in western Massachusetts: opposition
to the plants came from elements of academia and the counterculture, both of which
were outside the mainstream of American life. Semanie declared, "We'd frankly be
Montague Muse, No I, Summer 1974. Frances Crowe Papers, Sophia Smith Collections
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"Dear Friend", an AEC loiter by Robert Strachota, August 2H, 1974 Frances Crowe Papers, Sophm
Smith Collections.
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surprised ifthese particular communities voted against the moratoriums - they are
heavily loaded now with people from the academic world around Amherst." 101
Ironically, at a town meeting in the area's bastion of liberalism, the town of Amherst
narrowly voted down a moratorium on the Montague reactors. However, as debate
progressed over the coming months, Amherst, home to Hampshire College, Amherst
College and the University of Massachusetts' flagship campus, would become a
stronghold of the antinuclear movement. 102 The campaign gathered steam in the fall as
returning students enlisted in the campaign, especially student environmental groups
such as MASSP1RG.
The Montague Farm became the base for both the referendum campaign and
organizing for Lovejoy's fall trial. Frances Crowe, longtime Northampton resident and
Quaker antiwar activist, recalls sitting on bales of hay in a barn with those the
conventionally dressed, 54-year old activist later described as "alternative type people"
and "vegetarians". 103 Although there were many cultural differences between the old
guard religious pacifists whom Crowe represented and the new radicals of the hippie
communes, there was a broad overlap between their philosophies and commitment to
non-violence. Preparing for his defense, Lovejoy was intent on putting NU, the Atomic
Energy Commission and nuclear energy itselfon trial. Furthermore, Lovejoy was
determined to represent himself at the trial and spent days scouring law books and
meeting with Judge Kent Smith, who urged Lovejoy to retain council but was impressed
1
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With Lovejoy's ability to learn the law and prepare a defense.™ Lovejoy succeeded in
getting two high profile witnesses to testify on his behalf during the trial University of
California professor and former Manhattan Project scientist, John Gofman, whose book
on nuclear energy, Poisoned Power had become an important source of information for
many m the growing antinuclcar movement, was the most important witness In his
work, Gofilian drew attention to the under-reported problems that had plagued the
nuclear industry over the years: the dangers of low-level radiation, the underestimated
potential for a reactor core meltdown, the threat to future generations of spent radiation
that would need to be buried and would remain radioactive for over 100,000 years, and
the undemocratic decision making processes of the Atomic Energy Commission
,
103
Lovejoy'8 other star witness was radical activist-historian Howard /inn of Boston
I Jniversity A veteran of the movement against the Vietnam War, /inn s role at the trial
was to review the history of civil disobedience in America and place Lovejoy's action in
the tradition ofHenry David Thoreau, nineteenth century abolitionism, the women's
sulVrage movement, the labor movement, and more recently the civil rights and antiwar
movements Together, the scientist's and the historian's testimony sought to make the
case for a "necessity defense " They would claim Lovejoy had no meaningful recourse
through legal channels and his crime was committed in an effort to prevent a more
egregious crime 106
Greenfield Recorder. September 10, 1«)74, 4 Although Judge Smith tailed to dissuade lovejoy from
representing himself, he did prevail upon him to retain COUncU lor when Lovejoy himselftook the stand
Wassennan, 22.
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John Gofilian, Poisoned Power The C ase Against Nnelear Power Plants (I'liunaus, P A. Rodale Press
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The trial began <».. Septembej 17, 1974 al the Franklin County Superio. Court ...
(iroenfidd The dial electrified the I'.onee, Valley, garnering a great deal oflocal
publicity, and once again earning coverage by the New York Times indeed, the trial
became a majoi spectacle The COUTtroom was packed with Lovejoy supporters and, „s
hoped, had a veiy politicized atmosphere Residing Judge Kent Smith stated. Tins .s
one of the strangest trials eve. held ... hranklin ( ounly " ,H7 I
-ead.ng the p.osecution was
Distrid Attorney John Murphy The prosecution's case was limple Lovejoy had
intentionally deatroyed the wealhei lower, causing OVei $14,000 in damage, and had
confessed tO the crime Dismissing civil disobedience Bfl HI arbitrary and unacceptable
form ofoppoiing nucleai energy, Murphy argued Lovejoy'i personal motivations were
I OK
irnmatenal Aftei the prosecution presented its straightforward Case, the defense began
to lay the groundwork fbt its "necessity defense" argument On the wiiness stand,
Lovejoy began by telling the sloiy ofhis hie. emphasizing his deep lies to the region
ruining to his destruction ofthe town
.
Lovejoy declared thai he fell he had no choice
since legal channels weie in ailed blind ;illeys Lovejoy BTgued thai the Atomic Knergy
Commission's public hearings, where "interveners" could make then case against a
pioposed nucleai powet plant, were a sham Noting the AEC'a dubious iole as both
promotei ofnucleai energy and regulatoi ofthe nucleai industry, Lovejoy called the
Commission "a kangaroo court a panel thai acts as promotei and regulatoi judge, jury
in/
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..on on behali ol othen? 1 ovejoy staled, 1 he exiitcn. c ol Sum
I .ovejoy ...cms nothing compared In future KciicrfilioiiN and nil (hose people who :,„•
K.omui Ih- lump. iiimIoi i loud. dismal cloud ""' Lovtjoy'l attorney Hu n asked. "Was
tfa0N Were 011c single thing personally 01 ... writing, iluil inllucru ed you the moH Ifl yOUl
de< ision lo lopple the lower | n .,„„(• ol hjj „„, .1 moving Icslimony, I Ovejoy
answered, "Yon A III lie girl named Sequoia ii WU ImpOMlbk lo. m« to not tlpovei
Ih.'.l (owe. and live in hoiMC Willi I wo young c hildren who had no < onf.ol OVC! then
own live.
I he deftDM then CaUcd its lirsl witness on I .ovejoy 's Khali. IoIiii ( iolin.m
( liven (in- unuiuaJ nature <»i ihe dcicnsc witnesses' testimony, ludge Smith decided i«»
Withhold Ihc lubaequenl teitimony from the jury < inlinnn lx-gnn hy slating 1I...1 lie loll
moral and <>< iu
I obligation" i»> testify on 1 ovejoy'i behaU < loflnan reiterated many «»i
Ihe arguments against nueleai energy Irom his Ix.ok I Ic also sought lore enhave I he
"necessity deiense" argument hy arguing thai the nut loin industry wuh in a libel involved
I i>vc|<»y •. N111 Iota Win
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in a conspiracy to promote nuclear power through a concerted media campaign while
effectively limiting public debate through their power over the corporate media." 3
After Gofman's technical testimony as to the health and environmental risks of
nuclear energy, Howard Zinn took the witness stand. He reviewed the tradition of civil
disobedience in American history and argued that Lovejoy's action fell well within that
tradition, /inn argued that laws were often made by people representing special
interests, especially corporate interests, and that, often, more harm was done by those
who obeyed unjust laws than by those who broke them, an allusion to the "Nuremberg
Defense." Zinn described the history of corporations running roughshod over local
communities and people. He described a hundred years of almost unchecked pollution
and the numerous industrial accidents that only began to be curtailed with the emergence
Ofthe organized labor movement, which had also engaged in tactics of civil
disobedience. Whereas Lovejoy had invoked children and the future to justify his
actions, Zinn argued that Lovejoy also acted on behalf of those generations in the past
thai had suffered at the hands of the powerful but had been unable to do anything about
it."'
1
Alter the trial, Zinn stated:
If my trial testimony had an essence... it was the necessity of civil
disobedience in times of danger to life and liberty and health and how
historically in the United States we've seen many, many times how the...
institutions of government are really very inadequate in protecting us, as
we've seen from the number of wars we've engaged in, the number of
people who've been killed in industrial accidents, (he number o I people
exploited by corporations... [FJrom time to time, when grievances have
become too deep, groups of people had to break outside the machinery of
government, had to break the law [and] commit civil disobedience. 1 15
113 [bid Also, Wasscrman, 27-38
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A librarian from Gill, Massachusetts, Betty Bell appeared as a character witness
for Lovejoy An older woman who dressed conventionally, Bell described herself as
having been opposed to nuclear energy, but feeling uncomfortable with civil
disobedience. Bell spoke highly of Lovejoy as a person, and described how his sabotage
of the tower and the subsequent publicity around the case had led her to reconsider her
views on civil disobedience Now, according to Bell, she viewed Lovejoy's destruction
of the tower as in the spirit of the Boston Tea Party, Shay's Rebellion and Rosa Parks
refusal to move to the back of the bus She also told the court that in her view, Lovejoy's
action bought the community time to reconsider something that would have
repercussions for generations to come In an interview after the trial. Bell stated, "If the
lower were toppled, it would give us a year to think it over, to learn, to educate
ourselves, you know, have our eyes open to what the dangers were "' 16 Bell went on to
become a committed antinuclcar and environmental activist and was a crucial bridge
between (he Counterculture] activists and mainstream members of the community The
antinuclcar activists centered on the Montague harm brought a wealth of activist
experience from the 1 960s, including community organizing Several were veterans of
the civil rights movement, like Vincc O'Connor, who had done community work with
SNCC and Randy Kehler, who had been active with CORE. O'Connor said of Betty
Bell, "Well, you're the librarian for a little town, you know everybody and everybody
knows you, and when you come out and say this nuclear power thing doesn't sound like
IK.
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a good idea to mc and are willing to do things with a bunch of hippies, that becomes the
most dangerous combination They got farmers involved " 1,7
In the end, however, it was not the defense's arguments but a technicality that led
to Lovejoy's acquittal In order to discredit NU, the prosecution and the police, Lovejoy
brought in Montague tax assessor Robert Sulda, who said that the weather tower had
been assessed as "real property" and not "personal property" m Whereas the destruction
of "personal" property was a felony, destruction of "real" property was a misdemeanor.
Judge Kent Smith then ordered the case thrown out on the grounds that Lovejoy had
been charged with the wrong crime Although many of Lovejoy's supporters were
euphoric, Lovejoy was not. He pleaded with Judge Smith to allow his case to be sent to a
jury, his objective all along Smith refused Judge Smith seemed relieved to find a way
to dispense with the case In the most politicized local trial in recent history, he found
himselfbuffeted by countervailing pressures. Established business and labor interests,
especially the giant Nil, and much of the area's more conservative residents wanted a
conviction The Pioneer Valley, meanwhile, was aflame with antinuclear activism and
the case had nationwide as well as regional significance. Smith had a reputation as a
liberal judge, and Lovejoy later speculated that this might have influenced his decision.
Lovejoy also believed that the defense's arguments were beginning to resonate with the
liberal judge Zinn attributed the judge's decision to the "moral pressure" put on him and
the politicized atmosphere in the court 1,9 Whatever the personal reasons, Judge Smith
" 7
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tossed the case out and Lovejoy walked out of court a tree num. Once again, Lovejoy
liad mixed feelings about what he regarded as a partial victory
.Inst as he bid failed to
topple the entire weather lower, he won his ease but not by u jury verdict. from the
beginning, he had hoped that a jury verdict on Ins behalf would symbolize an indictment
ol the QUClear industry and put the industry on the defensive l*>lh locally and nationally.
Despite the somewhat anli climactic end lo a highly charged case, Lovejoy and
his supporters bid a great deal to celebrate. Alicr the trial, several jurors staled that the
jury was leaning, toward acquittal. Such a decision would liave been based almost
exclusively on Lovejoy's personal testimony since Judge Smith withheld (Sofnun and
Zilffi's testimony horn the jury Lovejoy's supporters lelt confident the jury was leaning
toward a no) guilty verdict. According, lo Frances Crowe, "Hveryone knew he would
have been found not guilty."120 Apparently, Lovejoy's demeanor at the trial, his
emphasis on the community and future generations, and his willingness to risk a long jail
term resonated most with at least some jurors. Shortly alter the trial, one juror, lames
O'Neill, told a documentary film crew that the jury was inclined lo acquit because the
"Commonwealth didn't prove the poind that he [Lovejoy] was malicious when he dip*
it."
m
O'Neill continued:
I hat s the reason why I think the jury would have acquitted him... I doif I
think he was malicious I don't think he's that kind of man. Me figured he
would sacrifice his own life... lor the existence of the community in this
area In other words he was going to lx* the sacrificial lamb Me didn't
care what happened lo him. All he cared about was gist Hie community at
large, the generations and generations tO nunc.
1 '
' " Interview wilh l innet's < i owe, Apnl 24, 1996
'' Lovejoy's Nuclcni War.
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On Judge Smith's decision to dismiss the case, O'Neill stated, "I was really glad
he did what he did "123
The trial of Sam Lovejoy not only energized the antinuclear movement of
western Massachusetts, it worked as a springboard for local activists to address a
national audience A film cooperative based at the Montague Farm called Green
Mountain Post Films made a documentary of Lovejoy 's sabotage and trial entitled
Loveioy's NuclearWar The documentary began with a 1946 quote by Albert Linstein,
in which the physicist states, "To the village square we must carry the facts of atomic
energy From there must come America's voice "m The film gave a short background
on the history of nuclear power from President Dwight Liscnhowcr's "Atom's for
Peace'' program through President Richard Nixon's pro-nuclear "Project Independence"
speech of November 7, 1973, where Nixon proposed reducing plant start up time from
ten to six years The documentary then reviewed the recent history of the proposed
Montague reactors and the life of Sam Lovejoy , s
The film focused primarily on the trial and included numerous interviews with
John Gofinan, Howard Zinn and Lovejoy. Standing against the backdrop of the
Connecticut River, Lovejoy says, "I had to hunt around for some recourse, some way 1
could stop this disaster from occurring in my area, and maybe stop it around the county
or even the world." ' Although the documentary is openly sympathetic to Lovejoy, it
m
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does seek to maintain a semblance of balance by giving a good deal oftime to those who
favor nuclear energy. There were several extended interviews with NU Vice President
Charles Bragg, as well as local residents who fevored nuclear energy. What emerges,
perhaps iinintentionally, was the degree to which the debate over nuclear energy in
western Massachusetts was being defined in cultural terms. The film showed short
snippets of local residents who express anger at Lovejoy for standing in the way of
progress and especially for breaking the law and destroying private property. Many of
the Pioneer Valley's more traditional residents, it becomes apparent, saw Lovejoy's
sabotage as a terrorist act more reminiscent of the SLA and Weather Underground than
of Martin Luther King or the Mahatma Gandhi. Lovejoy responded, "I found out how
hung up, literally, people are on property... They tend to protect property more, in many
ways, than they are willing to protect liberty, sometimes more than they are willing to
protect life."
127
NU Vice President Charles Bragg repeatedly sounded the cultural themes that
permeated so much of the debate over nuclear energy, portraying those opposed to
nuclear energy as an extremist fringe. Arguing that one must take into account not only
someone's arguments but their background, Bragg stated, "You try to weed out those
who are perhaps anti-technology.
.
.
They'd be as much against an electric toothbrush, if
you will, as against nuclear power plants. It's a lifestyle with them. You have, I think, to
take their opinions in context [and weigh that against] the background of science and
western civilization."
128
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A good portion of the documentary centered on the question of civil
disobedience Lovejoy and Zinn spent a good deal oftime discussing the philosophy and
history of civil disobedience. In reply, Charles Bragg dismissed civil disobedience as a
formula for anarchy in which a self-anointed minority can run roughshod over the will of
the majority as expressed through the democratic process. Bragg made the case that civil
disobedience could be used by the right as well as the left and ultimately was coercive
and undemocratic. The NU vice president argued that perhaps civil disobedience is
acceptable when used by a Gandhi, but not by a Hitler Others, such as the librarian
Betty Bell described how Lovejoy' s act had forced them to re-evaluate their views and
see civil disobedience in a new light. Among the latter, was Betty Bell's husband,
Constable for the town of Gill, Stanley Bell who states, "[The Montague nuclear plant]
was not just detrimental to Sam, but to all mankind. I had a completely different view of
civil disobedience after the trial." 129
Toward the end of the documentary, Lovejoy articulates a view of politics that
reflects the huge debt his philosophy owed to 1 960s New Left radicalism:
When you take a concrete position, that's politics. When you take a social
position and start to develop yourself as a social creature, that's when you
get political You're not a lobbyist anymore. You're not taking little
negotiating stands. You're saying 'no'.
130
Loveiov's Nuclear War became a powerful organizing tool for the antinuclear
movement in the 1 970s. It was screened for antinuclear groups and at independent film
festivals. The film made its way overseas in 1975, when film producers Daniel Keller
and Charles Light approached Randy Kehler, about to travel to Europe for an
129
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was
international War Resisters Conference, and asked ifhe'd screen Lovejoy's Nuclear War
for antinuclear groups overseas. Kehler and his companion Betsy Corner found
themselves at the massive 25,000 person antinuclear occupation at Wyhl, West
Germany. According to Kehler, "tons ofpeople came out" to see it as the film
"simultaneously translated". Kehler and Corner also showed the film in Freiburg, Bonn
and several other West German locations to enthusiastic crowds. 131 In 1976, Sam
Lovejoy and Anna Gyorgy took the film on a west coast tour to promote the antinuclear
referendum. 132
Although Lovejoy's trial would become known both nationally and
internationally, its immediate impact was felt most intensely in western Massachusetts.
Lovejoy's trial ended in late September 1974. Within weeks, residents of Hamden,
Hampshire and Berkshire counties would head to the polls to vote on whether to halt the
construction of the Montague nuclear power plant and on whether to dismantle existing
nuclear plants in Vernon, Vermont and Rowe, Massachusetts.
Counterattack:Labor. NU and the November Nuclear Power Referenda
During the months leading up to Lovejoy's trial, the Alternative Energy
Coalition fanned out across the Pioneer Valley and collected 3,800 signatures to put the
question of nuclear energy on the November ballot in three western Massachusetts
counties. Hamden, Hampshire and Berkshire counties comprised the state senatorial
district then held by Democrat John Olver. The first of the two non-binding referenda
131
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read: "Shall the state senator from this district be instructed to oppose the building of
nuclear power plants in Montague, Massachusetts'?" The second question asked voters:
"Shall the state senator for this district be instructed to sponsor and support a resolution
calling for the closing and dismantling of nuclear power plants in Rowe, Massachusetts
and Vernon, Vermont?" 133
As Lovejoy's trial approached, the ballot questions became the battle ground in
an intense debate that involved over 40 towns in the three county-area. The regional
battle over nuclear energy was watched closely by both the national nuclear industry and
organized labor, both of which saw the referenda as a worrisome challenge to nuclear
power with national implications.
As the energy crisis and high unemployment took its toll on American workers,
many unions, especially those in the construction trades, saw nuclear energy as a
potential source ofjobs for besieged workers. Although nuclear power plants, once
operational, employed only 200-300 skilled technicians, the construction of these plants,
lasting around four years, employed between 2,000-3,000 workers. NU estimated that at
its peak, construction of the Montague twin reactors would employ 2,450 workers,
including 100 boilermakers, 350 electricians, 200 iron workers, 300 pipe fitters, 150
welders, 250 carpenters, 50 asbestos workers 50 operating engineers, 60 bricklayers and
cement finishers, as well as 300 general laborers. 134 In the face of high unemployment
both nationally and regionally, residents could not easily dismiss the prospect of over
2,400 jobs that would benefit not only workers and their families but local businesses as
133
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well. For organized labor, the Montague plants represented a needed shot in the arm in a
recession-plagued economy
Both locally and nationally, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
(IBEW) spearheaded labor's campaign on behalf of nuclear energy In western
Massachusetts, the point man in labor's pronuclear campaign was a former electrician
and Navy veteran, George O'Brien. O'Brien had worked his way up the labor movement
from a journeyman electrician in search of steady work to business manager for IBEW
Local 34, president of the Northampton, Massachusetts Labor Council and President of
the Berkshire-Hampshire Building Trades Council A tough Irish-American with a
bawdy sense of humor, O'Brien stated, "1 was a Democrat since I was bom " , 35 An old-
style, lunchbox labor liberal, O'Brien had little patience for the new environmentalist,
civil rights, antiwar and feminist activists who streamed into the Democratic Party in the
1970s.
"When Sam Lovejoy was kicking up his heels and knocked the tower down,"
recalled O'Brien years later, it "upset me to no end. I was concerned with workers, with
people
" l36
For O'Brien, the unemployment of the 1970s was "heartbreaking" "I
always felt bad for the poor guy that wasn't working When 1 ran that outfit [IBEW
34]... I knew each man by his first name. I knew his wife by her first name. I knew how
many kids he had and some of them by their first names." 137 Seeing some of his
135
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members going through divorces that he attributed to the "frictions" ofunemployment,
O'Brien "called up anywhere and everywhere to get my men work." 138
The November nuclear energy referenda thus quickly became a struggle between
two grass roots movements. Organizing in college classrooms, peace churches and barns
at local communes were the advocates of a nuclear moratorium; from the union halls
came the moratorium opponents. Both sides spread out across the Pioneer Valley in
search of supporters. O'Brien recalled, "We did what we did best: leafleting. Going door
1 39
to door." Often enlisting the help of their children, union members, according to one
estimate, reached over 20,000 homes. 140 Especially active in opposing the Alternative
Energy Coalition's campaign was the newly formed IBEW Nuclear Committee, which
distributed thousands of pamphlets, some ofwhich urged residents to "Vote NO!" on the
moratorium. The committee argued the Montague plants "will not release harmful
amounts of radiation. They will be built and operated with the most rigid safety
requirements of any technology ever developed. They will provide needed electricity, far
cheaper than any available alternatives. They will provide jobs for the construction crafts
and material suppliers in this area." Another flier exhorted, "Vote NO on question #11:
Otherwise it could increase your electric bills, result in the loss of thousands of
construction jobs, and cause the region to lose significant economic gains." 141
Local colleges provided the forum for much ofthe debate over the referenda.
Speaking of the antinuclear movement's popularity at the University of Massachusetts,
138
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Amherst, O'Brien recalled, "They enlisted half the university." 142 At one university
debate, organized by Massachusetts PIRG, O'Brien declared, "If this group [PIRG1 is so
concerned for your safety and mine, then I submit that the [question] to appear on the
November 5 th ballot should read as follows: 'Instruct the state senator from the Franklin-
Hampshire district to do everything in his power to have the state legislature declare a
ban on the use of all motor vehicles in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." 143
Attempting to personalize the issue for the students, O'Brien asked, "What would the
University of Massachusetts do with a 36% reduction in power? Half the students would
have to attend classes one week and then go home for a week while the other halfof the
student body attend classes on the alternate week." 144
Although the labor campaign had many of the hallmarks of a grassroots
campaign, behind the scenes, representatives of the nuclear industry advised O'Brien.
According to O'Brien, "NU embraced me." 145 At every stage of the debate two public
relations men from NU, Montague Nuclear Project Officer Robert Barret and Public
Information Manager Bill Semanie coached O'Brien, seeing in the labor leader a more
142
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campaign became a model of a strategy the nuclear industry used with increasing effectiveness
throughout the 1970s. By having organized labor out front as the public face of a pronuclear campaign
while industry representatives orchestrated strategy behind the scenes, the nuclear industry was able to
elicit tar more public sympathy than would have been the case had corporate presidents and industry
experts taken the lead. Union workers and their families effectively countered the antinuclear movement's
grass roots image with one of their own. Furthermore, the confluence of interests between labor and
capital allowed the nuclear industry to mobilize labor's vast human resources, energy and experience in
waging public campaigns with the industry's own formidable financial resources. This strategy was most
widely and effectively used in the 1976 nuclear referendum campaign in California. See Thomas R.
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human face for the nuclear industry. Barrett and Semanie sent O'Brien a constant stream
of memos and articles "They would fill me in I wasn't the brainiest type, but I could
read We'd sit down with them [and] we'd take an anti-[nuclear] argument apart,"
recalled O'Brien. 146
O'Brien professed to doing a lot of "soul searching" about his cooperation with
NU since he was not "overly enthused to side with the nuclear industry " ,47 The nuclear
debate in western Massachusetts was a microcosm of a strange corporate-labor alliance
that was being forged at the national level as the controversy over nuclear energy heated
up in the mid-1970s. As a trade journal for General Electric gushed, "Organized labor
has gone to bat for nuclear power." The journal approvingly quoted Paul Snoop,
International Representative of the IBEW's Utility Operations Department, who stated,
"Across the bargaining table the adversary style prevails. [But] at this time there is no
table between us. Our friends need help " 148
Both the nuclear industry and the national labor unions that stood to benefit from
nuclear power took a keen interest in NU and O'Brien's fight against the antinuclear
movement in western Massachusetts IBEW's Paul Snoop wrote O'Brien, "Your
Ibid Barrett and Scmani, for the most part, allowed O'Brien to debate in his own inimitable style. An
exception came in 1977 when a local television station asked O'Brien to participate in a series of televised
debates on the Montague Nuclear Power Station The station went to great lengths to advertise the
upcoming debates One promotion for the scries stated: " The issue has broken the community into interest
groups reminiscent of the Vietnam War era. Jobs arc in high demand, and many labor unions have allied
themselves with the utilities and other industries who sec the plant as an example of economic progress for
the region. Students, older progressives, members of the peace and ecology movements sec the plant as a
threat to life and nature " CCATV Promotional News Release, Box 6, Folder 77, 1BEW . When Barrett and
Semanie learned (he station had invited some "heavy hitters" from New York to participate in the debates,
they told O'Brien, "Slay the hell out of thai." They were worried, recalled O'Brien, "that I d get my ass
handed to me" and that "I might embarrass the whole crowd." Interview with George O'Brien, April 27
1996.
147
Ibid.
MX
General Klcclric Newsletter Fall 1975, Box 7, Folder 95, 1BEW
91
approach to the anti-nuclcar groups is the correct one The obstructionists have taken to
the ballot and pose quite a serious threat to the nuclear industry If they are successful
locally (and they have a good chance of success), it will encourage them to seek a
statewide moratorium on nuclear construction Our efforts must be directed toward
preventing this."149 Charles Pillard, International President of the ffiEW, wrote in the
MiliW Journal, 'Presently the industry is under great pressure from a small group of
intelligent, articulate prophets of doom, who claim they, and only they, have the
knowledge and capability to determine the direction of this nation I lowever, I I IEY
DO NOT SPEAK FOR II IE IBEWI In short, whal they seek is to retard or halt
progress, which stimulates economic growth This is not doomsday! The D3EW will
not knuckle under to intimidation by word or deed of obstructionists We will support
our God, our Nation, our Union!"'™
NU and the [BEW's use of the term "obstructionist" to describe opponents of
nuclear energy highlighted a fundamental division between environmentalists - who
spoke frequently of the need for Americans to reconsider unchecked consumption and
advocated conservation -- and those who believed new technology held the key to
unlimited economic growth and prosperity At a debate held in an area high school,
O'Brien sought to underscore this difference with a touch of humor: "I am amazed at the
effort here to stop progress I las anybody here ever stopped to think what would
happen if they scuttled lord and the first automobile and we were still using the horse
"" Memo hml K Snoop to (iconic O'Brien, October 15. 1974, Box 7, Folder 93, IBFW
ls
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and carriage? Ho* could [we] ever gel rid ofall that horse shirt"" Lor advocates of
""clear energy, the new power source held the key to Baintaimog the economic growth
and prosperity that hud lifted much of*, working class toward the ranks ofthe middle
class in post-WorM War I. America, bn. was now threatened by the energy crisis and
siagllation. NU presiden. I.clan Sillin warned ofa "dc-industrial revolution"
.ha, would
impoverish working and middle class Americans Robert Murphy, Business Manager
fet Local 64 ofthe United As.socia.ion oLPIumbcrs iU,d S.can.lil.crs, sounded a similar
Ihcmc: Ifthese environmentalists and an.i-nukes don't get their act together with the
rest ofthe people here in New Hngland. then the six New Lngland stales will become a
national park."
133
I'or the opponents of nuclear energy, many of whose views were informed by the
anti-materialism ofthe counterculture, Americans had (o come to reject a lifestyle that
saw nature merely as a source of exploitation for maintaining a lifestyle based on ever
expanding consumption. Speaking ofthe energy crisis and its impact on American
workers, Sam Lovejoy declared, "So it's a short lerm rill, for the workers it's a burn.
And so what the workers need is... constant construction projects and so therefore,
constant development, right? Evermore, Evermore, Evermore... Well, then you start
studying the electrical consumption ofthe country and how much juice this country
1,1
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consumes in comparison to other countries. And you realize this country really is the
peak of gluttony and that we're just living this illusion
.
," 154
Thus, the debate over nuclear energy increasingly became a battle between those
who sought to maintain a lifestyle they knew and loved, and those who believed
Americans must radically alter their thinking and way of life. Like the corporate
representatives of the nuclear industry, O'Brien consistently accentuated the cultural
chasms that had developed in the 1960s and persisted into the 1970s. But whereas the
New Left and counterculture of the 1960s had represented a threat to traditional
Americans' values, in the recession plagued 1970s many saw the left, and especially
environmentalists, as a threat to their standard of living. O'Brien repeatedly invoked
environmentalists' threat to the ultimate symbol of middle class life: the television In
one speech, O'Brien asked, "Has the thought ever occurred to you that we might have to
ration electricity? Can you imagine unplugging the t.v. set? What a horrible thought!" 155
In another paean to the comforts of middle class life, O'Brien declared, "We can all
agree that coming home after a hard day's work that there is nothing like a nice cold beer
from the electric refrigerator, a refreshing hot shower, a good home cooked meal from
the electric stove and whatever the season, a little heat or air conditioning when you sit
to unwind with a good book or watch a little t.v"' 56 Such appeals were meant not only
to invoke fears of brown outs, but also to identify nuclear energy with Middle America,
The Saboteur. 60-
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ax dirtincl from the hippie, and radical, wl «,! a .luca! .„ A,„. „, a„s standard of
living and w;iy ofMr
Antinucleai activists, meanwhile, criticized theii laboi opponents as reactionary
I" L970, construction w<„k<,.s had attacked peaceful antiwai protesters in New Yo.k
(
'.iy 111 what became know,. as "the i tardhal Rebellion" Prom this grew image oi .he
"hardhat" thai was embraced by conservative politicians and ridiculed i>v ...any liberals
.«>'(! radicals This image was best portrayed in the 1970 film Joe and by the charactei
Archie Bunkei from television's All m the l am.iy Both Joe" and "Archie" came u>
symbolize the putative narrow mindedness and bigotry ofthe average blue < <>iia.
American. 137 Yeais later, activist Frances Crowe, ipeaking oflabor, conceded thai a1 the
time the antinucleai movement just "wrote these people off.'* 191 Vince O'Connor,
however, recalled thai the movemem wenl i<> great lengths to separate the technology
and the industry from the woikeis "We attacked the industry and not the people who
worked in the plants attack the r.uys in the suits but not the wo.kr.s in the plant 1,159
Nevertheless, as the debate ovei nuclcai powei intensified, O'Brien became increasingly
loihusB Freeman "Hardhats, Construction Workers, Manliness and the 1970 Pro-Wai
pemoii8lralions
,,
1 lo.irnal ol Social History, Su ei 1993, 723 44; David Halle, America s Working
Man Work, Nome and Politics Among Hlue (/ollai Property Owners (Chicago Uiiiversily ol CIhuibo
Press, IVH4), Pelei Carroll, "No One Calls Jl the Working Class" in II Seemed lake Nothing Happened
Hie liagedy and hoimscol America in ilu I97()b In the 1970s, I lie "Tonight Slum wilh lolmny ( arson
alio lampooned the Imaged the backwards blue coUai nipoi patriot with the host's reguJai character!
Floyd R Tunbo", who m a 1977 show w.is made to defend unclear |H)wci "Put Die down as an American
who (avers building nucleai plants i say nuekau energy i>iams are safe So what it people begin to glow
a little bit? Ai least we woo'l be hoed with the question ot not knowing where out children are ai night i
say we should trust k lenec science has given us cyclamatce, saccharine ami DDT So what it an
aioniu plant blows up? The people who say thai, they are afraid i<> die I'm not Hi nd to die bo ause hi
my lift I haw lived hy Hie good lx>ok, (he Aineiu an I .epon magazine Whal do Ihey expOCl US lo use fOl
tool, buffalo ( hips Now. these |erks warn to use sola] energy fbi electricity Doesn't that take the cake?
Mow do they expa i me to plug my drill into the sun? I'd ueed s very big step laddei "Johnny Carson
Sels Us Slniighl", I he Nation, lime IK. 1977, 740
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defensive about the popular image of working class Americans. In one speech, ( >»Blfa)
declared, "It is interesting to note that the environmentalists consider the construction
workers a bunch ofrowdies who come into the are., and disrupt a whole city or town" 1 "0
In another Speech, O'Brien exclaimed, "... the misnomer BbOUl the construction worker
willing to build anything lor a job is a lot of crap. We have lam.lies and we are just as
concerned with their future as anyone could be. l et s give them a break." 1 " 1
O'Brien, who remained on the front line of the nuclear debate into the late 1970s,
continued to develop this theme. At a debate at Hampshire College in I *>7X, O'Brien
gave his most spirited and memorable defense of blue-collar workers, one in which he
linked economic tears with a sense of cultural siege:
I am one ofthe rowdy construction workers Joe or Johnny six pack -
or one of the many names that construction workers are called. But you
ought to Understand where we're coining from... We are B highly visible
group. You can find us in any town in the U.S.A. We are the target of
many groups. It is small wonder we gel uptight, f or years now,
multinationals have been raising havoc with the American worker. We in
the labor movement have helplessly seen industries disappear from the
U.S. as the huge multinationals have moved out of our country... and
as... imports of foreign produced goods have spelled doom lor many
domestic industries. Environmentalists have taken their loll,
multinationals have taken their toll and the high cost ofenergy has taken
itstolL
162
As the debate over nuclear energy continued into the 1970s, more and more
environmentalists c ame to sympathize with the plight of blue collar Americans and
sought to build bridges between greens and labor. Among these was Sam Lovejoy's
friend, ant inuclear journalist
-activist Harvey Wasserman who became involved with a
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Washington, D C, based group, Environmentalists for Full Employment (EFE) EFE
accused corporations of "environmental blackmail" by threatening layoffs in retaliation
for environmental protection measures. EFE noted that workers were often those who
suffered the most from industrial pollution, which they encountered in the workplace 163
Wasserman conceded, however, "Unfortunately, environmentalists have often been
insensitive to working class needs and have been late to make the case that fighting
pollution can also create jobs." Wasserman continued, ".
. . as a single issue campaign,
environmentalism still lacks the in-depth clout to make a lasting impact. What could tip
the balance is a working alliance with organized labor." 164 Despite these efforts, labor-
environmentalist cooperation remained the exception to the rule throughout the 1970s.
During the final days before the November 5th vote, lobbying by the antinuclear
movement, NU and labor all reached a fever pitch The results ofthe vote came as a
stunning surprise to many involved. Although the moratorium on the Montague reactors
met with defeat, the narrow margin surpassed even the expectations of the heavily
ia
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Folder 95, H3EW The EFE fought an uphill battle. At its October 1975 convention, the AFL-CIO issued a
nuclear energy endorsement stated, "Government action is required to promote public acceptance of
nuclear power. Steps should be taken to reduce lead time for getting plants into production " AFL-CIO
American FcdcraUonist, July 1975, 3. One labor leader wrote to O'Brien that unions like the United Mine
Workers and the railroad unions, "cannot be expected to take an active interest in nuclear power, nor is
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toward alliances with environmental groups. The conference gave Wasserman hope. He wrote of
environmentalism and labor, "... both movements are in a critical state of flux right now and important
segments of the tow arc working toward a mutual understanding. When they reach it, we can look forward
to breathing some clean air again." "Environmentalists, Labor Joining Hands", undated article, circa 1977.
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OUtspent antinuclear movement Fifty-two percent ofthe voters supported building the
twin reactors, whereas forty-seven percent opposed them Less than one year aliei
Lovejoy's assault oil the weather tower, the antinuclear movement in western
Massachusetts had succeeded in dividing the region almost down the middle Given the
dearth of public discussion before 1974, ,t was a major accomplishment The issue of
nuclear energy had been elevated drarnat.cally and the debate in western Massachusetts
had drawn the attention of a national audience Speaking of the time before he toppled
the Montague weather tower, Lovejoy said, "In my opinion, even the hippies around
here in the area weren't getting their back up in the air and asking, 'Well, how are we
gonna fight this?"*166 The transformation that took place in the region over the course of
1974 was remarkable Fred Zapinski of the Alternative Energy Coalition crowed that for
a group operating with "a shoestring $700 budget using volunteers we felt we did a
damn good job " ,67 O'Brien, however, dismissed the movement's claims of moral
victory, comparing them to "the politician who finds some sort of solace in the vote no
matter what the margin ofdefeat."168 More soberly, NU President Lelan Sillin noted a
thirtford l imes. December 23, 1974 Undated newspaper article by Cindy Weiss, circa November 6,
1974, Box 7, Folder 97, IBEW. The lolal was 22,464 voles for the moratorium and 25, 806 voles against
15,301 residents supported dismantling the existing plants in Rowe, Massachusetts and Vernon, Vermont
to 31,948 against. In Montague, increasing opposition to Ihc plants was evident in the 1,091 votes for the
moratorium compared to 1,948 voles against Undated newspaper article by C indy Weiss Also, Hartford
Times
.
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"deterioration in the public climate" and warned again* "making energy policy a victim
of partisan polices [and] encouraging a public vendetta agaiflSl the energy industry
Although the vote on the Montague reactors invigorated the antinuclear
movement and caused nu representatives concern, the vote was ambiguous Unlike the
referendum on the Montague reactors, the one ealling for the dismantling ofYankee
Kowe and Vermont Yankee received only n% ofthe three-county vote, reflecting
perhaps a "not in my baek yard" sentiment by a quarter of those who had voted for the
Montague moratorium, more than an across-l he-board opposition to nuelear power 170
Some, however, like Vinee O'Connor, who had earnpa.gned for the referendum, saw the
Second VOte as a v.ctory "One third of the people, whieh
.s astounding, thought we
should close Vernon I think it was the second vote [that was significant! I mean you can
always be against something that hasn't happened yet, but to be for closing a nuclear
power plant that's already there and employs people and so forth, |means| we had been
very effective
The referendum had perhaps its biggest impact on liberal stale senator John
Olver A Pennsylvania native gifted with extraordinary academic skills, Olver completed
an accelerated program to graduate high school at the age of fifteen, received a B A
from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute at the age of eighteen, earned a Master from lulls
m a year, then went on to earn his doctorate in chemistry from the Massachusetts
Institute ofTechnology (Mil) in 1961 From Cambridge, Olver and his wife Rose, who
Address by Lelau !• Sillm, Jr to the Colony Club of Springfield, Massachusetts. February 26
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earned a doctorate from I larvard, moved to Amherst, where he became professor of
chcmislry a. the University of Massachusetts and she became a professor of psychology,
and later women's stud.es, a. Amheisl College In 1968, Olvei moved into public serv.ee
when he was elected to the Massachusetts I louse of Kepresentat.ves and earned a
reputation as a consummate liberal [n 1973, Diver won the state senate district
encompass.ng I lampshire, Berkshne and parts of I lamden count.es Still, the au.a of
academia clung to Olvcr, whose aloof, intellectual demeanor prompted many who knew
Inn. to comment that he seemed more comfortable in a classroom that, on the campaign
| mm
trail OfOlver, Frances CrOWC stated, "lie was a follower, not a leader Me wasn't
very courageous " l73 Vince O'Connor recalled, "John Olvcr was a very bright guy
not much of a wind mill tilter "174
Prior to the vote, Olvcr had supported nuclear power, arguing that scientists and
experts could be trusted to determine the safety of nuclear energy Certain the
referendum on the Montague reactors would go down to sizable defeat, Olvei had
declared that he would follow the wishes of the voters ns The surprising percentage of
voters opposed to the Montague reactors took Olvcr by surprise Alter the vote, Olvcr
staled that the moratorium's narrow defeat "indicates more concern about nuclear power
issues in this district than I had expected This vole shows how quickly anti-nuclear
"Olvcr A Professor of Liberal Arts", Boslon Globe, May I, 1991, 7, "l" District, Lcfl lo Right
Bipartisan Consensus Olvcr is ;i t rue Liberal", lloslon Globe, May 26, 1991, 21
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Ibcling has grown in this area during the past six months " ,7(> Hscwhcre, Olver
commented, "Three months ago, I would have suspeeted the whole thing would lose by
a 2 to I or 3 to I margin [the vote] is certainly a tribute to the work done by many
groups on the nuclear issue a great many questions have been raised in the public's
* 1 77
mind. I fenceforth, Olver attempted to straddle the divisive issue by supporting
nuclear power in general while opposing the building of the Montague twin reactors
until questions concerning the reprocessing, transport and storage of nuclear waste had
been adequately answered 178
The polarization of the heavily Democratic district foreshadowed a division that
increasingly confronted many Democrats throughout the 1970s l-nvironmentalists and
organized labor comprised two eore constituencies for many Democratic politicians In
the 1960s, (he Democratic Parly had been wrought with divisions over civil rights and
the Vietnam War In the 1970s, nuclear energy and cnvironmcntalism became the new
challenge foi Democrats Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy had assiduously
courted both labor and environmentalists Allei the Montague vote, Kennedy intensified
his support for the antinuclear movement Kennedy proposed an amendment to the new
law replacing the AEG with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) the law made
the NRC a strictly regulatory body, separating nuclear regulation from nuclear advocacy
that would require the federal government to provide funds for the usually outspent
antinuclear "interveners" at nuclear regulatory hearings
1
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The year following the 1974 referenda was relatively quiet in western
Massachusetts. Although local groups were permitted to testify against nuclear energy
before the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) as interveners, public
participation was largely limited at the proforma hearings.' 79 Meanwhile, Thomas
Lesser and other movement attorneys advised activists to focus their efforts on the state
rather than the federal government, noting of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "no
utility proposal has ever been rejected by the federal agency." Rather, they argued, the
movement should focus its efforts on the recently created Massachusetts Energy
Facilities Siting Council, which included environmental representatives and was, they
argued, not beholden to the nuclear industry. The lawyers noted, "... the fact that
Governor [Michael] Dukakis has announced his opposition to the proposed Montague
plants will certainly not be without influence." 180
As the Montague plants remained on hold, public and political support waned.
Publicity surrounding the plants continued to be negative. In 1978, eight Hampshire
College students in an Environmental Studies and Public Policy program working with
two ecologists, two physicists and a psychologist published a glossy, professional-
looking, sixty-four page book entitled, Meltdown at Montague: A Citizens Guide to the
Consequences of an Accident at a Nuclear Reactor in Franklin County. Massachusetts .
The well-researched study explained the workings ofa nuclear reactor with graphs, and
detailed various scenarios for a reactor core meltdown and its possible consequences for
Interview with Frances Crowe, April 23, 1996. Recalling her experiences with public participation at
NRC hearings, Crowe stated, "They don't really let anyone say very much."
I OA
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western Massachusetts The book began with the following caveat: "It should be
emphasized that the probability of such a serious accident occurring is very small,
although there remains considerable controversy over just what 'small' means in a
quantitative sense - Such a caveat did little to diminish the impact of the book's cover
illustration of twin nuclear reactors with ^Meltdown at Montague" emblazoned across
the top
1X1
The group also produced a half-hour 61m depicting a fictitious newscast
reporting on a reactor core meltdown at Montague 1X2
As the political climate deteriorated, NU, beset with economic difficulties,
announced the first in a series of deferrals of the Montague reactors in the fall of 1974.
Originally the twin reactors were slated to be operational in 1081 and 1983
respectively m In September 1974, NU announced the deferral of the first plant to 1982
Then, in February 1975, NU President Sillin announced a deferral of both plants to 1986
and 1988 respectively Citing double-digit inflation, high interest rates, a decline in
investor confidence and the first reduction in electricity sales in twenty-live years, Sillin
stated, "liven Millstone Unit No 3 [in Connecticut | could become victim of the present
climate." NU remained committed to building the Montague reactors, Sillin
continued, "provided public and regulatory support were forthcoming for that level of
utility rates necessary to attract capital investment meanwhile the clock ticks on and
1KI
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Conditions grow more threatening... I assure you that we remain committed to the
Construction Ofthese units al Montague... for What is al stake is more than the deferral
ofplanned eonstruetion. It is the deferral ofail of our mutual plans and hopes lor the
development of this region and the prosperity of its people." IK
'
,
lor the [BEW, the
deferrals were disappointing. The IBKW international leadership issued a statement
reading, "The impael of zero eleetrieal growth is felt by many IBEW members. The
delay and eaneellation of projects have foreed us on the unemployment rolls." 1X ',
On Mareh 28, 1979, nuelear energy advoeates suffered a devastating blow as the
world learned ofthe near reaetor eore meltdown of the Unit 2 nuelear reaetor at Three
Mile Island, Pennsylvania, and the attendant evacuation of over I ()(),()()() people, for Nil,
as (i>r the entire United States nuelear industry. Three Mile Island meant publie relations
damage eontrol. On May 14, 1979, NU took out a full page ad in Hie Daily Hampshire
Gazette that began, "In the wake of the Three Mile Island accident, there have been
publie expressions of doubt, of fear, of eoneern over Northeast Utilities' relianee on
nuelear power... while it may not yet be possible to answer all the questions that are in
people's minds, we urge you to seek out lads and to avoid the emotionalism whieh
obseures truth and impedes the making of rational decisions." The pieee went on to
argue that noone at Three Mile Island reeeived more radiation than an average annual
exposure to medieal x-rays, mid assured readers that the plant designs at Conneetieut
Yankee and Millstone differed from that used at Three Mile Island. NU argued that it
continued to examine alternatives, but that coal produced pollution and mining
Ibid
'
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accidents, oil was expensive and unreliable, hydro was limited, and solar power decades
away The ad concluded, "It is our firm belief that the decision to pursue the nuclear
alternative was the correct one for this region.
. . We continue to have faith in nuclear
1 X7
energy..." In 1981, NU announced the "temporary cancellation" of the Montague
reactors.
188
In an interview with the YaJlexAaVocate, Harvey Wasserman proclaimed
victory: "... the fact of the matter is we succeeded in Montague If there hadn't been
citizen opposition, there would be a plant there, or there would be construction there."
Again, the Vietnam analogy loomed large. "Throughout the Nixon years in the war, 1 am
convinced that the extension of the war in Viet Nam was solely designed to confuse any
possible feeling on the part of the antiwar movement that it was responsible for ending
the war. I am sure the same thing is true with the nuke
. . It has taken them all this time
to organize their orderly withdrawal. The last thing that Northeast Utilities wants to do is
admit that their defeat has been at the hands of a citizen movement. I think it's important
people realize this." Ultimately, the Montague twin nuclear reactor power station was
never built
The degree to which Lovejoy's sabotage and the subsequent movement against
nuclear energy led to the deferrals is difficult to gauge. As the 1 970s progressed, many
energy companies sought rate increases from consumers to build the plants that had been
ballyhooed as capable of producing energy "too cheap to meter". The questions raised
1 87
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by the antinuclear movement certainly played an important role in the erosion of public
confidence so necessary for further nuclear expansion Moreover, the growing public
participation as interveners at ACRS hearings in Massachusetts and around the country
bogged down many of the nuclear industry's representatives, resulting in further
expenses and delays for the nuclear industry.
As 1974 came to a close, the antinuclear movement in western Massachusetts
could look back on a year of tremendous growth The movement established a pattern
that later became evident in the movements against nuclear weapons, U.S. intervention
in Central America and apartheid Radicals employing direct action had forced the issue
of nuclear energy to the fore, thereby mobilizing grass roots participation and
galvanizing more mainstream groups into action, which in turn forced politicians to
address the new issue of concern Meanwhile, the western Massachusetts antinuclear
movement produced several new national leaders, most notably I larvcy Wasserman,
Anna Gyorgy and Sam Lovejoy himself, who went on to play major roles in the national
antinuclear movement The same pattern would repeat itself with the nuclear weapons
freeze movement six years later. After the opening battle over Montague, many western
Massachusetts antinuclear activists would soon throw themselves into the 1970s' most
dramatic confrontation over a nuclear power plant: the 1976-9 showdown in Seabrook,
New I lampshire
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CHAPTER II
MASSACHUSETTS ANTINUCLEAR ACTIVISTS AND THE BATTI F OVFR thpNUCLEAR POWER STATION AT SEABROOK, NE
*
^^HAmS ™
^^^^^
In February 1975, local antinuclear activists in the upper-Rhine town of Wyhl,
West Germany, frustrated with the lack of legal recourse to stop a proposed nuclear
power station in their town, spontaneously occupied the site of the proposed nuclear
reactor. The occupation soon grew to 28,000 antinuclear activists and lasted ten months.
The occupation at Wyhl captured the imagination ofAmerican antinuclear activists who
saw in the Wyhl protest a model, which embraced the values and tactics that Sam
Lovcjoy and his allies hoped to bring to the American antinuclear movement. The Wyhl
occupation had both a local base and an international perspective which embodied the
1970s slogan "Think Globally, Act Locally". Beginning with local environmentalists,
farmers, vintners and members of the local Protestant clergy, the Wyhl occupation soon
attracted activists from all corners of West Germany as well as France and Switzerland,
just across the West German boarder. The movement embraced a philosophy of local
grass-roots democracy and was heavily influenced by the growing European
environmentalism that the more militant, sectarian groups of the West German New Left
had dismissed until that time as bourgeois. With its virtual tent-city on the site, the Wyhl
occupation took on a countercultural sensibility, which meshed well with the
occupation's rural, local base. 1 The communal, non-violent occupation at Wyhl
resonated strongly with the American rural, countercultural left, which was then
1
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emerging as the driving force ofNew England's direct-action, antinuclear movement. As
Lovejoy's friend and feUow resident of the Montague Farm Anna Gyorgy stated, "The
action [at Wyhl] inspired nuclear opponents throughout the world."2 Over the coming
years, as protest against the proposed nuclear site at Seabrook, New Hampshire grew,
leading American activists would refer frequently to the example of the Wyhl
occupation which ultimately succeeded in stopping construction of the proposed West
German nuclear power plant.
Over the long term, the Wyhl occupation helped plant the seeds that would grow
into the West German Green Party in the 1980s; in important ways, however, the Wyhl
occupation had a larger immediate impact on American antinuclear activists than on
those in Europe. As the antinuclear movement grew in West Germany, it was largely
taken over by more sectarian, Marxist groups (known in West Germany as the "C-
Groups" due to their communist orientations) and later by urban anarchist groups known
as the "Black Block", which attempted to steer the movement in an anti-state direction. 3
I Inlike the peaceful occupation at Wyhl, the West German antinuclear movement
became caught up in a spiraling cycle of violence in which activists temporarily blinded
police with mirrors, employed slingshots and other weapons and were met by the full-
weight of state power. The pitched battles between helmeted antinuclear militants and
West German police in riot gear reached an apex in 1977 when unrelated acts of left-
wing terror by the West German Red Brigades (a group whose violence far exceeded the
SLA and Weatherman in America) reached an all time high. Under siege by the above-
ground C-groups and the underground Red Brigades, the West German government
:
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responded with severe restrictions on civil liberties that bordered on martial law and
constituted one of the German Republic's most serious constitutional. The shift to
revolutionary violence, which precipitated the government crackdown, squandered the
positive image the antinuclear movement had won with the West German public at
Wyhl.4 The West German antinuclear movement would not recover until the late 1970s
and early 1980s when the counterculture and environmental wings of the movement
began to reassert themselves. 5
In contrast, the American antinuclear movement that exploded at Seabrook
attempted to maintain the values and tactics that proved so successful at Wyhl, Germany.
Sam Lovejoy's sabotage had helped begin the redefinition of the American left. That
trend accelerated rapidly with the protests at Seabrook as the antinuclear left continued
to define itself in terms of moral witness, the philosophy of non-violence, the
counterculture, participatory democracy, feminism and especially grassroots localism. In
many ways, the American left in the latter halfof the 1970s came fall circle, returning to
the roots of the early 1960s New Left and Civil Rights Movement, the philosophy and
tactics of which were eclipsed by the revolutionary militancy of the late- 1960s antiwar
movement. It was this trend that increasingly attracted many new activists to the non-
violent, direct action movement at Seabrook. As Barbara Epstein notes in her important
study of the direct action movements of the 1970s and 1980s, Political Protest and
Cultural Revolution, the founders of the Clamshell Alliance, who led the opposition to
the Seabrook plant, were mostly in their late twenties and early thirties, many 'the
younger brothers and sisters" of the 1960s anti-war generation, who were infected by the
4
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idealism ofthe 1960s, yet turned off by the New Left's shift to violent confrontation.6
The dominant non-violent trend of the Scabrook movement would be challenged from
within by a minority who wished to return to the more militant style of the Vietnam-era
New Left and emulate the more confrontational style then dominating the European
antinuclear movement. The Seabrook movement was the defining movement for the
American Left in the 1970s and 1980s. As Epstein writes, "The non-violent direct action
movement of the late 1 970s and 1 980s began in 1 976 with the formation of the
Clamshell Alliance..."7
The Birth of the Clamshell Alliance
In 1969, the Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSNH) announced its
plans to build twin nuclear reactors on the seacoast town of Seabrook, New I lampshire.
PSNH would be a majority shareholder in the project and the remainder would be
funded by investments from eight other New England utilities, including Northeast
Utilities. PSNH, which provided 90% ofNew Hampshire's energy, planned to use
energy generated from the twin reactors to supply power not only to New Hampshire but
the entire New England region. The quiet town of Seabrook, a beach resort along New
I lampshire's eighteen-mile coastline, had a small off-season population of 5,300. The
town's population swelled, however, during summer months as residents from greater
New England flocked to Seabrook to enjoy the town's beaches and scenery. PSNH
6
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chose Seabrook due to its proximity to the ocean, which promised to supply the
hundreds of thousands of gallons of water needed to run the plants' cooling systems. 8
From the beginning, a small number of the town's residents expressed concern
about the proposed plants' impact on Seabrook's ecosystem, as well as aesthetic
concerns about the impact of the nuclear generating stat.on's large, gray towers on the
holiday resort's idyllic, beach-front scenery. Prior to the 1970s, there had been
interventions in different parts of the nation at the AEC's licensing hearings, which
raised safety concerns and in some cases brought about safety improvements in proposed
plants. The interventions, however, always came late in the process when the plants were
near completion and were restricted by law to narrow technical objections. 9 These
narrow grounds for public intervention expanded greatly, however, after the 1970
Environmental Protection Act, which mandated environmental impact studies (EIS) for
all proposed federal projects. Subsequent court decisions ruled that the environmental
impact studies required by the act applied to the AEC, and its successor, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), as well, thus broadening the possible grounds for
citizen interventions. By the early 1970s there was a dramatic increase of citizen
interventions using the Environmental Protection Act, most commonly challenging
nuclear power plants under construction on the grounds of low level radiation emitted
into the atmosphere and thermal pollution (the rise in temperature in bodies of water
Harvey Wasserman, "Nuclear War by the Sea", The Nation
. September 1 1, 1976. Reprinted in Harvey
Wasserman. ed. Energy War: Reports from the Front (WestporL Conn.: Lawrence Hill and Co. Publishers.
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caused by the return of cooling water to its source, which often resulted in a rise of water
temperature by as much as 40 degrees.) 10
A small group ofNew Hampshire residents responded to these changes in the
early 1970s by forming the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL). The SAPL focused
much of its attention on challenging PSNH's request for a licensing permit for the
Seabrook plants on the grounds of thermal pollution in the waters around Seabrook,
which would affect local marine life, especially the numerous clam beds in the area The
SAPL had a few years earlier stopped construction of an oil refinery by Aristotle Onasis
along New Hampshire's upper coast. The members of the SAPL, predominantly white,
educated and upper middle-class, now focused on a strictly legal interventionist strategy
for stopping construction of the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. Although the SAPL
won several suspensions of plant construction, these victories largely constituted
delaying tactics, as construction of the plants resumed after several months' delay."
In 1975, the SAPL elected as its president thirty-one-year old Guy Chichester, a
self-employed carpenter from Rye, New Hampshire, just outside of Seabrook. Born and
raised in Queens, New York, Chichester was the son of a fireman and telephone
operator He eventually relocated to Long Island, then served four years in the Navy and
eventually moved to Rye, New Hampshire in the early 1970s with his wife Madeleine
and their children where he made a living as a carpenter. Chichester had campaigned for
George McGovern in New Hampshire's 1972 primary and played an important role in
10
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fighting the Onasis oil refinery. 12 Chichester brought to the SAPL a more militant
personal style than the more staid SAPL presidents who had preceded him. As 1975
progressed, Chichester increasingly came to believe the narrow, legalistic focus of the
SAPL needed to be radically broadened. At public forums dealing with the Seabrook
issue, Chichester began denouncing the heads ofPSNH and New Hampshire's political
elites in ever more vehement terms, making many members of the SAPL
uncomfortable. 13 Working to employ new means for challenging the Seabrook plants, in
March of 1976 Chichester succeeded in having a non-binding referendum concerning the
Seabrook Nuclear Power Station put to the town's year-round residents. Unlike
Montague, Massachusetts two years earlier, whose residents votedfor nuclear power in a
referendum, the residents of Seabrook, mindful of the plants' potential impact on the
local environment and tourism voted 768 to 632 to "ban transportation or storage of
nuclear materials associated with the [nuclear] plants" - in affect a vote against the
plants.
14
As had been the case with Montague, the Seabrook referendum set off a wave
of similar referenda and town-meeting resolutions in nearby towns, most around the
Seabrook area and one just across the border in Massachusetts. 15 Just as had been the
case in western Massachusetts, where neighboring towns felt they would enjoy few of
the immediate economic benefits of nuclear power while taking on all the risks, each of
the eight towns that took a vote on the reactors voted against the Seabrook power station.
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These local examples of nuclear opposition had little impact, however, on PSNH, the
NRC or New Hampshire's conservative governor, Meldrim Thomas, all ofwhom
remained adamantly committed to building the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. 16
As 1976 progressed, Chichester became even more disillusioned with the legal
intervention process, which he now condemned publicly as designed by elites to serve
elites and as being impervious to public opinion In an interview, Chichester recalled,
"Our time and energy were going into the hearings presentations. And what we thought
was that our little lawyer there, who everyone was going around scraping up bucks for,
that he's able to do it. But on the right side of him there was a bank of lawyers that were
getting $1,000 a day. And on the left side of him was a bank of lawyers that were getting
$900 a day. It was a total gang-up picture " ,7 Chichester began talking of the need to
employ the tactics of non-violent civil disobedience, about which he knew relatively
little. At the same time, Chichester came to believe that opposition to Seabrook needed
to locus less on environmental impacts and more on the dangers of full-scale
catastrophe; e.g., potential reactor core meltdown Soon Chichester was criticizing his
own SAPL as too white, middle-class, legalistic and cautious, setting off rumblings of
discontent throughout the SAPL membership, much of which now became thoroughly
alienated from Chichester. Moderates within the organization openly denounced
Chichester's vociferous style and accused him of running roughshod over the wishes of
the group's members. Meanwhile, Chichester had begun making contact with New
England's more radical antinuclear activists, including New Hampshire Quakers and
16
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those who had been leading the fight against the proposed nuelear plant in Montague,
including Sam Lovejoy Chichester screened Lovejoy'sLNudMrWar at a SAPL meeting
and argued for a Montague style movement "That was about all I needed," recalled
Chichester, "I had been thinking about how do we get people in the streets? I didn't
really know how I was not quite ready yet " ,x Chichester's networking with New
England radicals further accelerated his radicali/.ation, so that by year's end, he had
broken with the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League
T
;
While Chichester was undergoing his transformation from legal intervener to
radical opponent of nuclear power, other New Hampshiritcs, already grounded in the
counterculture and more militant environmentalist!!, shot the first radical salvo in the
tight against the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station As many late- 1960s New England
hippie-radicals fled the cities for rural Vermont and western Massachusetts, a few chose
rural New Hampshire as their home Among these were a group of radical pacifists who
set up a commune called the Cireenleaf Harvesters' Guild in Ware, New Hampshire, not
far from Seabrook The members of the Guild sought to integrate (iandhian political and
spiritual principles with a 1960s counterculture! lifestyle and a focus on
environmentalism On January 4, 1976, in an act reminiscent of Sam Lovejoy's action at
Montague almost two years earlier, an apple picker at the collective, 22-year old Ron
Rieck, climbed up a 1 75-foot weather tower on the Seabrook construction site and stated
that he would stay there as a protest against the plant Rieck camped out on the top ofthe
tower for thirty-six hours while friends brought him food and supplies Among those
Sieve Vanillin. "The Voice of Protest". Concord Momloi Online. August 22 1999 S Retrieved Mav
15, 2003.
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who came to support Rieck were two members of the Cambridge (Boston) American
Friends Service Committee, Suki Rice and Elizabeth Boardman, two of the earliest
Massachusetts residents to get involved in the Seabrook debate. Finally, authorities
prevailed upon Rieck to climb down from the top of the tower where local police
awaited him with hot tea. PSNH never charged Rieck with trespass and the activist was
later acquitted of the charge of "creating a public nuisance". Nevertheless, Rieck's
action was a harbinger of things to come. 20
By the spring of 1976, Chichester and other radical New Hampshire opponents of
the Seabrook plants had established ties with other radicals from New England,
especially Massachusetts. Meeting at Chichester's home in Rye, a small number of these
activists began the planning that resulted in the founding of the Clamshell Alliance. At a
larger meeting of fifty people a few weeks later, the principles of the Clamshell Alliance
were ratified A number of Massachusetts activists were among the Clamshell's
founders. Among them were the Boston-based AFSC activists Suki Rice and Elizabeth
Boardman, veteran activists who became the Clamshell's main advisors on the principles
of non-violence and Quaker practices of affinity groups and consensus decision-making.
Also joining the early founders by the end of the year were Sam Lovejoy and Anna
Gyorgy who were criss-crossing the country as antinuclear ambassadors, giving talks
and encouraging the building of locally based antinuclear movements. 21
A number of other western Massachusetts activists were on hand from the
beginning. Especially prominent were those with pacifist and civil rights experience.
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Among them was a former Philadelphia civil rights activist Mary Wentworth, and Wally
and Juanita Nelson, an African American couple who moved to western Massachusetts
in the early 1970s and were close with Randy Kehler. Wally Nelson was among the
original CORE members in the early 1940s, was a conscientious objector during World
War II, went on to join the pacifist group Peacemakers and became a lifelong war tax
resister. Wally met Juanita in prison in the 1940s when she went to interview him for a
magazine article, and since then the two had been active in civil rights and antiwar
struggles. Soon, other pacifists with civil rights experience joined, such as former CORE
activist Kehler and former SNCC organizer Vince O'Connor, both ofwhom spent
eighteen months in prison for draft resistance during the Vietnam War.22
The core activists of the early Clamshell brought an immense degree of
organizational experience, which helped shape the new antinuclear movement. "People
brought this enormous reservoir of organizational experience," said O'Connor. He
added, "Their organizing methodology was the SNCC organizational methodology,
which is you go into the community and you organize people about issues... grass roots
2 3
organizing." To a large degree, the Clamshell organizers looked to the Montague
experience as a model. "I would say the genesis of this came out ofSam Lovejoy and his
friends because ofthe Montague plant.
. . We had sunk the Montague nuclear project
with the referendum," recalled O'Connor. 24 Of the Montague group, O'Connor said:
It became very clear to me not very long from moving [to western
Massachusetts] in July 1974... that this group had community roots. They
had identified nuclear power with harm to the community. And they
22
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were
successfully said these things were dangerous to us And they
extremely effective at community organizing I had the instinct from
working with SNCC that I could see this wasn't just a bunch of hippies
this was a real smart group of people that had great connections with the
community, which all the radicals didn't have [in the 1960s] They had all
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Thus, with organizational experience reaching back sometimes decades in
pacifist and civil rights activism, along with the Montague model, members of the
Clamshell Alliance - or "Clams", as they soon took to calling themselves - mapped out
their long-term strategy for stopping the Seabrook plants. The members decided to begin
a campaign of civil disobedience that would begin small and include only local New
I lampshirites, and grow incrementally, bringing in activists from around the New
England region All activists were to be trained in the principles of non-violence and
passive resistance prior to any action. Anyone taking part in civil disobedience would
have to join a small "affinity group" numbering from live to lilleen other activists, with
whom they would need to stay in contact during any occupation and maintain ties during
any imprisonment The affinity groups would also act as decision making bodies at any
action, passing their group's consensus up through a "spoke" to a meeting of
representatives of all the allinity groups. Beyond non-violent training and the formation
of an affinity group, activists engaging in civil disobedience were expected to adhere to
certain rules, including abstaining from any drug or alcohol use during an action and not
destroying any property
26
In a strategy reminiscent of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC) during the early civil rights movement and modeled on the Montague
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experience, the Clamshell Alliance also decided that close ties with local Seabrook
residents were imperative Ties with the local community would not only give the
movement legitimacy beyond its countercultural base, but over time would prove crucial
logistically as local residents availed Clamshell activists access to their property where
up to 500 activists would group, organize and camp out before undertaking mass civil
disobedience As the movement against the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station grew into
the thousands and activists from throughout New England poured into the movement
and pushed for more radical resistance, however, tensions would arise between those
who felt increased radicalism would alienate the Clams' more conservative local base
and those who felt locals should not have a privileged position within the movement
since a nuclear catastrophe would affect all New Engenders. 27
The principles and tactics of the Clamshell Alliance grew out of the experiences
of the 1960s civil rights and antiwar movement and were tailored to build on those
movement's successes and avoid a repeat their failures The Clams' return to the non-
violent philosophy of the early 1960s civil rights movement was especially attractive to
many who joined the movement. One Clam activist, looking back on the appeal of the
Clamshell Alliance stated: "The nonviolence is what really appealed to me. This is what
I missed during the Vietnam War days Though I was younger then, I wanted to get
involved But all I saw was the violence, and I did not want to get my head bashed. I was
terrified of that So here was that non-violent group, the Boston Clamshell, and I thought
now I am home." 2 *
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The Clamshell was also heavily influenced by the environmental,
counterculture and feminist movements, which preceded it, and injected
interpersonal and consensus-based approach to radical politics than had been the
with the male-dominated antiwar movement Activist and historian Barbara Epst
captures the Clams' evolution from the late 1960s Writing in her study of direct
movements, Epstein states:
a more
case
ein
action
[ The Clamshell Alliance] continued the New Left impulse toward a
pohtics of living out one's values and rejected the anti-war movement's
machismo and authoritarianism. For many of its members the Clamshell
was a realization of the hope that seemed to fade in the late sixties for a
movement based on shared commitments and mutual trust. 29
Epstein argues that much of the Clamshell philosophy grew from the fact that
many of its early founders were young Writes Epstein:
the largest numbers of those who became Clamshell activists were in
their twenties or early thirties, the distinctive character of the Clamshell
came from the particular outlook of this group, who were in a broad sense
the younger brothers and sisters of the antiwar movement. They had been
infected by the idealism of the sixties, but they had also seen the
weaknesses of the antiwar movement, its tendency to resort to internal
hierarchy and violent rhetoric, its sexism. Many of them had come to the
Clamshell from the women's movement or the environmental/ecology
movement, or had been deeply influenced by them. 30
While this analysis overlooks the large numbers of veteran activists at the Clams'
founding and the many younger college students who eventually swelled the Clamshell's
ranks, Epstein's argument does help explain the outlook pushed by many of the Clam's
early members
Harvey Wasserman, a veteran of the Montague antinuclear fight, was an activist-
journalist who had been active in the antiwar movement as a student at the University of
!9
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Michigan, Ann Arbor and was a veteran of the Liberation News Service (LNS) in the
late 1960s He, along with Cathy Wolff, would emerge as the Clamshell's two principle
designated spokespeople. Early on, Wasserman highlighted the importance of non-
violence to the new movement in the preface of his 1979 book, Enei£yJfeRe^
from the Front
The adoption of disciplined, non-violent mass action by late-seventies
activists has indicated a maturity and staying power born of the work ofGandhi Martin Luther King and Cesar Chavez. These tactics could carry
the seeds of a new social order in the country rarely dreamed possible
during the raucous, polarized days of Vietnam. 31
The Clams adherence to non-violence and consensus were not its only attractive
aspects in the latter half of the 1970s; of equal importance, early on, was the Clams'
grassroots localism. Members of the Montague Farm in western Massachusetts
especially pushed the need for a locally based movement. Anna Gyorgy, who joined the
Clamshell Alliance a year after it came into existence, declared, "The movement is built
from the bottom up Here the movement starts with the town There is no other way."32
Reiterating this theme, Wasserman, writing for New Age magazine in 1977, declared,
"Ifwe learned anything from Vietnam, it was that meaningful, lasting change can only
come from the bottom up. Nothing really moves in society until the people as a whole
are convinced that it should "33 Further articulating this theme was Sam Lovejoy who
had made it a personal crusade to help inspire local antinuclear movements around the
country, which he hoped would coalesce into a national antinuclear crusade. Like
31
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Gyorgy and Wasserman, Lovejoy looked to the 1960s as his point of reference: "The
single biggest failure of the New Left was that it never had a home base. It had a student
base But movements don't last unless they have a home base, a population base, not just
an age-segment base.
.
,"
34
Although a majority of Seabrook residents had voted against the nuclear plants,
many continued to view Clamshell activists with suspicion due to many of its members'
counterculture attire and lifestyle. Over time, however, the Clamshell Alliance began to
realize their vision of a radical movement against nuclear power rooted in the local
community. Slowly, the Clamshell Alliance built bridges to a growing minority of
Seabrook's more conventional, traditional, and frequently older residents. In some cases,
local residents themselves reached out to the Clams. Among the latter were Tony and
Louisa Santasucci who contacted the Clamshell Alliance after reading a blistering
editorial against the Seabrook nuclear plants by Guy Chichester in one of Seabrook's
local papers. For the Santasuccis, the Seabrook plants were literally a matter of "not in
my backyard". Unbeknownst to the Santasuccis, PSNH planned to buy a swathe of their
four-acre property which abutted the site of the nuclear power station. Tony Santasucci
stumbled upon PSNH's plans when he stepped into a drill hole dug in his yard, spraining
his ankle. Harvey Wasserman, in one of his contemporary articles on the Seabrook
movement, described Tony Santasucci, a sixty-two year old veteran of the Second World
War and a truck mechanic by profession, as "a folk hero in the saea of the Seabrook
34
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nuke .""> Throughout the mass actions of 1977-8, the Santasuccis were the Clams' most
reliable base among the area's more traditional residents, frequently offering then four-
acre property as a staging area and campground for Clam direct actions ,7
As was the case with many local Seabrook residents who opposed the plants but
sh.ed away from association with the Clamshell Alliance what the Clams later referred
to as "Closet Clams"
- Tony and Louisa Santasucci's opposition to the nuclear plants
stemmed not from 1960s radicalism, but traditional New Hampshire localism and
aversion to "big government" In one interview, Tony demanded, "If these plants are so
safe, how come I can't get any insurance for my house''"'* And, sounding a theme that
resonated with many Seabrook residents, Santasucci declared, "All this plant is for is a
quick buck They're not gonna lower taxes; they'll raise 'em Because, with people
coming in to operate the plant, they'll need more schools, more fire department, more
police department, they'll have to put sewers in. That's all gonna come out of the
Uxpayers of Seabrook And the people of Seabrook don't have that money to spread »39
Yet, despite the more conservative political tones of the Santasuccis' antinuclear
position, their militancy warmed the hearts of many Clams On one occasion, Tony
proclaimed, "We don't need that plant and if you ask me, the Public Service is a bunch
of liars. They'll never kick me out of here. They'll have to drag me out first "40 When a
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real estate agent with ties to PSNH told Louisa they'd bulldoze their home if they didn't
sell, Louisa snapped back, "You bring that bulldozer in and I'll sit right in front of it "41
The feistiness of the Santasuccis was just the image of local opposition that the
Clamshell Alliance wished to emphasize. The Santasuccis would appear in many local
television interviews and were featured prominently in Seabrook '77. a documentary by
western Massachusetts activist-film maker Robbie Leppzer, and The Last Resort
another documentary on the early Seabrook struggle by the makers of Loyejoymicleai
War 42 For the early, predominantly counterculture members of the Clamshell Alliance,
the support of stalwart locals gave the movement a sense of legitimacy and conformed to
the movement's post- 1960s grassroots vision.
By the late spring of 1976, then, the Clamshell Alliance had a set of working
principles, an articulate philosophy of non-violence and grassroots localism, and a
strategy of direct action, which called for incrementally growing site occupations.
Within a year the Clamshell Alliance mobilized the largest mass movement of the latter
half of the 1970s
Round One. The Seabrook Occupation of August 1. 1976: Eighteen Arrests
Before the Clamshell Alliance was officially formed, protest against the
Seabrook nuclear plants had already been growing. From Ron Rieck's January tower
occupation through an April 1 rally by approximately 300 antinuclear activists outside
41
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the SeabTOOk site, radieal opponents ofthe Seabrook plants felt a growing momentum -
The early members of the Clams sought to build on this momentum by planning their
first site oeeupation for early August. The intention was for a small oeeupation
comprised of New Hampshire residents, whieh the Clams hoped to follow with
occupations that would grow tenfold eaeh time. By starting slowly and limiting arrests to
local residents, the Clams eould give their roots time to take hold before the movement
was swamped by out-of-staters.44
Although the Clams had agreed New Hampshire residents would earry out the
first oeeupation, over 600 antinuelear activists arrived in Seabrook on August 1 to show
support for the occupation. According to Harvey Wasserman, these supporters came
from every state in New England. The day began with speeches, chants and singing
outside the Seabrook site. Some of the slogans that would become hallmarks of the
antinuelear movement nationally were scrawled on signs, such as "Hell No! We Won't
Clow!", "Split Wood, Not Atoms" and "Better Active Today Than Radioactive
Tomorrow!" Evincing early media savvy, Clamshell organizers of the event succeeded
in getting over forty journalists and reporters from both mainstream and alternative
outlets to cover the event. As the rally ended, the eighteen pre-designated occupiers, all
having undergone non-violence training, broke away from the crowd to cheers and
marched onto the plant site with over thirty journalists, media reporters and their film
crews in tow.
45
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As the assemblage ofClams and reporters reached their destination, the
occupiers began to plant small pine and maple saplings on the site ofthe future nuclear
reactors. The police then announced that everyone who did not immediately vacate the
site would be arrested, including members of the press and media. PSNH and political
supporters ofthe Seabrook nuclear plants narrowly avoided the public relations disaster
of arresting journalists. Covering the event for the nationally read left-liberal magazine
The Nation
,
Harvey Wasserman wrote, "The order [to arrest] was quickly
countermanded for the news teams, but the Clams sat down next to their saplings and
allowed themselves to be dragged through two hundred yards ofmud and underbrush to
waiting police vans."46 The Seabrook police station did not have room to accommodate
the eighteen arrestees, so they were all booked at the nearby Hampton Falls police
station, in the first of several Seabrook spillovers that within less than a year would
engulf all ofNew Hampshire.47
The first Clamshell occupation had garnered a good deal of coverage from local
and regional media as well as national attention from the alternative press. The Clams'
early success with the media continued throughout the week as Clams protested the
groundbreaking ceremony for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station by Republican
governor Meldrim Thomson and the heads ofPSNH on August 5. Police had to clear out
several older Seabrook residents who had parked themselves on chairs on a street
through which the dignitaries' motorcade was to pass. The streets outside the site
became the stage for scattered protests and several other street blockages, resulting in
46
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three arrests, including that ofGuy Chichester.48 At the Exeter ton, a twenty-four year
Old activist a (iretchen Siegler disrupted Governor Thomson's speech and was removed
by police. Meanwhile, in a public relations boondoggle, the Governor's photo at the
August 5 groundbreaking appeared in some loeal newspapers on August 6, juxtaposed
on the front page with headlines on the thirty-first anniversary ofthe atom.c bombmg of
I hroshima, a linkage of nuclear power with nuclear war which pronuclear public
relations people normally sought to avoid.49
As Clamshell activists were waging their non-violent guerrilla campaign in the
Streets against Governor Thomsons Seabrook groundbreaking, the Seabrook antinuclear
movement struck media gold In nearby Manchester, Democratic presidential nominee
Jimmy Carter was celebrating his New I lampshire primary victory earlier that year
f ollowing the (ieorgia governor was the Vermont-based Green Mountain Post Films co-
op, which had produced Lovejoy's Nuclear War, then being screened at antinuclear
events around the country. Members ofGreen Mountain Post Films were able to get
close enough to the future president to ask him about his thoughts on the August 1
Seabrook occupation Since anything the presidential contender said was national news,
Carter's answer gave the Clamshell publicity before a national audience.
50
Carter had
already evoked cautious optimism among the growing national antinuclear movement by
declaring he would make appointments to the NRC that would "be acceptable to Ralph
Nader." I lis reply to the Green Mountain Post Film's questions on civil disobedience
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would give more encouragement to antinuclear activists, not only drawing nation-wide
attention to the Seabrook civil disobedience campaign, but also seeming to approve it in
principle. To a national audience then, Carter, a former nuclear engineer, answered:
I've always felt that anybody who disagrees with the civil law in a matter
of conscience has a right openly to express that [through civil]
disobedience. At the same time, under our societal structure, it's
necessary that they be willing to take the consequence of their
disobedience. I believe that there's a place for nuclear power in our
future. It ought to be minimized, it ought to be a last resort; [there] ought
to be tough safety precautions guaranteed by the president and other
leaders in Washington, with nuclear power plants located where people
don't live, where the environment won't be destroyed, with the reactor
core beneath ground level, where the reactor building is tightly sealed and
they have a standardization of design, to make sure people can have
confidence in the safety of nuclear power plants. . 52
After its first week of active non-violent protest, the Clamshell Alliance had
fortuitously intersected with the bicentennial presidential campaign, winning national
attention. The momentum that had been building throughout 1976 now began to
snowball
Round Two: The Seabrook Occupation of August 22, 1976: 180 Arrests
The August 22 occupation was in many ways a re-run of that of August 1, except
for its scale. Again the occupiers began their trek to the plant site after a large legal rally,
this time attracting over 1,500 protesters. The rally took place at Hampton Falls, near the
Seabrook site, and once again the occupiers set off with an entourage of reporters in tow.
The 1 80 site occupiers consisted ofmany New Hampshirites, but now the Clamshell
Alliance opened the door to out-of-state activists Many of the occupiers of August 22
52 Wasserman. "Nuclear War by the Sea", The Nation
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had come from the Boston area and western Massachusetts that would turn into a flood
the following spring. 33
Like the eighteen occupiers from August 1, all 180 trespassing Clams were
arrested, but this time were taken to Portsmouth armory over twenty miles away. There
they were held overnight. The next day most were released on "personal recognizance-
after being charged with "criminal trespass". 54 But ten of the 180 who had previously
been arrested at the site, soon to be known as "the Seabrook Ten", were taken to jail and
charged with "contempt" for violating an earlier Superior Court injunction. The
"Seabrook Ten" were held until trial in early September. In a somewhat irregular move,
the ten were to be tried by the very judge who had issued the injunction, Maurice Bois.
When Massachusetts attorney Thomas Lesser, who had played an important role in the
Lovejoy case, attempted to withdraw upon the wishes of some of the defendants to
represent themselves, the court ordered Lesser to stay on as legal advisor to the
"Seabrook Ten". 55
Massachusetts activists were now playing a growing role in the movement
against the Seabrook nuclear plants. Boston AFSC members Suki Rice and Elizabeth
Boardman were the Clams' major advisors on non-violence and consensus, Thomas
Lesser from Northampton was legal advisor - albeit reluctantly - to the "Seabrook Ten"
- Sam Lovejoy and Anna Gyrogy had interrupted their cross-country antinuclear
proselytizing to focus on Seabrook, and now Harvey Wasserman worked tirelessly to
53
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publicize the Seabrook struggle in the nation's alternative press, from IMNatkm to
NewAge and regional papers such as western Massachusetts' Valley Advocate
,
56
Describing the injunctions as "fishy" and the trial of the "Seabrook Ten" as a
"railroad", Wasserman argued that Judge Maurice Bois, appointed by Governor
Thomson and a close associate of William Loeb, the conservative editor of the pro-
nuclear Manchester Union Leader
,
was acting as a tool ofNew Hampshire's pro-nuclear
establishment. Wasserman described the judge's refusal to let eight of the defendants
who were representing themselves to cross-examine witnesses. He described the
constant personal tete-a-tetes between Judge Bois and the defendants, writing, "The
judge... conducted a game of psychic jujitsu with the defendants, browbeating them
whenever possible. He persisted in calling Neil Linsky by a variety of names, ranging
from 'Lipsky' to 'Lishky and got into a tiff with defendant Medora Hamilton over her
wish to be addressed as 'Ms.'."57
As the trial wound up, Judge Bois allowed the defendants their final statements.
The defendants sought to argue they were not so much in contempt ofcourt as contempt
of nuclear power. They insisted the injunction violated their civil liberties and
maintained they were the victims of a political vendetta by New Hampshire's political
elite led by Governor Thomson. Defendant Mary Gregory declared, ".
. . ignorance of the
law is no excuse, but ignorance of the dangers of nuclear power is also no excuse. All
my actions have sprung from my concern for my children and my children's children."58
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The moral appeals had little affect on judge Bois, who declared all the defendants
"guilty" and sentenced them to six months jail without bail pending appeal. 59
The Draconian sentences offended many in New Hampshire who saw the judge's
behavior during the trial and his sentences as strong-arming. The ten defendants were
released after six days imprisonment by order of the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
Describing the manner in which the law seemed to have been used by the court for
political objectives, one ofNew Hampshire's U.S. Senators, Democrat John Durkin,
proclaimed in disgust that Judge Bois had made New Hampshire appear to be "the
Mississippi of the North:'60 Wasserman described Senator Durkin's statement as "a
comment that should have offended the people of Mississippi."61 After the trial,
Wasserman wrote, "The trial of the Seabrook ten made it clear.
. . that the stakes were
going to be very high in New Hampshire, and that somebody was taking these protests
very seriously."62 After the trial, the Clamshell decided to buy time and cancelled the
next planned occupation for October 23, holding a small, legal energy fair instead. 63
Members of the Clamshell Alliance now bunkered down for the winter and began
organizing for their third and biggest occupation the following spring. The floodgates
were to be removed and activists from all over New England actively encouraged to join
the Clamshell. Meanwhile, Governor Meldrim Thomson likewise prepared for what
promised to be a major showdown the following spring
59
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New Hampshire had long been the most conservative of the six New England
states. With its state motto, "Live Free or Die", New Hampshire voters were renown for
their independent, small-government conservatism and opposition to almost any form of
taxation (the state had no sales or income tax.) New Hampshire's limited tax-base was
partly responsible for the state's relatively underdeveloped infrastructure compared to its
neighbors, especially Massachusetts to the south. For many New Hampshirites, this
situation merely preserved the state's rustic New England charm. Many New
Hampshirites harbored a particular disdain for Massachusetts, especially the greater
Boston area, which they regarded as a pro-labor bastion of "big government" and
cosmopolitan liberalism.64 Nevertheless, New Hampshire's electorate also had a well-
earned reputation for unpredictability and independence, most dramatically underscored
in the 1968 Democratic primary when antiwar candidate Eugene McCarthy nearly
outpolled the incumbent president Lyndon Johnson.65 Southeastern New Hampshire,
where Seabrook was located was within the greater Boston media area. It represented the
most liberal section ofNew Hampshire; however, by Massachusetts' standards, even this
part ofNew Hampshire was relatively conservative.66
The symbol ofNew Hampshire conservatism in the 1970s was Republican
Governor Meldrim Thomson who had won the governorship in 1972 on a strongly anti-
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tax platform. Raised in Georgia, Thomson made his profession in the publishing
industry, eventually settling down in the Granite State. According to Harvey
Wasserman, Thomson ran the state like "his personal fief'.67 Historian Charles Bedford,
m Ws Seabrook Nuclear PoweLSMjonLCitjz^ Politics and Nuclear Power
writes, "Governor Thomson [believed] no problem had two sides and... relished his
bull-in-a-china-shop image..."68 Throughout the 1970s, Thomson had sought to bolster
his conservative reputation for a national audience in anticipation of a possible run for
the presidential nomination in the 1980 Republican primaries, where he hoped to run to
the right of Ronald Reagan. To that end, Thomson had visited the Republic of South
Africa and lauded its racial policies and ordered all state flags lowered to half-mast when
Taiwan was ejected from the Olympics in favor of the People's Republic of China.69
Thomson was one ofthe nation's most outspoken political advocates ofnuclear power
and saw the completion of the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station as a personal crusade. As
governor he ordered a "gag rule" put in place, forbidding any state employee from
expressing public criticism of the Seabrook project. When a suspiciously large number
of local Clamshell supporters in the Seabrook area reported various forms of harassment,
many believed it was part ofThomson's pro-nuclear crusade. According to Harvey
Wasserman, "Thomson's hand had already been evident throughout the town. Tax
assessments for local nuclear opponents had jumped far higher than those who supported
the plant. Known Clamshell sympathizers found themselves with zoning hassles,
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threatening phone calls, tax problems, and an escalating atmosphere of intimidation and
potential violence."70
Thomson's firm grip on the apparatus of state power was augmented by his close
alliance with William Loeb, the archconservative publisher of the Manchester I Jnion
Leader, an outlet for ideological conservatism read by many conservatives nationally.
Loeb used his newspaper as a booster for the Seabrook nuclear plants and as a
mouthpiece for Thomson to denounce the Clamshell Alliance. Throughout the struggle
over the Seabrook nuclear plants, Thomson accused the movement of being run
exclusively by "outsiders" and employed polemical invectives reminiscent of Spiro
Agnew in the late- 1960s. He referred to Clamshell activists as "a filthy, foul, un-
American minority... a gurgling, spurting bunch of unproductive individuals..."71 Thus,
as the May 1, 1977 date approached for what clearly would be the largest of the Clams'
site occupations, both the Alliance and the governor hoped to use the event to address a
national audience. Each became the other's perfect bete noir. As the showdown
approached, tensions escalated. In an article for The Nation. Harvey Wasserman wrote,
"Together Thomson and Loeb used the week prior to the [spring 1977] occupation to
create an environment absent from this country since the days of Vietnam . . . [labelling
alliance members 'communists', 'perverts'... and a 'cover for terrorism'"72 Governor
Thomson seemed prepared to wield the full weight of state power against the Clamshell
Alliance. The degree to which he did shocked even his most ardent detractors.
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Showdown: "The Battle of Seabrook": May
,
1 977
In the days leading up to the April 30-May 1 occupation, the Clamshell Alliance
held workshops on non-violence and passive resistance in churches and classrooms
throughout New England. Those who planned on committing civil disobedience met
with members of their affinity groups with whom they would need to stay in contact
throughout the action. The Clamshell Alliance distributed a "Handbook for Occupiers"
to all planning civil disobedience, which instructed them to bring food, blankets, and
medicine. Many occupiers arrived with lawyers' phone numbers inked onto their hands.
Several local Seabrook residents, including the Santasuccis, opened up their land to the
Clams, where up to 500 congregated and camped out in preparation for the next day's
occupation. Massachusetts Quakers opened up meeting houses as weigh-stations near the
New Hampshire border where a large number of western Massachusetts Clams spent the
night before the action. Clamshell activists car-pooled and chartered buses that streamed
into the Seabrook area, many from Boston area and western Massachusetts colleges. 73
Others came from as far away as Connecticut and Rhode Island, and some from as far
away as New York Chy. Signs all over the Seabrook area reading "Welcome Clams"
greeted them. The atmosphere was one ofexcitement and anticipation as the
preparations took on the air of a large-scale, non-violent military campaign. To New
York Times reporter John Kifiier, Harvey Wasserman declared, "This will be our
Bunker Hill - the first serious resistance."74
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Vmcc O'Connor drove to Scabrook in a largo vehicle with a group ofyounger
eollege Students Iron, Amherst and a pacifist deserter from (he Czechoslovak military
who had swum across a river to Austria and defected O'Connor had attended San
Francisco University, a Jesuit school and was a SNCC organizer in Arkansas in the mid-
L960S. O'Connor later became active in the San Francisco War Resisters League where
he got to know Randy Kchlcr, and later spent eighteen months in prison for refusing
induction into the military As with many affinity groups that trained and traveled
together to Scabrook, a strong esprit de corps quickly developed The group shared
stories and sang. The older, veteran activists shared stories of the U.S. civil rights
struggle and escaping a communist nation O'Connor warned the younger activists that
despite the thorough organizing, things could get unpredictable
I told people, "Look, this could be dangerous, the governor is a nut, the
police have guns "I told them stories of Mississippi about how (his one
woman said, "No one should come to the South unless you're prepared to
die" You don't want to tell people "Don't worry about it, it's
completely cool, there's no problem here when in fact that's not the truth,
so I said, "This could get pretty dangeious "
/s
Despite bellicose rhetoric from the governor and fears of official violence, the
police hoped to avoid conflict The Clamshell Alliance likewise sought to establish
cordial relations with the local police Two days before the occupation, Clamshell
organizers met with Colonel Paul Doyon, who would be in charge of the police during
the occupation, and informed him of their plans The Clams emphasized to Doyan their
lull intention to remain non-violent Relations between the Clamshell and the police, as
Interview with Vincent O'Connor, M;i> L3, 20<h
136
well as the New Hampshire National Guard, would generally remain peaceful
throughout the event. 76
Also two days prior to the occupation, a small delegation ofClams succeeded in
gaining a personal audience with Governor Thomson, who had referred to the Clams as
everything from "sexual deviants" to "terrorists". The meeting produced very little, but
some in the delegation believed they saw a slight softening on the part ofThomson. Two
Clams, Kathy Wolff and Robin Read, emerged from the meeting upbeat, stating, "I think
the meeting blew the governor's mind. He suddenly had to confront the fact that we are
also human beings, and that we were, in fact, committed to non-violence."77 Such
congeniality would prove short-lived, however, as the governor would oversee the state
response to the occupation very much as a general commanding his troupes.
Furthermore, the Loeb press went into overdrive villainizing the Clams One cartoon in
thc Manchester Union Leader depicted an invading army of clams, each with a hammer
and sickle on its shell On April 29, the paper's headline read, "Leftist groups hope for
violence."
7*
On the afternoon of April 30, 1977, the Clams converged on the Seabrook site
from three main staging areas Most arrived by land, but some were ferried to the site on
boats by local lobstermen who were among the strongest local supporters of the
movement, believing the nuclear plants threatened their livelihood. Over 2,000 activists -
- not all of who stayed to be arrested - and over 200 members of the press and media,
6
Wassennan. "High Tension in thc Energy Debate - The Clamshell Response", The Nation, June 18,
1977; Energy War: Reports from the Front , 70.
77
Ibid. 70.
7
* Manchester Union Leader
.
April 29, 1977.
137
poured onto the site. Col. Doyan had decided to let the Clams enter the property rather
than block them at the site's periphery, for fear of violence which might have spilled
onto the streets, especially the main highway into Seabrook, Route l. 79 Describing the
scene sometime later, Harvey Wasserman wrote, "There was an air ofgood feeling and
self-assurance among both the police and occupiers that made events seem more like a
ballet than a traditional political confrontation."80
Hampshire College graduate Robbie Leppzer captured the event in his
documentary, Seabrook 1977. Leppzer's footage shows hundreds upon hundreds of
Clam activists peacefully strolling onto the site. Although older white-haired Quakers
such as B Elizabeth Boardman and Frances Crowe, and others of conventional dress are
seen in the footage, on first sight one could easily think one was watching Woodstock
footage from 1969. The overwhelmingly countercultural nature of the movement
becomes abundantly clear in the documentary. One sees waves of activists with long
hair, tie-died shirts, sandals and other accoutrements of the counterculture backpacking
onto the site. The occupiers appear determined and in good spirits, with a good deal of
camaraderie in evidence. The Clamshell Alliance emphasized that protestors must not
bring any drugs or intoxicants onto the site, a stricture that by all accounts was
enthusiastically respected.
81
John Kifher ofThe New York Times wrote, "The demonstrators intended to set
up a camp site on the grounds modeling their action after a demonstration in western
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Wyhl| in which protestors seized a plant site and stopped construction ofa
nuclear plant." 1" Once on the site, the occupiers dug in, pitching tent, setting up la(rines
and creating what amounted to a small village on the Seabrook site, which the Clams
took to calling "Occupation City".83 Occupiers clustered with their affinity groups and
several distinct "neighborhoods" took shape. As Robbie Lepp/cr captured the event on
film for posterity, I larvey Wasserman was again on hand, in his dual role of activist and
journalist, covering the event for The Nation . Wasserman described the scene:
While most ofthe occupiers went about the business of living, a more or
less permanent conclave of elected representatives took root at the
southwest corner of the campsite. Among other things, this decision-
making body passed ordinances against the construction of nuclear power
plants or the transportation of radioactive materials within "town" limits.
It also sent messages of solidarity to the workers and environmentalists of
the world, and the 3,000 person rally being held across the marsh at the
Hampton Beach State Park by Concerned Citizens of Seabrook and
I lampion falls, an organization of local people opposed to the plant. 81
The police decided to allow the occupiers to camp out and make the arrests the
Ibllowing day. May I ("May Day"). The occupation was far larger than (iovernor
Thomson had anticipated and beyond the capacity of the 140 New Hampshire state
troopers to handle. On May 1, the governor called up New Hampshire's National (iuard,
which converged on the Seabrook site with scores of buses lor the mass arrests. 85 Still,
New I lampshire's recourses were not enough. Declaring a "state of emergency",
(iovernor Thomson put out a call to all New l-ngland governors for police back up. All
of New I{ngland\s governors complied, dispatching a total of 65 state police to
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Seabrook, with one notable and conspicuous exception, Massachusetts governor Michael
Dukakis. Elected in 1974 as an unabashed liberal reformer, Dukakis was the antithesis of
New Hampshire's openly reactionary governor. Both governors made little secret of the
contempt with which they held the other. In response to Governor Thomson's call for
police assistance from Massachusetts, Dukakis declared that there was no threat to
public order and he would thereby refuse to send Massachusetts state police to New
Hampshire. 86 (In the 1980s, Dukakis would likewise refuse to send Massachusetts
National Guard on military maneuvers in I londuras.) Dukakis was no doubt mindful of
the numerous Massachusetts activists camped out at Seabrook whose support he would
court in his bid for re-election the following year. Further, although Dukakis never
advocated dismantling existing nuclear plants in Massachusetts, he had become
unenthusiastic about nuclear energy, declaring, "I don't view nuclear as a particularly
promising or desirable source of energy for the nation and for New England in the
future, (iiven both the environmental problems and also the cost problems, 1 don't see
much of a future for nuclear in the energy picture for this country. I think alternative
sources are where we ought to be moving."87 (In the 1980s, the Bay State governor was
more responsible than any single individual for delaying the Seabrook Nuclear Power
Station Irom going on line.)88
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As a virtual army ofNew Hampshire police, National Guard and police from
Maine, Rhode Island, Connecticut and Vermont amassed outside the nuclear plant site
on May 1, Governor Thomson dramatically arrived by helicopter to take charge of his
troops, with two American flags protruding prominently from his jacket pocket. The
governor and Col. Doyan then met with six elected representatives from the Clamshell
Alliance, including Elizabeth Boardman. The scene resembled opposing generals
meeting on the middle of the field before battle. Col. Doyan greeted Bostonian
Boardman, "How do you do, Elizabeth? Welcome to New Hampshire, although I wish it
was in different circumstances." Doyan implored Boardman and the rest of the Clam
delegation to call off the battle: "I would like to encourage you to call it a weekend."
Boardman told the governor and Col. Doyan, "We are all mutually sorry. But our
purpose was not simply to draw attention to the occupation and capture media attention
but to stop all construction of the proposed power plant." Governor Thomson returned
the politeness "1 doubt that I could persuade you and I doubt that you could persuade
me, but that's America."89 Col Doyan appeared sympathetic according to those
witnessing the scene, expressing regret at what he now was about to do. At
approximately 3 p.m. Col. Doyan walked to the edge of "Occupation City" and over a
loud speaker announced that those not immediately vacating the premises would be
placed under arrest After a brief interval to allow the few who did not wish to be
arrested to leave, the arrests commenced with some occupiers going limp, as they had
been trained at the pre-occupation seminars. Most walked to the waiting buses where
they were photographed and identified. As the mass arrests got under way, one occupier
89 New York Times , May 2, 1977, 1 and 24; Also Richard Asinof. "No-Nukers Demonstrate Their
Strength at Scabrook", Valley Advocate
,
May 11,1 977.
141
Played "We Shall Overcome" on a bagpipe* Washerman described the scene for Jhe
Nation :
The arrests proceeded smoothly, if slowly. Piling people onto chartered
school buses and into National Guard troop carriers, the patrolmen took
more than twelve hours to haul everyone away. Some ofthe occupiers
who had packed up their gear in the afternoon unpacked it again and re-
opened their tents to wait through the long hours of the night. Many were
not arrested until dawn.
In all 1,414 Clamshell activists were taken into custody, taxing New Hampshire's
resources and infrastructure to the core. The occupiers were taken to National Guard
armories at Concord, Manchester, Portsmouth, Dover and Somersworth. Some ofthose
arrested were held for over twelve hours on the buses without access to toilets. Many
supporters ofthose arrested despaired as they frantically tried to find out where their
friends and relatives had been taken. Anna Gyorgy said, "It was a classic police-state
situation... It was like 1,400 people had been 'disappeared' by the state."92 The situation
was chaotic. Many of those arrested went up to three days without being able to
telephone outside supporters or their attorneys. Hundreds went as long as three days
before being provided beds. Meanwhile, Governor Thomson helicoptered back and forth
across New Hampshire, from the Seabrook plant site to the armories and to the courts
where the first occupiers were being arraigned. Early on, arrestees at some sites were
released on "personal recognizance" while at others some were being released on $100
bail. Apprised of this situation, Thomson helicoptered to the Hampton County District
Court and ordered the clerk to put away all personal recognizance forms. Most releases
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stopped throughout the state. 93 Clearly, Governor Thomson believed detainment, which
few Clams had expected to last more than a few days at most, would be a deterrent to
future actions at Seabrook and would bolster his hard-line "law and order" reputation
nationally. Most of those arrested eventually spent at least a week in National Guard
armories and almost 1,000 would be held for two weeks. Bail, originally set at $100,
seemed to rise arbitrarily, to $200 then to $500 (Thomson wanted $1,500) Application of
the law was erratic throughout. To divide the movement, the state pursued a policy of
allowing only New Hampshire residents out on personal recognizance, with the courts
arguing that bail was necessary to make sure out-of-staters showed up for trial. 94 Those
who had already posted $100 bond were told before they were released that the bail had
just increased. One Clam activist exclaimed in exasperation, "At Portsmouth we were
told we would be released on personal recognizance. Then it turned into $100. This
morning it was $200 and this afternoon it's $500 What's next?"95 Lawyers for the
Clamshell Alliance charged the state with "punitive detention", arguing not only that the
bail was excessive, but also unnecessary since all those arrested at previous Clamshell
actions had in fact shown up on their court dates. Attorney Emmanuel Krasner
complained, "It was a travesty. The state violated just about every right in the
Constitution."
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The ACLU soon launched an unsuccessful civil suite against Governor
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The detained activists at all the armories then embarked upon a course of "bail
solidarity", collectively refusing to post bond and demanding to be released on personal
recognizance. Thomson dug in his heels in what the NewYorkTimes described as a
"battle of wills."98 Anna Gyorgy told one reporter, "It's Meldrim. It's showdown in
Meldrimville."" The showdown quickly became the focus of national attention,
receiving coverage from the major television networks, lime, Newsweek, the major
American daily newspapers and the international press. To a national audience Governor
Thomson declared, "We are winning the battle of Seabrook." 100 The governor was
wrong. Each day the Clams were detained resulted in more press and media coverage,
which became increasingly critical of the governor and sympathetic to the Clams.
Remembered Vince O'Connor, "Meldrim Thomson was a lunatic and he played into our
hands by arresting us, which was a terrible mistake on his part because it gave us
enormous publicity and created solidarity among people that exists to this day."""
Moreover, the imprisonment of the activists was costing $50,000 a day in a state with
exceedingly low taxes. Rumblings of discontent emerged even among New
Hampshirites unsympathetic to the Clamshell Alliance (The Loeb press was a notable
exception ) The commissioners of Rockingham County, whose courts would have to try
all those arrested, openly denounced the governor and declared that not only would they
refuse to shoulder the massive legal costs but would sue the governor if he tried to pass
on the costs of the armory detentions to the county. (The costs of the arrests would soon
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be compounded by PSNH utility rate increases to pay for Seabrook's escalating
"construction work in progress" costs, further infuriating New Hampshire's frugal
voters. It would cost Meldrim Thomson his bid for re-election in 1978.) 102
A few days into the detentions, Thomson sought to turn the huge costs to his
advantage by portraying himself as a front-line defense against a radical antinuclear
movement that threatened to sweep the country. Thomson put out a national call to
"corporations, labor unions and rank-and-file citizens throughout America" to send
contributions to defer the huge debt being incurred in New Hampshire. All Americans
should know, declared Thomson, that "Our battle of today can become theirs
tomorrow. " 103 State Attorney General David Souter (the future Supreme Court Justice)
argued that if the Clams were released they would immediately re-occupy the site.
Harvey Wasserman, whom much of the national press now to looked to for comment,
described the governor's call for contributions as "a cheap publicity stunt" and Souter's
fears of re-occupation as "absurd" 104
Meanwhile, those detained in the armories replicated the communal democracy
they had established at "Occupation City" Many sang on the site, while being arrested
and when put in the armories. When faced with decisions the Clams met with their
affinity groups, passing their groups' consensus on up to meetings of elected affinity
group representatives. This was initially frustrating to police and National Guard who
sought in vain for conventional "leaders' with whom to speak. Men and women were
102
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held in common in most of the armories. Although drugs and alcohol were absent
throughout, many romances bloomed in the armories. In response, guards at the
Manchester armory threatened to segregate the men and women, which would have
broken up most of the affinity groups. Near rebellion broke out upon news of this. In an
interview with Barbara Epstein some years later, Boardman described the Guard pulling
her aside and confronting her about the liaisons, which were taking place. Boardman
recounted, "It was evidently my role as an older woman to be shocked about this. I
said.
.
.
'Ifyou separate us from our affinity groups, we are not going to be responsible
for what hell breaks loose.'" 105 The Guard relented so long as barriers were erected for
couples. A similar move to segregate males and females at the Portsmouth armory was
also abandoned after the detainees all tied their shoelaces together and piled their shoes
in the middle of the armory. Other armories like Concord, however, did segregate men
and women. 106 O'Connor recalled this was something of a joke among the gay and
lesbian friendly movement, stating, "They separated men and women but they didn't
quite get the idea that that might not accomplish their goal of suppressing sexual
activities..."
107
Over time, many Clamshell detainees worked to forge positive relations with the
National Guard and to sound them out on their views ofnuclear power. Rennie Cushing.
a highly visible local Clam, recalled, "We treated them [the National Guard] like fellow
human beings. A lot of the Guard was against the nukes to begin with, and a lot more
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were against it by the time the occupation was over." 108 The NewYorkTjmes_ described
relations between the Clams and the National Guard as "strikingly cordial". 109
One poignant story recalled by O'Connor occurred in the Concord armory on the
May 4 anniversary ofthe killings at Kent State:
The real dramatic moment was on May 4.
. . [it was]the anniversary of the
killings at Kent State and so people decided we were gonna hold hands
around the armory, circle the armory and have some minutes of silence
ten or fifteen. We did it and the [National Guard] who were cooking kept
making noises... and the silence just became overpowering, people didn't
tell them to "Shish", we said "We're doing our thing, we'U let them do
what they think is appropriate", and of course who killed the people at
Kent State but the National Guard? You know, this is who is taking care
of us. So finally everything stopped, no one made any noise throughout
the last few minutes, it was very remarkable. Then someone sang us out
of it with the Holly Neir song "It Could Have Been Me". 110
The intimacy was stronger in smaller armories, such as Concord, than
Manchester, the largest, which held over 600 people. Recalled O'Connor, "[E]veryone
could know each other [at] Concord... it had 200 people in it and I mean you could
know everybody by sight and feel comfortable with them..."777 Beyond meeting with
their affinity groups and fraternizing with the Guard, many Clams held informal
seminars on various topics, grouped to sing, met in small prayer groups or read to pass
the time. On the few occasions the Clams were allowed outside, games of Frisbee,
soccer and jumping on makeshift trampolines passed the time. Talent shows were held in
some of the armories. At Portsmouth, some Clams found and prominently displayed a
National Guard sign that read, "As a prisoner I will keep faith with my fellow
108
Wasserman, "High Tension in the Energy Debate - The Clamshell Response", The Nation. June 18,
1977; Energy War: Reports from the Front , 74-5.
109 New York Times
.
May 9, 1977, 18.
110
Interview with Vincent O'Connor, May 13, 2003.
111
Ibid.
147
prisoners. O'Connor observed, "Jails are the university of the revolution, you just
created four universities at Manchester, Concord, Dover, etc." 1,3 Many Clams would
later remember this time as the golden age of the Clamshell Alliance, a time of
"euphoria" and "solidarity" that would be sorely missed a year later when the Clamshell
factionalized. O'Connor said, "The atmosphere in the Concord armory was so good that
people stayed there instead of going back to school, like 'this is the first place in the real
world I feel comfortable outside my family.'" 114
Many attributed the spirit of mutuality and unity to what Clam activist Richard
Asinof, writing for the Valley Advocate described as "the strong impact that women in
key leadership roles exerted on the events." 115 Among the leading women in the
movement were Elizabeth Boardman, Suki Rice, and Anna Gyorgy Kathy Wolff
became co-spokesperson for the movement. Although at first she found that the mostly
male reporters instinctively went to Harvey Wasserman, Wolff asserted herself and took
on a more visible role Wolff asserted that the Clams' good feelings and unity was
largely due to the role women played in forging a new politics that departed from the
machismo of the late 1960s antiwar movement. "Women have been important in holding
the Clamshell together between actions," she said. Women helped the movement
transcend male egotism, what Wolff called the "my dog's bigger than your dog"
syndrome. "That tone is set when you must be competitive. Women have helped the men
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get over this hurdle in the movement.""" Describing this women directed movement,
Asinol wrote ofthe planning for the occupation:
There was very little ego battling in the decision-making bod.es, hardly
any ol the typical behavior associated with academics, bureaucrats and
radical groups, ofpeople speaking just to listen to themselves talk. When
Sam Lovejoy started monopolizing the phone and information at
Clamshell headquarters, he was quickly banished lor the next day at the
Portsmouth office.
Clamshell women further sought to make the connections between the
BntinUClear movement and feminism Anna ( iyorgy and Nesta King, a doctoral candidate
in feminism and ecology, at one Clam gathering, conducted a seminar on "Women and
Knergy", which they described in the program: "The connections between leminism and
stopping nuclear power. Why the issue is relevant to women. Nuclear power as a
manifestation Ofmale domination and exploitation ofthe earth. Women's concerns as
bearers of future generations."" 8
Despite the high spirits and camaraderie between men and women in the
armories, concerns arose. As the detentions dragged on, lawyers for the Clamshell
Alliance worried aloud about health conditions in the armories, taking their case lor
release to federal court where they described the armories as "ideal for transmission of
epidemic diseases." They were unsuccessful. A slow stream of Clam activists trickled
out of the armories, paying their bail so that they could return to their jobs or college
final exams. Ity May 10, however, there were still 7.U Clam detainees in New
'"•
Ibid
1,7
Ibid I ovejoy ran into (rouble dominating meetings dur ing the Montague protests as well, on one
OCC&sion being asked lo stop repeating points made by women in (lie group Telephone interview with
Vinoe O'Connor, April 3, 2003,
Turning Tide: The l ime lor Sale, Local and Renewable Lnergy Has C ome", Program, drCQ l 4>77
I97K Frances Crowe Papers, Sophia Smith Collection
149
Hampshire's armories. 119 Finally, after two weeks of detention, Rockingham County
prosecutor Carlton Eldridge entered into negotiations with the remaining detained
Clamshell activists. Eldridge offered to release the Clamshell detainees on personal
recognizance in exchange for mass trials, which would save the county enormous
expense. Breaking into their affinity groups, the detainees at the Somersworth, Dover
and Portsmouth armories accepted the deal; however, objections arose at the Manchester
and Concord armories, forcing the Clams and Eldridge back into negotiation. The
dissenting Clams demanded that some of the detainees receive public trials and at least
one jury trial (this would allow the Clams to attempt to put nuclear energy on trial in a
public forum as Sam Lovejoy had done in western Massachusetts). They also demanded
refunds for those who had already bailed out. With the prolonged detentions causing
national embarrassment for the state, and with the spiraling costs of the mass detainment,
Eldridge agreed to most of the Clams demands. The detained Clams finally approved the
deal on May 13. The processing and release of the last 541 detained Clams went on
through the night, taking over fourteen hours, but by May 14, two weeks after the
occupation began, all the Clamshell occupiers were now free. 120 Commenting on the
deal, Clam negotiator Charles Light declared, "... I guess the weight of all those people
was just too much for the state to carry." 121 As O'Connor recalled, "The meter was
running [and] they just couldn't handle the bills." 122
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Six months later, in November, 1977, the public trials demanded by the Clams
commenced in Rockingham County Superior Court By the agreement srxty-four Clam
activists were to be given public trials. Twenty-six year old Carter Wentworth, an artist
from Kensington, not far from Seabrook, was the focus of the jury trial. Wentworth was
represented by Boston attorney Eric Blumenson. On Wentworth' s behalf, Blumenson
announced he would employ a "competing harms" defense similar to the "necessity
defense" used by Sam Lovejoy in 1974. Also like Lovejoy, the defense stated that it
would call experts on nuclear energy and civil disobedience such as Dr. Helen Caldicott
and Boston University historian Howard Zinn, in an attempt to "put the nuclear industry
on trial". Presiding judge Wayne Mullavey denied both motions. 123 Wentworth sought to
persuade the jury of three men and three women of the necessity of occupying the site to
protect others from the potential harm of nuclear energy: "I went to Seabrook to protect
my life and my neighbors' lives. 1 was acting under the freedoms given to us in our
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence."' 24 With instructions to ignore the
"competing harms" defense from Judge Mullavey, the jury declared Wentworth "guilty".
The county prosecutor then asked the judge to pass down a sentence of 15 days and a
fine of $100. Surprising even the prosecution, Judge Mullavey passed down a sentence
of four months in prison. Describing the occupation of April 30 as a "mob action" and
mindful of Clamshell planning for another occupation in the spring of 1978, Mullavey
proclaimed, "This is one of the few cases since I've been on the bench in which
23
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sentencing may serve as a deterrent to future crimes ofthis type As the othei public
trials plodded along, similai sentences ofthree to foui months were meted oui The
Sentences wc.c fai longei than those usually g.vcn in New I lampshire curls fo!
"criminal trespass" Meanwhile, the ...ass trials ofthe vast majority ofthe occupiers,
agreed to in the May I | accord, were so long delayed that charges were eventually
dropped Some speculated thai the uneven sentencing, like the ea.ly distinctions made
between New I la.npsh.ie and out of slate ( lams, was ...tended to drive a wedge into the
movement 126
in mid-May of 1977, howevc., the clamshell Alliance was ignorant ofthe harsh
sentences thai lay down the ,oad To. a fraction of the occupies The mood upon the
release ofthe lasl detainees was euphonc and Clamshell activists fell a growing sense of
momentum that they hoped would snowball not only in New England but nationally and
internationally iiaivey Wasserman sought to sum up the impact ofthe April-May action
lo. leaders of The Nation
If the occupation pioved the anl.nuclea. movement had reached a new
level ofmaturity and mass appeal, ii also seemed a powerful testament to
the tactics ol non violence l oi the third tune the Clamshell Alliance had
staged a mass civil disobedience at lion without a single incidence of
violence 01 seiious bodily haim I he tactics of peaceful action had
opened ihe gales to the site when any Othei approach seemed certain to
have kept them closed ll also maintained foi the occupation an
ovei whelming base of credibility and populai support against which the
Thomson administration was simply unable lo respond
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The Clamshell Alliance had indeed grown dramatically within the short space of
one year The April-May action had successfully linked nuclear power at Seabrook to a
growing nuclear debate nationally by generating a great deal of national press and media
coverage, much of it sympathetic (Nevertheless many Clams repeatedly complained that
most press and media coverage focused on the arrests and detainments without delving
into the underlying dangers of nuclear energy, which had prompted so many to risk so
much by occupying the Seabrook site ) The direct -action militancy of the Clamshell
Alliance now became a model for new antinuclear groups which began emerging around
the country, such as the Abalone Alliance (California), the Palmetto Alliance (South
Carolina), the Oyster Shell Alliance (Louisiana), the Crabshell Alliance (Washington)
and the Conch Shell Alliance (Florida). 128 With the immense publicity the Clamshell had
achieved and with a growing sense of momentum, there was no doubt that the
organization would continue its exponential growth Looking ahead, Wasserman wrote:
Now, in the wake of its third tenfold increase in size, the alliance faces a
critical period Direct-action environmentalism has clearly accelerated
from a small assembly of local groups to a full-scale movement, and with
(hat must inevitably come all the growing pains of factionalism and
organizational strain.
129
Wasserman's forecast would prove far more accurate in 1978 than he realized, as
the Clamshell Alliance increasingly became divided over goals and strategy, with two
major factions emerging, "Soft Clams" and the smaller, more militant "Hard Clams".
But before the Clamshell had to deal with dissension within its own ranks, it braced for a
major pro-nuclear counter-offensive
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Corporate-Labor Pro-Nuclear Counteroffensivp
In the fall elections of 1976, environmental activists had put antinuclear
initiatives on the ballot in six states. The initiatives did not seek to ban nuclear energy
outright but rather sought to establish requirements for nuclear waste disposal, added
safety requirements, or the empowerment of state legislatures to regulate the nuclear
industry. Many ofthese baUot initiatives were complex, but all would have in affect put
serious brakes on the nuclear industry's growth. The most contested was Proposition 1
5
in the state of California, which would have given the California legislature wide
ranging powers to set standards for the nuclear industry, or impose a nuclear moratorium
if it chose. The California campaign was representative of the many ballot initiatives that
year in which environmentalists were heavily outspent by the nuclear industry. Since the
initiative was complex, the nuclear industry worked to further obfuscate the issue by
urging voters, "If you're confused, vote no."
130
But what ultimately worked most to
defeat the ballot initiative was a massive pro-nuclear campaign by organized labor that
was closely coordinated with the nuclear industry. Organized labor fanned out across
California, making arguments similar to those used by George O'Brien in the 1974
western Massachusetts referenda debate. When the California antinuclear initiative was
defeated, a representative for California's PSE & G gave most of the credit to the work
done by California workers: "The very fact of the visibility of neighborhood campaign
workers in so many communities acted as an offset to the 'it's the little people vs. the
Joppke, 66-7; Thomas R. Wellock, Critical Masses: Opposition to Nuclear Power in California, 1958-
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giant corporations' argument being used by the proponents [of the antinuelear
initiative]." 131
In New England, the corporate-labor alliance was once again mobilized, this time
against the Clamshell Alliance. New Hampshire's PSNI [, the largest shareholder in the
Seabrook nuclear project, organized a putative citizens' group called
-New I lampshire
Voice ofEnergy", which, though largely funded by the utility company, sought to put
organized labor front and center. George O'Brien, along with scores of New England
labor leaders, attended a "New England Nuclear Advocates Workshop" in early 1977,
where attendees were instructed how to make the case lor nuclear power in television
interviews and debates ("When asked a tough question, ask, 'Are you sure of your
facts?'"; " Try to end on an upbeat note"; "Never apologize on the air.") 112 As the
Seabrook struggle heated up, O'Brien again took up the pro-nuclear cause. At a locally
televised debate at I lampshire College in western Massachusetts, O'Brien sought to
highlight what he saw as the hypocrisy of the Clamshell Alliance:
How many gallons of file] were wasted on the trip to Seabrook to protest
and demonstrate? Surely, everyone didn't walk to Seabrook. How much
fuel was used to light the armories and eourtrooms in Manchester? How
much fuel was used to police and transport the demonstrators from
Seabrook to Manehester? Who's kidding who when they urge
conservation fuel?
1 11
A few weeks after the last Seabrook detainees were released, New Hampshire
Voice of Kncrgy staged what Harvey Wasserman himself described as "the nation's
largest pro-nuclear rally." Over 3,000 workers from New England, and some from as far
in
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south as Philadelphia and New Jersey, held a boisterous rally for nuclear power in
Manchester's JFK Arena. Many took up the chant, "Nukes! Nukes! Nukes!" and others
held banners reading, "Nuclear Power: The Pollution Solution" and "Nuclear Power:
Safer than Sex". Many in attendance wore hardhats as they listened to Governor
Meldrim Thomson praise them as "good Americans [who] came together, obeyed the
law, and made your point. You're much better than what I saw May first. By
comparison, you're beautiful " ,34 Also speaking was MIT professor Norman Rasmussen,
who had conducted a report for the AEC in the early 1970s, which concluded that the
likelihood of a nuclear catastrophe was negligible (the report was hotly contested by
other, more skeptical scientists ) To cheers, Rasmussen denounced Clamshell activists as
"irrational and illogical". Conservative Massachusetts Democrat Ed King (soon to defeat
Michael Dukakis in his bid for re-nomination in the 1978 Democratic primary)
proclaimed, "This really is the death struggle against the no-growth advocates." 135
Looking back, Wasserman observed, "The demonstration underscored ongoing support
for the Seabrook project, and further reminded antinuclear organizers of the urgency of
building ties with the union movement " , 36
Harvey Wasserman joined a growing number of national environmentalists who
sought to forge ties between the antinuclear movement and organized labor Wasserman
became active in Environmentalists for Full Employment, which sought to mobilize
environmentalists behind labor actions such as "Full Employment Week", and got the
134
Harvey Wasserman, "The Lyndon Johnson of die Seventies", Vallev Advocate
.
June 29. 1977; Energy
War: Reports from the Front
.
88-9
135
Ibid 88-9.
136
//>/</. 88-9.
156
support of some unions for pro-solar "Sun Day" celebrations in 1978. 137 The Clamshell
Alliance itselfhad worked to win support from labor. In a Clam newsletter entitled
"Workers, Energy and Jobs", the Clams quoted the United Auto Workers Leo Goodman,
who had campaigned against a Detroit nuclear plant in the 1950s and continued to
oppose nuclear energy in the 1970s: "There is no ecology-job conflict. We must have a
common goal to improve the quality of life. It is our right, not a privilege, to have
meaningful, safe and healthy jobs." The newsletter also declared, "IfALL Federal
buildings were required to use solar and conservation methods (400,000 federal
buildings) look at all the jobs that would be created. WOULDN'T WORKERS AND
UNIONS SUPPORT THAT?" 138 Antinuclear activists did forge some alliances with
labor in the late 1 970s. Sheet metal workers were enthusiastic about the prospects for
solar energy, and more socially activist unions such as the UAW and the Oil, Chemical
and Atomic Workers Union forged tenuous ties with the antinuclear movement. These,
however, were the exception. At its 1 976 convention, the AFL-CIO endorsed a strongly
pro-nuclear platform and continued to make strenuous efforts to speed up the
construction of nuclear plants throughout the 1970s. 139
Cracks in the Clamshell : "Hard Clams", "Soft Clams", "Closet Clams"and the Debate
Over a Fourth Occupation
The spring 1977 occupation had catapulted the Clamshell Alliance into the
national spotlight and made the Seabrook nuclear plants a symbol of the nation's
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growing nuclear debate In the months aRer the occupation, new recruits from
throughout New England poured into the Clamshell Alliance As the Clamshell sought to
absorb the mass influx, it continued to hold legal demonstrations and prepare for the
trials of those arrested at the April-May action Up until the spring of 1977, the
Clamshell Alliance was predominantly comprised of like-minded members and the slow
consensus process plodded along smoothly During the winter of 1977-78, however, as
the Clams planned for a fourth occupation for the coming spring, tensions were growing
both from without and from within the Alliance
By the winter of 1977, the ( lams increasingly found themselves entering a siege
mentality Numerous reports came to the fore of police infiltration, double-ringing
telephones (indicating phone taps), and mysterious vehicles parked outside Clam
meeting places which would pull out when approached and later turn out to have
untraceable license plates
140
Local Seabrook supporters of the Clamshell Alliance
complained of property tax increases disproportionate to their neighbors' and frequent
zoning hassles Tony Santasucci and at least one other local (Mam supporter complained
Oflow-flying helicopters buzzing their home 141 Compounding the sense of siege was
increasingly bellicose rhetoric from Governor Thomson that made some in the
movement fear he intended to turn Seabrook into "Chicago 1968" should the (Mams go
ahead with a fourth occupation The potential for violence had escalated now that PSNH
had fenced in most of the Seabrook nuclear construction site Since the Clamshell
'
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Alliance had worked so hard to cultivate cordial relations with law enforcement, the
prospects of violent confrontations with police and National Guard were unnerving.
The Clamshell's biggest problems, however, came from within. There were some
in the Clamshell who seemed more interested in the movement for the sense of
community it conveyed and as a vehicle through which to put their non-violent beliefs
into practice than stopping construction ofthe Seabrook plants. These Clams seemed
more attracted to the movement's form than its substance and often downplayed the
importance of pragmatic tactical questions Vince O'Connor observed a cleavage that
sometimes emerged between the leadership and the rank-and-file: "People had been
through enough organizations that they knew how organizations worked and they...
were to accomplish goals; for some people, the first time around they're a way to
express who you are.
.
" ,42 Was non-violence a lifestyle or tactic? Christian Joppke, in
his comparative study of the U.S. and West German antinuclear movements, writes that
for these Clams, "Opposing nuclear power was only the negative folio against which the
movement project of empowerment and community building unfolded." 143 Writing for
New Age in the fall of 1977, Harvey Wasserman sought to remind some in the
movement that the goal of the non-violent strategy was to stop the nuclear plants from
being built After surveying the history of non-violent activism in U.S. history,
Wasserman quotes Cesar Chavez, the labor organizer of Chicano grape pickers in the
1960s:
If all you're interested in is going around being non-violent and so
concerned about yourself, at some point the whole thing breaks down -
and you say to yourself, "Well, let them be violent, as long as I'm non-
142
Interview with Vincent O'Connor, May 13, 2003; see also Joppke, 79-80.
143
Ibid. 79.
159
violent " Or you begin to think it's okay to lose the battle as long as you
remain non-violent The idea is that you have to win and be non-violent
That's extremely important What do the poor care about strange
philosophies of non-violence if it doesn't mean bread for lhem'>' 44
Of more concern than those who saw the movement as a way of life were those
who now entered the movement and viewed the Clamshell Alliance as an instrument
with which to launch a full, frontal assault on the capitalist state Several small but
highly organized and ideologically committed anarchist groups joined the Clamshell,
turning their affinity groups into platforms to advocate much more militant action
against the Seabrook plants The anarchist groups were based mostly in Cambridge,
particularly MIT, but enjoyed support from some of the more radical antinuclear
activists in Vermont. Groups such as "Black Rose" and "Hard Rain" introduced a
sectarian style into the Boston Clamshell alien to the group's early spirit Hard Rain and
Black Rose believed the Clamshell had to embrace a more openly radical critique of the
corporate state, and adopt more militant strategies to shut the Seabrook plants down The
anarchist groups were the most visible members of those now calling themselves "Hard
(Mams" or the "Action Paction". These Clams had nothing but contempt for what they
saw as a bourgeois fetishism for symbolic non-violence in the movement, which they
believed alienated the predominantly white, middle class movement from the working
class Rather than occupy the Seabrook site to generate publicity and elevate the national
debate on nuclear power, the "Hard Clams" argued vociferously that, as in Europe, the
movement needed to move in the direction of making it physically impossible for the
plants to ever go online Black Rose, Hard Rain and the other "Hard ('lams" they
appealed to, in many ways, sought to radicalize the Clamshell in much the same way as
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SDS had worked to radicalize the antiwar movement in the late 1960s and as West
German leftists were then doing with the antinuclear movement across the Atlantic. 145
The influx ofthese new groups dramatically altered the dynamics of the
Clamshell Alliance, making consensus increasingly difficult as the Clams planned the
fourth occupation. One question now became the fulcrum upon which the divisions in
the Alliance pivoted: Since the Seabrook site was fenced in, should the Clams employ
fence-cutting to gain entrance to the site? From its inception, the Clamshell's principk
stated that destruction of property was not consistent with non-violence. Some Clams
stuck rigidly to this principle and declared they would take no part in fence cutting.
Some, who supported Sam Lovejoy's tower toppling in Montague, believed fence
cutting would be different than toppling the tower by night since it would lead to a direct
confrontation with police. The Clamshell's core organizers believed they could attract
between 3,000 and 5,000 occupiers to any fourth occupation; however, the bellicose
threats coming from New Hampshire caused many to fear the consequences of another
146
occupation.
The Hard Clams' calls for fence cutting and a forced entry of the construction
site put the Alliance on a collision course with a state government prepared to marshal
all its resources, and a governor who now refused to rule out lethal force. Governor
Thomson still smarted from the 1977 occupation that had cost the state $50,000 a day
and generated widespread sympathy for the Clamshell Alliance. Now the Clams
threatened to compound the cost to the state by scheduling the late June occupation for
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the kick-offofthe summer tourist season, Thomas Rath, New Hampshire's attorney
general argued .he line had to be draw,, "Seabrook is becoming the spring thing to do".
Rath sighed, and threatened the use of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) police 147
SWAT units had been created ... the late 1960s to combat .evolutionary leftists, but had
fallen out of popularity until 1077 when, according to one swat member, they were
"being reactivated because Ofgrowing fear that our country may be subject to terrorist
organizations and Seab.ook-like demonstrations
" Mx
Rockingham County district
attorney Carlton Hdridgc went even lurlhe. "Let's just say that we will make their visit
to OUI eounty as uncomfortable as possible The governor has said the same thing We
will use whatever force options we have, from nothing to bullets Non-violent ai rests
aren't the only thing in our arsenal I low far aie we willing to go'> Far " 149 The govemoi
threatened lire hoses and dogs, and declared that he was willing to elose the
Massachusetts-New Hampshire bordei and declare martial law "I have nevei used this
power before and I hope I don't have to use it for this demonstration," warned
Thomson 130
On top of the slate, pnvate right-wing groups in New Hampshire thieatened
violence At one small but vociferous anti-Clam rally, pro-nuclear protestors held signs
such as "Clams Should be Steamed and Not Heard" and "Clamshell Alliance Are a
Bunch of Jewish-Communist Hypocrite Stooges"
|S|
A leader of a right wing militia-
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type group died the Continental Line boasted, "We warn the Clanishel] to know we
have infiltrated (hem and are taking notes."152 Sam Lovejoy responded to (he threats,
"Sounds like more ofthe violeni talk that is only provocative and self-serving on the part
ofthe state. Violence will be the limit ofthe police or provocateurs outside the
( llamsheU. The biggest wild card is the right wing and construction trades folks, and .1
doesn't lake many ofthem."153
With the militancy ofthe Hard Clams and preparations lor martial law by the
state threatening to turn their hometown into a war /one, local sympathizers ofthe
Clamshell began withdrawing their support lor the occupation, including use oftheir
properlies as staging grounds. Since many in the movement believed local support
conlerrcd legitimacy on the Alliance and was crucial logistically, anything like fence
cutting and a forced occupation that jeopardized that support was anathema. Iv|
At Boston Clamshell meetings. Black Rose and Hard Rain continued to argue
strenuously lor fence cutting and occupying the site rn masse. These tactics, they
pointed out, had been used extensively in the European anlinuelcar movement. Non-
violent purists were aghast and many rank-and lile ( lams over whelmed by the "I lard
( !lams" stridency and use of anarchist theories. Those who had lived through the l%()s
could recall how small sectarian groups like the Maoist Progressive Labor had mired
down SI )S in never ending sectarian debate. I larvey Wasserman described the healed
Boston ( lam meetings lor WIN, a radical pacifist magazine associated with the War
Resist ers I eague:
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In Boston unanimity became impossible. A small but dedicated faction
within the Clamshell there found it necessary to continually block
consensus on basic issues of non-violence, advocating cutting off fences
and prolonging debate over basic guidelines of occupation behavior to the
point where meaningful political action became virtually impossible
Repeatedly Clamshell members asked that the minority stand aside orform their own group, and repeatedly the "action faction" refused,
pushing the issue until the moment it seemed they would finally be
expelled, and then strategically stepping down to keep a toehold inside
the Clamshell so they could fight again another day. It did not take long
for Boston meetings to degenerate into unpleasant and unproductive
debating matches, which debilitated much of Boston's organizing. 155
Although Wasserman's description spoke for many, perhaps a majority of Clams,
the Boston-based anarchists' arguments resonated with many other Clams, especially the
further away from Seabrook one got. Many out-of-state Clams were anxious to occupy
the site and believed the core, unofficial leadership, the "Soft Clams", was steering the
movement into safe, mainstream waters. Charges of "sell out" and "lack ofdemocracy"
began to be heard at local Clam meetings outside the militants' Boston base. Many
resented the high public profile of Wasserman, Anna Gyorgy, Sam Lovejoy, Kathy
Wolffand New Hampshire Clams such as Rennie Cushing and Guy Chichester, charging
them with "star tripping". 156 Although few "Hard Clams" outside of Boston subscribed
to anarchist principles, Hard Rain and Black Rose's militancy and charges ofmovement
"elitism" rang true for a growing number ofClam activists. Wasserman acknowledged
these divisions, describing Clam meetings throughout New England, which "could test
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the commitment ofeven the strongest Quake soul" while Clam staff"turned over
rapidly as nervous systems burned out under the strain » 157
it was m this tense atmosphere that New Hampshire's Attorney General Philip
Rath (who had recently replaced David Souter) astutely handed the Clamshell Alhanee
an Offer that would exaeerhate the Clams' divisions to the breaking point Kail,
approached the Clamshell's I 3-member coordinating eommittee with an oiler to allow
Hie Clams to hold a legal three-day rally on eighteen aeies ofproperty on the Seab.ook
site The only conditions were the Clams would promise to leave the site at the
designated time and engage in no illegal actions Many believed the offer was meant to
be rejected and thus make the Clams look obstinate and the stale and PSN1 1 appear
reasonable by Comparison Although the conservative Manchester Union l eader
denounced the deal as a "capitulationist" compromise with the Clamshell, (iovernoi
Thomson and psnii supported it |sx
The offei lut the Clamshell like a thunderbolt" Wasseiman wrote sometime
later, adding, " The Rath pioposal was clearly an attempt at cooplalion Polarization
within I he Alliance soared sky-high " l59 "Soil Clams" argued that acceptance of the
pioposal would neutralize Thomson and the Loeb piess's depiction of the (lams as a
militant fringe and allord the Clams an opportunity to stage a legal event m which the
antinuclear silent majority, the so-called "Closet Clams", would come out into the open
Maid Clams" shot back that the (iovernoi and l\SNII would never make such an oiler
'
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i. didn't serve their interests, that it was an effort to bottle up the antinuelear movement's
growing militaney and that aeceptance would be a blatant sell out. 160
Since the offer was made only several weeks before the planned June occupation
and at a time when the Clamshell had little hope of reaching consensus on how to
occupy the site, a response had to come quickly. The Clamshell coordinating committee
replied with a series ofdemands for safety requirements and plans for nuclear disposal
that if accepted would have had the effect of shutting down the plants. Rath refused
these counterproposals. With time running out, the coordinating committee accepted
Rath's proposal without sending the question down through the "spokes" to the
Clamshell's many allinity groups for approval. The committee announced, 'The
Clamshell has decided to hold a completely legal action and to not transgress the fenced
in construction area. Anyone who does so is not a member of the Clamshell Alliance." 161
This unilateral decision was almost heresy in an organization that had always worked by
consensus and claimed to be without leaders. The fact that the deal was reported in the
press before the coordinating committee had time to notify local Clam chapters, making
it dfaU accompli, compounded the outrage. 162
Acceptance ofthe Rath proposal set offa storm within the Clamshell. Members
denounced the coordinating committee as "sell outs" and accused them of "betrayal",
"subversion of process" and "elitism". Harvey Halpern, an outspoken representative of
the Boston "Hard Clams" called a legal rally "an ineffective symbolic act", adding, "1
have nothing against legal rallies, but we can't stop there. I would like to have direct
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action rather than moral witness." 163 Boston "Hard Clams" announced the formation of
"Clams for Democracy" and talked openly of carrying out civil disobedience on their
own at the legal rally. Others begrudgingly accepted the deal. Although many Clams
pointed out the positive side of the deal, few were convincing or enthusiastic. In the
maelstrom that followed acceptance of the Rath proposal, the fault lines that had been
growing in the Clamshell became clearer. Many discerned a Seabrook-western
Massachusetts alliance that advocated the deal, with Boston Clams divided and most
other out-of-state Clams decidedly against the deal. The former defended the deal as
necessary to maintain the Clams' local base and as an opportunity for outreach to the
supposed legions of "Closet Clams". The latter replied that locals should not be given a
special veto within the Clamshell as a nuclear catastrophe at Seabrook would affect
much of the region and since Seabrook had become a national symbol of nuclear
power. 164 Barbara Epstein argues that the divisions took on the dimensions of a "rural vs.
urban" dichotomy, writing, "many Clamshell activists in northern New England believed
that the rural roots of the movement mattered most, that what went on in Boston should
not be given undue weight. The view circulated among the rural people (most ofwhom
had recently fled the cities themselves) that the behavior of the Hard Rain people could
be put down to urban stress: city life drives people crazy." 165 Epstein singles out the
activists from the Montague Farm as representative of this tendency: "If any social form
was privileged in the movement it was the collective. The influence of the Montague
New Times
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Farm people was enhanced by the feet tha, ,hey represented a rural eommune. .."'« For
"Hard Clams", however, this was unacceptable and many referred to activists such as
Anna Gyorgy, Sam Lovejoy and Harvey Wasserman as the "Montague Farm Gang" or
the "Montague Farm Mafia" '« The divisions between urban militants and
countercultural rural activists hearkened back to the fissures tha, shot through the
Liberation News Service in 1968, and was a far cry from the harmony, unity and good
feelings of the 1 977 occupation.
Throughout 1977 and 1978, Wasserman had been not only the foremost
chronicler of the Clamshell movement in numerous magazine articles, but had become
an official spokesperson for the movement. Throughout its coverage of the Seabrook
saga, the I^w^rJOi^ and Boston Globe repeatedly sought out Wasserman for
comment, frequently juxtaposing Wasserman's replies with responses from Meldrim
Thomson. In almost all of Wasserman's articles and interviews, he dealt openly with
challenges facing the Clamshell Alliance and divisions in the movement. A notably
different tone emerges in Wasserman's piece for WIN magazine in June 1978. In an
uncharacteristically partisan tone, Wasserman denounced Black Rose and Hard Rain as
"a small but persistent minority bent on blocking unanimity without compromise" and
practitioners of "minority tyranny". 168 Wasserman insinuates that the Boston groups
were agent provocateurs: "Such infiltration could serve at least two purposes - it could
provide police with a constant supply of information, and it could also serve to disrupt
the organization from within... and promote violence." Backing off a bit, he wrote
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"There are obviously those within the movement who sincerely do not aeeept the taetics
ofnon-violenee as the best method of stopping atomie power and weapons and charges
of police infiltration must never be made against specific people [emphasis added]
without plenty ofevidence.'- Sam Lovejoy told a reporter, "It's absolutely true that
this organization is paranoid. I've seen some new faces who were pretty suspicious-
looking to me.'- For "Hard Clams", in turn, Wasserman and his associates were
suspect. Harvey Halpern of the "Hard Clams" called Jim Garrison, one of the Clam
architects ofthe deal, "a psychotic liar or a police agent." 171
As in-fighting spread through the Clams' ranks, both "Hard" and "Soft" Clams
invoked the experience of the much larger European antinuclear movement. For Boston
Harvey Halpern, the European antinuclear activists had made fence-cutting an art form,
which Americans would be wise to emulate. Further, the key to the success at Wyhl was
that occupation's sheer numbers, something the Clamshell was now in a position to
replicate.
172
For Wasserman, the lessons of Wyhl were different: "The three to four
thousand trained occupiers on which the [Clamshell] Alliance knew it could count might
have been able to move in from Massachusetts and Maine. But that was contrary to the
founding principles that, as at Wyhl, Germany, actions must spring from the local
community. No land, no local support - no occupation." 173
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The decision of the Clamshell Coordinating Committee left negative feeling,
Recriminations and second-guessing that would last for years. On the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the formation of the Clamshell Alliance, "Soft" Clam Kathy Wolff looked
back, still torn and said, "Perhaps we should have forged ahead with the occupation^
In a 1981 interview, Harvey Wasserman reflected, "For whatever reason... people in
New Hampshire decided that politically it was acceptable to break the law, but it was not
right to destroy property. Now in Massachusetts it might have been different, I think it
would have been different.'"* Ultimately, the decision sapped much of the Clamshell's
militancy, leaving a good deal of demoralization in its wake and depleted the movement
of its momentum, which was its strength. Had the Clams attempted to enter the Seabrook
site by force, however, there is little doubt that things would have gotten rough.
Governor Thomson was determined to avoid another illegal occupation and made clear
his willingness to use force to do so. A violent confrontation would have altered the non-
violent image of both the Clamshell Alliance and the national antinuclear movement at
the time. In West Germany, radical leftists in the antinuclear movement waged huge
street battles with riot police, which ended up squandering much of the good will the
movement had gained with the West German public after the peaceful mass occupation
of Wyhl in 1975. 176 Wasserman described the damned-if-you-do-damned-if-you-don't
scenario that faced the Clamshell Alliance:
They made us a middle-ground offer that became very hard to refuse. If
we refused a peaceful solution we'd appear unreasonable and lose the
credibility we gained last year. Ifwe accepted, it would look like we were
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The negative fallout from the Clamshell Alliance's decision to accept the Rath
proposal obscured some of the positive features of the legal "occupation" which
occurred in mid-June. With very little time to organize, the Clamshell was able to put
together a three and a halfday event which was attended by over 20,000 people.
Approximately 6,000 Clams camped out on the site during the event, many acting as
"peace marshals" and directing the massive influx of traffic to the site. At the fair held
Saturday, June 24 were numerous alternative energy exhibitions such as solar energy
collectors, solar ovens, windmills and geodesic domes. There were numerous
informational tables with literature discussing the dangers of nuclear power and the
potential of conservation and alternative energy. 178 By 1978, the national antinuclear
movement was placing added emphasis on conservation and energy alternatives to coal,
oil and nuclear. This was in large measure due to the 1976 state referenda campaigns,
where antinuclear activists concluded their antinuclear message suffered from not
putting forth alternatives to nuclear energy more forcefully. Many concluded that the
"jobs vs. the environment" framework of the nuclear debates in the 1976 referenda
campaigns had worked to the detriment of the antinuclear movement. 179 A further
impetus toward the emphasis on alternative energy and conservation came with Amory
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Lovins' 1976 work, SoftEr^P^hs, in which the respected scientist outlined
"soft" model of energy production and use which would not only diminish depend,
on oil, coal and nuclear energy, but take energy production from huge multinational
corporations and disperse it in a decentralized and democratic manner throughout the
United States. Lovins vision of locally controlled energy had great appeal to antinuclear
groups like the Clamshell which so highly valued grass-roots democracy. 180
The Alternative Energy Fair offered the Clamshell Alliance an opportunity to
showcase "soft" energy and its potential Despite the absence of a confrontation between
the Clams and the state, the event still received a good deal of friendly press and media
coverage. The event had the feel of a county fair more than a political rally, which
largely contnbuted to the huge crowds of local Seabrook and other New Hampshire
residents. Some were the much bally-hoed "Soft Clams", while many others were
merely curious Nevertheless, the Alternative Energy Fair afforded the Clamshell
Alliance an opportunity to communicate with many people who would have been scared
off by the prospect of a confrontation. Adding to the festive atmosphere were musical
performances and speeches on Sunday, June 25 by nationally known performers such as
Pete Seeger, Arlo Guthrie and Jackson Browne. The Sunday rally included speakers
such as Dr. John Gofman who had testified on behalfof Sam Lovejoy in 1974, civil
rights veteran and comedian Dick Gregory and renowned pediatrician and antiwar
activist, Dr. Benjamin Spock. Some of the speakers found themselves involved in the
"Hard Clam"-"Soft Clam" dispute. Dick Gregory told a reporter for the Boston Globe
he was shocked to hear about the deal with the state and had second thoughts about
1 80 Amory Lovins, Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable Peace (San Francisco: Friends ofthe Earth
International, 1977).
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•"ending. In a on^n-onc with "Hard Clam" Harvey Halpem, Benjamin Spock said,
"... Ifenough people show their opposition to nuclear power, whicW, way .hey do it,
ii doesn't matter."181
As New i [ampshire locals milled around information tables and involved
themselves with interactive exhibits, 1 lard (W, mainly from Boston and western
Massachusetts colleges, organized as ^lams for Democracy**, circulated through the
crowd handing out literature calling lor another mass occupation ofthe Seabrook site.
One ( lams lor Democracy llier read:
A large number ofpeople have experienced dissatisfection with the
shallowness ofpolitical debate within the ( !lamshell. The leaderships
private dealings with the stale 111 recent weeks has aggravated the
situation, creating doubts about the Alliance's ability or desire to stop
nuclear power through direct action... I low can we mobilize ourselves in
solidarity AtiAINST the State?182
Some discussed staying on the site after the designated hour for leaving, hut no
occupation materialized. 183 In an interview lor the New York Times, Wasser.nan sought
to put the best possible liice on the l air:
This demonstration brought out the closet ( lams. The vast majority ofthe
people who came here Sunday were local people who have had doubts
about the ( lams in the past. I've always thought we'd stop this plant, but
at times I've been weary. Now Tin sure. 1X4
Boston Globe. June 25, M>78, I.
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"Seahrook Protest Largest Anti-Nuke Rally 111 U S ", Valley Advocate, July 5, i<>78, 10. Out-of-StatOTS,
many coming hundreds ol miles wi re particularly outraged. One told a reporter, '1 suppose I would have
been seared by Thomson and his Blue Meanies, hut I would have eome anyhow ... I can't gel over the
thought that this is only going to be a tun tau, ami my husband anil I didn't 00100200 miles to eamp OUt at
a lair loi the weekend." Another sighed, "I eame up from Louisiana It wasn't until I got heie thai I found
out this Occupation has been ealled oil." //«,/
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Renrue Gushing reiterated the sentiment: "There are even more dose, Clams than
we thought- There was a good deal of evidence to support this The8**
noted the large number of families with children a, the even,, such as Paul and Shirly
Trabucco of Kensington, New Hampshire, who said, "We're no, members of any group
We jus, believe nuclear power should be stopped What are you going to do with all that
radioacive waste? It's not much of a legacy to leave our kids Harvey Halpem's
verdict was much d.fferen, He described the even, as merely a way «... for a few people
to play ou, their frustrations It's strictly symbolic, not a Clamshell action, and without
political effect
" 1X7
Meanwhile at Manchester, Governor Thomson attended a pro-nuclear rally and
"clambake", declaring the Clamshell Alliance to be "regenerated and rehabilitated" lxx
Asked if the poor attendance of only 500 people at his pro-nuclear rally was a sign of
growing doubts about nuclear power, the governor declared the low turnout was
"Because supporters of nuclear power are working people." But overall Thomson acted
triumphant, symbolizing his sense of victory over the Clamshell Alliance with his "clam
bake" and telling one reporter, "I'm going to eat some clams " ,X9 When the Alternative
Energy Fair was complete, Thomson declared victory, gloating in a manner that most
certainly rankled those who decided to accept the Rath proposal:
At no time was there one-minute construction time lost by workers, and at
no time was any portion of construction halted as a result of either direct
Boston Globe
. June 26, 1978. 1
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or indirect actions by demonstrators. The ClamsheU Alliance thereforeha^cxpenenccd what must te t0 them . vefy^J^Ef
^^^^^^^
SiegeofSeabrook '
A new organization, Clams for Direct Action at Seabrook (CDAS) grew out of
the 1978 Clams for Democracy movement. The new organization was determined to
move on its own and carry out the type of militant action they'd envisioned for June
1978. The organization had a large student base from western Massachusetts, Boston
and Providence, Rhode Island colleges and universities, and enjoyed support from the
International Socialists organization (ISO), a Trotskyist splinter group, and Boston's
Haymarket Fund, an anarchist organization. Wrote the Bpj*pnHe^
"The
Coalition for Direct Action at Seabrook is the black sheep of the Clamshell Alliance." 191
CDAS announced plans for a forced occupation of the Seabrook site for October
6, 1979. Harvey Halpern was the driving force and public spokesperson for the new
group. A CDAS pamphlet declared, "By direct action, we mean acting to stop nuclear
power ourselves, without appealing to or recognizing the legitimacy of the state or
corporate authority... We will be seriously challenging the authority of the state..." 192
Another flier proclaimed the group would cut fences to gain entrance to the site and then
"actively resist arrest" by running, linking arms and erecting barricades. "Once on the
site", the pamphlet continued, "we plan to build a community ofpeople living
190 New York Times. June 97, 1978, 10.
191
Boston Herald American . October 5, 1979, 1 and 4.
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cooperatively with the goal of preventing construction Iron, continuing. We plan to stay
until construction is irrevocably canceled." 193
Like the original founders of the Clamshell Alliance, the CDAS sought to lay
claim to the mantle of legitimacy by comparing their planned occupation to the West
German occupation at Wyhl. In one flier by an affiliated group, the Student Coalition
Against Nukes Nationwide (SCANN), the October 6 organizers declared, "The
occupation of Seabrook has the potential to stop its construction permanently. Five years
ago, West Germans occupied a nuclear plant site in Wyhl. To date there has been no
construction "' 9< In the CDAS October 6 handbook, "Let's Shut Down Seabrook!" the
group stated, "The people at.
.
.
Wyhl found that they could only depend on themselves to
make the fundamental changes needed to protect their health and safety." l95Critics
pointed out, however that the Wyhl occupation had depended on local support, which the
October 6 occupation generally did not have.' 96 The Seacoast New Hampshire Clamshell
put out a statement opposing the October 6 occupation, arguing it ignored the "present
political and economic climate of the state", and promised to unleash state violence that
would hurt the local movement. The public letter declared:
We state this as our formal position because, unlike others who may, if
they choose to, ignore the action, whatever happens on October 6 will
have a direct effect on our lives, our future organizing and our relation to
our neighbors. The CDAS proposal is like an electric fan - ifwe get in
I'M
Some Important Questions and Answers", CDAS Flier, circa summer/fall 1979. Frances Crowe
Papers, Sophia Smith Collection.
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One of the few important exceptions was Tony and Louisa Santasucci, who allowed over 1,500
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Iron! ofit, wc gel blown over, if we gel behind it, we ge, sucked ,n Wehave chosen to stand to the side."'7
CDAS responded that i, was no, ,hcm but PSNH .ha, was running roughshod
over locals' wishes. The organizers further argued that Seabrook was now a "worldwide
symbol" and that "We all live in Seabrook".
™
WIN Bag^ Be p„ b|ishc(] ,^
between Rudy Perkins ofthe Boston I lard Rain affinity group and "Soil" ( Jam [gal
Roodenko, former chair ofthe War Resisters League, who opposed the occupation.
Roodenko argued
,
"The ( all for the occupation is full ofanger, and anger inhibits clear
Ihinking." I Ic charged the CDAS with a "macho" style and "devil theory ofpolitics" that
would prove counterproductive. In response, Perkins accused the original Clamshell
organizers of being hypocritical and selling out: "In 1976 the Clamshell Alliance was
formed specifically to leave the well-worn channels ofacceptable protest, beeau.se those
channels had proven to he- dead ends
.
.
I, is the worst possible moment lor a retreat to
prc-( :iamshcll strategies." 1 99
The CDAS handbook staled "October 6 will be a departure from civil
disobedience."200 Members ofthe Clamshell Allianee who advocated non-violence were
particularly disturbed by this emphasis on physical resistance, which they believed
threatened to pit "'demonstrators' against 'workers' and 'police'". The New Hampshire
AFSC issued a statement that said that although they have "no reason to suppose that the
"Seacoast New 1 lampshirc Clamshell Position on the October 6 Occupation", circa tall 1 979 FrancesCrowe Papers, Sophia Smith Collection
Let's Shut Down Seabnx)k!" Handbook for the October 6, 1979 Direct Action at Seabrook circa
mer/mll 1970 I'ranr/n: r"r«u«. Pan*..-.. e,.~u:„ o~:.u /~>_u
m
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summer/fa 9. t rances Crowe Papers, Sophia Smith Collection
1
"Pros and Cons The October 6 Occupation", WJN, September 27, 1979, 14-16
"Let's Shut Down Seabrook!" Handbook for the October 6, 1979 Direct Action at Seabrook ClrCu
summer/fall 1979. Frances Crow Papers, Sophia Smith Collection. In her copy of the handbook, the only
marks made by Frances Crowe were to underline that passage.
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Coalition for Direct Action at Seabrook wants to perpetuate violence at Seabrook", such
wouid be the result.» A group called "Citizens for Nonviolence at Seabrook" appeared
on October 6 to distribute cards imploring all sides "to refrain front acts of physical
violence under any circumstances."202
When the showdown came on October 6, 1979, approximately 2,500 hardcore
acttvists heeded the CDAS's call, far fewer than the 10,000 hoped for. Although activists
of all ages were among the ranks, college students and out-of-staters were especially
prevalent. Awaiting them were over 200 members of the New Hampshire National
Guard and 250 state police from all the New England states except Connecticut, where
they were needed to deal with recent tornado damage Unlike his predecessor, Michael
Dukakis, Massachusetts' new pro-nuclear governor Ed King dispatched the
Massachusetts State police to the Granite State. 2- The new governor of New Hampshire,
Democrat Hugh Galen, likewise took different action than his predecessor in 1977.
Galen kept a low profile and avoided inflammatory statements. And rather than have
protestors bog down New Hampshire armories and courts, Galen ordered police and the
National Guard to repel efforts to enter the Seabrook construction site by whatever
means deemed necessary and keep arrests to a minimum. 204
What ensued were three days of assaults on the barbed-wire enclosed Seabrook
site, which police and the National Guard repelled with water cannon, mace, fire hoses,
Statement of the American friends Service Committee of New Hampshire Concerning (he October 6
Demonstration a( Seabrook" September 24, 1979 Frances Crowe Papers, Sophia Smith Collection
202
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smoke bombs and tear gas (German shepherds were he!d in reserve bu, no, nsed.)
Protestors attempted to en, throngh the fence with wire cntters while poliee poked their
night s,icks throngh the chain link fence and drove them back. The police repeatedly
maced and tear-gassed both protesters and reports, over 400 ofwhom were among the
protestors covering the story. On the first day the protesters did break throngh the fence
at one spot cansing police to pour through and aggressively drive them back. For three
days it continued, sporadic anempts to break through being repelled, protestors
retreating, regrouping and trying again. Many activists continued to argue for non-
violence and some sough, to address police and National Guard through the fence abou,
the dangers of nuclear power.205
The CDAS's lack or organizational experience was especially evident. Many of
the roving bands seeking to break through the fence were stymied by a lack of
coordination, and affinity group meetings bogged down in tactical disputes. The running
battles occasional became farcical. At one point, a Maine affinity group flying the state
flag along with an American flag found itself rushed by members of the Maine National
Guard, who charged from behind a gate in the fence, seized the protestors' Maine flag
and returned with it behind the fence, where they neatly folded it. 206 It rained heavily for
the three days adding to the desultory feel of the action, as each day saw more of the
original 2,500 trickle away. Some expressed disillusionment, while others felt embittered
and radicalized by the aggressive police tactics. Declared one activist, "There wasn't
enough of us and the police had all the weaponry. I think the cops are inviting terrorism
Boston Globe
. October 7, 8 and 9, 1979.
Boston Globe. October 8, 1 979, 3 1
.
179
again."207
by the way they're handling this." Said another, "It was like this in the 60s. This is how
the Weathermen got started and it could happen
After three days, the aetion was over, the fence breached but once and the
attempted entrance quickly repelled by the pouce barricade. Authorities arrested only
twenty-one protestor,- There would be no rerun of either the occupation of Wyhl, nor
the militant mass street battles that led to a constitutional crisis in West Germany in the
late 1 970s. The constituency for late 1 960s militancy was not there. The CDAS had
hoped that the nuclear disaster at Three Mile Island the previous spring would help
marshal recruits for the new confrontational direction they envisioned. Rather, the
disaster further swelled the national non-violent movement against nuclear power, with
Massachusetts activists once again at the center.
On March 28, 1 979, the Unit 2 nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island,
Pennsylvania experienced a series of technical malfunctions and human errors which
caused the feed water lines to the plant's cooling system to be cut off, beginning a
reactor core meltdown. As technicians frantically arrived at the site to try to arrest the
meltdown, over 100,000 residents in the Harrisburg area were evacuated. With great
effort, a full-blown meltdown that would have sent a radioactive cloud across a huge
swath ofPennsylvania and New Jersey was narrowly averted. Although similar near-
meltdowns had occurred before - most notably at the Enrico Fermi reactor outside of
207
Boston Globe
. October 10, 1979, 25
208
Ibid.
180
experiencing a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions 209
Throughout the 1970s, antinuclear activists had drawn parallels between nuc.ear
energy and the war in Vietnam Ralph Nader had proclaimed nuc.ear power to be "this
eountry's technological Vietnam -> Anna Gyorgy stated, "Nuc.ear power seemed in
many ways to be the 'Vietnam War brought home'. By aiding the nuc.ear industry whi.e
assuring the pub.ic it had nothing to fear, the government was supporting an energy
source that could prove as lethal as any war " 21 ' In 1 979, Harvey Wasserman was not
alone in declaring Three Mile Island to be the "Tet" of the nuclear industry. In his 1979
b00k
' Wasserman wrote, "During and
immediately after let, military officials downplayed the importance of the attack we
saw the same thing during Three Mile Island ,,2i
2
Just as with the Tet Offensive of 1968, the near-meltdown at Three Mile Island in
1979 was a turning point In the parlance of nuclear physics, opposition to nuclear power
was reaching a "critical mass" The accident at Three Mile Island occurred just days
after the release of The China Syndrome, a major motion picture starring Jack Lemon,
Jane Fonda and Michael Douglas which depicted a near-meltdown at a fictional
California plant.
On May 6, a little over a month after the accident, the largest antinuclear rally to
date took place outside the capitol building in Washington, D C. attended by between
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70,000 and 125,000 peop.e and featunng nationally known speakers such as Jane Fonda,
Dick Gregory, Tom Hayden and California governor Jerry Brown. Massachusetts
senator Edward Kennedy sent a message of support, which was read at the rally. Tune
magazine described the peaceful antinuclear rally as "one of the largest marches since
the Vietnam era "213 Sam Lovejoy and other Montague activists played a leadmg role in
the May 6 Coalition, which organized the rally, and Lovejoy acted as master of
ceremonies On May 7, six members of the coalition, including Lovejoy met with
President Jimmy Carter in the White House. 214 The antinuclear movement had high
hopes for Carter beginning with the 1976 encounter in New Hampshire, when Carter
told the press and Clamshell activists that nuclear power should be "a last resort". That
same year, Carter addressed the United Nations and declared, "U.S. dependence on
nuclear power should be kept to a minimum necessary to meet our needs. We should
apply much stronger safety standards as we regulate its use. And we must be honest with
our people concerning its problems and dangers." 215 Upon Carter's election, Ralph
Nader declared that if Carter failed to act "it won't be because he doesn't know the
danger; it won't be because he doesn't have the knowledge; it won't be because he
doesn't have the authority; it will be because he doesn't have the guts."216 Harvey
Wasserman proclaimed, "If Carter is held to his campaign rhetoric, his inauguration
should be a landmark in the decline of nuclear power.
. . The role ofJames Earl Carter in
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the next four years will be fascinating «o follow. He might be an environmental crazy for
all we know."217
By 1 979, the antinuclear movement had beeome disillusioned with Carter, who
did little exeep, oppose the Clineh River fas, breeder reaetor in Tennessee, and whose
administration gave the go ahead for the Seabrook reaetors in 1977. At that time, the
aD*Wfc£fe blaSted Ca"-- ~»» "President Carter seems to be turning
the Environmental Protection Agency into a bad joke.
. . Carter has, with this decision,
destroyed his credibility with those who supported him in the name ofthe natural
environment...^When, on May 7, ,979, Carter met with Lovejoy and the other
antinuclear activists, the administration asked the press to leave, and the activists
confronted the president. "We were trying to flush ou, Carter's position on nuclear
power.
1 think we did that," said Lovejoy after the meeting. He continued, "His position
basically was "we're not going to shut down nuclear power so don't kid around'... I
think the man is drowning. He's a technocrat who takes one step at a time... He doesn't
think in large terms."2 " In 1981, Wasserman, who had such optimism in 1976, declared
that Carter "sold us down the river on nuclear power, there is no doubt about it."220 Thus,
despite inroads made with such politicians as California governor Jerry Brown and
Senator Ted Kennedy, both ofwhom would challenge Carter for the Democratic
presidential nomination the following year, the antinuclear movement had little impact
on the White House.
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The post-Three Mile Island movement continued to gain momentum later that
summer, when a group of musicians formed a group called "MUSE" -
"Musicians for
Safe Energy"
-
and staged a star-studded "No Nukes" concert to raise money and
awareness. Thousands attended the five gala concerts at Madison Square Garden
featuring Jackson Brown, Bruce Springsteen, Carly Simon, James Taylor and others.
The event then became a motion picture. 22 ' Once again, Montague activists played a
major role The ubiquitous Lovejoy was the president ofMUSE and executive producer
of the concert and the film, which he distributed nationally in a contract with Warner
Brothers. Wasserman was the spokesmen for MUSE. Green Mountain Post films
contributed a twenty-minute documentary entitled "Save the Planet", wh,ch aired in the
middle of each concert and in the No Nukes film. 222
The five days of concerts ended with an antinuclear rally in New York's Battery
Park, attended by as many as 200,000 people Speaking at the rally were Tom Hayden,
Bella Abzug, native-American activist Winona LaDuke and Pete Seeger The organizers
invited only one elected official, the antinuclear firebrand Congressman Ed Markey of
Massachusetts, who told the crowd:
People who are a part of this perhaps can learn from the lessons of the
1960s, that demonstrations alone are not effective, that politicians can
ignore mass demonstrations, as occurred with the war in Vietnam, and
that the only way of really being effective is to take these demonstrations
Sc 2c°r r!-^°i^
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The aceident at Three Mile Island helped legitime the ant.nuclear opposition
and put the burden ofproofon the nue.ear industry, Although public opinion polls
showed a majority of Americans still supporting nuclear energy, those numbers began a
slow descent until by ,983 a majority of Americans opposed further nuclear plant
construction. 224 Most importantly, a growing number of liberal politicians experienced
an "ant.nuclear coming out", or, in the case of those already sympathetic to the
antinuclear cause, like Ed Markey, an escalation in their opposition to nuclear power.
Enter The Liberals Massachusetts Democrats and Opposition t„ r^k^
By the turn of the decade, Massachusetts in particular, and greater New England
in general, had become a stronghold of opposition to nuclear energy Before Three Mile
Island, a number of Massachusetts Democrats had, to greater or lesser degrees, aligned
themselves with the antinuclear movement, although they found themselves more
comfortable with the legal interveners than the direct-action wing of the movement.
When Congress debated the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which replaced the
Atomic Energy Commission with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Senator Ted
Kennedy introduced an amendment S. 2744 which would have required utilities to
reimburse antinuclear interveners, including "reasonable attorney fees", should their
interventions result in "substantial contributions" to public safety. Kennedy worked
closely with Friends of the Earth, one of the more radical legal intervening groups, in
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wnting the bill, wh1Ch was defeated with strenuous effort by senators with close ties to
the nuclear industry« When Kennedy made a bid for the Democratic presidential
nomination in 1 980, under pressure from Jerry Brown who was actively courting the
antinuclear vote, Kennedy announced his support for a nuclear moratorium. 22'
One Massachusetts Democrat who would have an immense ,mPact on the
Seabrook Nuclear Power Station was Congressman Ed Markey, who represented the
northeast corner of the state, much of which abutted New Hampshire and was within ten
miles of Seabrook. By 1980, Markey, along with Kennedy, was known as one of the
"gatekeepers", those members of Congress friendly to the antinuclear movement who
afforded its members access to the corndors of power. In the wake of Three Mile Island,
Markey introduced two bills in his Intenor and Insular Affairs Subcommittee The first
called for a six-month moratorium on the issuance of new permits for nuclear reactors;
the second required approval of emergency evacuation plans by all towns and states in a
given area around a nuclear plant before that plant could go on line. Although the former
went down to defeat, Congress passed the latter. 227 The NRC then put into affect a
requirement for an "Emergency Planning Zone" (EPZ) encompassing a ten-mile radius
around a nuclear plant. Henceforth, until all affected towns and states within the ten-mile
emergency planning zone submitted plans for evacuation in event of a nuclear
catastrophe, no nuclear power plant could become operational Over 130,000 people
lived within the Seabrook EPZ 228
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The EPZ requirement became a powerful tool for opposing the Seabrook plants.
In 1985, five Massachusetts towns lay within the EPZ and along with Hampton, New
Hampshire just over the border, refused to submit an emergency evacuation plan.
Representatives of these towns pointed to the huge traffic jams that affected the area fa
the summer months and argued no feasible evacuation plan was possible. 229 They found
a powerful ally in Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis, who after four years out of
office, made a strong political comeback and was again elected governor in 1982,
defeating pro-nuclear governor Ed King in the primary in a rematch of 1978 and then
easily defeating his Republican rival. Dukakis had already expressed his skepticism
about further reliance on nuclear energy in his first term, and had refused to send
Massachusetts police to New Hampshire as requested during the Clamshell Alliance's
spring 1977 occupation. In 1986, Dukakis announced that he would support all the
Massachusetts towns in the EPZ and refuse to submit an evacuation plan. That same
year, Dukakis had defied the federal government by refusing to submit a civil defense
plan for Massachusetts in the event of nuclear war. Previously, PSNH's opponents were
the outspent legal interveners and the grassroots Clamshell Alliance; now it faced the
full weight of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 230
The issue came to a head in September 1986 when the first Seabrook nuclear
reactor was ready to go on line. The NRC pressed Governor Dukakis to submit an
evacuation plan for the six affected Massachusetts towns. He refused. At a new
conference, the governor stated, "The unshakable truth is this: Ifa serious accident
occurs... the combination of conditions at Seabrook... create a foreseeable likelihood of
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high dosages of radioactive intake, agatnst whieh emergency planning and evacuation
cannot adequately protect." Dukakis declared that his decision was motivated by the
nuclear disaster at Chernobyl in the Ukraine. "Chernobyl changed the equation
dramatically," declared Dukakis, "We are no longer talking about models and theories."
Approximately My Massachusetts residents from border towns and antinuclear activists
applauded Dukakis as he emerged from his office following the press conference. An
Amesbury selectman exclaimed, "It's a whole new war now."231
Dukakis and New York governor Mario Cuomo, who was then leading that
state's opposition to the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station on Long Island, became new
symbols of state opposition to the federal government on nuclear energy. The two liberal
governors argued they were acting in the spirit of President Ronald Reagan's "New
Federalism" in which the president delegated more authority to the states and declared
he would defer to state and regional leaders in questions pertaining to them. 232
In early 1987, under pressure from New Hampshire Governor John Sununu and
PSNH, who complained of the financial hardships due to the delay over the EPZ, the
NRC unilaterally reduced the size of the zone, thus taking Massachusetts out of the
equation. Both Cuomo and Dukakis appeared at the NRC's mandatory public hearings
on the rule change. Cuomo 's testimony was an impassioned attack on the Reagan
administration's imderrnining of its own "Federalism". Dukakis, as usual more reserved,
told the commissioners, "The area around Seabrook... could not be evacuated in the
1
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even, ofa serious nuelear accident.'- Assailing the financial considerations behind the
rule change, Dukakis declared the rule change was "the nuclear equivalent of cutting the
number of fifeboats for the 'unstable' Titanic [because they would] make the voyage
unprofitable."- Meanwhile, Congressman Markey sponsored a bill, which would have
given governors a veto over licensing permits for nuclear reactors. The bill, however,
was defeated.235
In 1988, the Seabrook debate became part of the presidential election. The
BostonGlobe opined, "... Bush and Dukakis may well offer the voters the clearest
choice ever on nuclear power."236 Ed Markey charged, "If George Bush is elected, the
NRC will try to cut corners and do everything possible to license the [Seabrook]
plant." New Hampshire Governor John Sununu was co-chair of George Bush's
presidential campaign and led the Republican charge against Dukakis. Once again
Dukakis found himself in a political grudge match with a conservative New Hampshire
governor. Sununu compared New Hampshire favorably to Massachusetts and accused
Dukakis of high taxes and misgoverning. Speaking in Boston, Sununu charged, "Energy
is a classic example of ineptitude. You are out of additional electrical capacity." In
response, a Dukakis spokesmen counter-charged, "Governor Sununu's outspok.enness
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about Governor Dukakis is really due to the role that Governor Dukakis played in
Sununu's greatest failure, which was Seabrook."238
Dukakis had won the New Hampshire primary the previous February and
continued to eampaign hard in the state, including Seabrook where he spoke out against
the plant, telling local residents, "It seems to me that until we do something about
nuclear waste, I can't see how we can construct and license and operate these plants."239
Opponents of Seabrook knew the fate of the Seabrook nuclear power station hinged on
the outcome of the election. Dukakis declared he would support governors who wished
to veto nuclear projects and during the primaries George Bush made no secret of his
support for nuclear energy in general, and Seabrook in particular. Observed a Dukakis
strategist, "Seabrook is alive and well in a presidential contest... Of all the Republican
candidates, George Bush is the one most likely to bring Seabrook on line."240
After the election, in a surprising and arbitrary move, the Reagan administration
announced that it was issuing an executive order that would allow the Federal
Emergency Management Agency to draw up evacuation plans when local communities
refused to do so. The announcement was withheld until after the 1988 elections to deny
then Democratic presidential candidate Michael Dukakis a campaign issue.
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In early 1 989, New I lampsh.re Governor John Sununu became the White House
chiefofstafffor newly elected Preside* George H W Bush ,„ ,990. the fir* Seabrook
nuclear reactor went on line 241
never
movement
"The Pimple ojUhePumpkin"
The Clamshell Alliance limped along throughout the 1980s, holding period
demonstrations at the Seabrook site, a ghost of its former self. The Clams
recovered from the divisive debate over fence cutting in .978 In its short life, however,
the Clamshell Alliance had elevated the nuclear issue nationally and helped increase
animuclear opposition to the point that when the accident at Three Mile Island occurred
the ground was set for the decline of the nuclear industry The antinuclear
came late in the development of nuclear power Much of the industry's demise was due
to the escalating costs of nuclear energy The cost of the Seabrook plants soared from
initial estimates of $500,()00
.0 well over $2.5 billion. 242 PSNH went bankrupt in the late
1980s and had to sell all of its Seabrook shares Nevertheless, antinuclear activsts -
legal interveners, direct action activists and their liberal sympathizers in government -
had worked to increase both the financial and social costs of nuclear energy Although
103 nuclear reactors remained on line, no reactor begun after 1975 was ever
completed If the antinuclear movement failed to bring about a nuclear-free America,
they contributed in no small measure to the decline of that industry's growth Both
President Nixon and Ford in the mid-1970s envisioned over 1,000 operational nuclear
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power plants providing 50% of the energy in the United States by the year 2000 The
antinuclear movement played an important role in changing the nation's pro-nuclear
trajectory
The movement against nuclear energy, which had grown dramatically in the
wake of Three Mile Island, declined almost as fast. The biggest reason for the decline of
the movement against nuclear energy was the emergence of a new movement, which
would eclipse the issue of nuclear power, in Europe and the United States. Summing up
the growing groundswell that would sweep over the movement against nuclear energy in
1980, Dr. Helen Caldicott declared, "Nuclear power is the pimple on the pumpkin; the
pumpkin is nuclear weapons."245
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CHAPTER III
THE 1980 WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREEZE
REFERENDUM AND THE EMERGENCE OF MASSACHUSETTS AS A
NATIONAL STRONGHOLD OF THE NUCLEAR FREEZE MOVEMENT
The Election of 1980
On November 4, 1980, U.S. voters went to the polls to choose a president. The
national mood was angry and impatient, as all the crises of the 1970s seemed to come to
a head. Earlier, the incumbent president Jimmy Carter had described the national mood
as one of "malaise". For yet another year the nation endured double-digit inflation, high
unemployment, high interest rates, an energy crisis and long gas lines. On Election Day,
fifty-one American embassy personnel in Iran observed their one-year anniversary as
hostages of militant Islamic students in Tehran. The Iranian Revolution and the ongoing
hostage saga was the major news story throughout late 1979 and 1980. The crisis seemed
to highlight the post-Vietnam decline of U.S. power and prestige abroad and further
eroded the image of the sitting president who appeared helpless and adrift, especially
after a botched military rescue mission the previous October.
1
Jimmy Carter, the Washington outsider, had entered the White House in 1977
with an air of optimism that the Georgia governor could return the nation to the path of
integrity and reform in the wake of Watergate and Gerald Ford's unpopular pardon of
Richard Nixon. A moderate, pro-civil rights southern governor, Carter alternately
appealed to moderate and progressive constituencies in the election of 1976. Carter's
1
Peter Carroll, It Seemed Like Nothing Happened: America in the 1970 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 1982) 339-50.
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experience as a nuclear engineer and his campaign promises to make environmental
appointments acceptable to Ralph Nader and to reduce the role of nuclear energy evoked
hope among antinuclear activists. Harvey Wasserman was optimistic: "If Carter is held
to his campaign rhetoric, his inauguration should be a landmark in the decline of nuclear
power."3 Before the year was out, Wasserman denounced Carter as "the Lyndon
Johnson of the seventies", a president who raised left-liberal hopes only to dash them4
Others soon felt the disillusionment of antinuclear activists on the left-liberal
spectrum. Labor activists and their supporters in Congress felt betrayed by Carter's
belated endorsement of the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act and his
unenthusiastic, half-hearted work on the bill's behalf. Although Carter appointed a
record number ofwomen and minorities to federal courts, and factored human rights
considerations into U.S. foreign policy more than any president before or since, the
president's erratic shifts from the center began moving decidedly and consistently to the
right in 1978. 5 This was most true in U.S.-Soviet relations. Early on, Carter sought to
continue his predecessors' policies of detente, working toward negotiation and then
ratification of a new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II). By 1978, Carter's
policies were under heavy attack from the right in Congress, whose criticisms of detente
were amplified by a rabidly anti-disarmament organization, the Committee on the
Present Danger.6 In response, Carter's foreign policy moved in an increasingly hawkish
3
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direction. In 1978, Carter advocated the building of the mammoth MX missile,
proposing to mitigate the behemoth's vulnerability to a Soviet first strike by mounting
the missiles on railroad cars that would criss-cross the Great Plains. Then, in 1979,
Carter agreed to a NATO decision to introduce intermediate-range Pershing and Cruise
missiles into Western Europe by 1983. Whereas the allies saw the U.S. missiles as a
counterbalance to similar Soviet SS-20s, the Soviet Union condemned Carter's decision
to install the Pershing and Cruise missiles as a provocation tantamount to the Soviet
Union's installation of missiles in Cuba in 1962. 7 In 1979, Carter issued Presidential
Directive 59, which clarified U.S. nuclear policy, declaring that the goal of U.S. nuclear
weapons policy was not only to achieve deterrence but also to maintain the ability to
fight a limited nuclear war. Although PD 59 represented no new doctrine in U.S. nuclear
weapons policy, its timing and emphasis, combined with the president's increasingly
belligerent comments about the Soviet Union, further eroded detente. The coup de
grace came in December 1 979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to prop up
an unpopular pro-Soviet government in Kabul. In response, Carter removed SALT II
from consideration by Congress (although the treaty had already been affectively
blocked in the Senate), ordered a boycott of U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union and
announced a U.S. boycott of the 1980 summer Olympics in Moscow.
9
In response to Carter's lurch to the right, the restive liberal-wing of the
Democratic Party launched an "anybody but Carter" movement in 1980. Entering the
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Primaries late, Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy grabbed the flagging libera] banner
and denounced Carter for policies that he charged abandoned labor, the environment and
detenu. Soon, California's Governor Jerry Brown entered the presidential race,
Challenging Kennedy for liberals' support. As the liberals divided between Kennedy and
Brown, Carter pursued a "Rose Garden" strategy, avoiding the campaign trail and
asserting that matters ofstate, especially the crisis in Iran, necessitated his remaining at
the White House. With the liberals divided. Carter successfully used the weight of
incumbeney to win re-nomination at the Demoeratie Convention in New York. 10
Carter lumbered into the election of 1980 a badly wounded candidate. At certain
points in 1980, Carter's approval ratings sank lower than Richard Nixon's during the
Watergate crisis. 1
1
As liberals felt abandoned and moderates considered the presidential
candidacy ofcentrist Illinois Kepubliean, John Anderson, eonservatives enthusiastieally
and energetically mobilized behind the most ideologically right-wing candidate ever to
run lor the presidency ofthe United States. Ronald Reagan's candidacy represented the
intersection ofa trajectory begun with the (ioldwater campaign of 1964 and a moment in
history ripe for a major electoral shift against the party in power. The Conner aetor and
General Electric spokesman had been the most eloquent defender of Arizona Senator
Barry (ioldwatcr's ill-fated 1964 presidential campaign. As liberalism hit high tide in
1964, many observers believed the extreme right's capture of the Republican Party at the
San Francisco convention represented the death knell for the Grand Old Party. The
Johnson landslide of that year, garnering a greater percentage of the popular vote than
10
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any presidential candidate in history, seemed to bear out such an epitaph Yet, only two
years later, Ronald Reagan won the first of two consecutive terms as governor of the
nation's most populated state Denouncing Berkeley radicals, the hippy counterculture
and Black Panther militants, Reagan sought to link Great Society liberalism and New
Left radicalism and move the Republican Party and the country - further to the right 12
Aided by wealthy Californians and Richard Viguerics' revolutionary direct
mailing techniques, Reagan mounted a formidable challenge to incumbent president
(ierald Ford at the 1976 Republican primary Now, in November of 1980, with U.S.
hostages being paraded and humiliated before the world, Soviet aggression in Central
As.a, and with gas lines, inflation, unemployment, and energy shortages ravishing a
seemingly rudderless nation, Reagan and the Republican right smelled blood. Reagan
denounced detente as a "one way street" and called for a radical military build-up to
counter a Soviet Union he described as bent on world domination He also called for
dramatic cuts in taxes and social programs, proclaiming government was not the solution
but the problem Appealing to religious conservatives, a fast growing force in American
politics, Reagan decried the decline of the "traditional values" of "God, family and
country" at the expense of secularism, feminism, gay rights and other trends of the last
two decades. Reagan's strongest appeal, however, was simply as an alternative to Carter,
summed up in his campaign's most elective line: "Ask yourself, are you better off than
you were four years ago?" Although many Americans raised questions about the former
actor s foreign policy experience, trigger-happy nuclear war rhetoric, and age (he was
sixty-nine), his debate with President Carter just a week before the election appeared to
12
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have give Reagan enough presidential aura to counter (he concerns raised during the
campaign. 11
On the evening ol November 4, 1980, before polls even closed in California,
President Jimmy Carter conceded the eleetion to Ronald Reagan. As the evening
progressed it beeame apparent that the nation was experiencing an eleeloral shift of
teetonie proportions. Although Reagan garnered only 51% ofthe popular vote to
Carter's 42% and John Anderson's 7%, the eleetoral eollege count was lopsidedly in
Reagan's column (489 to 49); moreover, the Republicans seized control ofthe Senate lor
the first time in over two deeades and added thirty-three members to the I louse of
Representatives. The eleetion also saw the defeat ofsome ofthe Democratic Party's
most shining progressive lights, including 1972 presidential standard-bearer Senator
George McGovem and Idaho Senator Frank Church. 14
Reagan narrowly won even Massachusetts, the sole holdout in Nixon's 1972
landslide. Reflecting the eonservative (ide that seemed to be sweeping the nation, Hay
State voters also passed a state-wide relerendum, Proposition 2 V2 whieh lowered and
limited property tax rates (the initiative was based on Calilbrnia's Proposition 13 whieh
set offthe national "taxpayer revolt" in 1978.) Surveying the political landscape the day
alter the 1980 eleetion ollered little for those ofa progressive bent to be cheerful about.
However, on the political radar screen, there was a small dot blinking from western
Massachusetts where voters in three state senatorial districts had voted in a non-binding
relerendum 59% to 41% in support of a mutual nuclear weapons freeze between the
13
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<
foited States and Soviet « Won Although these districts wen, fo, Reagan by a narrow
ma,,,,,, the vote seemed to buck s national mood thai appeared to be moving in an
increasingly miUtaristic direction Ovei .he next lew years, the nuc.ea, weapons
.reeve
movement which first took ,00, ,„ western Massachusetts would sweep the nation, with
six states including California voting to, the heexe in L982, ove, 800,000 Americans
rallying „, New York's Central Park for a freeze that same yea,, the Mouse of
Kep.esentat.ves volmg lo, a nuelea, weapons l.ee.e resolution in 1983, and almost all
Democrats running lo, the party's presidential nomination „> 1984 endorsing the
freeze
ls
The bce/e movement, in short, was soon to galvanize disillusioned radicals and
liberals into a more cohesive opposition to the Reagan juggernaut li the election of L980
signaled the nation was moving to the right, there were also signs that the shift to the
right would he energetically conlested
an i,
,cease in
Hie Peace Movement Keboin
The demise ofdttente in the late ( lartei ycais was accompanied by
disarmament act.v.sm thai soon coalesced a.ound the nuclea, weapons freeze movement
Although various aims control- lobbying groups continued to wo,k in Washmgton
throughout the 1970s, there-energized disarmament movement ofthe late 1970s and
early 1980s was in many ways a return lo a movement that had been do, man! since the
early 1960s, eclipsed by the New Letts locus on I he wa. in Vietnam and racial
inequality, Historian Paul Boyei has described this period from 1963 to 1980 as the "Big
Sleep;' pan ofthe ongoing pattern of'activism and apathy" , mining throughout the
Meyer; Douglass (\ Waller, Congress ami (he Nuclear liee/e An Inside Look at Ilic Politics of a M iss
Movement (Amherst The University Of Massachusetts Press, 19X7)
atomic age in the United States.' 6 The first period ofactivism occurred from the end of
World War II through
.949, when atomic scientists, world federalists, radical pacifists
and remnants of the American left worked to bring atomic weapons under international
control and preempt a nuclear arms race. With the Soviet detonation of its first atomic
bomb in 1949 and the ensuing "Red Scare," the movement virtually disappeared until
the late 1950s when groups like SANE helped reignite a movement to "ban the bomb,"
which soon focused on working for a nuclear weapons test ban. The late 1 950s and early
1960s witnessed intense public questioning of the arms race, atomic weapons testing and
civil defense. Concern about nuclear war permeated the popular culture as novels such
as Nevil Shutc's OnJie^Beach, and Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler's Fail Safe
depicted the horrors of nuclear war and were made into blockbuster films including
Stanley Kubrick's classic Dr. Strangelove: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying ™H
Love the Bomb.
,
Anxiety over the arms race reached a climax with the very real
showdown between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis
of 1962. The peace movement achieved a partial success with the Limited l est Ban
Treaty (LTBT) signed by the Soviet Union, United States and Great Britain in 1963,
which ushered in the modest beginning ofentente. As the superpowers negotiated over
nuclear weapons beginning in 1963 through the 1970s, public concern over nuclear war
waned and apathy once again held sway. 17
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Although never completely quiescent, the disarmament movement seemed
almostmmm after Nixon's visits to Moscow and the signing ofSALT I and the ABM
Treaties. Slowly, however, the movement revived. "When the Vietnam War ended," said
Northampton Quaker Frances Crowe, "many of us woke up to the fact that the Pentagor
used those Vietnam years to stockpile a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons." 18 During the
mid-1970s, disarmament activists such as Dr. Helen Caldicott of Physicians for Social
Responsibility (PSR) sought to link the ,ssue of nuclear weapons with the burgeoning
movement against nuclear energy. In 1978, the United Nations General Assembly, at the
behest of non-aligned nations, held its first Special Session on Disarmament in New
York City as 1 5,000-25-000 activists joined a rally outside. During the 1979 debate in
the U S. Senate over SALT II, Oregon's maverick Republican Senator, Mark Hatfield
introduced an amendment to the treaty calling for a freeze in the production and testing
of nuclear weapons. 19
Riding the growing concern generated by the antinuclear energy movement, the
U.N. Special Session and the SALT II debate, a Swedish-born woman named Randall
Forsberg, member of the Institute for Disarmament and Defense Studies (IDDS), based
in Brookline, Massachusetts, proposed a U S -Soviet nuclear weapons freeze as a way to
bring together the technical experts of the arms control lobby with a popular movement
for an end to the arms race. Forsberg had focused on disarmament since the 1960s when
she was active in Sweden's Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The
difficulty in slowing the arms race, Forsberg came to believe, stemmed from the public's
18 A Journey of Conscience". Frances Crowe draft speech, circa 1981-1982. Frances Crowe Papers
Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College, Northampton. Massachusetts.
19
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feelin« ofholplcmess in the fece ofthe technicaJ intricacies associated withamw
control negotiations. This left the technical experts in the arms co bby isolated
,rom 41 gCnfiral Publk M Accordi
°fl to Forsberg, "There was no active grassroots
support [for sal, „,...
,
think that's the reason , was shelved.'*' Outlining whaf she
described as the "percolate up theory", Forsberg hoped to generate
. popula, movement,
which would create the political pressure the expert lobbying groups, needed to be
efleenve in wiaWngton, a proposal to fteeze nuclear weapon, deployment, p ction
and testing was simple and ac< essibk to .he lay public, The narrow focus ol the
proposal, Forsberg believed, could bring togethe, liberals, moderates, radicals and even
some conservatives. In her 1980 manifesto, 'H bil to Halt .he Nucleai Arms Race" (soon
referred to simply as "The ( lall") Forsberg declared:
( iarnpaigns <<» stop Individual weapons systems are sometimes treated ;.s
unilateral disarmament <>, circumvented i»v the development ol alternative
systems. I he pros and cons ol the SA1 Tin reaty are too technical foi
™ patience <»i the average person In contrast, an eflbrl i<> stop the
devetopment and production ol all 1 1 s and Soviet nucleai weapons >s
simple, straightforward, effective and mutual; and foi all these reasons it
Is likely io have greatei populai support This is essential foi creating the
scale ol popular support that Is needed i<> make nucleai arms control
efforts suc< lessfuL
Fowberg hoped i<, create as broad based s movement as possible, believing the
American middle class to U- the ke V constituency foi breaking through to the
mainstream. 3 The freeze could appeal i<» those concerned about the costs ofthe arms
//>/,/. IS / X
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race and potential nuclear war but not interested in radical social transformation.
Converse*, although many radicals criticized the freeze movement for no, addressing
.he sources of the cold war, imperialism and militarism, and for being more an arms
control than a disarmament movement, many nonetheless realized the freeze offered a
springboard for launching a more sweeping critique ofAmerican society. Early freeze
activist Mark Niedergang wrote for WJN, "The freeze provides progressives with an
opportunity to criticize political and economic relations from within the mainstream.""
Further, by halting the arms race, the freeze caUed into question many ofthe basic
premises of the cold war. A freeze, if followed by serious disarmament negotiations, as
hoped, would accomplish nothing short of pulling the plug on potential nuclear
Armageddon.
Advocates of the freeze, including the American Friends Service Committee
(AFSC), Mobilization for Survival (MfS), the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) and
others sought to introduce the freeze proposal at the Democratic Party's 1980 convention
in New York. Although championed by progressives such as California Congressman
Ron Dellums and Iowa Senator Tom Harkin, both Jimmy Carter and Ted Kennedy
sought to keep the freeze at arms length. The proposal was defeated 78 to 51 by the
platform committee. The attempt to take the freeze directly to the national level proved a
false start, which only underscored the necessity ofa grassroots base.25
What gave the freeze its jump-start was a small group of radical pacifists in
western Massachusetts who had observed how New England activists had built a mass
24
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movement against nuclear energy frotn the bottotn up Acting independently, these
activists sought to implement Forsberg's
"percolate up theory" by planting the freeze
movement in the soil of western Massachusetts. Only when such local movements took
root across the country, they believed, could an effective national movement be
launched 2" This localise strategy would be one of the two pillars of the freeze
movement's phenomenally rapid growth The other pillar would be a presidential
administration whose massive arms build up and Strangelovian pronouncements about
"winnable" and "limited" nuclear war would scare many Americans into the arms of
growing nuclear weapons freeze movement
B^ndy_Ke_hler, Judith Scheckel and Traprock
In 1979, Randy Kehler was a 37-year teacher and old organic farmer with his
wife Betsy Corner and daughter, Lillian. Kehler was about to embark upon a whirlwind
odyssey, first leading the successful freeze referendum campaign m western
Massachusetts in 1980 and then being elected to the top position of the national freeze
movement in 1981, a post he held through 1983. Kehler's short, chestnut brown hair and
youthful looks gave him a wholesome "all-American" appearance which belied his
radical past but played well to the middle American image the freeze movement hoped
to cultivate
27
.
Born in Scarsdale, New York, Kehler had a typical white, middle class
upbringing, telling one interviewer, "I was certainly not raised a pacifist
. . My parents
Ibid.. 173-5.
Springfield Sunday Republican November 11, 1981.
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was
activism..."30
were reasonably patnotic, middle class citizens »» As a young man, Kehler's views on
mi.itary service were far from radical: "When « turned 18 it didn't occur to me not to
register [for the draft] and in college I came close to signing up for naval ROTC. It
not until several years later that I decided not to cooperate [with Selective Service]."29
Like much of his generation, Kehler was politicized dunng the civil nghts era and
radicalized dunng the Vietnam War while at college. Kehler traces his political
awakening to 1963, when "there was a particular incident that opened my eyes to the
deeper problems besetting our country, and opened my eyes at the same time to
He had taken a train from Scarsdale to Harlem to see a jazz show.
Emerging from the subway, Kehler saw an Afhcan American crowd listening to a Black
Nationalist orator on the street A young African American approached the naive Kehler,
and said, "You're in trouble here, this is a dangerous place for a white person to be." The
young man then took Kehler to a local Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) organizing
meeting for the upcoming March on Washington for Jobs and Justice Kehler said
meeting the CORE people transformed his attitude from being a "removed, elitist and
condescending" middle class white who saw civil rights activists as "publicity seeking
egotists" to a committed young man who returned to Scarsdale to raise money for
CORE 31
Kehler then traveled with a CORE bus to the Washington, D C. march in August
in what he described as a "double whammy", first because the experience of seeing
28
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Martin Luther King Jr.'s historic «, Have a Dream" speech deepened his commitment to
civil rights, and secondly because on (he way down he sat next to an Immigrant, Max
Sandine, an "elderly pacifist ofRussian birth, [who] introduced me to the concept of
non-violence and pacifism, winch was as foreign to me as civil rights."32
I" the mid- 1 960s Kehler attended I larvard I rniversity. « )uring his time as a
l larvard student, he spent a yea, abroad In Tanzania with a private . [arvard-Radclifie
organization
-nodded on the Peace Corps.33 Appalled by the massive violence and
destruction ofthe Vietnam war, Kehler gravitated In the direction ofabsolute pacifism,
or what he preferred to call "active non-violence" " Kehler's objection to war had a
moral and religious grounding, though he never subscribed to any one particular faith.
From 1967 to 1970, Kehler relocated to the San Francisco Bay area, the epicenter of
1960s political and cultural radicalism, where he worked as a regional organizer for the
west coasi branch ofthe War Resistor's League.33
Kehler's pacifism became so thorough that he refused even to register with the
Selective Service as a conscientious objector, in a 19*0 interview, Kehler recalled, "1
had declined to apply for c.o. StatUS because I firmly believed that any lorn, of
cooperation with the .miliary would make me a guilty party to the military's chief
occupation at that time, aggression and genocide in Vietnam"36 Kehler was convicted
for non-cooperation with the draft. On Feb. 16, 1970 he began serving a 22-month
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deducting a pelage ofhis tax return each year comparable to the notary percentage
ofthe federa, budget » (In the ,9,0, the federal government confiscated and auctioned
offKehler and Betsy (WS home to pay for their back taxes, which became the
subject ot a Randy Leppzer documentary, An Act ofP^W,.
}
In 1973, Kchlcr returned to the east coast and settled down in Franklin County in
western Massachusetts. I le later described bis move to western Massachusetts as
"happenstance". I le came with friends who told him of a new alternative school at
Woolman 1 1,11 in
, >eerfield where he soon became co-director. Kchlcr felt «1 liked
Western Mass' anyway" and saw the area as being "as good a place as any to put down
roots."
38
lie was soon swept up in the antinuclear movement sparked by Sam Love,oy\s
toppling ofthe Montague weather tower. » In western Massachusetts, Kehler came into
contact with a number Ofradical pacilists such as AISC members Wally and Juanita
Nelson and Frances Crowe, and became active in the region's growing network ofwar
lax resisters. Kehler's experience with the western Massachusetts left in the 1970s
helped make him a confirmed and zealous advocate of grassroots politics. 40 In 1980,
Kehler declared, "Hvery movement has to start somewhere and it has to start small."41
Telephone interview with Randy Kehler, May 5, 2003.
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After .he L980 fieeze referendum victory, Kehler proclaimed, "Ours ,s but a small spark,
but it's small sparks that often lead to raging forest fires."42
The other driving force in the formation ofTraproek and the western
Massachusetts ireexe campaign was sister Judith Scheckel. Scheckel came to western
Massachusetts iron, the School Sisters ofNotre I ) ;,n, ,n Minnesota lor an internship
With the area's AFS( ), Throughout her hie, Scheckel felt a special Calling to work among
•l.c downtrodden. Affected as many Catholics were by the social doctrines ofVatican []
Which Called on the faithful to play a greater folc .n helping the world's destitute,
Scheckel worked lor a time With ( esar ( have, and the t United Farm Workers and then in
the mid-1970s spent several months working with the poor in Honduras.43 Scheckel told
a -porter in loxo, "1 have dedicated my life to working for peace and justice, no, only
OH an individual level but it, a broader sense m (he world community/'44 Seheekel \s
pacifism was an outgrowth oi he, ( a.hohe la.ti, According to Seheekel,
'There is strong
theological and moral support [for a weapons moratorium] Every pope in the QUClear arc
has called for disarmament/'43 On anothei occasion, Seheekel declared, "a person cannot
be a ( Ihristian and believe ... a loving < tod and at the same time allow lor the building of
nuclear weapons.""* Seheekel rema.ned active ... western Massachusetts throughout the
Truprock Report, Vol I, #5, Novembei 1980. Traproek Peace Center Records 1979-1985" Serie. iBox i.Foldei I, MS so. Special Collections and Archives, w i n Dubois i ibrary University 'ot
Massachusetts, Ajnhersl (hereinafter cited as Traproek Peace Center Record s
)
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1 980s, playing an even greater role in the area's peace movement when KeHer moved to
St.Louis to head the national freeze movement
The seeds of the western Massachusetts freeze movement were planted in 1978.
Recalled Kehler, "When I started, my focus was still
.oca.. The Woolman Hill school
had fo.ded in
.978. [and] the Quakers who owned i, were trying to decide what to do
with it." Harvey Cox of the Harvard Divinity School approached Kehler about making
WoolmanW a center for the study of non-violence Consulting wrth others, who soon
formed the core group of Traprock, Kehler said, "very soon we decided non-violence as
a subject was too broad looking for a more particular focus, we decided on nuclear
disarmament."" Through local fundraising and support from the
.n.erna.ional Semmar
or. Training for Non-Violent Action, Kehler, Scheckel and others of the core group were
able to purchase the buildings atop the hill, which had recently housed the Woolman Hill
school, as well as 100 acres ofbucolic farmland Locals knew the ndge abutting the hill
as "Traprock", and thus the activists named their new peace movement headquarters
simply "Traprock" An eighteenth century abolitionist John Woolman had once owned
the land upon which the Traprock buildings stood, a connection the twentieth century
peace activists relished 18 Soon after the official founding of Traprock in September
1979, Kehler declared, "The time has come for a new abolitionist movement, this time to
abolish the institution ofwar
.
.
We should remember that the American abolitionists of
Telephone interview with Randy Kehler. May 5. 2003.
Springfield Sunday Republican November 22, 1 98 1.
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us, and yet ii was abolished."
Acco.Cn, t0 Kehler, V \ never heard OfRandy Forsberg", but instead learned of
the Ireexe proposal from a group of ( hr.st.an pacifists Centered on Sojourners magazine
in Washington,
'
Among then, was Jin, Wallace, who had shared the idea with
Oregon Senator Mark
.
latfield a, one oftheir numerous prayer breakfasts, « [atfield .hen
tried 10 msert .he freeze proposal into .he sai /hi treaty. Kehler stated, "As an
organizing tool the freeze being so conceptually simple and clear was great to organize
-ound." I le added, "Then I heard about Randy lorsbcrg and talked to her about it."50
During Traprock's first year, Kehler and Scheckel ae.ed as (he group's .wo foil-
time Salaried Officials (.hey received $800/month). They were joined by several area
residents, most of who,,, were already ac.ive ,n other peace Organizations, who
Comprised Traprock's core group and who ,n many ways foreshadowed in microcosm
the national freeze movement to come. They included Pauline Bassett (Mobilization for
Survival), Harvey Cox (Harvard Divinity School), Frances ( rowe (AFSC), Gordon
FaisOH (Movement for a New Society), Meg Gage (Amherst High School) and Judy
TitUS ( Woolman 1 1,11 lam, ( ommunity). The core group consisted predom.nantly of
individuals who were in their thirties or older, educated, while, middle class, and whose
activism was predominantly faith-based.' 1 Members ofthe core group espoused
localism, yet also evinced a global perspective. Several of them traveled abroad in the
r>
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early 1980s to participate in the European and Japanese peaee movements, and a few
even went on peaee missions to the Soviet Union and east bloe nations. 52
Traproek's eore group presaged the national movement's profile in many ways.
Many observed that the freeze was an "older" movement than the 1960s anti-war
movement, and tndeed included many veterans of that movement. Freeze activist Jeb
Brugman, the official "Peace Commissioner" of Cambridge, Massachusetts, when asked
by a BostojiGIobe reporter in 1 984, "How has the peace movement changed?" replied,
"It's gotten much larger, much broader, and older - the average age fof activists] now is
30 rather than 1 8 »* In 1 982, radical columnists Alexander Cockburn and James
Ridgeway, in a Ne^yJxftRe^ew article entitled "The Freeze Movement Versus
Reagan" observed, "The generations who came to active political maturity at the time of
the civil rights drive in the early sixties, and at the time of Kent State nearly a decade
later, still probably remain the active leavening in left and left-liberal organizing in the
United States."54 At the height of the freeze movement in 1982, Ne^ysweeLobserved,
"Up to now, young people - especially college students, like those who protested
Vietnam
- have been conspicuously absent from the anti-nuclear movement."55
Although college students were involved in freeze activism, by and large the movement
was directed much more from the pulpit than the classroom. Again, the Traprock core
Traprock Report
,
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group's religions onentation reflected what soon became a national trend.- At the height
of the 1980 western Massachusetts freeze referendum campaign, Kehler told a reporter,
"A high percentage of religiously motivated people are taking a lead on this." 57 In
another intent, Kehler affirmed, "This is an older bunch than the antiwar groups of
the Vietnam era... more middle class, more religious, more professionals in its ranks." 5*
Such would be the case throughout the freeze movement's history.
Lastly and perhaps most significantly, Traprock saw the emergence of women as
a leading force in defining the movement. Traprock's active members included more
women than men These female activists frequently put forward a feminist perspective
on the arms race. In an early Traprock newsletter piece entitled, "War and Patriarchy",
the group asserted, "War is the inevitable product of a society that teaches aggression,
competition and hierarchy. We cannot end war without taking apart the patriarchal ethos
which is at its root." 5" Two of the national freeze movement's most prominent leaders,
Randall Forsberg and Dr Helen Caldicott symbolized the growing importance of women
in the freeze movement. Caldicott in particular emphasized what she believed to be the
role of male psychology in the arms race: "Men are full of the negative masculine
principles of egocentricity, competition and killing. Therefore the world is in the grip of
this negative masculine principle Women, on the other hand, have a highly developed
>fi Cockbum and Ridgcway, "The Freeze Versus Ronald Reagan", 17-18.
" Undated newspaper chpp.ng, The Post Standard by J.P. Powers. Traprock Peace Center Records Series
5, Box 5, Folder 31, MS 80. '
58
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nurturing instinct and care about humanity. We have a built in passion for survival.^ In
December 1 982, over 30,000 British women protested and camped out at Greenham
Common to protest the impending arrival of 96 U.S Pershing and Cruise missiles. In
solidarity, several thousand U.S. women formed the Seneca Women's Peace
Encampment outside the U.S. Army Base m New York through which the Cruise and
Pershings were supposed to pass in transit to England. Several Traprock women joined
the encampment, which emphasized a feminist critique of the arms race. 61
Traprock was officially formed in the fall of 1979 and in February 1980 began
publication ofIheJj^prockRe^ a monthly newsletter with information on the
group's local activities as well as international news dealing with the global peace
movement. The masthead ofThe Traprock Report and many of the group's fundraising
letters included the following quote from the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.: "I refuse to
accept the cynical notion that nation after nation must spiral down a militaristic stairway
into the hell of nuclear destruction. I believe that unarmed truth and unconditional love
will have the final word in reality."62 Traprock would engage in many activities over the
years, including a summer international peace camp where young people from around
the world would stay and work together on peace issues. Traprock's first project,
however, was the campaign to put the nuclear weapons freeze on the ballot in western
Massachusetts for the November 1 980 election. The idea for a freeze referendum grew
out of western Massachusetts' recent activist history. According to Kehler, "I proposed
60
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we put a nuclear freeze on the baUot the same way we put the Montague plants on the
ballot." Kehler believed a referendum campaign was a great way to "raise [an] issue,
make it legitimate" and provided a good "excuse to go door to door to educate people
about an issue."" Summing up Traprock's global vision and local activism was the
popular slogan sometimes affixed to Traprock fliers, "Thinking Globally, Acting
Locally."64
In 1 946, Albert Einstein wrote, "To the village square we must carry the facts of
atomic energy. From there must come America's voice."65 Like the opponents of nuclear
power before them, Traprock activists now took the issue of the atom to the village
square. Kehler summed up Traprock's approach: "There will be no shortcuts... There's
only one road and it's the long one, the one that begins in our local churches and
synagogues, in our union halls and town halls, in our school auditoriums and on our
village greens."
66
In fundraising letters, monthly issues of the Traprock Report fliers,
and local newspaper and television interviews, the members of Traprock emphasized
their philosophy of global change through local politics. In an early fundraiser, Traprock
declared, "We see the global arms race as the most visible manifestation of societies
with distorted priorities. Our work to provide a grassroots training program mirrors our
63
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belief that true social change occurs when people on the local level both demand and
actually create a more just world.'- The road to Washington, these freeze pioneers
believed, would be paved through local communities across America. Traprock
emphasized this strategy in fundraising letters, declaring, "There already exists a handful
of national organizations who do important work at the national level; but until there is a
network of local, community-based organizations like Traprock who are creating local
disarmament constituencies all over the country, efforts in Washington will lack the
political muscle necessary to overcome the powerful forces perpetuating the arms
race."
68
The point was reiterated constantly in the pages of the Traprock Report- "The
main focus is on building public support from a very broad cross section of people
around the country, and not focusing on Washington until that public support is large
enough to cause national leaders to take heed." 69 Echoing the Clamshell Alliance,
whose direct actions at Seabrook rose from 1 8 arrests to 1 80 arrests to over 1 ,400 arrests,
Randy Kehler predicted the freeze movement would grow in a "geometric
progression."70 "Clearly", stated Kehler, "our efforts here in western Massachusetts are
part of something already large and just beginning to grow."71
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Kehler and other early members of Traproek were galvanized into aetion by the
failure ofSALT 11 and the simultaneous eo.d war resurgenee that so alarmed national
disarmament and arms eontrol organizations. An early issue of the Ixap^oekRe^ort
responded to President Carter's Presidential Directive #59, whieh publie.y outlined and
refined what previously had been a quiet poliey of planning for limited nuelear war:
"Although President Carter's Directive No. 59 announces a policy which has been in
efTect for years, the fact that it is now being publicized is a clear indication of an attempt
to make the concept of a 'limited' nuclear war palatable to the American public." 72
Traproek latched onto the freeze idea, then being discussed in Boston by Randall
Forsberg's IDDA, as a way to by-pass the complexities ofarms control negotiations and
put the arms race before the general public in a simple manner which promised to have
broad appeal. In a 1980 speech, Forsberg declared, "People who are afraid of
disarmament are more willing to stop where we are, to stop building more. It's a good
first step."
73
Anti-arms control organizations such as the Committee on the Present
Danger indiscriminately hurled the charge of "unilateral disarmament" at radical
disarmament advocates and liberal arms control groups alike. By advocating a "mutual
and verifiable" U.S.-Soviet freeze of the arms race, the freeze proposal could appeal to
those who saw the escalating arms race as dangerous and wasteful, but who might shy
away from more radical appeals. Kehler emphasized Forsberg's point in an interview
with the Greenfield Recorder, stating, "We can't say we want complete disarmament
tomorrow. The first step toward stopping the threat of nuclear war is to freeze the
72
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testing, production and depioynten, of new thermonuclear weapon... Since the arms
race has never stopped, such a freeze would be a monumental achievement... It's a
modest practical proposal that appeals to many people on all sides of the political
spectrum. It's not a wild-eyed idea."74
Although Kehler and his western Massachusetts colleagues saw the appeal of the
freeze proposal in terms similar to Forsberg's, they nevertheless approached the freeze
idea from a much different place on the ideological spectrum. Whereas Forsberg hoped a
freeze proposal would generate the popular, predominantly middle-class movement she
believed necessary to make arms control efforts more effective, the Traprock activists
hoped the freeze would be a first step in dismantling the military-industrial complex, the
cold war national security state, and the conservative national ideology, which
perpetuated them. Traprock activists, approaching the freeze predominantly from the
point of radical pacifism, hoped the movement would lay the groundwork for such
radical social and economic transformation of the United States. 75 The second issue of
the Traprock Report in early 1980, outlined the group's more radical perspective:
"Though reversing the arms race may be the absolute precondition to solving many other
pressing social problems - patriarchy, poverty, racism, the destruction of the
environment
- we do recognize the intrinsic connections between them all."76
Throughout the freeze movement's meteoric rise and decline, Forsberg worked
assiduously to keep the freeze proposal simple and uncoupled from other issues such as
74
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nuclear power. She also worked to keep the nascent movement's radical base publicly
off the radar screen. At an early national meeting of freeze supporters, Forsberg argued
the that the movement's
"pcacenik/radical/religious-pacifist composition... might
dissuade other middle-of-the-road constituencies from participating."77 While radicals
such as Kehler hewed to this "middle-of-the-road" strategy in a general way, they
nevertheless put forth their more radical vision on favorable occasions. Thus, Forsberg
embraced what in many ways was a radical proposal in the pursuit of the more limited
end ofarms control, while Kehler and other radicals embraced a campaign whose
language and tactics were moderate in an effort to bring about more radical change. The
freeze was thus the fulcrum around which both liberals and radicals would push for their
respective objectives. Over time this would prove the source of both the movement's
strength and weakness.
In early 1980, Traprock introduced the idea ofa freeze referendum in western
Massachusetts to area activists. In the April/May 1980 issue of the Traprock Report, the
group explained, " The moratorium concept, of simply stopping where we are, should
appeal to a broad spectrum of voters. Having the questions on the ballot legitimizes the
issue and gives every single voter the opportunity to say 'yes' or 'no' to the most
important life-and-death question the human race has ever faced."78 To the Valley
Advocate
,
Kehler stated, "We don't naively believe... that we can change the course of
the arms race with one referendum in western Massachusetts. We alone aren't going to
do anything, but how does anything happen? It begins somewhere. This could be the
77
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first ofmany referendums. This is a historic opportunity to serve as eatalyst for the
whole country. Massachusetts was the first [state] to vote to end the war in Vietnam and
we can begin a national effort to freeze the arms race."79
Traprock quickly conducted outreach to western Massachusetts' many peace
organizations and activated the activist infrastructure, which had sprung to life with such
alacrity after Sam Lovejoy had toppled the Montague tower in 1974. Traprock member
Frances Crowe, also an AFSC member, was particularly crucial in employing her
already legendary organizational skills in this regard, as well as procuring AFSC funding
for the referendum effort. Groups such as the Amherst Disarmament Coalition and
others soon joined Traprock in co-sponsoring the referendum campaign. Armed with
fliers and petitions, local activists, predominantly from the area's churches but also
drawing on academics and students from nearby campuses, set up tables in town centers,
supermarkets, strip malls and fairs throughout the area, seeking the 1 ,200 signatures
necessary to place the non-binding freeze proposal on the November ballot in three state
senate districts comprising Hampshire, Franklin, Berkshire and parts of Hamden
counties in western Massachusetts. The petition drive was accompanied by an education
campaign on the arms race, consisting of numerous public talks, study groups and
seminars on the arms race, as well as several vicwings of films at area such as 1,000
Cranes: The Children of Hiroshima
,
We Are the Guinea Pigs War Without Winners and
the ever-popular Dr. Strangelove . 80
79
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The freeze campaign sought to remain separate from the issue of nuclear energy
Petitioners received instructions to ask people to help them get a "proposal for a freeze
on the arms race on the ballot", not a proposal for a freeze in nuclear weapons. A memo,
"Tips for Petitioners" instructed, "We want to stay away from the word 'nuclear' smce it
has become such an emotionally charged word and since people don't easily separate it
from the nuclear energy issue."8 'Randy Kehler recalled, "Some groups felt nuclear
weapons and energy should be joined at the hip
. We needed to keep the focus simple
and clear and not take on an issue that divided along some different lines."82
Within a short time the movement had procured the requisite signatures and the
freeze became "Question #7" on the November ballot. (The activists actually procured
over 5,000 signatures, far surpassing the minimum required to put the question on the
ballot.
83
) The official referendum question read.
Shall the State Senator from this district be instructed to introduce a
resolution in the State Senate:
1 ) Requesting the President of the United States to propose to the
Soviet Union a mutual nuclear weapons moratorium by which
the United States and Soviet Union agree to halt immediately
the testing, production and deployment of all nuclear
warheads, missiles and delivery systems, and,
2) Requesting Congress to transfer the funds saved to civilian
use.
84
Once the question was officially assured a place on the November ballot,
activists stepped up what became a nine-month campaign. While activists handed out
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freeze fliers on street corners and sympathetic clergy wove chsarmament themes into
their sendees, a Spnngfield-based billboard firm, the Radding Sign Co. donated six area
billboards to the newly formed "Yes- On 7 Campaign" Samuel Orleans of the Radding
Sign Co. told a reporter, "We feel it's a logical issue whether we agree or degree"85
One large billboard depicted the symbolic s.lhouettes of a man and woman each holding
the hand of a single child between them, with the horizontal silhouettes of nuclear
missiles pointed at the family and the lines "Vote Yes on Question 7" across the top of
the billboard. 86 Anywhere crowds gathered freeze proponents were likely to be present,
including the U S Army exhibit depicting the White Sands Missile Range at the Three
County Fair in Hadley. Frances Crowe and fourteen others AFSC members picketed the
exhibit despite being repeatedly asked to leave for having "no permit" to demonstrate.
Crowe denounced the exhibit to a reporter, calling it part of the "Pentagon's advertising
campaign, [to] justify a soaring defense budget and to get people to accept the
inevitability of a limited nuclear war."87
Freeze proponents also fanned out to malls and other public gathering spots to
conduct an "Arms Race Survey", a nominal information gathering effort really aimed at
winning support for the freeze. Volunteers would approach passersby and ask, "Hi, do
you have a minute to answer four questions on the nuclear arms race?" They would then
fill out an individual card based on the respondent's answers and give the respondent the
Daily Hampshire Gazette . October 3. 1980
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nghf answers. The questions were all designed ,o dramatize the dangers of the nuciear
arms race and need for a freeze. 88
The western Massachusetts freeze campaign sought to highlight religious and
economy themes in its fliers and other forms of public outreach. According to one
estimate, the "Yes on 7" campaign had over 300 volunteers leafleting throughout the
area who handed out an estimated 60,000 fliers. 89 One flier, entitled "A Christian
Response of 'Yes' to Question 7", quoted Rev. Father Leo James Hoar of the Campus
Ministry Diocese of Springfield:
We in western Mass have a glorious moral value to share with the rest of
the United States... We here in western Massachusetts are the first
community of people having a referendum which offers the choice to the
people as to whether or not they want to live with the Russians in peace
or we and the Russians will die at about the same time via a nuclear warAnd 1 am all for liv.ng - living in peace... On November 4 th - when we
vote "yes" to Question #7, we shall be giving flesh to the faith of Church
teachings.
Another pamphlet tailored toward religious sensibilities entitled "A New Spirit"
began with Isaiah's biblical quote of 'pounding swords into ploughshares", then quoted
local minister Robert McAfee Brown of the United Church of Christ, who declared,
"The life of faith in service to God is in direct contradiction to the life of fear in service
Arms Race Survey
.
Some of the cards with answers and comments are in the Frances Crowe PapersSophia Sm.th Collection. The questions were: I ) With our present nuclear stockpile, government officials
estimate we can kill every Soviet citizen: a) once, b) 10 times over, c) 40 times over, d) 60 times over- 2)Which nation has forged all of the major advances in the arms race? a) Soviet Union, b) United States c)
Both led some advances; 3) About 40% of our federal budgets is used for military spending How do large
military budgets affect the economy? a) Stops Unemployment, b) Aids Free Enterprise, c) Creates
Unemployment and Inflation, d) Lowers taxes; 4) Over the next five years, the average family of four will
spend at least how much on nuclear weapons? a) about $500, b) about $1,000, c) about $5,000, d) about
$8,000.
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to nuclear armaments Similar endorsement by local clergy, including Rabbi David
Sapers,ein, preceded .he pamphlet's featured quote, a 1979 statement to Sojourners by
the nationally renowned evangelical minister. Rev Billy Graham Graham, a confidant
"••presidents and well-known anfi-communist, surprised conservatives by endorsing the
freeze early on, thereby bestowing a good deal oflegitimacy on the freeze in Middle
America:
The present insanity of the global arms race, if continued will lead
inevitably to a conflagration so great that Auschwitz will seem like a
minor rehearsal Is nuclear holocaust inevitable if the arms race is not
stopped ) f rankly, the answer is almost certainly yes.
. . The nuclear arms
race is not just a political issue it is a moral and spiritual issue as well 92
Alongside religious themes, proponents of the freeze sought to connect the arms
-ace to economic issues, a compelling approach in a country shaken by almost a decade
of ongoing economic dislocation (Indeed the freeze movement's national trajectory
would run nearly parallel to the recession of the early 1980s ) To do this, Traprock
activists sought to introduce the national work of William Winpinsinger into the western
Massachusetts campaign Winpinsinger was the president of the International
Association ofMachinists (IAM) The 1AM president had become co-chair ofSANE and
beginning in 1979 sought to merge the issues ofjobs and the nuclear arms race
Winpinsinger commissioned a study, which issued its findings in a 1979 report entitled,
"The Impact ofMilitary Spending on the Machinist Union" 93 Based largely on Bureau
of Labor Statistics sources, the report concluded that defense spending, especially for
A New Spirit", Pamphlet Circa October, 1980. Frances Crowe Private Papers Northampton
Massachusetts.
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nuclear weapons, was capital intensive and that one billion dollars converted from
defense to civilian spending would result in far more jobs being created. In statistics that
the western Massachusetts movement disseminated in numerous fliers, the IAM report
concluded that such a conversion could create 187,299 education jobs, 138,939
healthcare jobs, 100,072 construction jobs, 92,071 mass transit jobs as compared to the
75,710 jobs created by military spending. Overall, the report concluded that, on average,
for every one billion dollars of defense spending converted to riviKan spending, 14,000
new jobs would be created. 94 Winpinsinger wrote to members of SANE:
For years we've been sold a bill of goods about the "beneficial effects" of
military spending The arms budget has been viewed as a giant public
works program to stimulate the economy and provide jobs and incomeWe now know the truth. Far from aiding prosperity, excessive arms
spending weakens civilian industry and is a major cause of inflation and
unemployment
Randy Kehler and others in Traprock hoped to attract the support of local labor
organizations. "We want to work with union locals because these groups are mobilized
when they realize that military spending costs jobs," Kehler told a local reporter 96 The
"Yes on 7" campaign's major union support came from the local United Electrical
Workers Union, based in Pittsfield, a longtime leftist union headed by organizer/activist
David Cohen 97 Despite the jobs focus, the western Massachusetts freeze movement, as
would be the case nationally, ran into ambivalence among organized labor who saw in
Ibid The I. A.M. report also concluded that between 1975-8. the top 100 defense contractors with I A M
contracts received an increase of $5 billion from the Pentagon, while the Machinist Union suffered a net
loss of 12.0(H) jobs
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the movement a potential threat to jobs and heard echoes of the previous decade's
movement against nuclear energy. A local reporter noted that "spokesmen for local labor
organizations, gave the [freeze] proposal mixed reviews."98
In concert with the freeze movement's focus on jobs was the impact the arms
race had on human services and other cherished social programs. Here, the activists
sought to make the cost of the arms race tangible by citing its impact on specific local
programs. Frances Crowe asked one local reporter, "Why should we be spending all that
money for weapons we cannot use? We need the money for human services - for day
care and health care
- right here in Northampton."99 One "Yes on 7" flier depicted a pie
with 47o/0 Qf the federa , budget aHocated tQ defense
recent
cuts (pre-Reagan) to a number of social programs such as Title 20 Child Care Funding,
CETA and many others, concluding, "The list goes on! Services can only be maintained
by increasing local taxes or by organized efforts to cut military spending " ,0° Speakers at
a three-day teach-in at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, drove home the
economic linkage between tough times and a runaway arms race Renowned political
scientist, Columbia Professor Seymour Melman, whose life work focused on the
military-industrial complex, told the students, "The permanent war economy has become
the prime source of the inflation and unemployment we now endure." 10 ' Another
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speaker, Johnetta Cole, inveighed, "We need low ineome housing, no, homing for death
in the shape ofan MX missile." 102
In its emphasis on religious and economic themes, the western Massachusetts
freeze campaign prefigured the national movement to come. It did likewise with a tactic
that would be employed across the United States and was being used increasingly by the
west European peace movement: endorsement of its position by professional
Organizations. The "Yes on 7 Campaign" reached out to doctors and nurses, lawyers and
educators, social workers and artists, winning endorsements from a host of their
professional associations. The endorsements often were accompanied by paid "signature
ads" printed in local newspapers. The tactic was immensely popular and effective. First,
it introduced the arms race and the freeze proposal as points of discussion in these
organizations, making them "water cooler topics" on the job. Second, professional
endorsements helped move freeze support deeper into the mainstream. Third, the
signature ads, which often included hundreds of local names, personalized support for
the freeze. Lastly, associations could give their own professional vantage point on the
freeze. Thus, educators could discuss the impact of the arms race on children,
psychologists could assess the impact on Americans' mental health, scientists could
focus on the destructive power of nuclear weapons, and social workers could focus on
cuts to social programs. The 1 980 western Massachusetts campaign featured numerous
professional endorsements and signature ads. Among the most effective professional
endorsements were those that came from doctors and nurses, repositories of great public
trust. One full-page ad sponsored by (he "Yes on 7 Campaign" appearing in the Daily
102
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Ummr^m,, included the signatures of over 100 area health professionals, mostly
doctors and registered nurses. The ad first discussed the impact the arms race had on
health services, stating, "... the continued expansion of the military budget for the
development and products of nuclear weapons drains funds from much needed health
and social service programs.-"' The ad then went on to d.scuss the medical tmpl.cat.ons
of nuclear war. Nationally, Dr. Helen Caldicott had done much in her controversial
lectures to introduce the American public to the gruesome medical affects to be expected
from a nuclear blast and radioactive fallout, and the degree to which medical
professionals would be helpless to deal with such carnage Fxhoing Caldicott's views,
the doctors and nurses' ad in themxmnmmG^ declared that in the event of
nuclear war, "There is no possible effective medical response except to administer
stockpiles of morphine " 104
The "Yes on 7 Campaign" conducted a savvy press and media campaign,
procuring a surprising amount of local coverage during a presidential election year in
which voters would face a crowded ballot, including seven ballot questions. The latter
included the hotly debated Proposition 2 1/2, a statewide proposal to reduce loSl
property taxes based on the 1978 Proposition 13 in California, credited with setting off
the national "taxpayer revolt" then reaching Massachusetts. 105 The freeze campaign
placed paid ads in all the area's major local newspapers, all eleven radio stations and
received coverage from the three regional television networks The local press and media
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covered the campaign regularly, conducted interviews with freeze activists and
published numerous letters-to-thc-editor on the freeze campaign, some occasionally
devoting full pages to letters discussing the freeze (the letters ran heavily pro-freeze.)
OveraU, the "Yes on 7 Campaign" was able to project a sympathetic image to the public,
and convey its main points successfully through the press and media.' 06 By election day,
the "Yes on 7 Campaign" had won the endorsement ofmost the area press, including
Ihe Morning Union, ferkshire_Eagie, Greenfield R«-n„W ValleyAdvgcate and the
moderately conservative Springfield Repnhlican.which lasso endorsed Ronald Reagan
for president. 107
Although the western Massachusetts freeze campaign maintained its local focus,
keeping community supporters in the forefront, at least one national figure was brought
in to stump for question #7. Daniel Ellsberg, the famous leaker of the Pentagon Paper, in
1 97 1
,
had joined Dave Dellinger and other 1 960s activists in the mid- 1 970s to form
Mobilization for Survival (MfS), a group modeled on the Vietnam-era's "Mobe"
(Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam). The group declared its mission was '^to put
back on the political agenda what had been lost in the Vietnam years: an awareness of
the threat of nuclear holocaust." 108 In 1979, Randall Forsberg first proposed her version
of a nuclear weapons freeze at a convention of600 MfS members. Although the western
Massachusetts campaign was launched independently of the national movement, Kehler,
Crowe and other local activists kept national organizations apprised of their progress.
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For their part, national figures watched the "Yes on 7 Campaign" closely, seeing it as a
Pilot program to test the appeal of the freeze with mainstream voters. 109
In the fall of 1980, Darnel Ellsberg came to western Massachusetts to speak on
behalfof the freeze at area colleges, where the former Defense Department official
turned activist was a popular draw. Ellsberg came at the request of Kehler, whom he had
known since the late 1 960s, when Ellsberg says KehJer's willingness to go to jail to
oppose the war influenced his decision to leak the Penta^Par^rs, 1 10 Ellsberg
barnstormed the area in the weeks leading up to the election. "We can stop setting the
example (of) encouraging the reliance on nuclear weapons (as a defense) strategy...
We've set the worst possible example for the last thirty-five years and that has kept us
from using our weight diplomatically against nuclear proliferation," Ellsberg told
students at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.'" After sharing the concerns
voiced by several students over President Carter's recent re-introduction of Selective
Service registration, Ellsberg fielded questions about the upcoming presidential election.
What is interesting, is the degree to which the local freeze movement rarely mentioned
Ronald Reagan in 1980, given the right-wing Republican's hard-line anti-Soviet stance
and call for an even greater arms build up than the one currently under way. Much ofthe
liberal-left spectrum in the United States continued to focus anger and betrayal at
Carter's hard-line turn in 1978, which only grew more belligerent as the 1980 election
approached. Asked by students where he stood on the presidential contest, Ellsberg
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expressed a common ambivalence among progressives: "I would have to say what
they're offering us is the same arms race It gets down to which one would most likely
break his promises. Carter has broken so many promises already, maybe he'll break his
promise to go ahead with the MX missile. On that basis, I'd have to vote against
Reagan At another forum, Ellsberg stated, "I see a threat going with Carter or
Reagan." He would, however, vote for Carter, Ellsberg continued, because at least Carter
didn't "celebrate the arms race". 113 Beyond the presidential election, however,
Ellsberg's main message was for his audience to go out and vote for the freeze: "I hope
western Mass' will show the way. I hope two years from now there will be a referendum
on every ballot in every state."
114
The western Massachusetts freeze movement also confronted another
which would face the national freeze movement over the coming years, anti-
communism The 1980 presidential election was one marked by strident anti-Soviet
rhetoric from both the Carter and Reagan campaigns. By the turn of the decade, the
improved U.S. -Soviet relations ushered in by detente had given way to tensions
reminiscent of the early years of the cold war. The "Yes on 7" campaign thus had to
promote an end to the arms race in an election year where anti-communist rhetoric
reached peak volume. 115
In western Massachusetts, freeze activists challenged the basic premises of U S
cold war ideology, while remaining critical of both the United States and Soviet Union
issue.
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To one reporter, Kehler declared, "We don't naively believe the Sonets have peaceful
intensions. .."" 6 Yet, while cntical of the Soviet Union, freeze activists worked to
deflate the image of the Soviet Union as an inveterately expansionist power bent on
world domination. For many peace activists, the idea of the "Red Menace" was an
exaggeration used to prop up the military-industrial complex and perpetuate the arms
race. Marta Daniels of the AFSC, back from her second trip to the USSR., told a
gathering of Traprock activists in September, 1980, that a "powerful segment of our
population (military and industrial) has a vested interest in the maintenance of the Soviet
threat Earlier in the year, Randy Kehler stated to a reporter from the Greenfield
Recorder :
The current saber rattling about a new 'Russian threat' is nothing but
election rhetoric. Though the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan must be
condemned, thus far the scale and duration of it in no way compare to our
own invasion of Vietnam We forget that Russia and its Eastern European
client states are almost completely surrounded by hostile neighbors.
. . In
short, Russia is hardly on the verge of taking over Western Europe,
overrunning the rest of the Third World or launching a war against the
U.S.
The "Yes on 7" campaign sought to address questions concerning the Soviet
Union head on. One flier entitled "Behind the Scenes. The Myth of the Soviet Threat-
discussed corporate profits from defense spending and exposed the role ofNew Right
organizations like the Committee on the Present Danger in promoting the new "Red
116
Valley Advocate October I, 1980
117
Daily Hampshire Gazette. September 12, 1980
118
Greenfield Recorder. February 2. 1980.
231
Scare".- Another flier entitled, "But What About the Russians?' equated the United
States and Soviet Union's respective imperialisms. It stated:
Both nations are seeking control of scarce world resources. Since WorldWar II, both nations have used military intervention, propaganTand
scare tactics to maintain and expand their influence. Like the Soviets wehave consistently interfered in the affairs of other nations.
. The rece^Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to preserve the shaky pro-Soviet
government, far from gaining them leadership in the Third World has
earned the Soviets near universal condemnation and has brought ihem
into conflict with the non-aligned nations. 120
The freeze movement also worked to humanize Soviet citizens. Over the coming
years, several Massachusetts towns would declare themselves "sister cities" with towns
and cities in the Soviet Union, as part of a campaign promoted by another American
arms control organization, "Ground Zero". 121 Several Traprock activists themselves
would visit the Soviet Union and others would join national letter writing campaigns to
the Soviet leadership, calling for the release of imprisoned Soviet peace activists. 122 On
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Traprock's Meg Gage was among those who visited the U.S.SR. Gage met with an "unofficial" Sovietdisarmament group, which, though not anti-government, was viewed with suspicion by the governmentGage descr.bed the group as "rhetorical and guarded" during official meetings and "candid" during their
unmon.tored breaks. Gage found her Soviet hosts friendly, but noted "a lack of information available to
the Soviet people. She believed, however, that her peace mission to the U.S.S.R met with "some
success". Traprock Report
.
Vol. HI, # 10, July, 1983. One example ofa nationally circulated letter signed
by U.S. peace activists and sent to the Soviet leadership, was an appeal for the release of Sergei Batovrin
in 1982. The letter read in part: "We welcome the recent Soviet renunciation of first use of nuclear
weapons. However, it belies the Soviet claim to be 'peace loving' when independent Soviet peace activists
- our brothers and sisters in the movement
-are labeled as 'provocative', 'illegal' and 'anti-social'... As
activists opposed to actions by the Reagan administration that would escalate the arms race we the
undersigned call upon you to release SERGEI BATOVRIN, now interned in a psychiatric hospital, and to
cease harassment of other independent activists and allow their voices to be heard on this most vital of
issues - the issue of survival in the shadow of nuclear war." Traprock Report
. Vol. HI #5 September
1982.
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.he whole, the western Massachusetts freeze movement, by maintainmg a critiea, stance
toward both superpowers and emphasizing a shared global humanity over an
ideologically divided world, helped keep the focus on the arms race itself and its cos, to
both societies
The major element of the national movement foreshadowed in the 1980 western
Massachusetts freeze campaign was its electoral strategy Randy Kehler repeatedly
emphasized that the goal was to produce a locally based mass movement that would be
"large enough to cause national leaders to take heed Although the movement against
nuclear energy made forays into electoral politics, predominantly through antinuclear
referenda, the movement remained focused primarily on direct action or legal
interventions More than most movements of the 1970s and 1980s, the freeze movement
kept an eye on influencing elected representatives, working to win their endorsements of
a freeze In the 1980 campaign, the immediate focus was on three state senators, John
Olver (Franklin and Hampshire Counties), Martin Reilly (Hamden County) and Peter
Webber (Berkshire County) who were to be instructed by the referendum to introduce a
freeze resolution in the state senate The movement also worked relentlessly on western
Massachusetts' congressman, Silvio Conte, a well-liked moderate Republican. 124
Much of the focus in the 1980 campaign was on Democrat John Olver, whose
district encompassed many freeze strongholds such as Amherst, Northampton and
Deerfield. Early in the campaign, Olver stated that although he supported arms control
efforts, he doubted the freeze was "verifiable", sounding a theme that would be heard
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over and over by opponents of the freeze in coming years. '» Conte likewise expressed
reservations. As the election neared and the freeze movement seemed to garner a
growing gronndswell of support, however, both politicians came out in support of the
freeze, although Kehler would later refer to Gome's belated endorsement as "somewhat
reluctant".'" Looking back on Giver's actions during this period, Frances Crowe stated
.hat Olver was never "a leader" but "a follower" - Within months, however, Olver
would find himself the point man in the campaign to win endorsement of the freeze from
the Massachusetts legislature, and Conte would find himself torn between his
increasingly conservative national political party and strongly pro-freeze constituency.
Both Conte and Olver were the lirst Bay State politicians swept along by the rising tide
of the freeze movement. By 1983, both houses of the state legislature, the governor, and
all twelve members of the Massachusetts congressional delegation would endorse the
freeze.
On November 4, 1980, voters in western Massachusetts' three state senatorial
districts voted 59% to 41% in favor of a nuclear weapons freeze. In Olver's district, an
astonishing 64.5% of the electorate endorsed the freeze proposal. The numbers were
likewise high in Berkshire County where 59.2% of the voters said "yes" to question #7.
In the sections ofmore conservative Hamden County that voted on the freeze, 50.5%
voted for the moratorium. Overall, 59 of 62 towns voting endorsed the freeze. Yet, in a
vote that perplexed many, the same region of western Massachusetts which endorsed the
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freeze likewise narrowly cast the majority of its votes for Ronald Reagan, with 33 of62
towns voting for the conservative Republican ,2X The freeze, however, garnered a
majority of votes in almost all the towns that went for Reagan as well. Some observers
believed that going into the election Reagan's strength was more on the economic front,
and that his strident anti-communism was a source of concern to voters that Reagan only
helped alleviate late in the campaign by his more statesman-like demeanor during his
televised debate with Carter a week before the election. This could possibly explain the
mixed message sent by voters Or one could also see in the western Massachusetts vote
an across-the-board rejection of the status quo, although local incumbents like Conte
were all re-elected 129
Days before the November 1980 vote, Randy Kehler confidently predicted, "Our
work is going to send a signal around the country about how Americans feel about the
arms race.""
0
Frances Crowe, in a 1983 speech, described a less optimistic feeling:
"Election night we gathered to celebrate our work but certainly not in expectation of
victory. Some of us thought maybe twenty-five percent would vote for the freeze. As the
news came in that Reagan was winning, the polls also reported that we were
winning!" 1 31 If many liberals and radicals across the United States were despondent at
the results of the presidential election, supporters of a nuclear weapons freeze were
elated at the overwhelming popular endorsement of their proposal in western
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Massachusetts. To the Nation, Kehler proclaimed, "This vote in western Massachusetts
shows that the American public is indeed receptive to proposals for stopping the arms
race. The issue of nuclear arms transcends party lines and liberal vs. conservative
divisions... noone wants a nuclear war."' 32 Adi Bemak, long-time peace activist with
the Amherst Disarmament Coalition and "Yes on 7" organizer, declared, "The
campaign's success in votes gathered indicates that grassroots organizing on a complex
and formidable national issue is possible and demonstrates the impact people just talking
to people can have." 133
Just weeks before the November vote, Kehler, Frances Crowe and other
Massachusetts activists met with over forty national arms control and disarmament
advocates on the eighth floor of U.N Plaza in New York City. Kehler returned to western
Massachusetts, and told local freeze supporters, "I found that nearly everyone at the
meeting had not only heard about the western Massachusetts referendum, but they said
they viewed it as the bellwether of the whole moratorium movement, the first real test
anywhere in the country of the public's reaction to the moratorium proposal." 134 For
Kehler, the "Yes on 7" campaign had tested the political waters and found Americans
receptive to ending the arms race. Kehler and others now sought to ballyhoo the western
Massachusetts campaign as a model that could be transplanted across America:
... Our success in western Massachusetts, an area diverse enough to be
foirly representative of the country as a whole, means that the American
public is indeed receptive to constructive bilateral proposals for ending
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S3&roM nuclear arms race despite the el~,s~
After the vote, Daniel Ellsberg promised to tell "the western Massachusetts
story" coast to coast. The story, however, seemed to spread rapidly immediately after the
November election. Freeze pioneer, Oregon Senator Mark Hatfield wrote to Traprock, "I
want to send you my congratulations for your successful referendum campalgn in
Western Massachusetts. I understand that the proposition.
. . was approved by a
decisive majority. This is greatly encouraging." 136 Traprock was inundated within a
week with requests for information coming from around the country, especially from
pacifist religious groups Recalling the aftermath of the vote, Frances Crowe said
;
"Then
mail came in from all over the country asking how we had done it.
,
."
137 An AFSC
member from Seattle, Washington, Anne Willard, wrote Traprock, "I just read about
your wonderful campaign in myQimm^dCMs.
. . congratulations on your hard
work and on the very positive results. If you have details of the campaign that you are
willing to send, I would appreciate very much receiving them. I hope to be able to make
good use of them.
.
" ,38
From Bloomington, Indiana a woman wrote, "Word is soreadine
of your successful referendum on the arms race! [which is] raising much enthusiasm in
our local [AFSC] meeting that perhaps some such movement could be started in Indiana.
We realize, however, that much hard work went into your campaign, and would
135
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appreciate any tactics that you could share with us. Specifically we wonder about the
best approach to community, winch leaders are best to approach, effective outreach
techniques, which facts/arguments/issues seemed to impress people most, etc"™
According to Traprock's Judith Scheckel, "We have received requests for information
on how to conduct a referendum like this one from fourteen other states and church
groups like the Mennonites, Presbyterians and Pax Christ! (a Catholic Peace Group)
As word spread of the western Massachusetts success story, freeze support
spread like wild fire up the Connecticut Rtver Valley as over fourteen Vermont towns
voted in town meetings to endorse a nuclear weapons freeze in the months following the
November election. 141 Town meetings across western Massachusetts soon did the same
transforming the region into a bastion of solidly pro-freeze sentiment. Cambridge joined
the trend in the spring of 1981 with its endorsement of the freeze. 142 As Randy Kehler
moved to St. Louis to take charge of a newly formed national freeze movement,
organizers in western Massachusetts began their efforts to turn all of Massachusetts into
a nuclear weapons freeze fortress Traprock, the Amherst Disarmament Coalition and
others involved in the "Yes on 7 Campaign" branched out across the state making
contacts with other local Massachusetts disarmament groups, especially in Cambridge,
Rulh Sanders to AFSC Western Massachusetts Regular Office, circa November/December 1 980trances Crowe Papers. Northampton, Massachusetts.
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flagahip state ofthe national nuclear weapons freeze movement
The Massachusetts Legislature's Nuclear Weapons Krceae Resolution, Spring 1981
A week after the dec
, the Traprock Repor, proclaimed, "We did it! |(),„ slalc
Senators] have a popular mandate to carry the nuclear weapons moratorium proposal to
the State House in Boston- Liberal Democratic state senate John Olve, had gone
from initial skepticism toward the nuclear weapons freeze proposal to endorsing as the
movement gathered suck,!, After western Massachusetts voters resoundingly approved
die iicczc in Novembei 1980, olve, transformed himselfalmost ovemighi into the
movement's chiefelected advocate on Boston's Beacon Hill Olve. coordinated his
efforts closely win, Traprock Weeks after the vote, Olve, wrote Traprock members, "As
my aide, Stan Rosenberg, indicated during his visit with you at the Traprock Peace
( Vnic
,
l intend to file with the Senate Clerk by December t the Resolution related to
Ballot Question in i understand that optimally you would like to see the matter acted
upon between the third week ofMarch and the end ofApril to coincide with othe,
activities ofinterest to your group I will do my best to see that it con.es before the
Senate during thai period " l4S As promised, Olve, and Springfield Democrat Alan
Sisitsky co-sponsored a freeze resolution in the Massachusetts Senate ,,, early
111
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Decembe,- Olver took the freeze movement case ,o his colleagues in ,he state
capital, declaring,
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As the freeze debate evolved, Olver found himself most comfortable with the
movement's emphasis on the social costs of the anus race In a statement, which seemed
to draw on William Winpinsinger's I.A.M. report, Olver stated, "The same billion
dollars [spent on nuclear weapons) put to civilian use will employ 73,000 police, 76,000
teachers or 85,000 nurses— Olver and his allies in the state senate introduced Senate
Resolution #455, which called upon the President of the United States to propose to the
U S S R, a nuclear weapons moratorium and to transfer the funds saved to civilian
use.
,4
" Lobbying hard for the resolution were activists from the Massachusetts Coalition
for a Nuclear Weapons Freeze, including many veterans of the western Massachusetts
campaign As debate unfolded, eastern Massachusetts activists increasingly weighed in,
with the Cambridge city council endorsing a nuclear weapons freeze on March 16, 1981
and a Boston-based group "Jobs With Peace" successfully lobbying for a companion
resolution to Res # 455, Res. # 454 which would have the state legislature call on the
federal government to cease "unnecessary spending" on new military programs and to
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Another religious figure to speak for the freeze was Robert Hillegass of the
Massachusetts Council of Churches, who declared, "Such a nuclear policy [of deterrence
through massive retaliation], which holds humanity and the earth itself hostage is
evidently a crime against humanity and God." 155
The state lecture's Joint Federal Financial Assistance Committee approved
the resolutions, which were then passed in the Massachusetts Senate on May 18 and the
Massachusetts House of Representatives on June 9. 156 While Olver shepherded the
resolution through the senate - aided by numerous pro-freeze lobbyists - Greenfield
state representative, Democrat William Benson worked for passage in the house, telling
colleagues, "We have to take a serious look at what we're doing and [determine] if, in
the long run, it's sane.'" 57 Thus, only eight months after voters in the western half of the
state expressed their support for a nuclear weapons freeze, the Massachusetts legislature
went on record endorsing a new direction for the nation, just as it had been the first to do
in 1970 when that same body passed a resolution calling for U.S. withdrawal from the
ongoing war in Vietnam. The Coalition for a Nuclear Weapons Freeze drew attention to
the historical parallel in a press release "The Coalition is encouraged knowing that in
1970, the Massachusetts Legislature voted for a resolution calling for an end to the
Vietnam War. That vote was the first such vote by a state legislature - it helped catalyze
public acceptance of opposition to the war.
. . The nuclear freeze vote is another
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historical firs,- Freeze aetivis.s were dated by their rapid progress on the state level.
Eugene Angus, a professor of literature at Western New England College and member of
the Amherst Disarmament Coalition, declared after the vote, "We are telling Reagan in
no uncertain terms that we as a state are senous about this.
. . It was very gratifymg to see
the state legislature do this." 159
Ih^^husetts^^
By 1982, the freeze movement was taking the United States by storm, becoming
a nightly topic on the evening news and taking up increasing space in the nation's
newspapers, periodicals and public discourse. In an endorsement of the freeze, the
BostonGlobe declared, "Almost suddenly, a new political movement is blowing in the
wind from coast to coast. It's called the 'freeze' movement... To the amazement of
national security specialists and others who have lobbied for years in the dusty bins of
arms control, the freeze looks like it's going to be a political heavyweight A few months
ago most observers of the American scene would have said that a responsible, credible,
politically effective 'peace movement' was years away." 160 On June 12, 1982, over
850,000 Americans rallied peacefully for a nuclear weapons freeze in New York City in
what many consider one of the largest peace demonstration in U.S. history 161
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In the Commonwealth, the Massachusetts Coalition for a Nuclear Weapons
Freeze worked hard to build on the momentum of the previous two years to keep the Bay
State at the cutting edge of the national freeze movement. Senator Edward Kennedy's
staff had recently contacted Randy Kehler and was workup to align the senator closer to
both Massachusetts and national freeze organizations. 162 The minutes of a Western
Massachusetts Coalition for a Nuclear Weapons Freeze meeting at which Frances
Crowe, Pauline Bassett and Judith Sheckel were present, reveal that Senator Kennedy
was behind the idea to put the freeze on a statewide referendum the following
November. The minutes state: "Senator Kennedy had suggested to the group of
Massachusetts freeze workers who met with him several weeks ago that Massachusetts
have a statewide referendum on the freeze. The Council for a Nuclear Weapons Freeze
in Cambridge has been working with the legislature to place the freeze on the November
ballot."
163
The movement thus set as its goal for 1982 a freeze referendum to be voted on
statewide in the November elections. If the movement could win a place for a freeze
referendum on the ballot, it would make Massachusetts one of nine states placing the
freeze on a statewide ballot that year. Since California would be voting on the freeze, the
national movement boasted that over 30% of all Americans would be offered a chance to
express their views on the freeze at the polls that November. 164
Once again, the leader in the state senate was John Olver. Olver's western
Massachusetts district remained a stronghold of freeze activism in the state. Olver, who
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had given a lukewarm endorsement of the freeze in 1980, had, by 1982, become a
crusader for the proposal at the state level Olver and fellow state senator George
Bachrach (D-Watertown) co-drafted a circular letter calling on the state legislature to put
a freeze referendum on the November ballot for all Bay State residents to vote on. Olver
and Bachrach procured the signatures of 28 state senators and 92 state representatives
(over half the state's House of Representatives), many ofwhom were lobbied
relentlessly by freeze activists. The Olver circular letter called on the legislature to put to
the voters a referendum calling on President Reagan, Secretary of State Alexander Haig
and U.S. delegates to the U.N. Disarmament Session, to propose a "prompt freeze,
(followed by| scheduled, verifiable, progressive reduction of nuclear weapons arsenals,
leading to the eradication and banning of such weapons "' 65 The Olver-Bachrach
circular letter declared,
What is required is a strong conventional defense and sensible foreign
and economic policies, which will ensure our security.
. . We cannot
afford, nor can our adversaries, ever spiraling expenditures on weapons
that cannot be used and therefore do not provide security
. It is a sham to
say that we can afford more for nuclear weapons while depriving the
people of this country housing, mass transportation, education and social
services.
..
So that they may have their share of nuclear weapons the Soviet people
stand in line for food and wait years for housing while their government
spends a huge share of their gross national product on nuclear arms
. . So
that we may have our share of nuclear weapons our government talks of a
five-year military buildup costing $1.5 trillion, while budgets for mass
transportation, education, housing and social services are cut. 166
Unlike the Massachusetts freeze campaigns of 1980 and 1981, where opposition
was unorganized and scattered, by 1 982, the Reagan administration reeularlv emoloved
165 The Morning Union May 27, 1982
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the "bully pulpit" to denounce the freeze as "unilateral lament" and to redbait the
national movement as inspired by Moscow.- This emboldened freeze opponents on the
state level, who now geared up in Massachusetts to stop the freeze proposal from
reaching voters on the state ballot in November 1982. Although the state Senate acted
with dispatch, passing the bill to put the freeze on the ballot 36-1, the bill soon ran into
trouble in the state's House of Representatives where Republicans and conservative
Democrats sought to kill the ballot question through amendments with language
designed to alter the question ' 68 One representative affixed the wording "unless the
president feels it will weaken the United States" to the end of the freeze ballot question
passed by the Senate. 169 Representative William Robinson (R-Melrose) added language
forbidding freeze negotiations "if militarily disadvantageous to the United States".
Representative Marie Howe (D-Somerville) proposed an amendment forbidding
negotiations until the Soviet Union withdraws from Afghanistan and pull out of Eastern
Europe 170 Freeze advocate Pauline Bassett sighed in exasperation, "We didn't anticipate
this" as freeze activists stepped up their lobbying to break the logjam before the deadline
passed for questions to appear on the November ballot. 171 Given their proximity to the
statehouse, the Cambridge Council for a Nuclear Weapons Freeze took the lead in
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lobbying for the ballot question in the state legislature, making almost daily
appearances. 172
Many charged House Speaker Thomas McGee, a conservative Democrat, with
preventing the ballot question from going to a joint conference committee. Democratic
candidate for governor Michael Dukakis inserted himself into the dispute, hoping to
break the impasse by strongly endorsing the freeze. Speaking before the Kennedy
Library in Boston, Dukakis declared:
Here with the Kennedy Library behind us, we are reminded of PresidentJohn Kennedy s successful support in 1963 of a treaty banning all nuclear
weapons testing in the air, sea and outer space.
. . Nuclear war cannot be
won or survived. It can only be prevented. Let the people of
Massachusetts tell the President to seek an agreement with the Soviet
Union for a mutual, verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and
deployment of nuclear weapons. 173
The logjam was finally broken when McGee received a letter from the state's
national congressional delegation, including Ted Kennedy and U.S. Speaker of the
House Tip O'Neill, both ofwhom were working to promote a freeze resolution at the
national level. The conference committee stripped the ballot question of the
conservative amendments added in the House and sent it along to the state secretary of
state barely in time to make the printing deadline for the November ballot. The freeze
question to face Bay State voters - Ballot Question #5 -- read:
Shall the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts inform the
President and the Congress of the United States that it is the desire of the
people of Massachusetts to have the government of the United States
work vigorously to negotiate a mutual nuclear weapons moratorium and
172
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were
rations^75
^^ aPPr°Priate verifica^n, with the Soviet Un,on and other
Massachusetts conservatives were not happy. Several were angry that the same
liberal representatives who were pushing to have the freeze included on the ballot
simultaneously opposed to including a referendum question on the death penalty.
Democratic State Senator Robert Parker complained, "the issue of capital punishment
was delayed in getting on the ballot by the same people who are yelling and screaming
to get this [the freeze] on the ballot " l7* (Ultimately, both appeared on the November
ballot.) State Senator Robert Hall (R-Fichtburg) denounced the freeze ballot question as
a liberal ploy "to bring all the fruit loops out in November "' 77 Echoing the red baiting
coming out of the administration in Washington, DC, Representative Royall Switzer
(R-Wellesly) inveighed, "The liberals, I sometimes think, are carrying the baggage for
the Russians, who want a nuclear freeze because they know how far ahead thev are " ,7*
The place of the freeze on the statewide ballot was assured with the signature of
Governor Ed King, who many called Ronald Reagan's favorite Democrat for his
opposition to abortion, support for capital punishment, and pro-business and anti-tax
positions. King was gearing up for his own rematch in the upcoming Democratic
primaries with former governor Michael Dukakis, who was trying to stage his own
political comeback Although King's conservative streak might have inclined him to
oppose the freeze, he clearly saw the proposal's popularity in the state and wisely
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avoided handing his more liberal gubernatorial opponent another 1Ssue by refusing to
sign the bill. King declared simply that he was "against nuclear war, against all
The election of 1982 saw the freeze movement hit high tide. Earlier that year, the
United States House of Representatives fell two votes short of passing a freeze
resolution (206-204) » The Democrats picked up a number of seats in the House and
Senate that November.- Of the nine states voting on the freeze, only Arizona voted it
down 59o/0-4,o/0 . In the beIlwether^ of Callforma ^^m[y^^
52.5% support. Elsewhere, the freeze proposal's margin of victory was greater. The
tallies were: Michigan, 57%; Montana, 57%; New Jersey, 66%; North Dakota, 58%;
Oregon, 61.5%; and Rhode Island, 59%. Twenty-nine cities likewise passed freeze
resolutions, as did Washington, D C. Not to be outdone, Massachusetts voters approved
the freeze by an astonishing 74%, with every single town in the state registering its
approval. 182 Surveying the freeze proposal's coast to coast victories, Traprock's Judith
Scheckel exclaimed, "In 1980, after our small referendum victory in western
Massachusetts, none of us dreamt that two years later 30% of the country would have an
opportunity to vote on the Freeze." 183
By 1982, Massachusetts had emerged as the freeze movement's most reliable
base. All twelve members of the state's congressional delegation in Washington
Ibid On the King administration, see Richard Gaines and Michael Segal, Dukakis and the Reform
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supported it, the state legislature had given its approval and now nearly three of every
four voters in the state expressed their support. The only weak link in Massachusetts
polities vis-a-vis the freeze was the governor's office where Ed King offered only tacit
and unenthusiastic support. That was about to change dramatically.
The breakdown ofdetente in the late 1970s and ensuing arms buildup was
accompanied in the United States by a revived emphasis on civil defense. The Carter
administration allocated increased funds for civil defense and called upon the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to work with the states in drawing up more
detailed civil defense plans for moving urban residents to rural "host" communities
known as "Crisis Relocation Planning" (CRP). As the new Reagan administration
undertook its massive nuclear weapons buildup in the early 1980s, it placed even greater
emphasis on CRP, incorporating it into its planning for waging and winning a nuclear
war. The Reagan administration proposed a record $4.2 billion budget for FEMA's civil
defense planning. Not since the days of "duck and cover" drills and fallout shelters of
the 1 950s and early 1 960s, had so much emphasis been placed on civil defense and
never in U.S. history had so much money been earmarked for it. 184
The resurrection of civil defense planning was all the more unnerving to peace
advocates since it took place in the context not only of the Reagan administration
buildup but the administration's heightened rhetoric about fighting "limited" and
"winnable" nuclear wars. The rhetoric was often surreal and frightening. FEMA head
s arms
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Lou, Giuffrida said of a nuclear war, "It would be a temble mess, but it wouldn't be
unmanageable- Undersecretary of Defense, T.K. Jones advised that to survive a
nuclear war, Americans should "dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors and then
throw three feet of dirt on top- Amencan deaths, Jones argued, could be kept as low
as ten million in a nuclear war provided there were "enough shovels to go around." 187
Secretary of State Alexander Haig spoke of firing "nuclear warning shots" and Eugene
Rostow proclaimed, "We are living in a pre-war and not a post-war world." 188
In the early Reagan years, FEMA was officially charged with drawing up plans,
in concert with the states, for relocating over 15% of the U.S. population to designated
"host" communities. This plan presumed a week's notice. Many critics pointed out that
the Soviet Union would likely view such a massive population shift as a sign the United
States was preparing for a nuclear war, thus encouraging a Soviet first strike.
Nevertheless, the Reagan administration pushed ahead with its civil defense planning,
making the administration's talk of planning for winnable nuclear war seem all the more
palpable to millions of Americans. Adding to the sense of unreality, FEMA announced
that it would work to keep U.S. financial institutions running after a nuclear war and
advised relocating Americans to bring their credit cards with them. 189
These plans made the arms race all the more tangible to those in Massachusetts
as they learned details of their state's CRP. Tentatively, much of rural western
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Massachusetts was designated to be host communities For example, Amherst was to
take in ,60,000 resident, from the nearby cities of Springfield, , lolyoke and Granby.
Greenfield was to host 158,000 people from Cambridge. 190
^ early 1980s, a national movement in opposition to CRP grew side by side
With the freeze movement Once again Massachusetts was at the forefront Two
academic communities led the way, firs. Cambridge and then Amherst Cambridge,
Lome to « larvard University. MIT, and other academic institutions, was an upscale town
abutting greater Boston In 198.
, members of the Cambridge Council for a Nuclear
Weapons Freezejoined other town peace activists to push lor some symbolic action to
show Cambridge's opposition to CRP As the state' legislature debated the free/.e
resolutions of 198 I acoss the Charles River, 72% ofCambridge voters approved a non-
b.nding resolution declaring Cambridge a nuclear free /one (NFZ) and stating the town's
Opposition to cooperating with FEMA's CRP in any form 191 I am proud to be among
th0SC who rccogm/c the fallacy ofCambridge c.t./ens grabbing then credit cards and
their wills and driving to Greenfield to escape the horror of nuclear war," Cambridge
City Councilor Sandra Graham later declared 192
The issue quickly merged with free/.e activism in western Massachusetts where
the Amherst Disa.mamcnt Coalition, the Amherst Ad I loc Committee on Crisis
Relocation Planning, the Committee for a Nuclear f ree Amhersl ar.d Traprock's Civil
I >efense Information project led the campaign 193 The Chan of Amherst Hoard of
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Select™ denounced CRP as "a crue, joke ,o convince people you can survive a nuclear
war At a 1982 hearing with state civil defense officials, a Jewish resident of
Amherst, Arthur Lansky, lambasted the state's CRP, comparing such planning to the
mentality that had produced genocide earlier in the century:
The Holocaust was perpetrated by bureaucrats who forgot to ask whvwho watched without comment.
. Having lost family and friends to oneho ocaus
,
we are not content to si. by and watch a second nuclear
Sou,tc
Cam,M
I
3"6 lhe
°
ne bureaUcra,ic st<* <° ««Pt this planwithout becoming comphct m the whole We cannot accept our assigned
stations in the machine of death 195
The movement to promote non-cooperation with CRP gathered steam as the
freeze movement swept across the country. Cities and town in Europe had begun
declaring themselves NFZs in opposition to planned deployment ofU.S. Pershing and
Cruise missiles, and a growing number of American cities and towns were doing the
same."
6 A number, like Amherst, refused to cooperate with their state's CRP In 1984
Amherst passed one of the nation's most stringent, binding NFZ by-laws. After two
hours of raucous debate, the town council voted 101-60 to declare Amherst a NFZ,
requiring Amherst to divest all funds from any company involved in the production of
nuclear weapons; banning all such corporations from doing business in the town; and
banning unclassified research related to nuclear war (the University ofMassachusetts
had banned all classified research in 1972). 197 Within a year, the town sponsored two
pamphlets on CRP, one entitled, "Why There Is No Protecting Against the
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Consequences of Nuclear War" and another "Why No Steps Short of Nuclear
Disarmament Could Protect the Citizens of Amherst from Nuclear War." 198
By 1984, 58 U.S. cities and towns had declared themselves NFZs, of which 20
were in Massachusetts. 1- Ironically, in 1983, Cambndge residents voted down an effort
similar to the one passed a year later in Amherst, which would have made Cambridge's
non-binding NFZ proclamation binding. 200 During a petition drive to put the NFZ
question on the ballot, Richard Scheuer of the Nuclear Free Cambridge campalgn wrote
an opinion piece in the BosJpnGlobe_explaining the campaign to Cambridge voters:
A nuclear free zone is an area, which is free of nuclear related activities
Individual communities define nuclear as they wish, and we of the
Nuclear Free Cambndge Campaign, which is part of the peace group
Mobilization for Survival, are focusing on banning all nuclear weapons
rrom our city. We are saying that we are not going to wait while the
government debates arms control measures. We want work on nuclear
weapons to stop in Cambridge now, because allowing it to continue is
being complict in the arms race. Just as 19th century abolitionists took a
step toward abolishing slavery by refusing to recognize fugitive slave
taws in their own communities, Cambridge and other nuclear free areas
are taking a step toward disarmament by refusing to be complicit in the
arms race.
An organized opposition led by Boston University president John Silber emerged
to oppose the proposed NFZ law. At public meetings, the right-wing Boston University
president would clap in the face ofNFZ supporters, declaring each clap represented
100,000 Afghan refugees. Others argued the bill would impinge on academic freedom
and still others argued that the philosophy of defying federal policy behind the NFZ
198
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movement was too similar ,n theory to that employed by the wrote segregate south
during the civil nghts era.- The proposed Cambridge NFZ would have been the first in
the nation to actually disrupt nuclear weapons research. Although the bill would have to
be tested in court, the bmding referendum would have affected the extens.ve nuclear
weapons research being conducted at Cambridge educational institutions, and impacted
Draper Labs, a major nuclear weapons contractor located within the town's limits. In one
of the first setbacks for antinuclear weapons activists in Massachusetts, Cambridge
voters rejected the NFZ proposal. 203
A similar fate befell NFZ proponents in Northampton in 1984, who failed to win
passage of a NFZ bill which would have impacted that town's Kollmorgen Corporation
which had received a $6 2 million contract to make periscopes for Trident nuclear
submarines. Local unions mobilized to defend jobs they saw threatened by the proposed
NFZ. Trying to put a positive spin on the city council vote, AFSC member Victoria
Stafford stated, "It's more important to lay the groundwork with the community and
unions and management than it is to demand they give up contracts We're trying to get
a dialogue going." Meanwhile, nearby Leverett, Belchertown and Shutesbury joined the
list of town's proclaiming themselves NFZs. 204 It became clear, however, that as the
peace movement went beyond symbolic referenda to binding resolutions with real
economic consequences, resistance would grow.
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The dmmmm movemenl in Massachuseus had hs grea.es,„ in
opporfng state partieipatioa in < ». „„„,,„„ wns w ^ way ()y^^ ^
cooperate with state planners, situating themselves in a legal limbo. ,„,, beginning in
1983, opponent, of < !RP (bund themselves a friend in a* Hay State's newly elected
Governor, Michael Dukakis and his
.,. Govemo, Vietnam veteran John Kerry During
the 1982 campaign, Dukakis condemned ( KP as "a Doomsday scheme" and an "attempt
I" deeeive the publie into believing thai nuelear war is SUrvivabte."203 The
I >uknkis/Kerry campaign promised that ifelected they would make available
"the
resourees ofOUT olliec to expand and coordinate all loeal elloris to say 'no' to .such a
plan."20" I >ukakis won re-eleeli<„, in l<«2 after lour years on! ofoffice in a major
political comeback.
Michael Dukakis was first elected to the state legislature in l%4 as one ofthe
young "clean government" reform Democrats then taking on the state's Democrat old
guard. Dukakis's I9XK presidential campa.gn literature later stated, ^Angered by the
excesses of Joseph McCarthy, and inspired by John Kennedy during his campa.gn lor
president, Michael Dukakis became an active participant in state Democratic Party
allairs. ,."207 Once elected to the legislature from his home dislrict ol Brookline, Dukakis
prided himself as a progressive, dispassionate technocrat, who worked against
corruption, special interests and influence peddling in Male government. In the turbulent
"Massachusetts New l-xecutive Order On Civil Defense", Press Packet, June 28 1984 Michael S
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sixties, Dukakis made a name for himself by championing auto insurance reform.
Nevertheless, he supported the state legislature's resolution calling for U.S. withdrawal
from Vietnam in 1970, and had also won the praise of Massachusetts disarmament
groups. Dukakis ran for lieutenant governor in 1970 on a ticket with Boston's libera,
mayor Kevin White, who lost the race for governor to liberal Republican Francis
Sargent. In the early ,970s, Michael Dukakis became a household name in
Massachusetts by moderating the popular political television program, "The Advocates"
In 1 974, Dukakis won the Democratic nomination for governor and ran slightly to the
right of Francis Sargent, defeating the charismatic two-term governor with the help of a
worsening economic downturn, anger at Sargent over court mandated busing in
Boston.
208
Dukakis's first term took place during the worst phase of the 1970's economic
crisis. Breaking a campaign promise, Dukak,s was forced to raise taxes and make painful
cuts in social programs to cover a massive budget shortfall hidden by the previous
administration. The former infuriated moderates and conservatives, and the latter threw
liberals such as state representative Barney Frank into a rage, accusing Dukakis of
balancing the budget on the backs of the poor. Others attacked the Dukakis style as aloof
and arrogant and criticized his absolute refusal to engage in compromise or any
patronage whatsoever. By 1978, although the budget was on a sound footing and the
Massachusetts economy improving, and despite the fact that Dukakis had conducted
ofthe cleanest administrations in memory, voters surprised all observers by electing
one
p £H ^n!
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connive businessman and former fcotbaU player Ed Kin, in the Democratic
primary. Kin, easily wen, on to defeat his Republican opponen. ,n November.™
By 1982, Ed King had scandalized Lay State votet, with the most eorrup, and
inep, administrations in decades. Almost all ofKing's most glaring vices seemed to be
Dukakis's strongest virtues. During his years out ofoffiee, Dukakis had softened his
image and worked to repair his damaged relations with business, who H he had over
regulated them, and liberals who still rankled a, the harsh budge, eu.s ofthe first
Dukakis administration Once elected, Dukakis's second term proved the most
successful of his three as he developed a national reputation for his successful welfare,
job .raining and tax rclorn, programs."" While Dukakis ,nade a national name with his
economic experiments, he also opened the doors of his adminis,ra,ion to Massachusetts
peace activists,211
Beginning in 1983, members of Traprock and olher Massachusetts peace
organizations began meeting with Dukakis aid MarDee Xifaras and Lt. (iovernor John
Kerry, a former peace activist with Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Until being
elected to the I Jnited States Senate in 1 984, Kerry acted as a bridge between freeze
activists and the governor. At a June 27, 1983 meeting, activists proposed to Kerry that
the new administration rescind a 1956 executive order making evacuation planning part
Ofthe state's civil defense policy; withhold state funds from all civil defense activity;
create an executive position in the Commonwealth to promote prevention of nuclear
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advocate".213
'he campaign again*
< IRP bad begun in Ma,,,, ,,,,,,,., daring the apring of
1981. Activiata s„d, as Traprock'a Matthew I eighton and Antorat'a Ad l loc
< tomndtte. on < IRP member, Nancy Foate, bad spen, a good pan o( three yeara
lobbying, organizing and educating to public e utter futility ofcivil defense
"
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6108 ofa « war-2" Within a yea, oi taking office, Dukakis
!RP Wd - *» « P»P°«als P». to Ke„ y to previous year. First, Dukakis
circulated a nuclear weapons freeze petition at to National Governors Association
meeting of 198
..
procuring majority support, then sen, copies ol the petition to all
membera ofC '•'*•» Then, on June 28, 1984, Dukakis, as promised, issued an
executive order withdrawing to ( loi nwealth from national < IRP Executive l trder
No. 242 declared, «(T]he only effective defense against to horrors of nuckai we, ,
"' """ eSaia> 11 »i to prevention ofnuclear war." li pledged the
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At a ceremony attended by hundreds of activist, Dukakis announced his
executive order and spoke to the issue of civil defense, stating, "the notion that wc can
seriously he,p reduce the horrors of nuCear war by repeating thousands and thousands
of people has always seemed to me a fantasy a, test... I don', care how far apart we are
with other nations... it seems to me there is one thing that unites all of us in this small
world and that is some sense ofhumanity.'*" Concluding his speech to rousing
applause, Dukakis declared:
S ^
r
Ct
i
Cal,y
T*"8 ' thCre are "° Safe havens from ""dear
ZTn " .
CX 8 P°tential Strength 0f nuclear weaP°^ ^ suchthat nuclear war can neither be won, nor survived, it can only be
prevented... [Therefore] no funds shall be expended by the
Commonwealth for crisis relocation planning for nuclear war. God savethe Commonwealth of Massachusetts.218
Sharing the podium with the governor at the executive order signing was
Amherst activist Nancy Foster, who spoke to the assembled crowd, summing up the past
three years ofactivism around the issue:
The people at the grassroots have recognized 'crisis relocation' for what it
is
-
an unworkable and dangerously misleading scheme which treats
civilians it purports to protect as expendable pawns in a national strategy
tor waging nuclear war... Public acknowledgement of our profound and
immediate peril, and of the futility of seeking protection through
evacuation and shelter, is a tribute to an aroused citizenry, working
through the democratic process, and to the responsiveness of their elected
leaders, first in the cities and towns, now in the Commonwealth as a
whole. Public commitment to our only defense against that peril -
prevention of nuclear war - is an even greater tribute, and a signal for
hope. The Governor in his Executive Order makes that commitment for
Massachusetts.
Undated newspaper clipping, circa June, 1984. Frances Crowe Private Papers. Northampton
Massachusetts. '
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By rejecting CRP, Dukakis joined the governors of California, Maryland and
New Mexieo in a growing national movement opposing FEMA's eivil defense plans as
both unworkable, and an unacceptable attempt to promote the ldea of "winnable" nuclear
war. Less than a year from Dukakis' June 28, 1984 executive order withdrawing
Massachusetts from all crisis relocation planning, FEMA's deputy press aid Russell
Clanahan confirmed, "Crisis relocation planning has been abandoned, no question about
it-"
220
For freeze and anti-civil defease activists it was an important v,ctory, marking the
end of the dark ages of Reagan's first-term, during which the administration sought
return America to a 1950s civil defense mentality and foster acceptance of Strange!
ideas of waging, surviving and winning a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.
Freeze activists and their friends in the campaign against CRP were jubilant at
Dukakis's 1984 executive order. The Traprock Report informed readers that not only
had Dukakis pulled the state out ofCRP, but had appointed a "Governor's Peace
Commission", stating:
Governor Dukakis has recently agreed to appoint a commission that
would make recommendations on how the Commonwealth can advance
the cause of peace. This is one result of the work done by the Ad Hoc
Commission on Crisis Relocation Planning which developed from a
statewide meeting organized by Traprock in February 1983 and which led
to the Governor's rejection ofCRP in June of this year. 221
On April 25, 1985, Dukakis issued another executive order, No. 254, officially
forming the "Governor's Advisory Committee on the Impact of the Nuclear Arms Race
on Massachusetts". The preamble read in part:
220
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WHEREAS the Massachusetts members of the United States Congresshave repeatedly shown a commitment to halting the ever-escalaUnf
nuclear arms race; and fe
WHEREAS the Massachusetts legislature by resolution in 1981 and the
citizens of Massachusetts by referendum in 1982 have declared their cleardesire for a halt to the nuclear arms race,
I, Michael Dukakis, do hereby establish the Governor's Advisory
Committee on the Impact of the Nuclear Arms race on
Massachusetts...
Executive Order No 254 called for fifteen to twenty-five members on the
Advisory Committee, who "shall have a demonstrated commitment to arms control". 223
"Talking Points" put together for the announcement by the governor's staff emphasized
the role of peace activists in the formation of the committee: "Today's announcement is
the culmination of a lot of hard work by people across the state. Concerned citizens
throughout the Commonwealth have requested that we establish this Advisory
Committee to consider the impact of the nuclear arms race on Massachusetts. Those on
the Committee and those here today represent thousands of individuals in
Massachusetts..."224 The Advisory Committee included twenty-two members. It was
chaired by Jennifer Leaning of Physicians for Social Responsibility and Eric E. Van
Loon, Undersecretary of Economic Affairs. The Advisory Committee included members
from academia, business and labor, and featured prominent peace activists such as
Executive Order No. 254, By his Excellency Michael S. Dukakis, April 25, 1985. Michael S Dukakis
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Nancy Foster, Randy Kehler and veteran disarmament activist Jerome Grossman of the
Council for a Livable World. 225
The Advisory Committee's work was to study the economic ,mpact of the arms
race on Massachusetts and find ways to promote peace through education and promoting
links with people in the Union. In June of 1986, as the name ofMichael Dukakis became
increasingly mentioned as a possible 1988 Democratic presidential candidate, the
Governor's Advisory Committee on the Impact of the Arms Race on Massachusetts
issued its official report. The report proved controversial. Several unidentified members
leaked stories to the press that accused the Dukakis administration of trying to block
efforts by the economic committee from reaching stronger recommendations and
conclusions than the governor would have liked. 226 Ironically, the report showed that the
state that seemed most opposed to the arms race benefited from it immensely. The report
found that in fiscal year (FY) 1985, Massachusetts defense contractors received $1.5
billion from the nuclear arms race, constituting 1.5% of the Massachusetts' gross state
product. Sixty-six percent of this defense work was for the Reagan administration's
Trident and MX programs, 99% of which went to just nine contractors, 77% ofthem in
the Route 1 28/Interstate 495 technological beltway around Boston and 9% in Pittsfield
in the western part of the state. The report concluded, nuclear weapons spending created
14,000 jobs in the Commonwealth or .05% of the state's jobs, and created 12,000 other
First Year Report of the Governor's Advisory Committee on the Impact of the Nuclear Arms Race on
Massachusetts
,
June 20. 1986. Michael S. Dukakis Presidential Campaign Papers, Manuscript 32 Box 5
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jobs indirectly.-7 The largest defense contractors in the state included AVCO, Draper
Labs, General Electnc, GTE and Raytheon ™ Critics charged that the "Massachusetts
Miracle" being trumpeted by Dukakis in annexation of a presidential run was largely
fueled not by the governor's economic policies but by the Reagan arms build up. 229
Despite the economic benefits that seemed to accrue to the state from the arms
race, the study issued four recommendations to help end the arms race:
II^ZI^Z its armual reports on the impact of the arms race on
2) Use public resources to help individuals and firms make the transition
to non-nuclear work.
3) Have the Commissioner of Education convene a working group todevelop nuclear arms race curriculum materials for possible use bv
schools. 3
4) Establish a formal "sister state" relationship with a Soviet province. 230
The report concluded, "One state within our nation cannot end the nuclear arms
race. A mobilized citizenry and an active state government can, however, give direction
clarity, and voice to a concern that is widely shared." Although the report's
recommendations were not radical, the economic conclusions were far from comforting
for a governor so identified with freezing the arms race, but whose state had so many
jobs dependent on that very arms race. Co-chair Dr. Jennifer Leaning told the Boston
227
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Globe, "I wou.d no, be surprised ifthe governor accepts our report and says, 'Goodbye
folks; you're a little too hot to be around.'"231
A week after the Advtsory Committee issued its report, Dukakis's staff put
together "Talking Points" for the upcoming meetmg between the governor and the
Committee. The governor was to embrace the report while finessing some of its
implications. He would open by stating, "I greatly appreciate all of the hard work of the
members of the Committee. It is obvious from the thoughtful and detailed nature of the
report that a great deal of time and effort went into its preparat.on.
. . The report and the
recommendations are bold, innovative and very thoughtful."232 The governor would then
assert, "We are spending billions of dollars on nuclear weapons which we don't need...
Spending on these strategic weapons provides the economy with a false boost. And no
state in the union knows this better than Massachusetts. At the end of the 1960s, there
were 25,000 engineers out of work in Massachusetts [due to defense cuts.]" Now, the
governor argued, Massachusetts could avoid those consequences of defense cuts since
"Our current economic success is the result of a diversified economy."233
The governor's "Talking Points" anticipated "Potential Criticism ofthe Report",
most of which it saw coming from the left and not the right. The potential criticisms
included. "Report plays down dramatic growth in nuclear arms race spending";
"Economic development recommendation should be stronger"; the report didn't "create
State Office of Economic Conversion"; "The report's focus on the nuclear arms race
231
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obscures Massachusetts economic reliance on overall military spending";
"Vulnerability
to layoffs exists ifthe late 60s experience is repeated"; and the "Governor should
denounce nuclear arms race spending as dangerous, wasteful and immoral and let the
business community know it's not welcome in Massachusetts.'-'
,„ response to these
anticipated critiques, Dukakis planned to emphasize the Massachusetts economy's
diversity, the use ofencouragement and incentives to promote economic conversion, a
strong peace education curriculum and serious efforts to forge a "sister state"
relationship with a Soviet Republic. Dukakis would argue, "We have done a tremendous
amount already. This Committee is an example of a first in the nation initiative... Also,
the responsibility primarily belongs to Congress and to the President. Our Congressional
delegation has taken the lead on this issue and is well aware of the support of the
Dukakis Administration in this area."235
The Advisory Committee report marked yet another expression of opposition to
the nuclear arms race in Massachusetts, and reinforced the state's position as a national
leader in seeking a new direction in the cold war. The report forced Iky State residents
to confront the degree to which the military-industrial complex had become interwoven
in the state's economy. Yet the report was also another example of the politics of
symbolism, showing the limits ofopposing the nuclear arms race when confronted with
the economic realities ofjobs and billions in corporate profits. Although freeze activism
had been able to avoid hard economic realities, eventually, like the movement against
nuclear power, it would have to take on powerful economic interests. Although the state
would continue to legitimize freeze activism and even make resources available to the
234
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movement, in the end, a new direetion in the arms raee and cold war would have to eome
from Washington, D C.
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CHAPTER IV
The nghtward turn in American politics symbolized by the election of Ronald
Reagan in 1980 was foreshadowed across the Atlantic by the election ofMargaret
Thacher and the Conservative Party in Britain's 1979 national elections. Like Reagan.
Thacher called lor cuts in soe.a. spending, less regulation ofbusineSS, reduced taxation,
an arms buildup and a harder hue toward the Novel Union. BVCH Socal Democrats such
as West German chancellor I felmul Schmidt, a staunch advocate Ofdetente, called lor
building up nato s nuclear weaponry Meeting in Brussels in December of 1979, the
leaders of NAT(
)
natrons adopted a decision to deploy I I S medium range nnss.les in
Britain, Holland, Belgium, Italy and the Federal Republic ofQermany (FRO)by the fall
Of l<>X 3 The decision was based on a desire hy NAT( ) natrons to counter the 700
medium range ss-20s the Soviet Union had aimed at western Europe. On top ofthe
independent nuclear capability already possed by Britain and France, the United Slates
was to install 464 Cruise and 108 l»ershing II intermediate range missiles in NATO
nations, with all the Pershing and 96 Cruise missiles earmarked for the FR< i alone The
goal was first to link the U.S. closer to Us western European allies who lea.ed the parity
in Strategic long-range missiles sought by SALT II would leave them vulnerable to the
Soviet Union's superior conventional forces. Second, European Leaders ofNATO
unions hoped to pursue what they called a "double track" policy ofbuilding up NA'K ) s
intermediate nuclear weaponry while pursuing parallel negotiations aimed a. reducing
the number of comparable Soviet SS-20s.'
The decision under Jimmy Carter to install U.S. "Euromissiles" in NATO nations
came against the backdrop of the deterioration which reached a new low only weeks
after the Brussels conference when the U S S R, invaded Afghanistan. By 1980, the
stirrings of a new European peace movement could be felt across Western Europe, and
especially the FRG, as concern grew over the emergence of what some called "Cold War
II". As in the United States, the nascent European peace movement grew exponentially
with the election of Ronald Reagan who had campaigned against detente and arms
control.
2
If Reagan's loose talk of 'Vinnable nuclear war" disturbed many Americans, it
positively rattled many Europeans, who saw in the U.S. president's rhetoric of nuclear
war confirmation of their image of the former actor as a Hollywood cowboy who now
had his finger on the nuclear trigger. Unlike earlier presidents, who regardless of policy
at least sought to assuage the fear of nuclear war, Reagan seemed to go out of his way to
exacerbate such fears with speeches such as the one he gave at West Point, proclaiming,
"Man has used every weapon he has ever devised.
. . it takes no crystal ball to perceive
that a nuclear war is likely, sooner or later."
3
As seen, the freeze movement in the United States began before the election of
Ronald Reagan, galvanized into action by the breakdown ofdetente and the adoption of
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more hard-line ami-Soviet policies in the ,a,e Carter year, Likewise, the European
peace movement had already begun mobilizing by late ,979. For poNtica, scientist Steve
Breyman, who has written on the West German peace movement in the early !980s and
its impact on West German and U.S. cold war policy, i, was the NATO decision of
December
,979 that constituted the "spark tha, ignited the dry kindling of [European]
peace movement potential.- Thus, as Reagan assumed office, there were already the
stirrings ofa growing trans-Atlantic antinuclear weapons movement. The enormous
Reagan arms build up, however, in concert with the administration's openly belligerent
rhetoric toward the Soviet Union, was the final ingredient which se, the stage for the
dramatic growth of the freeze movement in the United States and the peace movement in
Western Europe. Now, NATO plans to base U.S. Pershing II and Cruise missiles in
Western Europe seemed less a part of a "double-track" policy aimed a. negotiations than
preparation lor waging limited nuclear war. Rather than binding the U.S. to the fate of
Europe, many Europeans now believed the Euromissiles, in effect, de-coupled the U.S.
from Western Europe, allowing it the option of fighting a nuclear war limited to the
European theater. 5
From 1981 through the final showdown in the fall of 1983 when the U.S. Cruise
and Pershing II missiles were installed, Western Europe witnessed the largest peace
movement in its postwar history. Antinuclear weapons protests of tens of thousands and
then hundreds of thousands swept across the borders of Western European nations,
enveloping large portions of the European middleclass. Polls showed that by 1982, up to
" Ibid. 9.
s
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69% of west Germans polled opposed the mtroduetiou ofthe Pershing D and ( Iruiae
missiles on West ( German so,,, with 5m ofEngJish respondent8 taldng fl^^
o« basingUA Cruise missiles In Britain*' focreasingly, Western Europeans saw the
Med States under Ronald Reagan, rather than .he Soviet Union, as * major source oi
instability and potential war in Europe. As opposition to (he Euromissiles began to
translate into cUminishing support lor NAT<
>, members ofthe Reagan administration
worried about .he spirit of««neutralism'' .hey saw spread,,,, across Western Europe. 7
The u.s. freeze and European peace movements blossomed at almost exactly the
same time, ran parallel through most oftheir respective histories and shared a number of
similarities. In both, older activists were .he driving organizing force, with women such
as West German Green Party activist Petra Kelly playing highly visible, lead,,,, roles.
Both movements witnessed the mobilization ofnumerous religious figures, especially
Protestant clergy, as movement leaders. The u.s. freeze and European antinuclear
weapons movements both sought to achieve as broad a base ofsupport as possible,
which led to tensions in each over time. Yet, lor two mass movements employing similar
tactics and consisting ofsimilar bases ofsupport, the two movements often remained
remarkably separate. Beginning in the fell of 1981, the huge European peac e marches
became headline stones in the I IS. press. Although Wes. European activists stressed
their protests were directed at the U.S. government and not (he American people,
frequently the protests took on an anti-American tone, which became fodder lor U.S.
news outlets. Early on, U.S. freeze leaders decided to keep the American freeze
" fbid, 120 and 125.
' fbid. too
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movement separate from the Europe*, peace movement. To w,„ a mass Ka.se of^
movement, free ofassociations with the frequently mm mililanl and an(,
American peace movent, overseas.' Despte this national strategy, many ofthe morc
radical activists in the American movement sough, to promote a global vision and
strategy independent ofthe freeze movement. Numerous American activists crossed the
Atlantic
,„ participate in Western Europe's mass peace marches, while others carried ou,
civil disobedience at home to protest the deployment of the U.S. Cruise and Pershing I,
missiles.
9
Despite the decision to uncouple the emerging U.S. freeze movement from the
I European peace movement, the two movements were born, grew, peaked and declined a,
almost exactly identical times. Thus, the freeze movement which swept the United States
from 1980 through 1983, had as its constant backdrop, the impending showdown in
Europe over the basing ofU.S. Cruise and Pershing I, missiles, making both movements
part ofa trans-Atlantic peace movement. Combined, the two movements represented the
greatest political challenge faced by Ronald Reagan during his first term.
* Meyer, 229-30.
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On March 20-22, 1981, over 300 antinuclear weapons activists met at
Georgetown University's Center for Peace Studies in Washington, D C for a "National
Strategy Conference for a Nuc.ear Weapons Freeze" Activists representing groups such
as Mobilization for Survival (MfS), the Council for a Livable World (CLW), the
American Fnends Service Committee (AFSC) and other mostly radical pacifist peace
groups met in the natton's capital to map out a long term strategy for a national nuclear
weapons freeze movement Among the 300 plus activists representing thirty-one states at
the conference were Randall Forsberg, Randy Kehler and the conference's keynote
speaker, Frances Crowe from the western Massachusetts AFSC 10 Kehler and Crowe had
met with many of those attending the conference at the UN. Plaza Building the previous
October, on the eve of the freeze referendum vote in western Massachusetts. It was from
this meeting that Kehler had reported to his Traprock colleagues that national activists
were looking to the western Massachusetts referendum campaign as "the bellwether of
the whole moratorium movement" 11
At the national freeze movement's founding conference in Washington, D C,
Kehler and Crowe found themselves treated like minor celebrities, being repeatedly
asked about the western Massachusetts freeze campaign the previous fall and how the
lessons there could be applied nationally. The conference adopted a national strategy to
be carried out over a three-year period. The group decided to embrace the localist
strategy advocated most ardently by Kehler, and to work through existing peace groups
TjlfirocLReport. Vol. U, #2, April 1981; Traprock Fundraising Letter. October 15, 1980 Traprock
Peace Center Records. Meyer, 176-7.
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conference comitted ot'timi phases
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town
IW <>nc- Demonstrate the positive potential ol the freeze proposal lb,
stopping the arms race
Phase Two Build broad and visible public support foi the freeze
'
base i hree Focus public support .... policy nukes so thai ii becomes a
matte. Ol national debate
Phase Foui
.
Win the debate so that the freeze is adopted as a national
policy objective
one in
The lirsl phase- would be dominated by small, grassroots eirorts like the
western Massachusetts, each designed to show the viability of the how proposal on
«
small scale and to begin building the local bases around the country on which the
national movement would depend The early phase was to be as decentralized as
possible, giving loc al activists broad leeway to build the movemenl to fit local
conditions Building on these small victories, the second plw.se would seek much ureale
national visibility, shifting focus, once momentum had bee., built, onto policy makers in
Washington, D.C Lastly, the movemenl hoped to translate the freeze proposal into
reality by having it adopted as 1
1 s policy The conference predicated this strategy on
' Meyer, i7<>-7
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past experience with disarmament effort, The conference adopted a "Strategy for
Stopping the Nuclear Arms Race", which stated, "Past efforts at serious arms control,
such as the 1 972 Democratic platform for cutting the military budget, the transfer
amendment resolutions of the mid-1970s and the SALT II ratification process failed in
part because they were not preceded by active educational efforts among the general
public by a sufficiently broad spectrum of organizations." 14
To carry out this national strategy, the conference created the Nuclear Weapons
Freeze Campaign (NWFC). The new organization would hold two national conferences
a year, during which the conferees from around the country would choose a part time
National Committee, which in turn would choose a full time Executive Committee and a
Nuclear Weapons Freeze Clearinghouse to disseminate freeze and disarmament
information. The National Committee would also elect task forces to deal with issues
such as religion, minorities, labor, media, direct action and fundraising. The aim was to
make the NWFC a loose coordinating body to map out overall strategy, while keeping as
much organizing as possible at the grass roots. 15 The new organization also resolved to
begin publication of Thejreeze Newsletter, with the aim of keeping all of its members
aware of the various freeze activities taking place across the nation. 16
Initially, the NWFC was based in Brookline, Massachusetts at the headquarters
of Randall Forsberg's Institute for Disarmament and Defense Studies (IDDS). This
'Strategy for Stopping the Nuclear Arms Race", Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign March 1981
Frances Crowe Papers, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts (hereinafter
cited as Frances Crowe Papers, Sophia Smith Collection).
15 Memo: To National Committee, From: Executive Committee, Subject: "Insuring Strong Task Forces"
December 1 1, 1981. Frances Crowe Papers. Sophia Smith Collection.
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decision, however, situated the movement in the heart ofNew England, already viewed
as far ahead of the rest of the country on the 1Ssue, and nsked associating the movement
with many of the greater Boston area peace groups. The movement soon decided to
move its headquarters to St. Louis, Missouri, roughly the geography, center of the
United States. Choosing St. Louis, it was hoped, would emphasize the mtddle-American
image the movement hoped to project. 17 Participants in the national freeze movement
elected Randy Kehler as one of it first two national
"coordinators" Kehler was an ideal
choice in many ways. His commitment was beyond question, he had the expenence of
having helped lead the first successful local pro-freeze campaign, his physical
appearance and dress were conventional, and his soft-spoken style would be an asset.
Kehler, looking back, stated, "My job was to hold the movement together, to resolve
tension, to find a middle road that could hold this movement together." 18
Randy Kehler's grand design called for an emphasis on grassroots organizing and
seeking the broadest possible support across the political spectrum. At a second national
conference in late 1981, Kehler summarized the movement's strategy:
Our challenge in the upcoming months will be to reach out to that wide
spectrum of Americans never involved in this type of movement While
we broaden our base to include labor, business, minority groups Middle
America, we also must use creative means to sustain the many local
efforts which are already well underway.
. . We must sustain our energy
while we keep our eyes on our goal: the implementation of the Freeze. 19
This focus would frequently put Kehler in the position of advocating moderate
positions, which often belied his radical past and ongoing war tax resistance. Kehler
17
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worked hard to bridge the freeze movement's limited immediate goal with its more
radical long-term ambitions. In one memo, Kehler wrote:
As we are all aware, one of the principal criticisms of the freeze is that itdoes not go far enough As Seymour Melman, an avowed freeze
supporter, sa.d in a talk at Hampshire College this past weekend "Whatwomes me about the freeze is that we may focus so much on getting afreeze that once we ve got it we won't know where to go from there "(Not a d.rect quote) This is perhaps a ticklish area, for we don't want to
scare people away by seeming to ask for too much too soon. Yet I agree
w.th Me ma. A very simple approach, 1 think, is to couple the freezeproposal w.th a preamble "Step One' every chance we get... It's not thatthe campa.gn has failed to mention the business of Step One, followed by
a Step Two cons.sting of negotiated reductions on both sides, it's just thatwe need to make more of it™ J
Beyond those who felt the national freeze movement did not go far enough, were
those who felt it did not go fast enough As national coordinator of the NWFC, Kehler
quickly found that many in the national movement seemed too eager to take the
movement to Washington before its local base had been sufficiently built Kehler
confided to some in the movement, "I think there is a tendency among freeze organizers
to look ahead to the Congressional elections of November 1982 with some feeling of
panic, a feeling that somehow we must totally reshape our national strategy in order to
focus exclusively on these elections. In my view, the primary work ahead of us in '82 is
base-building work... not the Congressional elections " 21 In response, Kehler sent out a
memo to members of the freeze movement urging patience and arguing strenuously for
keeping the movement focused on building local grassroots organizations. Sent out over
the signatures of Kehler and his colleague at the national headquarters, Gordon Faisson,
Memo: "Comments on (he Strategy-Related Papers Distributed at October 10 1981 East Coast
Meeting". From: Randy Kehler. November 9, 1981. Frances Crowe Papers. Sophia Smith Collection
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the memo was an impassioned and detailed defense of the local strategy that had proved
so successful in western Massachusetts. "Our concern", the memo stated, "is that we
take this strategy seriously and, specifically, thatm avoid the temptation to go directly
to elected officials, at the state orfederal levels, without doing our homework [emphasis
in the original]
- that is, the work of organrzrng freeze support at home, in our local
communities and local organizations "22 Referring to the recent adoption of a freeze
resolution in the Massachusetts legislature in the spring of 1981, which some national
activists wanted to try to replicate immediately in their home states, Kehler warned, "It
was our feeling in the Massachusetts campaign, that we probably would not have been
successful [with the leg.slature] had we not been able to confront state legislators with
the fruits of our previous local organizing, the victory of the freeze referendum in
western Massachusetts in November, 1980 (the culmination of a nine month campaign)
and the resulting endorsements of many conservative as well as liberal newspapers and
politicians in western Massachusetts (including the somewhat reluctant endorsement of
western Massachusetts Congressman, Silvio Conte, considered a moderate
Republican.)"23
_,,
Kehler and Faisson's memo proceeded to make a number of astute observations,
which deserve some considered attention They first noted that a local strategy was a
powerful recruitment tool. "The distance between people and faraway capitals and
bureaucrats tends to maintain the distancing and numbing that bedevils our psychic and
Memo. "To: Active Participants in the Nuclear Weapon freeze Campaign." From: Randv Kehler and
Gordon Faisson July 22, 1981. Traprock Peace Center Records
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political processes.- People who might feel intimidated or alienated by national or
state-wide campaigns, the memo argued, would be more inclined to "get their feet wet as
organizers if the campaign is local..." Overtime, a percentage of such local activists
would choose to get involved at a higher geographical level. Further, the scope of a
nuclear war was difficult to fathom A local campaign could personalize the dangers
faced by humanity, making them less abstract and thus more persuasive to potential
supporters. In a subsection entitled "Bringing the Arms Race Home", the memo stated,
"Rather than try to convince our neighbors that Massachusetts or the country as a whole
could never defend itselfonce a nuclear war had begun, we explain that Greenfield...
would probably be engulfed in a firestorm if a one megaton bomb fell on nearby
Westover Air Force Base..."25 Both of these strategies, recruitment through local
organizing and emphasizing the local impact of the arms race became one of the
movement's strengths as it spread across the United States.
The memo continued to point out the logistical strengths of a grassroots
movement. First, local organizers would be able to choose "appropriate tactics", suited
to local conditions. Since local activists would not be "anonymous", their influence with
their neighbors, local newspaper editors and local elected officials would be seen as
having "the most integrity". Lastly, local campaigns would allow the freeze movement
to fly under the radar of well-financed national opposition groups who were unlikely to
take notice of local campaigns, and appear to be outside intruders should they attempt to
intervene in a local campaign. "We are much less likely to run into well-financed
24
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opposition from corporate interests (e.g. defense industries and their lobbying
associations) when the campaign is local The forces mos, apt to oppose us are usually
large and centralis. For this reason, they rarely have much influence in a p c r
local community."26
Has was an important less,,,, no doubt partly learned Iron, the experience ofthe
statewide campaigns to ban or limit nuclear energy in the 1 970s. In all cases, statewide
movement, for an.innelcar energy referenda bad run into Stiffopposition Iron, national
utilities whose pro-nuclear campaigns outspenl antrnuclear power campaigns by as much
as ten times." h, the ,970s, the nnelcar energy industry sought to offiel their
"outsider"
image by enlisting local labor unions to he the public lace oftheir pro-nnclcar
campaigns. The 1980 freeze campaign, although winning only limited union support,
never d.rcclly threatened defense jobs, and thus avoided mobilizing the only potentially
viable opposition in western Massachusetts. As seen in the previous chapter, when
defense jobs were directly challenged by the freeze movement in the Northampton and
Cambridge NFZ campaigns, the Hay Slate freeze movement ran into its lirsl set-backs. '»
The Kehler-Faisson memo seems to have staunched the rumblings in the national
freeze movement lor going to the lop too soon. The years 1981 and 1982 saw local
movements, all with their own color and Hair, sprouting up across America. The
movement look hold most quickly in New England, spreading throughout the Northeast,
»
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especially in New York and New Jersey. In New York Ctty, over 3,400 Manhattan
residents attended small "town meetings" to endorse the freeze on May 25, 1982. "This
is Jeffersonian democracy in action", declared one participant. 29 In New Jersey, liberal
Democratic governor Brendan Byrne proclaimed October 24-3
1 , 198 1 "Mutual Nuclear
Freeze Week" in the Garden State. 30 Movements sprang up in the Midwest, through the
plains states and swept across the entire west coast, taking firm root in all-important
California, where freeze activists, beginning in December of 1981, began procuring over
500,000 signatures to put the freeze on the ballot in 1982. Not surprisingly, the South
and Southwest were the most difficult geographical areas in the country for the freeze to
breach. 31
Piggybacking the national media coverage ofthe European peace movement that
began in late 1981, the national freeze movement became the focus of growing press and
media coverage in the United States. David S. Meyer, in his important study of the
national freeze movement, A Winter of Discontent graphs the growing coverage of the
freeze by the press and media, showing coverage of the movement to have exploded in
1982, peaked throughout 1983, and declined rapidly in 1984. 32 Meyer found Helen
Caldicott and "Ground Zero's" Roger Molander to be the most commonly quoted
29 Ham C. Boyte. 'The Formation of the New Peace Movement: A Communitarian Perspective " Social
Policy
, Summer 1982. '
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Senator 1.1ward Kennedy and Congressman 1,1
Markey, relative late-comers to the fn^ quotccJ rnorc oftcn n
The MAMM !!„ its message through events organic by other
mmmm groups Roger Mabtf^ aW National Security Council analyst,
fouled Ground Zero fa 1*7* w„h h, twfc brother Eari, to clove them between policy
and the public OfOttOd Zero sought primarily to do this through an information
campa.gr, under the Mo.an "Nuclear War: What's In It f or You" L,ke so many others,
Molander was galvar„„;d ,nto action by the failure of SAf/f II. "-(he s.lencc was
deafening", Molander told
.Newsweek, "It was quite clear that you couldn't conduct
policy on this issue with a gulf between the people.
. . and the leaders."" Among the
ways Ground Zero Knight to promote arms control was through its "Sister City"
campaign, ,n wh.ch c.tics and towns declare a "sister" relationship with a town or city
the USSR, with the goal of underscoring the interconnected^ between those at
"ground zero" in the Soviet finion and the United States. from April 18-25, 1982,
Molander organized "Ground Zero Week," a nationwide information campaign modeled
on the Vietnam teach-ins that swept America in l%5. An estimated one million
Americans part.c.pated m the many speeches, film screenings, seminars and debates held
around the country at cities, colleges and high schools. 4 ' Although Moldander never
endorsed the free/* proposal. Ground Zero Week turned into a major forum for free/e
advocates to spread their message. A former member of the U.S. Arms Control and
n
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Disarmament Agency, Mo.ander hoped Ground Zero week would pressure the Reagan
administration mto returning to arms control talks "What we seek is a public active
enough m the dialogue about nuclear war that they fee. compelled to work with the
Government m coming up with solutions, whether it be disarmament, a freeze, or some
other option," Molandcr declared u '
By the spring of 1982, the freeze movement began to "percolate up" as Randall
Forsberg had hoped A number of Hollywood actors and other celebrities publicly
Campaigned for the freeze, including Martin Sheen, Susan Sarandon, Tony Randall,
Stevie Wonder, Yo-Yo Ma, Leonard Bernstein, Meryl Streep, as well as several
Celebrity-activist lummaricS SUch as J"an
"a<^ Pete Seeger, Jackson Browne, Paul
Newman and I tarry Belafonte. Scientist Carl Sagan of the popular PBS documentary.
Cosmos, became one of the movement's most active boosters in scores of television
appearances.37 The freeze campaign also won endorsements from a number of former
national security policy makers, among whom were (ieorge Kennan, Avenll Harnman,
(icorgc Ball, Warren Christopher, Clark Clifford, Hoddmg Carle, Henry Cabot Lodge
and former CIA Director William Colby former military officials who publicly
endorsed the freeze included Admirals Gene Laroque, Gene Carroll, Noel (iayler. Major
General William Fairbourn and Admiral Hyman Rickover, whom some called "the
lather of the nuclear navy", but who now made it a personal crusade to campaign for
absolute disarmament. Wrote Alexander Cockburn and James Ridgeway in New Left
'"Douglass C Waller, Congress and (he Nuclear lree/.e: An Inside Look al the Polit.cs of a Mass
Movement (Amherst, Massachusetts University of Massachusetts Press. I')S7) V)
" Meyer. 102; Waller 67.
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tads*. «* is re.arkabie how many ou.-of-power co,d warriors have suddeniy seen
light on the road to Damascus."™
The most potent endorsements of the freeze, however, came from the pulpit.
Churches and synagogues across America became bases of freeze organizing, and many
ministers, priests and rabbis discussed the freeze with their congregations » The most
influential endorsement came m the form of two pastoral letters issued by the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops in 198. and 1982, entitled, "The Challenge ofPeace:
God's Promise and Our Response", in which the bishops not only endorsed a nuclear
weapons freeze but called for deep cuts in nuclear armaments leading to the elimination
of nuclear weapons (The Reagan administration was particularly concerned about the
bishop's pastoral letter, and after protesting the first letter in early 1982, found the
bishops issuing an even more adamant letter later in the year.")40 The National Council
of Churches, the Union of Amencan Hebrew Congregations, the United Presbyterian
Church and the American Baptist Churches joined the Bishops. 41
The freeze movement also won the endorsement, and more importantly the
financial support, of a number of wealthy businesspeople and well-financed foundations
In California, Los Angeles millionaire Harold Willens helped finance a large share of
that state's 1982 freeze referendum campaign. Foundations financing disarmament and
freeze activity included the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Stern Fund and the MacArthur
38
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Kenneth Oalbraith, Vermont'. Moderate Republican Congrea.man Jamei leffbrd.,Li
Ooveraoi Madeleine Kunin and Democratic Senatoi Patrick Leahy 14 One ipeakei not
allowed to attend was v,,,, Kaprolov, counseloi from the Soviet Embassy, who had been
Invited, but prevented from attending by the Reagan administration, which had ret ently
impoeed rettrit tion. .... the movement ol Soviet personnel ... the I Fnited State. ...
retaliation fo. limilai ... dona i arried out by the Soviet I Won ' i he diplomat
Imbroglio made the evenl national new. Upon reaching Moacow, Vermont, Robin Loyd
of the Burlington Peace < ioalition proclaimed, "It was thrilling when we arrived ...
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Moscow, ft was a spontaneous outpouring of feeling. Everyone was saying,V. not „
far from Washington to Moscow.'"46
The probation of grassroots freeze campaigns and the heightened national
visibly of the movement began to be reflected in public opinion polls by the spring of
.982. An Associated Press/NBC poll showed 83% of Americans supporting the freeze
proposal; a ^shinstojU^ost poll showed 79% support; a CBS/NeyyJferi^ poU
had 77% ofAmericans backing the freeze; and a Gallup poll pegged pro-freeze support
at 71% « The freeze movement s inroads on the public opinion front were likewise
being reflected on the political front. In December, 1981, after a little more than a year
of freeze activism, twenty-lbur members of the House of Representatives and only one
Senator
-
Rhode Island Democrat, Clairbome Pell - had announced their support for the
freeze. By the spring of 1982, those numbers were up to 169 announced supporters in the
I louse of Representatives and twenty-five in the Senate. 48 Noting the shift in public
attitudes over the course of two years, Douglass C. Waller, congressional aide to
Massachusetts Congressman Ed Markey, wrote, "Just as 1 980 was not a good year for a
politician to admit he favored arms control, 1982 was not a good year for him to say he
opposed it."49
The rapid growth of national politcal support was most remarkable in
Massachusetts. In July 1 98 1 , the Massachusetts Coalition for a Nuclear Freeze noted in
46
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ta^fe, "We are far behind in the lJnited State, Qnly twe|vg^
representatives have endorsed the freeze... Why none from Massachnsetts?
,Ae,na,Iy,
Silvio Come had endorse i« in ,980.] One reason ,s the rightward shift in Congress. B««
here in Massachnsetts, with onr record of independence and ieadership in national and
foreign affairs, the main reason is lack of pnblic interest."^ the November
.982 vote
on the freeze rcferendnm in Masssachnsetts. the Coalition for a Nnclear Weapons Freeze
boasted on one of its tliers, "The entire Massachnsetts delegation in Congress,
Republican and Democrat alike, urges a yes vote on question 5". 51
The changes in Massachusetts politicians positions were sometimes dramatic. In
1 98 1
,
Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas described the freeze proposal as "on the
fringe" and added, "It is not a sophisticated answer to a complex problem."52 By March
1 982, Tsongas embraced the freeze and welcomed Bay State freeze activists to the
capital with open arms when (hey presented both Tsongas and Silvio Conte with eight by
twelve foot postcards filled with signatures tor the freeze. The minutes of the western
Massachusetts Steering Committee for the Coalition for a Nuclear Weapons Freeze,
described the moment: "Tsongas loved the card and has put it in his office. Abby
[Seixas] came away with the impression that he is involved and sincere, and that she is
glad there are politicians of his character. It is interesting to note that he had serious
50
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hesitations about the freeze in its ability to get through Congress, and now JUst a short
month later he is sponsoring the resolution in Congress."53
Like Tsongas, moderate Republican Silvio Conte sponsored the freeze resolution
-king its way through the House of Representatives in 1982. Conte, once considered a
lukewarm supporter, was now leading the push for the freeze due to the incessant
lobbying of his western Massachusetts constituents. The minutes for another western
Massachusetts Steenng Committee reveal how activists lobbied their congressman: "...
•leffCiuffreda, who is the main person in Conte's western Massachusetts office
... is very
supportive of the freeze and will make sure that Conte sees news stories about the freeze
when he comes to the area. Our responsibility is to get the articles to him.
.
.
" 54 On key
votes, organizations like Traprock mobilized freeze supporters to lobby their elected
official. One such case occurred with the September 1982 vote on the MX and Pershing
M missiles, when a Traprock letter urged members to focus on Silvio Conte and
Democrat Edward Boland: "They are considered swing votes who could go either way
and may be influenced by constituent pressure. Please urge everyone you know to write
or call Conte or Boland jmmediatelyjo thank them for their recent support for the freeze
(the Zablocki amendment) and to urge them to vote against funding for the MX and
Pershing II ." (Boland was the only member of the Massachusetts delegation to vote for
the Pershing II. All opposed the MX.) Even politicians who strongly supported the
freeze could not escape the ceaseless lobbying. Western Massachusetts organizers
Ldn7
r,
1982
SSaChUSellS Steering C0mmittee Minutes CoallUon for a Nuclear Weapons Freeze,
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exhorted freeze supporters to "Birddog Conte, Boiand, Kennedy and Tsongas for the
purpose of strengthening their comrrntment to the freeze and disannament.- The
national movement likewise encouraged loeal groups to continue to lobby supporters. A
NWFC memo to local organizers urged: "Even if your Congressional Representative
supports the Freeze Resolution andjs a cosponsor
,
i( „m ^^^
letters, proxies, and phone calls. This will provide supportive legislators with
ammunition for their own lobbying efforts.
"
56
In some cases, it was politicians who sought out the freeze movement Accenting
to Randy Kehler, the staff of Senator Edward Kennedy "very aggressively pursued us"
Kehler said, "Kennedy's people came to us. They saw us as a bandwagon they wanted to
get their man behind, or in front of, I should say." 57 Kennedy's people attended the 1982
freeze conference in Colorado, and quickly developed close relations with the
movement, coordinating the push for a freeze resolution in Congress with the national
freeze movement. "Ted Kennedy wanted to follow in Jack's footsteps," Kehler
recalled.
58
Kennedy hoped to pass a freeze resolution to coincide with the twentieth
anniversary ofJohn Kennedy's signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. According to
"Strategy Ideas for November 1982: Steering Committee Minutes". Western Massachusetts Coalitionl:^Z^Tns Frcc/C - Novcrber 1982 Franccs Crcwc Papcre - So»hias5K2£*X3.Massachusetts freeze proponents worked closely with several Bay State legislators to delay a vote on theMX A Massachusetts Coalition for a Nuclear Weapons Freeze memo nofed This was accomplish^ byc Massachusetts delegation - Speaker O'Neill. Representatives Markey andtt^^SK^
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Kehler, Kennedy "smcerely believed io the value of the freeze" and had first turned to
Mark Hatfield. But Kehler felt Kennedy's sohcitousness might have hurt the movement,
stating, "[It was] very heady for us to be courted that way by such a national figure, at
the same time it caused us to leap ahead of ourselves before we were ready."59
Thus, in a few short years, the movement for a nuclear weapons freeze exploded
across the United States. In western Massachusetts,Jh^n^ proudly
headlined a May 1982 article on the growmg national freeze movement, "Seed Planted
in WMass Spreads Across Nation.- To the N^v^kWs, Randy Kehler declared,
"I feel like I'm on a comet, but I don't know whether I'm leading it or on its tail."6 ' As
Kehler spoke, the national freeze movement was on the cusp of its most spectacular
event, the June 1 2, 1 982 rally for a nuclear weapons freeze in New York's Central Park.
^^^^
Following New England, the freeze movement took hold most rapidly in New
York, whose State Assembly adopted a freeze resolution in 1981 close on the heals of
the Massachusetts legislature's freeze resolution. New York City had become a
particular hotbed of freeze activity. New York City was likewise home to the
headquarters of numerous peace organizations, which made the city one of the nation's
organizational hubs of freeze activity. In the fall of 1 98 1 , local organizers began
planning for a huge pro-freeze rally in Manhattan's expansive and idyllic Central Park.
59
Ibid.
60
Greenfield Recorder . May 25, 1982.
New York Times
. March 15, 1982; Meyer, 128
290
The freeze rally was schedu.ed for mid-June to coincide with the United Nation's
Second Special Session on Disarmament ft seemed that almost every political group to
the left of center wanted a p.ece of the fast-growing freeze movement Over 80 national
groups and I SO local New York City groups coalesced into a planning coalition Not
surprisingly, the coalition underwent major rift, and divisions. The divisions tended to
run between radical groups who wished to connect the arms race with issues such as
U.S. policy in Central America and support for aparthc.d m South Afiiea, and those who
worked hard to keep the freeze movement's commitment to a tight focus on the freeze to
win broad-based support Radicals believed the rally was being diluted to the point
where its message was being lost, while advocates for a more focused message, believed
if the rally went too far left it would alienate the many 'mainstream" Americans they
hoped to attract Racial divisions compounded these divisions, with militant African-
American organizations such as Harlem fight Back and the Brooklyn-based Black
I foited Front demanding more explicit connections between the arms race, racism and
poverty be made at the rally Many of the white, middle-class freeze activists were
unaccustomed to working with minority groups and misunderstandings and tensions
grew. Some organizations such as Greenpeace, furious at what they believed was an
obstructionist attitude by the Black United Front and its allies, walked out More
experienced organizations, including the War Resisters League and the AFSC, played
crucial roles in holding most of the planning coalition together 62
The divisions were hardly visible on June 12 as hundreds of thousands of people
flooded the streets of New York City converging on Central Park under sunny blue
62
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skies. Most estimates place the number attending the rally at around 750,000 people,
although some argue the numbers exceeded one millioa" The mood was peaceful and
festive, imbued with the wholesomeness that had become something of a trademark at
many freeze events Relations were warm between the crowd and the police, many of
whom expressed sympathy with the cause Amidst balloons, tables, exhibitions and
roaming street vendors milled a crowd of all ages. "It was an intense experience to see
the range of people there
- from people m wheelchairs to babes at the breast," declared
Hampshire College Ecology Professor Arthur Westing upon his return to western
Massachusetts/'4 Westing was one of an estimated 10,000 Massachusetts residents who
converged on New York City for the rally « Boston and Cambridge, satirizing FEMA's
crisis relocation planning, declared June 12'" "Preventive Evacuation Day" and urged
city residents to head for New York City 66 Days before the June 12 rally, state
representative Thomas M Gallagher (D-Boston) urged Bostonians to go, declaring,
"Last fall millions of Europeans came out and demonstrated against the nuclear arms
race as totally insane and a danger to the entire planet, it is time for Americans to stand
up and be counted this Saturday."67
The Central Park rally witnessed a seemingly endless procession of speakers
cross the podium to address the crowd Among them were Massachusetts Congressman
Ed Markey, Bella Abzug, Coretta Scott King, Bruce Springsteen, Orson Welles, Pete
63
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Seeger, Llnda Rondstadt, Seymour Melman, David Dellinger and Randall Forsberg
Forsberg underscored the social cost of the arms race, ask.g the crowd, "How can we
spend $20 billion a year on these stupid weapons when infant nutrition and school
aids and eat dog food; and 20% 0f the black population is unemployedT*8 (At the
Planning sessions the previous fall, some moderates went so far as to suggest the Central
Park rally avo.d connecting the arms race to its social cost at home, arguing this could
alienate fiscal conservatives who might otherwise support the freeze. This strategy was
bemg pursued in California's ,982 freeze referendum campaign, where no mention was
made of transferring money saved from arms spending to domestic programs in the
ballot question. Throughout the day on June 12, those connections were repeatedly
made.)69 As three quarters ofa million people rallied for a nuclear weapons freeze in
Central Park, they were joined on the other coast by over 50,000 who attended a
simultaneous freeze rally in San Francisco. 70 Two days later, over 1,000 activists were
arrested in front of the United Nations building protesting the arms race. The decision
was made to segregate civil disobedience from the legal march to avoid alienating
moderates; thus the direct actions took place on June 14. Among those attending the
Saturday rally and arrested the following Monday was Traprock founder, Judith Sheckel.
Upon returning to western Massachusetts, Sheckel was ecstatic: "The joy at the rally was
intense. We are so bombarded daily by images of violence in the media that it was a
68
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movng expenence «o see so r^y peop.e who are so ,ovmg
,
patiem md^ „
another."71
For most ofthose who attended, the June 12 freeze rally was a joyous affirmation
of life in the eause of preventing nuelear death. There were, however, some
undercurrents oftens™ at the event. A week before the rally, Israel had invaded
Lebanon in a move that drew a good deal of criticism, some of it from within Israel
itself. Some at the rally wished to denounce the Israeli invasion and emphasize that
Israel, was another nuclear power. In the end, radical MIT professor Noam Chomsky
and veteran activist David Delhnger were the only two speakers to broach the potentially
divisive issue.
72
Dellinger and radical colleague Sidney Lens offered further criticisms a
short time later, charging the relatively moderate freeze movement had "not yet
generated the same kind of idealism of the 60s and 70s on the campuses and among
working class youth.
.
.
In the Vietnam War, we didn't make progress until we took an
absolutist position on withdrawal." 73 For others, the broad base visible at the rally made
it an unqualified success. Elected officials who had been gradually embracing the freeze
were especially pleased. Congressman Markey called the freeze "a middle class
movement", adding, "These are people with real clout in their communities."74
In many ways, the June 12, 1982 Central Park freeze rally marked the
culmination oftwo years of rapid growth through grassroots organizing. At the rally,
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From the beginning ofthe 1980 freeze referendum campaign ... western
Massachusetts, activists had hoped .<> win ove. elected officials to pro-freeze positions,
Moving to st, Louis, Kehlet worked to keep the focus ofthe NWFCon building
grassroots support first, and then focusing that support on Congress when the time was
right By 1982, the national movement had begun tO make the shift The Inst mcnln, of
<
longress to led the pressure ofthe growing liee/e movement was moderate Republican
Silvio Conte ofthe Massachusetts First Congressional district, which encompassed most
of the movement s stronghold ... western Massachusetts During the 1980 referendum
campaign, ( lonte had belatedly endorsed the freeze, and subsequent to the campaign,
local freeze activists soughl to hold ( ionte's feet to the fire
76
Ovei the next several years,
freeze activists from the first district inundated Conte with pro freeze letters, petitions
and oir.ee visits At public meetings ... Northampton and Greenfield, ... spring of 1981,
activists confronted Conte, chanting, Kill thecutsl cm the killing!" One working
mothei exclaimed, Yon want tO spend $100 billion on the MX, htil you won I spend
two billion on food stamps foi lummy people'" 77
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By 1982, Conte became one of the most vis.ble supporters of a freeze resolution
in Congress. Along with Oregon Republican Mark Hatfield, he emerged as the mam
Republican freeze proponents in Congress, giving the campalgn the bipartisan
appearance the movement sought. Conte sponsored the first and second attempts at
passing freeze resolutions in Congress in 1982 and 1983, attributing Ws sponsorship to
"the groundswell of public sentiment against the frightening buildup of nuclear
weapons."78 The Oregon Senator and Massachusetts Congressman were among
Washington's most colorful characters. Conte had a reputation for flamboyance,
especially during his "pork of the year awards" when he would put on a plastic pig nose,
and before media cameras denounce "pork barrel spending" in Congress, singling out
particularly egregious examples. Hatfield was to the left of most Democrats on many
issues, first proposing a freeze as part of the SALT II accords in 1979, and regularly
denouncing U.S. intervention in Central America The freeze was always a personal
issue for Hatfield who as a naval officer in the Pacific had walked through the ruins of
Hiroshima in late 1945. Hatfield remembered, "I could not help but be so totally
overwhelmed by the utter and indiscriminate destruction... Looking in one direction or
any other direction in that city, there was nothing but a mass of rubble and the stench of
rotting human life. I had a sense of ambivalence about the kind of power that had been
unleashed in the world." 79
Another Massachusetts Congressman who became a driving force behind a
freeze resolution in Congress was Democrat Ed Markey, whose district encompassed
8
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working class neighborhoods north of Boston. Seen by his colleagues as a young
firebrand, Markey had made a name for himself as an opponent of nuclear energy in the
late 1 970s, becoming especially visible on the issue after the near meltdown at Three
Mile Island. More than any other member of Congress, Markey would work to shepherd
the freeze through the House of Representatives. Markey's congressional aide, Douglass
C Waller, played a major role in Markey's relationship with activists in the freeze
movement, and recounted the congressional campaign for a freeze resolution in his
Movement, Although Markey shared freeze activists concerns over nuclear war, the
ambitious Congressman also saw the issue as a way to raise his visibility and recruit
supporters. Waller is candid about this, describing how Markey's administrative
assistant Peter Franchot had brought Randall Forsberg's "The Call" to Markey's
attention. Franchot told Waller and Markey, "The freeze is going to sweep this country, I
can feel it in my bones. And there's no reason why we shouldn't be in the middle of
it."
80
Most crucial of all was the endorsement by Edward Kennedy who had remained
something ofa sleeping giant when it came to the freeze. In early 1982, the Traprock
Report wrote, "In spite ofthe success of the referendum and passage of the Freeze
resolution in the Massachusetts House and Senate, Senators Kennedy and Tsongas ...
still have failed to endorse the Freeze publicly."81 That soon changed. Confirming
Kehler's account, one Kennedy staffer said, "We could all see that the movement was on
80
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the verge of a breakthrough... The Senator just wanted to get on top of it, harness a„ that
energy, and bring it to Washington instead ofjust Letting it go on.- On March 10, 1982,
at a press conference held at American University's Kay Spiritual Life Center, Kennedy
announced his support lor the freeze and declared he and Hatfield would introduce the
Kennedy-Hatfleld Nuclear Weapons Freeze Resolution in the United States Senate.83
The impact of the Kennedy endorsement was profound. Many in the freeze movement
were thrilled to win such a powerful ally who would bring in greater establishment
support. As Waller notes, «... Kennedy had not only become the liberal leader of his
party, but was also the voice of the liberals, capable ofdefining and setting the agenda
among the established left, f or diehard liberals, a wink and a nod from Kennedy were
enough to spark a flame under an issue. In the case of the freeze, Kennedy built a
bonfire, and the faithful responded in droves."84 Others were critical, accusing Kennedy
Oftrying to co-opt the movement and make it an appendage of his presidential
campaign. 8 '' Within weeks, however, Kennedy aides working with members of Senator
Hatfield's stan; had put together a book under the senators' names, f reeze!: Or How
You Can Help Prevent Nuclear Wan "''Although at times technical in nature, the work
included a section dealing with the 1980 western Massachusetts referendum campaign
and was dedicated to "all members of the nuclear freeze movement who have awakened
82
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the co-spo,,sor.ship ofeighteen senators and 1 1 5 Representatives". Randy Renter and
...hers a, the NWF(
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headquarters in St. I auis believed Kennedy and Markey were
moving too las, i„
.
longress, bul Kennedy insisted on forging ahead with or without the
national movement's endorsement. Kennedy staffer Jan Kalicki and Markey aide
I touglass Waller now became full-time liaisons with the NWF( ; meeting regularly with
its leaders!,,,, and atten,
; the group's conventions. Tensions emerged as some activists
acensed Kennedy and Markey ofwatering down the freeze resolution by lakmg on, the
words 'immediate freeze" and instead c; ,g on the preside,,, to "decide when and
how" 10 negotiate a freeze win, the s„vie, l Won. Waller and Kalicki informed the
movement that these chants were necessary to assure moderates' support. The
congressional siallers worked ,„ modify other movement demands. Sources oftension
included the NWF( "s demands thai the freeze resolution target funding for spccilic
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weapons systems and oppose dep,oymen, of the Euromissi.es. Wa.ler and Ka.icki
generally prevailed in these debates, arguing the ,a„er demands would ea, into moderate
support for the freeze resolution. 89
The staffofCongressman Edward Markey beeame the spearhead ofthe
professional °f 'he frceze«~
•
M«kcy formed a pro-freeze political aetion
eommittee called the "United States Committee Against Nuelear War". Advising
members ineluded such Democratic liberals as Philip Burton of California, Barbara
Mikulski of Maryland, Peter Rodino, Jr. ofNew jersey, Patricia Schroeder of Colorado,
Paul Simon of Illinois and Morris Udall of Arizona. In a 1983 fitndraising letter for the
political action committee
,
Markey wrote:
We formed the Committee to help insure the passage ofthe Freeze
resolution I sponsored in the House, and a similar one sponsored by
Senators Kennedy and Hatfield in the Senate... For too long my
colleagues in the House have been intimidated by massive New Right war
chests accumulated early in the election cycle for the purpose of
convincing them that they must support the arms race or face defeat at the
polls... Therefore, if we are to win in the House this month we must have
the resources which demonstrate our strength in the country. 90
After the Kennedy endorsement, even the NWFC's focus shifted increasingly
from grassroots activism to congressional lobbying. The Freeze Newsletter heram*
Freeze Focus, and stories about civil disobedience in the U.S. or the mass peace marches
in Europe gave way to an almost exclusive focus on the campaign in Congress and
national elections. Meanwhile, the NWFC took on more ofthe feel of a professional
89
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Tins campaign is too important to involve only 'peace people'... Thus wchave tned to focus on mainstream Americans who are car hi ofnuckarwar yc, d.strus, the Russians... [The public, is not overly su
c
1ttbZtrad,tonal 'movement- methods ofmass comn,u„,ca,,ou.
. Be „don
.
want to tun, people offbefore they hear the message,wc"pnrposdy avotded the traditional movement images ofpeace dovesnnssdes or mushroom clouds.
.
. Rather we have Wed to elicit a positive
aZe","(,us."'
m 'Ct,,ng
°^ "* «— Pl-sTn, image
One ad juxtaposed a photo ol Admiral < ienc l,aRo(|ue with the word "Enough", and a
quote Iron, the admiral on the "Myth ol Sovic, Nuclear Superiority" Another showed a
fuzzy license plate with discernible numbers with the caption, "Wc (io, Their Number"
and a short paragraph beginning, "You're looking at an actual Russian license plate as i,
might appear Iron, an American satellite." The ad then made the case that a freeze Could
be verified due to American high-resolution satellite photography. Others showed
mainstream Americans such as a construction worker and a mother with children raising
concerns about a freeze that the respective ads briefly addressed. Each ended with,
"Freeze. Because No One Wants a Nuclear War."'"
" Meyer, 206.
Beginner's Luck", cover letter accompanying freeze ad kit. The letter and all twelve ads are in the
r,'^
S
.iT? ft"? Sophi; ' Sm ! ,h (:°,lcction - Thc creators ofthe ads claimed to l>e non-professiona
volunteers, but il is elear from the letter and the ads that they were very familiar will, modern marketing
theories. H
93 ibid
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With the .urn
...wards professio„aliZat,on, activists faded from „a,,(1„al
prominence and Kennedy and Markcy became the most frequency interviewed and
quoted spokespeople for the national freeze movement* As the freeze movement
underwent these transformations graduahy ancr the June ,2, ,,82 Central park ra„y, the
movement made further inroad, into moderate support, but began seeing a steady stream
out ofthe movement by radicals who fel, the freeze had become too mainstream and
lound the militancy ofthe growing Central Amencan solidarity campaign more in line
with their brand of activism 95
The erosion ofthe freeze movement's base, however, was still in the future in the
spring of 1 982 The events of that sprmg "Ground ZeroWeek", introduction of the
Kennedy-] latfield Resolution in the I louse and Senate, and the Central Park rally
ra.sed the national profile of the freeze movement to a headl.ne story and media
Saturation Kehler recalled that at this time, "the freeze was hot
I
with
I
the med.a
hyping .t, to tell you the truth, larger than life."96 The Reagan administration could no
longer ignore the movement and sent out administration figures and supporters to
challenge the freeze on the airwaves, in print and on the lecture circu.t Alexander Haig
denounced it as dangerous arms control policy which would weaken America while
conservative members of Congress accused the movement of promoting "unilateral
disarmament". To counter the huge religious support the freeze had mustered, Rev Jerry
Falwell denounced the "freezeniks" and accused the movement of promoting atheism
M Meyer ,128
" s
Ibid., 263
96
' Interview with Randy Kehler, May 5, 2001 Of (he salurahon coverage, Kehler sa.d. "In (he end (hat
hurl us.
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and surrender ,n the odd war." Inev itab,y , the freeze movement found itself red baited
as members of the admin.stration now insmuated the movement was funded and gu.ded
behind the scenes by the KGB Reagan charged the freeze "was inspired no, by the
sincere, hones, peopie who wan, peace, bu, by some who wan, the weakening of
America and so are manipulating many hones, and sincere people- ReaderiD^
published an article by John Barron in which ,he writer claimed three intelligence
officers ,o,d him the KGB directed ,he freeze Rona,d Reagan, citing ,he article, declared
.ha, the Soviet Union "saw an advantage in a peace movemen, buil, around ,he ,dea of a
nuclear freeze. There is no question about foreign agents that were sen, to help
instigate and help create and keep such a movemen, going " " Passing the president's
notice was the fac, that one month prior ,o his charges of Soviet infiltration, Randy
Kehler was urging freeze supporters ,o write the Soviet government to free Sergei
Bairovin, a dissident Soviet peace activist then being held in a Sov,et mental hospital '»
Mark Hatfield responded to Reagan's charges, "I fought the communists in China when
I was with the Navy I fought them on the platforms in a debate on an ideological basis. I
just haven't found one in the nuclear freeze movement." 101
97
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the Amencan Communist Party and the World Peace Council, endorsede freeze. Such organizations, however, seem merely to have attached themselves to a popular movement
1 heir influence was marginal, unlike Europe, where various Communist Parties played a more prominent
role, although usually advocated tactics to the right of the rest of the European peace movement See
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The Reagan admiration's efforts to red bait the movement seem to have
backfired. Congressman Markey believed the administration's attaeks only raised the
profile of the freeze and solidified its support due to the charge's baselessness.- Rrding
the popular momentum of the movement, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired
by freeze supporter Jonathon Bingham, reported ou, a favorable freeze resolution 28-8
on June 23, 1982.'" The support of Speaker of the Hons, Tip O'Neill assured the
resolution made its way to the House floor. Before the vote, O'Neill, who as a
congressman in 1953 had witnessed an atomic test, declared, "Anybody that ever saw
one of those bombs must wonder why wc did not start this freeze long ago.""" Silvio
Conte inveighed, "The resolution before us incorporates the mandate of those growing
millions to get on with meaningful arms limitation and reduction and a, the same time to
stop
-
I say again, stop
- the endless nuclear buildup between the Soviet Union and the
United States.'""5 Ed Markey proclaimed, "I am proud to say tha, today in the House we
are voting on a resolution that says we have learned from the horror of Hiroshima. This
resolution says we want to freeze the nuclear arms race so we don't drift closer and
closer to a nuclear holocaust that would have the destructive force ofone million
Hiroshimas." 106
m
Meyer, 227-8.
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Republican conservatives like Illinois' Representative Henry Hyde fiercely
attacked the bill as weakening America's defenses and freezing „, Soviet superiority
The Reagan administration countered by having Senators Join, Warn* (R-VA) and
hawkish Democrat
.
lenry "Scoop" Jackson introduce a countet amendment ... the
Senate, wind, called foi a freeze ofnucleat weapons, but only aftet the administration's
current buildup was complete and had resulted in Soviet reductions Markey denounced
the Jackson VVarne. amendment, which was introduced into .he House debate by
Representative William s Broomfield (R-Nfl), as a "phony freeze" Afte. heated debate,
in its first test on August 5, 1982, .he ( lonte-Markey Bingham freeze amendment lost to
the BroomfleId alternative
''v b razoi .h.n margin, 202-204 107 Meanwhile, .he Senate
Foreign Relations Committee rejected Kennedy Hatfield fo. Jackson Wame. by a vote
of 12-5 108
Despite the defeat, many freeze proponents we.c buoyed by a defbal ofonly two
vo.es on the eve ofCongressional elections Kenedy declared, "My .he nanowes. of
margins, the nucleat freeze may have lost ... .he i louse ofRepresentatives, bui it is
winning day by day in .he country, and i a.,, confidenl thai it w.n prevail al the poll...,.
Places in Noven.be. and beyond "m Randy Kehlei responded, "We are disappointed .ha.
the majority of. he I louse ofRepresentatives today voted against aU.S -Soviei freeze on
the nucleat arms .ace a. the same time, we are ..ready elated that a neat majority voted
fot the Freeze Tins vote demonstrates the great progress thai the Freeze campaign has
l07
Meyei m 7-k
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Nuclei Freeze Narrowly Pails in Housed Representatives'', Nucleat Freeze Foundation circa
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made since March of this year... The real vote, however, will come this fall, when
millions Offreeze supporters, m thousands ofcommunities across the country assess
candidates for Congress on the basis of their stand on the Freeze ." 110
The closeness of the
.
louse vote, in tandem with the growing public support for
the freeze, now focused movement attention on the upcoming congressional elections in
which Democrats hoped to reverse the Republican gains of 1980 The results augured
well for the freeze movement The freeze movement won impressive state referendum
v.ctories m Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island and,
of course, Massachusetts The campaign won a hard-fought victory in California, where
the movement ran into opposition from the state's aerospace industry 1,1 Only Arizona,
where Barry Goldwater lobbied hard against it, defeated a freeze referendum The freeze
likewise passed in 36 of38 cities and towns where it was on the ballot 1,2 In a press
release for the NWFC, Randall Forsberg crowed.
Yesterday's vote on the Freeze sends a clear and unprecedented mandate
to the U.S. Government to propose to the Soviet Union an immediate
mutual and verifiable freeze on the arms race. The overall vote count
favored the Freeze by a margin of60% to 40%.
. . Voters favored the
Freeze in industrial states in rural plains states ... and in metropolitan
areas The Freeze passed in California where the Reagan administration
worked hard to defeat the proposition. Support for the Freeze cuts across
traditional conservative-liberal lines. Building on this decisive victory,
the national Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign will mount a massive
'
grassroots effort to persuade Congress and the Administration to carry out
the wishes of the majority of the American people. 113
110
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Press Release, Randall Forsberg, Chair of the National Advisory Board, Nuclear Weapons Freeze
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•n the House of Representatives, the Democrats picked up twenty-six seats.
Although this was in large measure due to the recession, which had seen unemployment
go over 10%, the freeze movement believed it now had the numbers to push the freeze
through the House of Representatives 1 14
In the spring of 1983, Kennedy, Conte and Markey geared up for another effort
at getting a freeze resolution through Congress. At one meeting, over seventy
Massachusetts activists met with Kennedy, Massachusetts^ junior senator Paul Tsongas,
who had belatedly endorsed the freeze, and Conte Western Massachusetts members of
the delegation gave Conte 4,000 "proxy votes" for the freeze they had collected back
home, thanked h,m lor bis past support and encouraged him to work even harder for the
freeze.
113
The movement scored Its first victory of 1983 in March when the House
Foreign Affairs Committee once again passed a freeze resolution, this time 27-9 In
Kmc, (he full I louse met to consider what was now called the "Zablocki resolution" after
f oreign Affairs Committee Chair dement Zablocki (D-WI). Congress embarked on fifty
hours of contentious debate and numerous attempts by Republicans to substitute
amendments favorable to the president's position on nuclear weapons and arms control
in what Markey charged was "filibuster by amendment" Proponents of the freeze fought
back seventeen amendments 1,7 Critics of the Zablocki bill argued it would lock in a
putative Soviet nuclear weapons superiority In response to the charges being thrown at
the freeze proposal in the House, Senator Kennedy responded, "No one in authority,
1,4
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including President Reagan, would trade our deterrent for Soviet forces As debate
dragged on, Markey sighed, «, wanted the Freeze to be the debate of the decade, no, a
decade of debate." 119
Finally, exhausted members of the House adopted a pro-administration
amendment, introduced by conservative Democrat Elliot Levitas of Georgia, which
supported a freeze but stated a U S
-Soviet freeze would be invalidated should no actual
reductions of weapons come about shortly after adoption Other amendments were
adopted stating that the resolution would not affect current weapons systems or planned
deployment of the Euromissiles ,2« The last to speak was the Speaker, Tip O'Neill:
We have concluded a long, and at times trying debate
. The freeze issue
in my opmion has finally been drawn. We are ready to choose a historic
'
course, whether to continue the policies of the past or to chart a new
path. The freeze supporters all across the country spoke clearly last
November and w.ll now speak through their representatives They want
an end to the arms race. They want the leaders of the superpowers to
recogmze that the on-rushing train of nuclear weapons must be stopped
I hat is also my personal desire 121
The House of Representatives then voted 278-149 for the joint resolution. Many freeze
supporters were crestfallen at the number of amendments, which they believed diluted
the resolution's message. Leon Panetta (D-CA) summed up the elasticity of the
resolution: "Whether you are a hawk or a dove or something in between.
. . When you go
back home, you can say anything you want about this legislation." 122 The ambivalence
u
*/bid, 78
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among ,'rcc.e activists took a turn toward demoralization when ,hc Senate defied the
Kennedy-,M,ld freeze resolution 40-58 „„ Octobct 3 1 . 1983 Three weeks late, the
I louse voted to fund the MX missile 239-186, The Senate followed sun soon thereafter
59-39 I2»
Showdown in I mi ope
The failure ofthe freeze resolution in the Senate came just weeks before the
P'anned deployment ofU.S. Cruise and Pershing I, missiles ,n Europe, scheduled to
begin on November 23, ,983 Many freeze and disarmament proponents had hoped to
stop deployment of these new weapons, which gave the United States a hair-trigger first
Strike capability The high velocity Pershing II could reach the Soviet Union m .ess than
ten minutes and the Cruise was designed to fly beneath Soviet radar Throughout
October, Western Europe was rocked by a paroxysm of protests that marked the
culmination ofthree years ofdemonstrations. Over a half-million gathered in Rome and
400,000 .n Amsterdam to protest impending installation of the Huromissiles On October
1
5, over one million West Germans turned out to protest across the f ederal Republic,
'Von, Bonn to Hamburg to Berlin In the Schwabian region of West Germany, over
200,000 demonstrators clasped hands and formed a 70-mile human chain surrounding
U S bases in Stuttgart and Ulm, which were scheduled to receive Pershing II missiles 121
1,1 the Unitcd States
<
*e national freeze movement had agreed to downplay the
Euromissile debate, largely at the advice of Kennedy and Markey aides Jan Kalicki and
l23 /W<*,232
12
" Breyman, L93-6.
309
D0U*"8 Wa"CT
'
w
"" »n~ ><" .he ,,r<>m,*s wouid bc puitclvc<1
"
ta" S f°r
'
U""aU:ral The nww: neverthelw, continued to lobby
Congress to delay i„s,allme„, ofthe Euromissiles Some activist* however, had
moved to oppose the .,„ Ufa , lc„ own in a more rad.ca, fashion (,„ Julv 4,
198
1
over 2.0,0 women had begun ea,np,„g „ut « the 0 , Seneca Army^ m
^
V°rk WhiC
" »—"* "Pershing m.ssdcs were scheduled ...
pm m transit to Europe The women created wtal they called the "Women',
Encmpmw for a Future of Peace and Justice", which remained throughuul the
sununer, swelling M times to over 6,000 women A, the camp, radical leshians worked
with older, more conventional activto, torn the tatoric peace movements, and femini,,
critUm ofthe a„„s ,acc were emphasized Conservative local townsfolk saw the camp
as an invasion of«c«mm„„is,s" and "lesbians" On Angus, I, over 240 of the women
scaled a six foot fence and were arrested a, the base in a direct action protest ofthe
Pershing ll missiles, among them
.
number ofMassachusetts activists Frances Crowe
was among those arrested, stating, "It was terribly empowering to climb the fence I'd
..ever climbed a fence before l decided
. needed to put my body into the machine that's
cwating madness » The I
J
s Army dropped the trespassing charges but ordered the
women to stay away from I he base 126
The Simultaneous campaigns fo win Senate approval of a freeze resolution,
defeat the MX and stop the Euronussiles suffered a devastating blow in late August with
news that the Soviet Union had shot down a South Korean passenger jet, KAI, 007,
I2S »
I)cush,„s Made By theThirt National Conference of the Nucleai Weapons Freeze Campaign" s,Lc^Missoiin.Febniaiy^, 1983. Frances Crowe Papers, Sophia Snuth Collection
Greenfield Recorder, September 6, 1983
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a teen, ofanO-Sovie, bostfuty
,„ lhc Unt.ed States. ,„ a lerter ,o >oca, orgamzers the
Soviets continues to be a major area ofconcern.
. . There seen. ,o be a sense in Congress
a. the present time that H might be best to let the emotional fervor around the Korean
issue die down before getting a vote on the MX or the Senate Freeze resoiution. ,n other
words, the further from the airliner movement, the better the possibility there is for a
more positive vote on both issuer " l27 Th„ „ ic in
. cs. 1 he memo also suggested that "to move the nation
pas. its grief and anger... i, is important right now to acknowledge the tragedy when
doing press work. It is important right now to point to the arms control lessons inherent
in the tragedy." 128
During the period from October 2 1 -24, 1983, U.S. peace activists held numerous
legal rallies to protest deployment of the Euromissiics. Over 6,000 demonstrated on the
Boston Commons, where John Olver was among the speakers. '» Earlier in the year,
western Massachusetts activists had begun a petition campaign ,o Representative Come
under the banner, "Supper,
.he Freeze. Freeze
.he Euromissiles." The pe.i.ion read: "We
urge you to support the amendment soon lo be introduced,
.o delay by one year the
deploymcn. of the Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe."' 30 In October, .he petition
drive paid offwhen Conte wrote a letter to his fellow Republican, President Ronald
"Dear Local Organizer", NWFC.Seplember 14, 1983. Frances Crowe Papers, Sophia Smith Collection
rrlf„":ers.
mid"°C,0ber
'
Ra"dy Keh 'Cr
"^"^ °f 'he KAL 007 incidenl in a
'°
fr<**=
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Reagan, stating, "We beUeve tha, a sta tesma,,ike initia,ive to de,ay the deployment
the direction of the arm, race and establish a new momentum for nuclear arms control
Conte's letter was co-signed by Congressman Markey, Senator Kennedy and Oregon
Senator, Mark
,
latheld. Most of Congress, however, remained solidly behind the
Euromissiles. 131
By late October, i, was dear the trans-Atlantic protests were not going to be able
to stop deployment ofthe Cruise and Pershing I, missiles, funding for the MX or win
Senate support for a free™ resolution. The backlash engendered by the KAI. 007
incident was compounded that fall by a terrorist attack on a U.S. military eompound in
Lebanon, killing 241 marines, and the U.S. invasion ofGrenada a week later, setting off
a wave triumphant nationalism across the nation. In a section of a letter to organizers
subtitled, "10X2 and 1083 Hps and Downs", Kehler discussed the movement's bleak
prospects:
aw i;? c
'SaS
I""'
WhlCh tnggered a hurricane of anti-Soviet hysteriaAlthough U.S. intelligence experts now say that the Soviet fighter pilotsprobably did not know they were shooting at a civilian airliner and
despite many people's doubts about the true mission ofthe KAL plane
I resident Reagan seems to have successfully exploited the incident to
'
pick up additional support for his nuclear arms program in Congress It
is now mid-October, and the prospect for victories at the national level is
not good. I he Freeze resolution in the Senate is not expected to pass the
anti-MX forces still face an uphill struggle, and our legislative efforts to
delay the deployment of the Cruise and Pershing II missiles, scheduled to
begin in December, face even tougher opposition? Who can help but feel
some discouragement?
131
Ibid.
, November 2 1, 1983
132 «Where We've Been and Where We're Going", Randy Kehler, NWFC Letter, October 1983.
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Anticipating a post-deployment depression in the ranks, Randy Kehier wrote another
letter to aetivists, whieh attempted to boost sagging morale in the face of impending
deployment ofthe Euromissiles. It read in part:
We will continue to struggle as hard as we can against the denlovmemBut we must also recognize that if the deployment does ,aJ<e nlace
"
mutual freeze, far from being invahdated byZ depfo^t w I 'become more urgent than ever. Yes, it wiU also be more diffic^ gthe likely Sov,et counter-escalation, and no doubt wc will be hvL ivenmore perilous world. But the initial prermse of trds cLTpaignS
aterTf h ^^^ dep,0yed "°W Can »* un7 Joyedla , t ere is a will on both sides to do it.
. . Despite short-term obstaclwe face, the very progress we have made should give us greatTope for
On November 23, 1983, the first nine Pershing II missUes reached the Federal
Republic of Germany, soon followed by a steady stream of more Pershing II and Cruise
missiles to their assigned stations. 134 Coming so elosely on the heels of the defeat of the
freeze in the Senate and passage of appropriations for the MX (the politically most
vulnerable missile pursued by the administration), the deployment of the Euromissiles
represented a real nadir for the disarmament movement in the United States. After an
exhilarating three years of expansion, accompanied by many emotional peaks, a sense of
demoralization began to set on the freeze movement.
The sense of fatigue and despair that began to pervade the movement in the fall
of 1983 was compounded by ABC's broadcast of the television movie, "The Day After".
Broadcast on Sunday night, November 20, 1983, the movie, starring Jason Robbards
featured a dramatic depiction of the affects of a nuclear war on Lawrence, Kansas.
133
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Although
.he movie helped drive home a message the freeze movement had been
making for three years, eommg
,„ the wake of the Soviet downing 0f Korean Airhners
007 the previous September, the defeat of.be freeze in the Sena.e, passage of.be MX
and depioymen, of .he Euromissiles, many in .be movemen. feared
.he film's ,,mi„g
would add
.o a growing sense of helplessness and fatalism * Local freeze groups
organized "How to Avoid the Day After" discussion groups, advised members no, .0
wa,ch
.he move alone, offered advice on how ,0 dtscuss
.he fito, w,.h children, and
generally encouraged members to fight any sense of helplessness the movie might
evoke."0
Direct Action in .he Ape nf ,h» r,»r
While the freeze movement worked to build grassroots support and endorsements
from elected officials, a number ofcommitted acttvists continued ,0 carry out direct
action protests of the nuclear arms race. The first major action occurred on September 9,
1080 a, the General Electrtc factory in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, where a group
calling itself the "Plowshares 8" hammered on the nose cone of two Minutemen missiles
and poured their own blood over blueprints and tools causing approximately $10-
$40,000 ofdamage Among the Plowshares 8 was Vietnam-era radical priests Daniel
and Philip Berrigan, whose involvement, along with their lawyer, former Attorney
General Ramsey Clark, assured the action widespread publicity In their first trial in
1981, the defendants were sentenced to 3-10 years; however, the sentences were thrown
'" Traprock Report Vol. III. #2, October 1983
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out on appea. and the case rented in the news throughout the , 980s, beeonung a
cause celebre among American radicals. 137
Massachusetts freeze activists, predominantly from faith-based groups seeking
ways to carry out "mora, witness" against the arms race, were especially involved in
direct action campaigns of the early 1980, In the summer of 1981, the Committee for
Creative Non-Violence organized a "Call to Prayer and Resistance" in which the
centerpiece was a civil disobedience action at the White House. Seven western
Massachusetts activists, including Frances Crowe of the Northampton AFSC, Traprock's
Judith Shecke. and Ruth Benn of the Amherst Disarmament Coalition joined 124 other
activists, who, after breaking away from a White House tour, sat in the White House
driveway and prayed for "survival of the human race" and denounced recent budget cuts
for human services. The group, which included veteran civil rights activist, Dick
Gregory, was arrested on charges of "unlawful entry" and taken to separate male and
female prisons. 138 The arrestees issued a lengthy statement to explain their action:
We feel our symbolic action is both warranted and appropriate. We are
convinced that the world's peace and the future of mankind are so
seriously threatened that we must resort to civil disobedience. Dr Martin
Luther King stated that non-violent direct action 'seeks so to dramatize
the issue that it can no longer be ignored.' We believe that the threat of
nuclear war and the escalating arms race that makes such a threat
possible, is the most important issue of our time... We believe the threat
ol nuclear war increases daily, yet we are optimistic that positive change
can, and will take place. We call upon the President, in the interest of
national security, to initiate a proposal for a mutual U.S-U S S R nuclear
weapons freeze This would be the first step toward nuclear
disarmament.
138
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A« the hearings in June
,981, some obsess heheved the judge was sympathetic
•o the defendants who pleaded guilty to unlawful entry
,
receive(J SK^
sentenees, three m0nths probation and were firmly instated by the judge to stay out of
the White House.- The ease received national attention and heiped elevate the profile
of Frances Crowe, who, with Sheckel and Kehler, had been among the driving forces
behind the
.980 freeze resolution in western Massachusetts Crowe was already well
known as one of the Bay State's most colorful activists and effective organizers,
especially skilled a. drawing new recruits into various social movements Upon
receiving the New England Award for Excellence in Social Justice Actions in ,981, the
speaker inducing Crowe stated, "I can think of no one who more fully embodies the
call ofJesus in Luke 4 to "set at liberty those who are oppressed."- Crowe played an
active and leading role in the movement against the Vietnam War and against nuclear
energy in ,he 1970s. During the 1980s, she would also be actively involved with the
Central American Solidarity movement and the campaign against apartheid m South
Africa Unlike many in the freeze and disarmament movements, Crowe could date her
opposition to nuclear weapons to the dawn of the atorruc age. Crowe recalled the fateful
moment in a 1982 speech on the subject:
Thirty-seven years ago, when , heard the news over the radio ofthe
bombing of Hiroshima I was shocked beyond understanding I was
alone, a bride in New Orleans waiting for Tom to return from his duty
in the U.S. Army.
,
was overwhelmed with a feeling of shock and grief I
unplugged the iron left the place mat I was ironing and went out to
wander the streets of the French Quarter looking for a supportive group to
share my feelings with, the closest I came was a second hand book store
141
Valley Advocate June 30, 1981.
United Methodist Reporter June 12, 1981
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Crowe traces her ae«ivism back t0 her schoolgir
, days jn
during the 1 930s, where she led a failed pet.tion campaign to have her high school
provide a gyn, Cass for girU as well as boys. "My mother gave me a vision," recaUs
Crowe, "she told me to go places in the world."- Crowe said of Carthage, "There was
a lot of classism and racism there. The Kn Klux Klan were very strong in our
community, and as members of a small Catholic Church we were targeted."- After
spending two years a, Stephen's College, an all-women's college in Missouri Crowe
completed a degree in psychology at Syracuse University.
Crowe underwent important changes during World War II. She took on war work
at the Spcrry and Bell Labs plants in New York, while she worked toward a graduate
degree at nights a. Columbia and then the New School for Social research. "I was a
'Rosie the Riveter'", recalled Crowe, "... and then the war was over and we women
were told to go home, back to the kitchen and have children." 145
"I started to get politicized then", remembered Crowe of her years at the Sperry
and Bell plants during World War II. 1* According to Crowe, "I'd been so idealistic for
my country, and then I was seeing all this waste and greed around me. Other people
Frances Crowe draft speech, circa l982.Frances Crowe Papers, Sophia Smith Collection.
141
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weren't idealistic; .hcy were there «0 make money Pro,,,
.he war , was getting reaHy
turned off By the time the United S,a (eS dropped the bomb on I broshima.
, was ready to
be a pacifist." 14' I„ many ways
, the atomic bombings ofHiroshima and Nagasaki
became the guiding motifofCrowe's life. "Spiiual pass,vi ty is the firs, death, nuclear
1-locaus, is th. second death," Crowe would iater repeat Crowe graduaUy gravitated in
the direction ofthe Quakers, stating, "My conscience didn't feel comfortable with
Catholic beltel'
"
Looking back a, her evolution toward radtcal pacifism, Crowe recalled,
"When they dropped the atomic bomb on I Broshima . became somewhat ofa Quaker in
belief overnight
,
feh (hat was the wrong thtng to do So much k.lling.'- At the end
Ofthe war, Crowe married a physics, and radtologist, |)r Thomas Crowe, whose
expertise gave I rances Crowe a deeper understanding than most Americans of the
dangers of radiation 149
Thomas and Frances Crowe settled down in the late 1940s and 1950s, having
three children, Caltha, lareth and Ton, Crowe described herselfduring these years as a
"traditional housewife and mothet" One ofthe Crowe children. lareth, was born deaf so
Frances and Thomas moved to Norlhamplon, Massachusetts to be near its prestigious
(lark School for the Deal'"" In the late 1950s, Crowe grav.taled in the direction of the
growing "Ban the Bomb" movement In 10X0, she recalled of this period, "It took us a
long time allcr the fust bomb was dropped ,„ realize the dangers to humans ofatomic
radiation. Literature came to our home in the early 1960s on the dangers ofopen air
i I
lhul
" K
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testing.
,
read it.
,
realized the dangers to my family. This was hitting e.ose to home-
Crowe beeame aetive in SANE during the early 1 960s' campatgn for a nue.ear test ban
treaty. Later tn the deeade, Crowe's aetivist energies shifted toward opposing the
Vietnam War. She organized daily pickets at Westover Air Base in Chieopee and ran the
Pioneer Valley Peaee Center, whieh offered draft counseling between 1968 and 1973. At
times she had over seventy young men meeting in her offiee/basement.
"I feel it was a
real crisis in men's lives," she recalled, "People were coming to me desperate, looking
for the quickest, easiest way out of mi.itary service. 1 tried to show them how they could
respond in a human way."' 52 Draft counseling became a crusade for Crowe, who
managed to appear at local high schools along side military recruiters to discuss
alternatives to military service.'" Crowe also frequently drove between Northampton
and Amherst, picking up young men hitchhiking on Route 9 and offered them draft
counseling. 154 Crowe became a full time member of the American Friends Service
Committee, declaring of the Quakers, "It's a small denomination, but its influence is
way out of proportion to its size." 155
After the war in Vietnam, Crowe became involved in the movement against
nuclear energy; however, with the birth of the freeze movement, Crowe came foil circle
to the issue that more than any other set her on her activist path. Crowe particularly felt
151
Ibid
'«
Cr°We dr3ft SpeCCh
'
CirCa ,978 ~9 Frances Crowe PaPers
-
S°Phia Smith CollectionIbid On one occasion, when she felt military recruiters addressing students in an auditorium weretaking more than the.r allotted five minutes, Crowe interrupted to say, "This isn't working I suggestthose ofyou opposed to war in any form and want to know about your legal options to military service
move to this side of the room." According to Crowe, all but five did
154
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raP 'dM °f«*~ Peace movement in Europe, which critics
(,,Sm,SSC(J
"
' l0lbnditiS
" *" «" the« ofneutralist and disarmament sentiment ,n
.he Netherlands. «, loUanditis," Crowe declared,
"Well, I have I lo.land.tis.
. . and it's the
best disease Pve ever had... and
, caugh( it lrom the Europeans... Seen, the pictures oi
.he their huge demonstrations... talking to people who have been to Europe... it's very
infectious.^ For ( rowe, «, lollanditis" was the antidote to the apathy she lei, the arms
race created: "... [fone does no, have a future, why Struggle?" 1" Quoting a study by
Yale psychologist Robert
.1. Lifton in which eighty percent ol respondents purportedly
sau. they believed they would die in a nuclear war, Crowe railed against the "psychic
numbing" she felt pervaded American society, stating, « To endure the thought of
possible anmhilation of life on this plane, results in many people turning to religious
culls, drugs, alcohol, entertainment, pornography, excessive self-fullillment [to] turn i,
oil |and
| Hip the page.
,,IS8
When the freeze movement began in the 1980s, ( rowe, now in her sixties, was
the veteran ofmany years ofactivism. She played a central role in the western
Massachusetts referendum campaign of 1980 and gave the keynote address at the first
national freeze conference. Like Anna (iyorgy and Sam Fovejoy, who took western
Massachusetts 1 anti-nuclear energy gospel around the country, Crowe lectured lor the
freeze all over the United States. In a 19X1 keynote speech lor (he first New Jersey
freeze conference, Crowe declared, "I am here to talk to you about the problem of
156
"Keynote Speech to the First New Jersey Conference on the Freeze, 1981", Frances Crowe draff
speed). Frances Crowe Papers, Sophia Smith Collection.
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successful^ gai„i„g a 8tate endorsement for ,he Mu.ua. Nuclear Weapons Freeze.
what wc can do abort ,. and to M you whal wc d ,d^ .
,^
MaSMChUSC,,S CroW
« -»W a ,»ng record ofdim* action experience and
"C'°US
'"'
CS ' S The 5> 2 " C™« amused a, the perp.exed reaction she
often encountered from police arresting her for civil disobedience ( Irowe observed,
"One gets a
.<„ ofmUeage ou. ofwhite hair
' Crowe's civil disobedience a. the White
'
louse was the am of several high profile actions she would .ake in the 1980s Crowe',
mO« spectacular dncc, ac
, tool place on October 3, 1983, as the .'reeve movement's
Muenca in ( longreas appeared to he wamng. Crowe and seven other women, five of
whom were nuns, entered the Electric Boat plan, a, Quonse, Point, Rhode Island, which
produced i ndent ll submarine-baaed mtssiles, issued an "indictment" to the plant's
personnel and then spray-painted "Thou Shah Nol Kill" on several missile Casings."'
A
" Crowe's fourteenth arrest, the Electric Boat action resulted in the
activist's Brat extended jail time Crowe and he, co-defendants were convicted of
"malicious nuschiel" and sentenced to six months prison, all but thirty days of which
were suspended, and lined approximately $150 Judge Albert DeRobbio ejected over
thirty supporters of< .owe and the other defendants from the courtroom in South
Kingston, Rhode Island for singing "'2
Kcvnolc Speech to (he FlfSl New Jersey ( onlc.cncc on the Freeze, 1 98 1 Frances ( '.owe drall of
speech Frances Crowe Papers. Sophia Smith Collection
"'" Hoslon Glotxi, January 2, 19X4.
Daily Hampshire (ia/cllc, January II, 1984,
undated newspaper clipping, circa, December 1983-Januaiy, iwt Frances Crowe Pacers
Northampton, Massachusetts
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be their grandmother,"
< Irowe told a report* upon he,
-Cease «- Although Crowe was a
vegetarian, she was only saved meal fa prison "It was not easy, said Crowe, «h was
PriS°n Wh" t: htt P^"— jail was flooded with letters of support foi
Crowe The volume eventually reached a point where the prison could no longer inspect
«- lette"^ withheld Crowe's mail altogethe, The inconigible (
-owe continued her
Political activity in prison, talking polities with .he inmates and getting thirty-eight of
them to sign a petition of support fo, Rev Jesse Jackson's 1984 bid fo, the
presidency
u,s
Jackson's Rainbow Coalition was a growing force in American politics, and
Jackson was anx.ous to build bridges to the peace movement Jackson interceded in an
attempi to have Crowe and he, fellow activists released early (When Crowe was
released aftet he, mandated thirty days. Jackson mistakenly claimed credit foi he, "early
release"
) When C, owe was released, howeve,
,
she made national news by holding a
P-css conference with Jackson a, the oh.ey s, Baptist ( h,„ch in Providence There,
Crowe endorsed Jesse Jackson io, president, declaring, "lie's buildings rainbow
coalition, and i don't think we're going to get anywhere on ending the arms race unless
blacks are involved I le's really trying to make peace a platform At the press
' Undated newspapei clipping, Frances Crowe Papers Northampton Massachusetts
"'' Springfield Union. February 6, 1 984
"•
' Ibid
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conference, Crowe and Jackson kissed. A photographer, whose photo was rented in
Ifeweek and numerous local newspapers, captured the moment. 167
Entering 1984, much of the freeze movement was demoralized over the failures
of the previous fall, when the Senate rejected the freeze, Congress funded the MX
missile, and deployment of the Euromissiles proceeded on schedule. The focus in 1984
was on the upcoming presidential elections. The political action committee Freeze Voter
'84 was formed at the NWFC meeting in St. Lou, in late 1983. It represented the apex
of the movement's professionalization, employing extensive direct mailing and the
"bundling" of individual contributions. The goal was to "change the politicians" by
focusing on pro-freeze candidates. All the Democratic candidates endorsed the freeze in
some form. Freeze Voter '84 circulated a chart with the candidates' positions on major
issues, such as the freeze, the Euromissiles, the MX, Trident II, the B-l bomber and so
forth. All the candidates except Jesse Jackson and long-shot George McGovern had
supported at least one issue the freeze movement opposed. Thus, California
Congressman Alan Cranston, the most solicitous of freeze movement support, passed
each litmus test but one, his support for the B-l bomber. Gary Hart had only endorsed
the freeze late in the campaign, supported the Euromissile deployment but was strongly
opposed to the MX. 168 Freeze supporters split among the candidates with some opting
for the most viable and others for candidates with the purest records. In western
167
168
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Massachusetts, an oSshoo, ofthe statewide Seeze movement,
"Elect the Freeze in >S4»
endorsed freeze activist 00.00™, Mary Wentworth over Republican Silvio < *nte, who
easily went on to re-election. u,<>
The Democrats and the freeze movemeof were in for an uphill struggle. By early
l«>84, the painful recession ofthe early 19S0, begat, to break. Shorn ofthe inflation that
had plagued the eeonomy i„ the 1970s, Reagan declared success lor his economic
remedies an,, proclaimed a new "morning ,n America" The freeze movement had risen
against the backdrop ofthe recession, which seemed to spread a general pessimism
throughout the nation. Further, the substantive cuts in social programs occurring
simuhaneously with defense increases a, a time of economic hardship had played in,,,
I he freeze movement's hands.
The early Reagan years had seen the "war winners" emerge as the public face of
•he Reagatl administration's arms build up. Their often-belligerent rhetoric had done
IllUCh lo scare many Americans into the freeze movement's arms. Beginning m 1981,
Ronald Reagatl Shifted his priorities to a new weapons system, the Strategic Defense
Initiative (Sl)l), a proposed space defense that Reagan argued would end "mutually
assured destruction" and usher in the end ofthe nuclear arms race. Although
disarmament activists knew such a weapon was destabilizing, a violation ofthe 1972
ARM Treaty and likely to loster a new arms race, SDJ allowed Reagan lo change his
rhetoric from the belligerent sounding themes ofthe "war winners" lo the peaceful-
sounding words Ofending the amis race through a defensive shield. 170 Speaking ofthe
169
Meyer, 242-6.
170
Itances lit/.j-erald. Way Oul There
... (he Ulue: Reagan, Star Wars and the l<nd ofthe Cold War (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.)
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Republican platform on SDI, Kehler exclaimed, "It was just like ours. It said how
deterrence is folly and immoral, and economically the arms race is killing us, and there's
no [civil] defense against nuclear weapons anyway " 171 In her exhaustive study of the
SDI Pr°8ram
'
^^^^
War, Frances Fitzgerald argues it was the freeze movement which tipped the balance in
the Reagan administration away from its buildup policies to reliance on a proposed
defensive shield. By 1982, argues Fitzgerald, "What the debate showed was that in just
two years the freeze had achieved rhetorical dominance over the administration
»
172
To
sound more "reassuring" and "outflank" the freeze, the administration tied freeze
rhetonc to its proposed SDI system. Kehler immediately recognized the movement's
own words coming back at him from the White House. On the road to "Star Wars",
Fitzgerald writes that few administration figures "mention a phenomenon of great
importance to them at the time. Once this element is introduced, the story [of SDI]
begins to make sense
- otherwise it is like the score of a piano concerto with the p.ano
part missing. The phenomenon is, of course, the anti-nuclear movement: the freeze." 173
With a rebounding economy and the new emphasis on peace rather than war, the
Reagan administration was able to move away from its biggest liabilities during its early
years, the image of the president as heartless toward the poor and jobless, and as a
'warmonger' bent on some sort of nuclear showdown. Going into the 1984 election,
Reagan could play to his strengths, and the affable "great communicator" hit his stride,
171
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but fit the mood of an economic recovery well
Finally, Walter Mondale, the Democrat's standard bearer, failed to catch fire
with the American public and especially the freeze movement, which regarded the
Minnesotan with ambivalence Monda!e had supported the anus buiidup of the !ate
Carter years and continued to embrace deployment of the Euromissiles. He called for a
5% mditary budget increase over inflation compared to 8% by Reagan, and a quarantine
of revolutionary Nicaragua, which further alienated the left,
Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis had endorsed Mondale early in the
primaries, and sough, to energize Mondale's campaign at a Boston Freeze Voter rally in
October Dukakis hoped his own strong freeze credent.als would help legnimize
Mondale for skeptical freeze advocates, Dukakis aid Mardee Xifaras sen, the governor a
memo on his upcoming speech ,ha, stated, "I strongly urge you to send a very pointed,
no nonsense message about what the American people are thinking on the war and peace
issues, as contrasted with what the Reagan Republicans are saying and doing Freeze
Voter '84 highlighted the presence of Dukakis at the rally in fliers that read, "Join Freeze
Voter '84, Governor Dukakis, and other politicians who support the Freeze, Saturday,
October 20"' for a Major Political Rally and Massive Literature Distribution Action ,""5
At the October 20 rally, which took place at Faneuil Hall, Dukakis appeared with
Lieutenant Governor John Kerry, liberal congressmen Barney Frank, Gerry Studds, and
o2*££ M°,rC,hfn? ,D^'S' 5" '^'P3'™ » Freeze Voter '84 Rally a, Faneuil Hall .October I ). 1984. ichael S, Dukakis Presidential Campaign papers. Manuscript
.12, Box 5. Folder 28.1.
175
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Ed Markey, as wdl as Democratic challenger «o Silvio Conte, Mary Wentworth.
Dukakis lashed out at the Reagan admiration, accusing i, of"substituting tough talk
for courageous actton and for refusing to wake us from the nightmare of nuclear
destruction/' Invoking the memory ofJohn Kennedy, Dukakis denounced the Reagan
administration's lack of progress toward arms control and its SDI program:
^
A little over twenty years ago this month, during one of the mostmghtenmg penods of our recent htstory, PresideM Keim^yg^n thehotlme to Moscow and ended the Cuban Missile Crisis The cu" ent
admmtstratton doesn't even know the phone number [the] failu tomeet, to negot.ate, to take even the smallest steps to control these deadly
weapons threatens to rob us and our children of our future And mostdtsturbmg of all, th.s administration is not content with the tools of
deaTUlnl7 °,n,rh b K T WaMS 10 drCle ,he heavens with «omictb
;
In their platform, the Republicans talk of surviving a nuclear
war.
Despite the strong support for the freeze movement in the Bay State, Dukakis'
efforts failed to deliver even Massachusetts for Mondale. In November, Reagan was re-
elected with 59% of the national vote, with Mondale winning only the District of
Columbia and his home state 177
In late 1984, the freeze movement tried one last ditch effort to get Congress to
impose a freeze by using the power of the purse. Once again, Kennedy, Hatfield and
Markey teamed up to sponsor, with Jim Leach (R-IA), the "Arms Race Moratorium
Act", which called for an end of testing on warheads, long range missiles and anti-
satellite missiles.
178
Called the "Quick Freeze", the bill would have slowed but not
stopped the arms race. Kehler and the NWFC enthusiastically embraced the proposal,
1 76
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which attracted 120 co-sponsors in the House and seven in the Senate. The entire
Massachusetts delegation was on board.- The bill never made much headway -
Henceforth, opponents of the arms race drifted offto other movements. Many
foeused on opposing SDI, in which they were soon joined by most of the Massachusetts
delegation, including Silvio Conte. Others moved into the growing Central American
Solidarity Movement and the anti-apartheid movement.
IteJrnpacLMiheJire^
David Meyer argues that the freeze movement was "notable for its failures". 18
1
He especially blames the movement's shift toward political lobbying and
professionalization at the expense of the grassroots and believes the movement became
too dependent on the Kennedy and Markey staffpeople. Meyer believes this trend
resulted in the movement's
"demobilization" and "depoliticization."' 82 To some extent,
Meyer is correct, and here the experience resembled that of the Clamshell Alliance in
1978, when ,. opted for a legal energy fair over another direct action, demoralizing much
of its more committed base. Still, Meyer acknowledges that the movement shifted the
rhetoric in the nation and might have prepared the ground for the negotiations with
Mikhail Gorbachev in the Reagan administration's second term. Writes Meyer, "The
movement can also be seen as a political triumph. The freeze effectively forced an
179I»k RcP°^ Vol. IV, #2, March 1984. Traprock Peace Center Records.
180
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ex.re.nely popular preside„, ,„ return to ,ong.estabfched^^ ^^
consistently eschewed and had vigorously criticized."'"
Frances Eitzgerald believes the freeze movement had a tnajor impact on the
•rajecory of the Reagan administration's nuclear weapons policies, attributing to the
movement the mellower, more reassurmg tone confrng ou, of the White House begimnng
in
.983. The freeze movement and the West European peace movement constituted one
"f .he largest mass movements ever to grow simultaneously on both sides of the
Atlantic. Each moved far deeper into the mainstream of their respective countries-
established politics than most movements ever do. They had shifted the terms of the
debate and had made it more clear than ever that populations on both sides of ,he
Atlantic were tiring of the cold war and d,d no, cnvlsi„n i. ending in a victory scenario
for one side or .he other, as did many of the "war winner" strategists who were
ascendant in the early Reagan years. Although the freeze movement was unable to stop
appropriations for a single weapons system in the Reagan administration budget, the
movement's long-term impact prepared the ground for the coming of Gorbachev, and the
revival of a new detente that ultimately led to the negotiated end of the cold war.
Yet, despite the case that one can make for the freeze movement changing the
tone and trajectory of the Reagan administration's nuclear weapons policy, the fact
remained that the freeze movement's victories remained either symbolic or indirect.
According to Randy Kehler, the freeze movement suffered from having "support a mile
wide and an inch deep".' 84 For Kehler, the shift of focus to Washington, D.C. was
'" Ibid. 272
184
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premature and fatal. Kchler stated, "[the] demise ofthe national free. ,came when the
movement, ran ou, of things people could do in their local communities.
. . Whcn (hc
focus moved to Washington i, was harder for people to plug in where they are.- for
Kehler, the major lessors of the freeze movement were "don't go to Washington too
soon";
"don't believe your own press"; "have things to do in people's own
communities"; and "you can', diversify a movement onee ifs going [if it isn't]
multiracial from the beginning." The long-term lesson that Kehler argued was most
important was the power ofmoney in Congress. Kehler recalled that the freeze
"underestimated the clout ofthe nuclear weapons industry.""6
Between
.980 and 1983 the freeze grew into one ofthe largest peace movements
in US. history. The movement had penetrated the mainstream press and media and
became the largest countervailing voice to the cold war rhetoric ofRonald Reagan. In
the fell of 1083. international events such as the downing of KAI. 007 and the U.S.
invasion ofGrenada strengthened Reagan's cold war positions. The economic recovery
of late 1983 helped boost Reagan's popularity and further contributed to the freeze
movement's decline. Yet. as freeze activists sough. ,„ stop nuclear war. a war ofanother
kind beckoned closer to home. Throughout the early Reagan years, a growing movement
emerged in opposition to the adminstration's intervention in Central America, which
many Americans feared was leading the country down the path ofanother Vietnam. The
Central American "soldiarity" movement grew in the shadow ofthe freeze then
exploded in mid-decade. The movement won strong support in Congress, which moved
™ Ibid
186
Ibid Based on their experience with the power ofthe nuclear weapons industry, many freeze activists
later led the movement for campaign finance reform.
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to impose limits on the admiration's intervention against the leftist government
Nicaragua Efforts by member* of the Reagan administration to circumvent
congressional restrictions would give rise to .he scries of illegal activities that
collectively came to be known as the Iran-Contra scandal "
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CHAPTER V
THE CENTRAL AMERICAN SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT IN MASSACHUSETTS
On December 2, 1980, Ststers Ita Ford and Maura Clarke of the Maryknoll Order
prepared to take a flight from Managua, Nicaragua to San Salvador, the capital of El
Salvador and from there to return to the small northwestern town of Chalatenango,
where for most of the last year they had worked distributing food and clothing to
impoverished refugees fleeing the war zone that engulfed ever larger secttons of rural El
Salvador.' In 1979, a reform/^ had come to power in El Salvador, hopmg to address
that nation's staggering poverty and inequality, where for decades a small oligarchy and
brutal military oversaw a society in which 1 .9% of the people owned 57% of the land. 2
Within months, however, most left-leaning members ofth,junta quit in protest over the
military's absolute refusal to countenance any land reform or democratic change. As
popular protest continued to sweep El Salvador, the military intensified its campaign of
repression and in 1 980, a divided Marxist guerrilla movement unified in the Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). 3 The guerrillas took their name from a leftist
leader of a 1932 peasant uprising during which 10,000-30,000 peasants were killed by
New York Times
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.he Salvadoran ntitay in wha, can, ,o be known as ^ Malanza - Cthe
Just six days before Sisters Ford and Clarke returned to El Salvador, six civil.an
politicians from the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), an opposition pontical
group sympathetic to the FMLN, were murdered by right-wing "death souads" aligned
with the Salvadoran military and ruling oligarchy According to The Ne* York Tin.es,
over 8,000 Salvadorans had been killed in political violence over the pas, year,
predommantly by the rightist government's National Guard, Army and infamous
Treasury Police. 6
The atmosphere was quite different in Managua, where Sisters [ta and Maura had
just spent several days a. a conference of the Maryknoll order. A little over a year
earlier, a guerrilla army known as the Sandinistas coordinated a final military offensive
throughout Nicaragua wh.ch toppled that country's long-time dictator, Anastosio
Somoza and his National Guard The Sandinistas had taken their name from the populist
leader Augusto Cesar Sandino who had led a peasant army in opposition to occupying
United States Marines from 1926 until 1933, when he was murdered by the U S -
installed dictator. By 1979, the Somoza family had no, only ruled Nicaragua for decades,
but also owned much of that nation's land and resources.' As Sisters Ita and Maura
traveled through Managua, much of the city lay in ruins, not only from the civil war
4
febSIr^W^^^^^ (Lincoln: UnivcUv of
s
LeoGrande, 59-60.
' New York Times . December 7, 1980, 9.
(New
<
YSikSi f9
C
8I)
ard °iCtnCK S°m0^ a"d thc U*™ of U S 'nv"»v^nt in Centra| Am^
333
which brought the Sandinistas
,„ power and claitned the iives ofover 50,000
Niearaguans, bu, from the devastating earthquake whieh struck the city in ,972 »
Nevertheiess, in December
, 980 Nicaragua was for many, anbued with a festive
air of liberation after long years ofoppression. Sister Maura Clarke was especially
enthusiastic about the prospects for the Sandinista revolution. Before coming to El
Salvador, the Bronx, N Y. native had worked for seventeen years among Nicaragua's
poor.' Sister Maura's years in Nicaragua coincided with the spread of Liberation
Theology throughout Latin America. Growing out of Vatican IPs cal, on the church to
do more to alleviate the suffering of the poor and the impact of the 1959 Cuban
Revolution on Latin America, Liberation Theology was an amalgam of the Christian
Gospel and Marxist ideology. The previous summer. Sister Maura told a Church
magazine, "I believe very much in non-violence bu, also we can never judge anyone
who has to resort to violence, as in Nicaragua, because of the institutional injustice and
violence present in the country lor years and years." 10
Sister Maura Clarke was not alone in her sentiments. The Maryknoll Order was a
liberal order in which nuns were not required to wear veils and which, in the words of
Sisters Maura and Ita's superior, Sister Peg Merker, had a mission "to go to other
countries to work for the poor and the oppressed and for the promotion ofjustice." Sister
Ita left her Brooklyn, N.Y. neighborhood to join the order in 1971 and was sent to Chile,
where in 1973 she witnessed first-hand the U.S.-sponsored overthrow ofdemocratically-
Ibld; New York Times December 7, 1980, 1 and 9.
Ibid, 9; Gettleman, 140.
' New York Times
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elected Marxist President, Salvador Allende. She, like Sister Maura, had begun work in
aligned with right-wing ARENA party ,eader, Roberto D'Aubuisson, assassinated the
Arehbishop of San Salvador Oscar Arnulfo Romero. The previous February, the
Archbishop had written a personal letter to United States President Jimmy Carter
imploring him to cut all U.S. military aid to El Salvador:
\S-to
tmly^ t0 defend hUman FightS
'
y°U: Prohib* mmtaryaid the Salvador*, government: Guarantee that your goveramernnoT
mtervene, d.ectly or indirectly, with military, economic orSTpressure in determining the destiny ofthe Salvadoran people iTopethat your religious sentiments and your sensitivity to the defense ofhuman rights will move you to accept my plea avoiding, withTuch
acceptance, any greater, any greater bloodshed in this suffering country. 12
The day before the Archbishop's assassination and Sister Ita's arrival in El
Salvador, Archbishop Romero made an impassioned plea to the soldiers ofthe
Salvadoran military to stop that nation's bloodshed:
Brothers, you came from our own people. You are killing your own
brothers. Any human order to kill must be subordinate to the law ofGod
which says, "Thou Shalt Not Kill". No soldier is obliged to obey an order^
contrary to the law ofGod. No one has to obey an immoral law It is high
time you obeyed your consciences rather than sinful orders. The church
cannot remain silent before such an abomination... In the name ofGod
in the name of this suffering people whose cry rises to heaven more
loudly each day, I implore you, I beg you, I order you: Stop the
repression.
As Sisters Ita and Maura returned to El Salvador on December 2, news ofthe
most recent assassinations a week earlier of six opposition leaders was the talk ofthe
11
Ibid.
12
Gettleman, 135-6.
"Ibid. Quoted in full on "Romero", http:www.icomm.ca/carecen/page25.html. Retrieved November 25
ZUUZ.
335
capita,. Sister Dorothy Kazel, a Clevdand, Ohio native and mcmher of the Ursuhne
Order, met the Sister, a, the San Saivador a.rpor, a,„„g with Jean Donovan, a Catholic
lay worker from Westport, Connec.ieut. Together, the four ehnrehwomen left the eapita,
in a Toyota van, heading north ,„ retnrn to their mission in Chalatenango. A week
earher, whi.e they were in Niearagua. severa, messages had been left for the nnns on the
Chalatenango parish door. One read, "Go to Cuba to finish your Commnnist work" and
another proclaimed, "In this honse are Communists. Everyone who enters here will die.
Try and see." 14
A day later, on December 3, the eharred remains of the Toyota van was
discovered some twenty-five miles north of the capital. The van was connected to the
churchwomen by the engine's serial number. The next day, twenty miles from where the
van had been deposited and burned, the bodies of Sisters Ita l ord, Maura Clarke,
Dorothy Kazel and lay worker Jean Donovan were found by poor local farmers in a
shallow two-foot grave, their clothes torn and their bodies badly mutilated. Autopsies
later revealed the women had been raped, then shot in the skulls execution style. 15
On December 4, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White learned of the
news and departed north to collect the bodies of the murdered U.S. citizens. The
Ambassador had no doubt this was the work of the Salvadoran military, and that no low-
level officer would carry out such executions without orders from higher up. A lifelong
professional diplomat, Robert White had been appointed to El Salvador by President
Carter and took seriously the president's injunction to make human rights a centerpiece
1
1
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-M. policy ,n the regioa After the 1979 W,„,,,,
.volution „, Nicaragua, however
( *ntraJ America increasingly became caught up in the renew.. ( »,d War marked hy the
decline oiditeme, feilure ofSALT H, the Soviet Evasion ofAfghan and a
resurgent Republican Right in the United States. As the deaths from right-wing violence
— » 1980, the ( larter ad^inistoation refused to heed Archbishop Romero's plea to
cut recently renew., military aid «<> El Salvador. Now, fa response to me murder of four
I JA citizens, .he ( larter administration suspend.. $2. rnillion ofmiUtary and economic
aid to El Salvador. Fearing an FMLN victory, however, the Administration reinstated
some aid a week later, and all 0f ft within a monlh. 1 "
Ambassador White, an uncommonly decent .nan with a genuine concern for the
welfare ofthe people ofEl Salvador, knew the hopes ofthe early ( larter years to
promote human rights throughout the region were gone. The previous month, .he people
ofthe l toted States had elected a man oetermined to make Central America .he frontline
in 8 resurgent global erusade .0 eon.am Communism. Fearing Nicaragua and El Salvador
could become Soviet outposts in the western hemisphere, Ronald Reagan vowed to hall
the spread ofMarxist revolution in Central America by any means necessary. Rightist
forces in Centra] America viewed the incoming administration, with its numerous critics
ofthe Carter human rights policy, as saviors. The incoming Reagan administration
promised a massive reshuffling ofState Department personnel to re.leet the new policy,
LeoGrande 16-17, 4 J-6 Carter's new policy in Central America was further underscored in i<>77 whenhe new president declared, "Being confident ofOUT future, we are now tree of that inordinate fear ofommumsn, winch once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that tea, " Quoted in Gettleman'On he C arter human rights policy, besides 1
-coGrande's excellent overview, see Richard Thornton I he
'
•artcr Years: I oward a New ( ilobal ( )rder (New York: Paragon I louse, 1991); Joshua Muravchie The
ncertam rumpet: jimmy Carter and the. )ilemmas ol Human Rights Policy (Lanham, Maryland^Hamdton I ress, 1986); and Hamilton Jordon, Crisis: The Last Year of the Carter IV, s„l,-„ Y , N,W YorkPutnam, 19X2). —
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and declared that the firs, to go would be Robert White, who was indeed fired
unceremoniously 17
Alongside the renewed arms race, the new administration's policies in Central
Amenca soon became a lightening rod for radical active and liberal challenges to the
Reagan administration Throughout the 1980s, the unpunished murders and cherished
memories of Jean Donovan and Sisters Ita Ford, Maura Clarke and Dorothy Kazel would
hang like a pall over the debate on Ronald Reagan's policies in Central Amenca.
Responding to a 1993 report by the United Nations Truth Commission on El Salvador
that concluded the order for the churchwomen's executions came from high up the
military chain of command, the U. S. State Department issued a statement which read in
part "This particular act of barbarism did more to inflame the debate over El Salvador in
the United States than any other single incident." 18
AJS[e\v Administration and a New Movement
During 1 98
1
,
as part of its across the board arms build up and more
confrontational policy toward the Soviet Union, the new Reagan administration sought
to recast the conflicts in Central America in terms of the global cold war. Although the
Carter administration, especially in its later years, increasingly factored cold war
concerns into its Central American policy, the Democratic administration continued to
see the region's problems as largely outgrowths of local causes such as endemic poverty,
stark class inequality, a legacy of military government and ongoing human rights
17
Ibid. 58,76, 82.
18 New York Times April 3, 1998.
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violations (what conservatives derided as "regionalitis".) The new Reagan
admin,,,,., while oecasiona„y acknowledging such forces
, sough, t(> de.cmphasbe
•hen, and p,)r,rayed ,he regWs problems as predominant the result of Soviet and
Cuban outeMe agitation,, Rcferrjng
,o E, Sa|vad<)r <and wj(h^ vjcinam^^ fa
mind,, the administration's hawkish Secre.ary ofState, Alexander Ha.g privately
exhorted Reagan, "Mr. President, you can win this one."20
Reagan quickly worked to triple U.S. aid to El Salvador and ,„ increase the
numhers ofU.S. military advisors in the country ,„ HHy-two. The administration's
strategy was to contain leftist rebels in El Salvador through military victory by the
government's armed forces, while working to bolster the Salvadoran center, especially
Imta president
.lose Napolean Duartc's Christian Democrats, and gradually to reduce the
number ol'dcath squad killings, hold elections in two years time and implement a modest
land reform program. 21
If (he administration's policy was containment in HI Salvador, then overtime it
came to be rollback in Nicaragua. Ailer the 1979 Sandinista revolution, the Carter
administration hoped to move the new revolutionary government in the direction of
multi-party democracy and a market economy by reinstating, and even increasing aid,
which had been cut in the last months of the Somoza regime, but earmarking large
.
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;
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Undeclared War on Nicaragua (Boulder: West view Press, 1987).
^nainistas. I ne
20
Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, ReaPan and Foreign Policy HMow York: MacMillan, 1981).
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cut U.S. aid to Nicaragua Although the Reag, , slli ,scl ^
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in El Salvador settle, .- ly and protracted stalemate in 1982, the a, istration
shifted it. rocs toward destabilizing the Sandinista gov. ,,,„ ,„ Nicaragua, which i,
•"
," S° I
'" : the Sa)vad0™ ** and seek,,,,. to export revol, , ,i , ,
'
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"
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'
""' dstrati°" do this by covertly arming and training
dtaaflfcted Nicaragua™ in neighboring l londura. and destabilizing Nicaragu, gh
.
proxy wbj and cove operations carried oul by C.I.A The anti-Sandlnista
eoutttettevotutionariea, late, known u theContras, grew of'the re antsof
S
'" Na a 1 8(10 °fwhom were secretly Sown out ofthe country to
i tonduraa by the Carta administration win, the tall ofthe Somoza regime i„ 1979.°
>hm Pm '" " s ioy "' < Centra! Ante) ica concet ned many liberals who
were outraged thai the administration seemed to Ik, so uncondit,o„allv s,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,l„-
Salvadoran /«/»„. wind, seemed incapable oi unwilling to reign in its armed forces and
paramilitary death squads, whose vict„„s averaged over 700 pe, month throughout 198]
""' 1982 '" The imPacl Wils c™' more electrifying o„ ihc radical lefl Radical interest in
Latin America traced back as ftu as the late 1950s, when Fidel Castro and his band of
guerrillas captured the imaginations ofmuch ofthe 1 1 s lefl and, fo, a time, even many
mainstream liberals Over the next decade, as Che Guevara became an icon ofthe
campus-based New Left, a number ofyoung leftists carrying ..„ a tradition thai we,,,
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back to the Lincoln Brigades dunng the 1930s Spanlsh CM War, sought to aid the new
revolutionary government ofCuba by traveling to the .land nation to help with harvests
as Brigades in the internationalist Venceramos Bngades. By the 1970s, Cuba's hold
on the imaginations of the U.S.
.eft had begun to fade; yet radical interest in Latin
America continued, primarily through the influence of Liberation Theology. 24
The 1979 Sandinista revolution captivated the North American left. The
Sandinistas recaptured some of the romantic aura of the early Cuban revolution, yet
seemed to differ in important ways from Communist-bloc nations and their rigid
ideologies and bureaucratic governments. The revolutionary movement in Nicaragua
seemed humanized by the influence of Liberation Theology, witnessed by the absence of
a bloodbath after the rise to power and the new regime's quick abolition of the death
penalty and its lenient treatment of former Guardsmen. The new Sandinista government
included poets such as renowned author Ernesto Cardenal, and unlike Cuba, which
persecuted the Catholic Church indiscriminately as a bastion of reaction, the Sandinista
government included two priests in its nine-member Directorate. The Nicaraguan
revolution could be many things to many people. To more radical leftists who felt
disaffected by the less militant politics of the antinuclear energy or freeze movements,
solidarity with the Sandinista revolution allowed them to identify with an anti-
imperialist, Marxist influenced movement. For those of a countercultural orientation, the
agrarian nature of the revolution held much appeal (many such internationalists who
trekked to Nicaragua during the 1980s earned the moniker, "Sandalistas"). For religious
activists, the revolution held the promise of putting Liberation Theology's vision of a
" 4
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The early solidarity movement waa especially attractive to young, more militant
leftiata. This often led to tensions with older activists and peace groupa. According to
historian and activist Van < rosse, "In those years, < IISPES activists acquired a reputation
as inaiateru [red] Bag waving partisans ofthe FMLN."2' Thua, although a 1981 CISPES
ally
.., Washington, D.C. drew 100,000 marchers, the CISPES' sponsored rally the
following year attracted only 60,000 due to defections by more man e peace groups.
Many spoke in these divisive early years ofan '^-intervention movement" versus a
?s
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"solidary movement. Whereas the former relegated itself ,„ opposing U.S.
intervention on the 8ron„ds of self-determination, peace and human rights, the latter
openly and enthusiastically procla.mcd its support for the Sandinistas, FMLN and other
revolutionary movements in the region. According to Gossc, "the difference was mutua,
stylistic discomfort. Solidarity activists were committed to a posture of enthusiastic and
continual militancc on hchalfofan anti-impcria, revolution. Ami-intervention workers...
favored persuasion over confrontation and a carefully - American- humanitarian
approach."" Gossc, however, describes this as a "sterile division" because "as the Right
had charged all along... the results for Central America are likely to be the same:
hindering intervention means
-One, two. many" popular victories in the long run."» As
the decade progressed, however, the two strands became par. ofa larger movement, in
which the differences at times were difficult to distinguish. (Hereinafter, the movement
will be referred to as the "Central American Solidarity Movement".)
Early Solidarity Activism in Massachusetts
Although Massachusetts would emerge as a stronghold of the Central American
solidarity movement, early on the issue of Central America was eclipsed by the
phenomenal growth of the freeze movement in the Bay State. Despite this
overshadowing presence, however, awareness of the issues confronting the people of
Central America grew steadily through activist letters-to-the-editor, prayer vigils,
speaking tours and sporadic rallies against U.S. intervention in the region. Much of the
25
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ear,y movemen, was educat.ona, in nature Area churehes, mcluding CongregattonaHsts,
Unitarians and the AFSC, were especially active ,n the nascent campaign to educate
Massachusetts residents on the issues of Central America. Often, churches co.laborated,
as was the case in western Massachusetts with an "Ecumenical Memorial Servrce for
Victims of Political Oppression" held at St. Brigids Catholic Church on January 1 1,
1 98
1
,
sponsored by the Amherst Clergy Association, the AFSC, and the Western
Massachusetts Latin American Solidarity Committee Guests from El Salvador m
attendance descnbed to the assembled group the horrors occurring in their native land
Patricia Sellars, a Philadelphia AFSC member just returned from El Salvador asked,
"What can we as North Americans do^ Do what you can stop dehumanizmg people,
start thinking of human rights as your rights." 31
The more militant nature of solidarity activism helped it gain greater traction at
college and university campuses, where alongside the anti-apartheid movement that
swelled in the latter half of the decade, it developed a far stronger student base than the
freeze movement Just three months into the new Reagan administration, over 1,500
activists rallied against Reagan's Central American policies at the University of
Massachusetts, Amherst. Sponsored by a coalition of twenty-three student and
community groups, an eclectic mix of church-based and student-based activists
assembled at the University of Massachusetts Student Union, then marched through the
downtown area to the Amherst Commons where speakers denounced the
administration's policies, with some focusing more on human rights violations in Central
Daily Hampshire Gazette, January 16, 1981. Valley Advocate . January 19, 1981.
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America and others more ardently proclauning revolutionai7^ .(y^^^
the Sandinistas and a few even expressing support for Cuba."
Typical of the community-based rallies against U.S. intervention was a protest a,
Northampton's Pulaski Park on Apnl 26, ,98,, which also attracted an estimated ,,500
protestors. The raU/s featured speakers inCuded MaryknoU Sister Mario Russo, David
Cohen of the United Electrical Workers (UE) Holyoke Loca, 264, and a representative
of El Salvador's Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) appearing under the alias of
"Duran". Cohen sought to connect U.S. policy in Central America with U.S. domestic
issues, asserting tha, many in the U.S. labor movement opposed Reagan's policies "since
El Salvador is a haven for runaway factories and multinational corporations. Although
the military government declares unions illegal, every major union hall has been bombed
or burned... the only reason the U.S. government hasn't sent troops into El Salvador is
because of demonstrations like this..."" As the rag-tag band of activists listened, large
green military transport planes lumbered overhead across the gray sky bound for nearby
Westover Airforce Base, symbolizing for many the omnipresent fear ofanother Vietnam
being played out in Central America. 34
After Cohen, "Duran" ofthe FDR spoke to the crowd emphasizing the
indigenous sources of El Salvador's revolutionary movement:
The press says the conflict in El Salvador is the result ofexternal
communist powers rather than internal conditions of poverty and
oppression - the Salvadoran people are a peace loving people, our
struggle for freedom from Duarte's oppression has nothing to do with
32
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Cuba or Russia nor can our freedom be determined by U S aid to the
71 2% P-PleL e0% ofInland
Concluding his impassioned remarks, "Duran" raised a clenched fist and declared to the
crowd, "We have learned it is better to die fighting than to live on our knees!"36
Alongside rallies, Massachusetts activists threw themselves into the national
material aid campaigns on behalf ofwar victims in El Salvador. During the decade,
Medical Aid for El Salvador (MAES) raised $700,000 for medical supplies; New El
Salvador Today (NEST) raised $157,000 m general aid; and CISPES raised $500,000. 37
The material aid campaign was highly controversial and subject to frequent red baiting
since much of the aid was distributed in war zones behind FMLN "zones of control-
Celebrities such as actors Mike Farrell of "M A S H " and Ed Asner of the popular "Lou
Grant Show" played prominent public roles in these national campaigns. 38 In Western
Massachusetts, groups such as the AFSC-sponsored Central American Working Group
(CAWG), an all-women's organization, worked to bring the successful localise strategy
of the freeze and antinuclear energy campaigns to Central American solidarity activism.
The CAWG pursued a multi-generational, highly interpersonal solidarity campaign in an
effort to bring the movement into traditionally non-activist sections of the community.
The group often set up stands in public places and went door to door in neighborhoods
soliciting aid for Central American war victims. During these community outreach
JJ
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campaigns, and at more traditional rallies, the women of the CAWG would circulate
Polaroid photos of famines from El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala, to personals
the issues ofwar and poverty in a way they felt slick newspaper photographs could not
The goal of such campaigns was not only to raise money for victims of war and poverty
in Central America but to forge a sense of personal connection between North
Americans and their neighbors to the south, much as the freeze movement sought to
make the issues of nuclear war less abstract and more personal. 39
The Central American solidarity campaign in Massachusetts began to pick up
steam in 1983. This was due, first, to the waning of the freeze movement that had pulled
so much of the Bay State's activist energy into its vortex; and secondly, due to the
Reagan administration's rapidly escalating proxy war against the Sandinista regime in
Nicaragua. Throughout 1982, news reports of a covert, C.I. A.
-directed military
campaign by Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries against the leftist government in
Managua surfaced with increasing frequency. By 1983, the Reagan administration's
denials gave way to confirmation of U.S. support for the rebel forces, but with the
limited aim, the administration contended, of interdicting Sandinista weapons smuggling
to the FMLN in neighboring El Salvador. Thus, although the Reagan administration
sought to package its aid to the Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries as defensive in
nature and with limited objectives, to many liberals and radicals the covert aid campaign
signaled a dramatic escalation in the administration's efforts to destabilize and ultimately
overthrow the revolutionary government in Nicaragua 40
• Interview with Lois Ahrens. December 8. 1996.
40 New York Times
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The shift in focus in Massachusetts was signaled in the summer of 1983 when
fifteen Massachusetts activists announced they would be among the first contingent of
North Americans to travel to the Nicaraguan war zone as part of Witness for Peace, a
national faith-based campaign to raise awareness of the proxy war and seek to stop it
with their presence. The Massachusetts delegation on the first Witness for Peace
delegation was headed by Boston Congregationalist Minister Frank Dorman and
included in its ranks the ubiquitous Frances Crowe, whose focus now began to shift from
disarmament to Central American solidarity activism. Crowe, who'd just played the
leading role in forming the Northampton-based Central American Working Group, and
only months earlier had been arrested in Rhode Island for painting "Thou Shalt Not Kill"
on a nuclear submarine, now prepared to enter the remote areas of the war-torn
Nicaraguan-Honduran border. Before departing, Crowe told a reporter for The Boston
Globe, "What we will be doing is putting non-violence to work by putting our bodies in
front of violence." 41
The Witness for Peace mission gained a good deal of national publicity and was
followed by many more Witness for Peace missions to the war zone involving hundreds
of North Americans. Upon returning from the war-ravaged Honduran-Nicaraguan
border, Ruth Harkins of the Western Massachusetts AFSC expressed her opposition to
U.S. government policies in terms of the "Spirit of 1776": "This is not our battle. I feel
that Nicaraguans have accomplished a revolution, just as we did 200 years ago, and they
Boston Globe
.
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are emMed ,o the fruits of revo.utioa They e,ata a right t0 self-de.en^ion which
we are not respecting."42
By 1985, the Reagan admiration's proxy war became increasingly destructive
and destabilizing as the Sandinista government was forced to divert ever greater
resources from popular social programs, earmarking over 50% of its budget to its war
with the ever-expanding
"Contras" (as the U.S.-backed Nicaraguan rebels were now
called.)43 Reagan declared the Contras to be "the moral equivalent of our founding
fathers". As the U.S. proxy war continued in the mid- 1 980s, the admimstration's policies
became increasingly mired in controversy. In 1984, it was revealed that the C.l.A. had
blown up oil tanks in Corinto, Nicaragua and mined the nation's major harbor, resulting
in a rare adverse ruling against the United States by the World Court in the Hague
(which the administration declared null.)44
The Solidarity Movement and Governor Michael S. Dnkakk
Just like the nuclear weapons freeze movement, the solidarity movement in
Massachusetts sought to build bridges to Governor Michael Dukakis. The governor was
again receptive. Dukakis spoke Spanish and had attended the University of San Marcos
in Peru in 1 954 when the C.l.A. orchestrated the overthrow of the democratically elected
president of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz. Ever since, Dukakis had remained critical of the
42
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U.S. role in Uft America, to ,983, Dukakis responded to one solidarity activist,
writing:
Both as an individual and as a Governor of the Commonwealth I haveoften expressed my ^agreement with the policies of President Rea^n inSouth America generally and in El Salvador and NicaraguaZtiSOnce again, I see our nation expending large amounts
and covert mihtary a,d under the general rubric of protecting us againlt
wXm
UT H Ce, a8a,ni 1 th°Se Wh°™" the -tio8na e andisdom of such policies attacked as either naTve or unpatriotic I am mostconcerned with the obvious parallels to our unfortunate and cos lyinvolvement in Southeast Asia. 45 y
Early in Dukakis's term, the Boston Coordinating Council on Central America
contacted the governor in the hope that he would declare September 1 5, 1 983 a "Day for
Peace with Justice in Central America". The Boston Coordinating Council worked to
direct cooperative projects by several groups active in solidarity activism such as the
AFSC, Mobilization for Survival, Catholic Connection, the Central American Solidarity
Association (CASA), the Maryknoll Center for Justice and Peace Concerns, the New
England Committee in Solidarity with the People of HI Salvador (CISPES), OXFAM
America and the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee. Dan Petegorsky of Boston's
Mobilization for Survival wrote Dukakis, "September 15, the date on which Central
American peoples traditionally celebrate their independence from Spain, has been
designated as a national day ofaction for peace in Nicaragua and Central America.
. . We
are grateful for the interest that you have shown on Central American issues in the past,
and hope that you will join with us and with people across the state and the country on
September 1 5 in voicing our concerns over the direction of the Reagan administration's
Michael S. Dukak.s to Rebecca Cunningham, December 12, 1983. Michael S. Dukakis President
Campa.gn Papers, University Libraries, Archives and Special Collections Department Northeastern
Un.versity, Boston, Massachusetts, Manuscript 32, Box 5, Folder 282 (hereinafter cited as Michael S
Dukakis Presidential Campaign Papers).
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policies." Dukakis responded by issuing what would be the first ofmany proclamations
sought by Massachusetts solidarity activists. Noting, "The policies of the Reagan
administration, contrary to the expressed opinions of the people of Massachusetts, are
serving to increase the likelihood of war," the governor proclaimed September 15 a
"Day for Peace and Justice in Central America" He urged citizens to "express their
concern over the grave situation in whatever ways they feel are appropriate."47
In 1984, Dukakis responded to solidarity activists by again proclaiming
September 1
5 a "Day for Peace and Justice" in Central America, and by endorsing the
1984 East-Coast speaking tour of Marta Alicia Rivera, a representative of the National
Association of Salvadoran Educators (ANDES), who helped initiate a fifty-eight day
general strike in 1968, was kidnapped and tortured by the Salvadoran National Guard in
1979 and subsequently fled the country. The Massachusetts Teachers Association asked
Dukakis to endorse her tour, which he did despite charges from the Reagan
administration that Rivera and ANDES sympathized with the Salvadoran guerrillas. 48
^S.^ * 1983 S P~ campaign
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drug-smuggling Panamama dictator", Manuel Noriega. "Central American Groups", circa summer 1988
Michael S. Dukakis Presidential Campaign Papers, Manuscript 32, Box 4, Folder 229
351
Dukakis also endorsed a referenda, question appearing in thirty-nine of the
state's repressive districts, calling on ,he President and Congress to en, a„ mi,ita„
aid to Centra, America and withdraw all military advisors from the region. The Centra,
American Referendum Campaign, another statewide coalition of solidarity groups
sought to imitate the success of the free, movement's referenda campaigns and featured
Dukakis's endorsement prominent* h thc campaign
. Qne flier^ across
the top, "Remember Vietnam? Vote 'Yes' for Peace in Centra, America on November
6". On the bottom was a photo ofDominic Bozzotto, a Massachusetts union organizer
with Maria Alicia Rivera; a photo and quote endorsing the referendum question by
Randal, Forsbcrg; and in the center, a photo ofa smiling Michael Dukakis at his desk,
with the quote: "The people of Central America wan, from the American people only
those things wc ourselves treasure most - respect for self-determination, the peaceful
settlement ofdisputes, and the equitable and democratic sharing of opportunities. We as
Americans have an obligation to protect those values and to seek alternatives to
intervention and militarism.'""' The referendum question won in most districts and
Dukakis used the results the following spring to proclaim "Central America Week",
stating in part, "Whereas the voters of Massachusetts voted overwhelmingly, on
November 6, 1984, to urge Congress to end the shipment ofarms and other military aid
which would prolong the war in Central America and lead to the overthrow of local
governments, and
... Whereas, The people of Massachusetts have undertaken major
efforts to provide material aid and political support to relieve the suffering in Central
America and to bring a just end to war in this region... I, Michael Dukakis... proclaim
"Flier, "Remember Vietnam?" circa October 1984. Miehael S. Dukakis Presidential Campaign Papers
Manuscript 32, Box 4, Folder 282. p
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March
.7-25, .085 as CENTRAL AMERICA WEEK."30 Thus, Dukakis joined the
Massachusetts delegation in Congress to make Massachusetts the most visible and
unified state m opposition to Reagan's Central American policies As was the case with
the freeze movement, grassroots activism had percolated up
The 1985 Hmbargo Protests
In the spring of
.985, the Reagan administration imposed an economic embargo
on Nicaragua To many solidarity activists, the embargo, beyond promising greater
hardship for the people of Nicaragua, seemed to presage war Over the previous two
years, I
J
S Army and National Guard units had been conducting large, highly visible
m.litary maneuvers called "Big Pine" just across the border m . [onduras. 51 In response
to the administration's escalating saber-rattling, solidarity activists in the United States
undertook a national "Pledge of Resistance" (PGR) campaign, in which signatories
pledged to conduct massive civil disobedience in the event ofU.S. war on Nicaragua or
in El Salvador. The hope was to maintain the specter of Vietnam-era scale street protest
as a deterrent to a I
J S invasion of a Central American nation. 52
By the spring of 1985, huge, often boisterous, pledge meetings were taking place
across Massachusetts Many activists described the Reagan administration's embargo as
an act of war and argued the pledge should be activated Yet national leaders of the POR
so „A Proclamation By His Excellency, Michael s Dukakis, Governor," 1985. Michael S. Dukak.s
Prcsidcnlial Campaign Papers. Manuscript 32, Box, 4. ('older 229
51
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New York Tunes, May 8, 1985; Boston Globe, May 8, 1985 Inierv.cw with Fiances Crowe. December
1, 1996.
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more
pushed for independent regional aetion. Frances Crowe declared, "More and
people arc begimnng
,0 think that something has go, to be done quickly and ,, [the POR
can for action] should be activated now. Personally, Vm ready now.- M . resu„ of
this impatience, a number of locahties across the U.S. moved on thcir own in invoking
the pledge's call to action. 54
On May 7, 1985, ami-embargo protests took place throughout the United States,
each of which targeted federal buildings. As over 300 activists were arrested in San
Francisco, cradle of the solidarity movement, over 500 activists were arrested in Boston
and 1 35 activists were arrested at the Springfield Federal Budding in Western
Massachusetts, including, Frances Crowe." Again the issue of self-determination was
emphasized. "I feel very strongly that people in that country [Nicaragua] have a right to
self-determination," proclaimed Mitchell Goslin ofAmherst after his civil
disobedience * University of Massachusetts Professor Patrick Sullivan of Faculty for
Peace declared, "The embargo is an ac, ofwar and congressional opposition has go, to
be mounted."57
As anti-embargo protests took place in New York City, Seattle, Chicago, New
Haven, Denver, Santa Fe and smaller communities such as Worcester and Pittsfield,
53
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Massachusetts, by fc the largest occurred in Boston » Throughout the day on May , 7,
Boston-area solidarity activists tnckled ,nto the JFK Federal Budding, mi,„ng about or
eating a, the pubhc cafeteria. By late afternoon, over 500 activists converged to the
budding's front lobby and sa, down, taking up anti-embargo chants, determrned to stay
past the 6:30 p.m closing time Outside the building, between 1,000-2,000 supporters
protested the U.S. embargo. The atmosphere was loud and raucous. Numerous signs
such as those reading "Reagan's Peace Proposal: Drop Dead Or We'll Kill You" and
"Embargo Reagan" drove home the protestors' message. The BoaopGlobe declared the
protest "reminiscent in its tone and intensity of ami-Vietnam war rallies of the late
1960s."" Among the speakers at the energetic rally was African Amencan community
activist Mel King and State Senator George D. Bachrach of Watertown who declared,
"We can still understand the difference between right and wrong. This is a simple issue.
The government of Nicaragua is indigenous We are the interloper "«' Also addressing
the crowd was Richard Bell, an aide to Democrat John Kerry who'd been elected to the
U.S. Senate seat held by retiring Paul Tsongas in 1984. Kerry, who had been the conduit
between freeze activists and Mike Dukakis as Lieutenant Governor, sought to continue
fostering his ties with the activist left by reaching out to it on Central America. Bell
declared, "Senator Kerry commends [the demonstrators inside] for your moral courage
and moral leadership civil disobedience is the highest form of political activity."61
' New York Times, May 8. 1985, 16; Boston Globe . May 8, 1985. 1 and 10
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At 6 30 PA) police and federal marshals began the mass arrests with most
protestors walking out but dozens choosing to go limp The arrestees were transferred ,n
groups of thirty to U.S. Distnct Court for processing that went on through the night,
through the next day and into the subsequent night. Those who cooperated were
processed and eventually released on their own recogntzance, while those who refused
by giving their names as "John Doe", "Jane Doe" or "Sandino" were held and threatened
with perjury. Among those committing civil disobedience was fifty-eight year old Rev.
Frank Dorman of Cambridge, who had led the Massachusetts delegation on the first
Witness for Peace mission to Nicaragua in 1 983 Dorman told a reporter for the Boston
Globe, "As an ordained minister, it should be recorded that we are here because of acts
of conscience."62 Twenty-three year old Ellen Kage of Waltham declared, "What I did
was not criminal. What we are protesting is criminal..." 63 Greenfield resident Frank
Giordana declared after his arrest in Boston, "The hottest place in hell is reserved for
those who do nothing. I consider this an act of patriotism"64 Boston POR coordinator
Catherine Hoffmann commented, "We are pleased - both about the number of people
who participated in civil disobedience and those who took part in the legal
demonstration "65
As hundreds were arrested in Boston and Springfield, smaller actions took pi
in Greenfield and Williamsburg, while 100 activists in Pittsfield, after a ninety
ace
minute
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vigil, sent medical aid to Nicaragua in a "symbolic embargo busting action" 66 The anti-
embargo protests of 1985 coincided *» the fast-growing anti-apartheid movement,
which was sweepmg the nation's campuses and African Amencan communities, with its
call for economic divestment from the wrote supremacist nation of South Africa. For
many, the fact that the United States had imposed an embargo on a poor nation whose
government was struggling to help the poor, while refusing to divest from a wealthy
nation that kept the majority ofits citizens impovenshed and oppressed under a racial
caste system, pointed up the corruption of U.S. foreign policy. For many, the contrast of
U.S. policy toward South Africa and Nicaragua further highlighted the administration's
selective concerns over human rights which appeared dictated more by capitalist
imperatives and cold war strategy than democratic principles. Beginning in the spring of
1985, the solidarity movement increasingly took up the chant, "Boycott South Africa,
Not Nicaragua!"67
In early June, 1985 Congress voted 248-184 to send $27 million in "non-lethal"
aid to the contras.
68
The entire Massachusetts congressional delegation voted 'no', and
had in fact played a pivotal role in defeating Reagan's proposed military aid package for
the contras earlier in the year.
69
Shortly after that vote, however, Nicaraguan President
Daniel Ortega took a jet to Moscow in search of aid in a move much criticized as ill
timed and ill considered. As a result, Reagan was able to turn the sagging congressional
support for contra aid around and procure a compromise "non-lethal" aid package,
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keeping the armed Nicaragua,, opposition's hope for finther assistance alive.™ The vote
soon sparked renewed protest across the United States CM disobedience resumed on
June 12, ,985, when ninety-three activists, led by a procession of drum-beating
Buddhists from the Leverett Peace Pagoda, were arrested in Ch.copee outside the
Westover Air Base. Many handcuffed themselves to gates while others entwined
themselves with rope to make arrest more difficult ." One protestor, Joan Pinkham of
Amherst, told a local reporter, "As patnotic citizens it is our duty to protest and resist-
During the protest Chicopee Mayor Richard Lak arrived to survey the scene
Sympathetic to the protestors cause but deeply concerned about the cost to the city in
terms of police overtime. Mayor Lak stated, «K is not the cause we are objecting to but
the cost."
71
Protestors responded that they believed the costs were to be picked up by the
federal government, that i, was not their intention to cause hardsh.p for the financially
strapped city, but that the protests were nevertheless a moral imperative Meanwhile,
twenty-four activists were arrested at the Greenfield I R S building, including Freeze
activist Judith Scheckel 74
In Boston, reaction to the $27 million aid package rekindled the militant protests
of the previous month As POR protests erupted in San Francisco, Washington, DC,
Kansas City, Seattle and Eugene, Oregon, over 1,500 protestors once again converged
on the JFK Federal Building "We are here to organize an active resistance to war"
71
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proc.ai.ed PGR organizer David Truscello, addmg, "We will not per.it Ronald Reagan
to drag this country into this war We are going to make sure that we are a significant
factor in his decision to wage war We're going to come back We will not go away »»
Learning from the experience of the May embargo protests, Peter Thomas,
regional administrator of the Genera. Services Administration wh.ch ran the JFK Federal
Building decided to avoid making arrests. Anticipating the protests, he had the building
barricaded off and instructed police to simply remove but not arrest those breaching the
barricade Nevertheless, employees entering the JFK Federal Building needed to produce
identification.
"It's not our intention to arrest anyone," Thomas declared Pleased with
•he results, Thomas continued, "I must say we came up with a pretty good strategy."76
to response, POR organizer Anne Shumway told a reporter, "We confer this a victory
of sorts because we partially closed down the building "77
The contra aid protests spilled over into the next day in Boston as hundreds of
activists marched upon the Armed Forces Recruiting Center on Tremont St. and then the
Coast Guard Marine Safety Office on Commercial St where an INS branch was
located. Chanting, "No recruiting today!" the boisterous protestors were held at bay by
barricades and mounted police, with over eighty being taken away after breaching police
lines. "The people here are willing to risk arrest, their jobs, being put in the files of the
F B I. and being trampled by police horses in order to make it clear that the public won't
7S
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to^e the killing „n„nocenl pc()p, „ (,n(ra , Amerita „ dedarcd ^ ^
the Boston POR.78
Confrontation between activisto and police were no, ,he o„,y souree oftension to
emerge during the , 985 etnbargo and contra a,d protests. Throughout lhe^^rffc
1 980s, there was an undercurrent of tension in the solidarity m„vemen, between those
with a genera,* more mora, and pacilis, orientation and those who more ardently
proclaimed thcr Marxist sympathies with revolutionary forces in Central America.
Although these groups often shared similar interpretations ofU.S. policy and sympathy
stylistic discomfort- often surfaced a, the POR meetings of ,985 - For some, the more
strident mihtancy of others smacked ofa certain machismo, with more outspokenly
militant groups tending to be more male in composition. Age also seemed to factor in. as
older activists often took an eye-rolling attitude to the younger, clcnchcd-ftst militants.
Lois Ahrcns ofthe CAWG, in her thirties and forties during the 1080s. recalls disputes
with those .she describes as "more partisan" who had a "much more unshakeahle. non-
questioning attitude about the inlhllibility ofthe Sandinistas."'" Recalling the large
Pledge meetings ol early 1085, Ahrens says, "there would be these guys who were the
revolutionary guys', that were trying to take a lot ofspace, and there were those of us
78
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who were older than «hey were, and women, that maybe wanted «o be less
confrontational..." But, Ahrens adds, "As a general rule, we won out.""
Another cleavage that came tnto stark relief by 1985 was a regional one
remmiscen, ofthe divisions between Boston-based and Western Massachusetts ac.vists
during the Seabrook protests. Frances Crowe describes these divisions as no, so much
ideological as organizational. According to Crowe, the Boston-based, largely
Cambridge-centered groups, which had closer ties to national organization,, tended to be
more "bureaucratic" and "top down" as opposed to Western Massachusetts solidarity
activists who she regards as more "grass roots" and "bottom up".- Indeed, whereas large
national groups like C.SPES in the early ,980s and NECAN subsequently, played major
roles in the eastern par, of the state, in Western Massachusetts the movement tended to
be decentralized and composed ofa plethora of small "affinity groups" such as the
CAWG which operated independently not only from other groups but even its own
parent organization, the AFSC. 83
Despite the divisions between eastern and western halves of the state,
Massachusetts emerged from the 1985 embargo and eontra aid protests with an even
higher profile in the national movement. This trend reached its apex in 1986 with the
anti-C.I.A. protests that swept college campuses across the country culminating on April
27, 1987 with the massive anti-C.I.A. protests and arrests outside the Agency's
headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Since the C.I.A.'s role in Central America was well
81
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known, from its mining 0f Nicaragua's harbors (o i(s trainjng Qf comras ^
groups. I„ ,986-7, the C.I.A. became the focus ofmilitant protest in Massachusetts. 84
In early November, University of Massachusetts, Amherst students belonging to
the Radical Student Union «RSU) and the Central American Solidarity Association
(CASA) geared up for the impending arrival ofC.l.A. recruiters on campus. The student
activists argued tha, since university poKcy forbid criminal organizations from recruiting
on campus, the C.l.A. should be banned due to their illegal activities around the world
and especially, in the radical students' view, in Central America. On Thursday evening,
November
.3, 1986, anti-C.l.A. students held a protest and candlelight vigil, which
succeeded in getting a C.l.A. informational session cancelled. The anti-C.l.A. students
faced counter-protests from pro-CI A. students, arguing efforts to ban the Agency from
recruiting on campus violated students' first amendment rights to free association and
undermined national security." The next day, Friday, November 14, the radical students
tried to halt the planned C.l.A. recruitment session, but the Agency quietly relocated and
rescheduled, thereby evading disruption. Thirteen students, all from RSU and CASA,
then occupied the office of Chancellor Joseph DurTey to demand a meeting on the
New York Times
. April 17, 1987.
Daily Hampshire Gazette, November 15, 1986; Valley Advocate. April 20, 1987.
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was an
""iVCra 'VS P*» M CIA
" ^fusing to vacate a, time ofthe bonding's
dosing, campus police entered the office and arrested the students."
The University
„, Massachusetts Subsequently sough, an injunction limiting
where the students could go on cantpus. The RSI, and CASA argued that this
infringes ofthe students hrs, amendment rights and an effort intimidate the
movement to ban the C.I.A. from campus". On November 24, ,986, hundreds of
I 'mversity of Massachusetts students along with other "live college" area students and
community members turned out to protest the injunctions and push for a ban on C.I.A
recruhmcn, on campus. The proles, was one ofmany hostile receptions C.I.A. campus
recruiters had received on campuses throughout the tail. The protestors occupied
Munson I tall, an administrative nerve center on the campus, and held the building for
seven hours. Surrounding the building were forty campus police joined by forty ou.side
police from the University of Massachusetts, Boston campus, the town of Ambers, and
stale police in riot control gear.
88
On hand for the protest rally and joining the students in the building occupation
was 1960s veteran activist and Worcester native Abbie 1 .oilman, who was in the area to
promote his idea ofa new national student organization.89 Although the young students
reacted coolly at first to Hoffman, whom they saw somewhat as a relic of another era,
the Yippie founder won them over. At the occupation, Hoffman declared, "Back to the
86
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mture. It's ,968 out there- As the police began to arrest the building occup.ers, three
protestors sought to block a police bus with the arrested protestors from leaving by
sitting down in their path. Among those three was former first daughter Amy Carter,
then an activist student at Brown University. 91
All in all, the police arrested fifty-nine protestors. Those ins.de the university
building were charged with trespassing while Carter and the other two who blocked the
police vehicle were charged with disorderly conduct. Four police were injured in the
action, a few reporting bite marks and one a dislocated shoulder The arrestees were held
in handcuffs for over seven hours. Chancellor Duffy ordered Hoffman banned from the
campus and declared, "If Hoffman wants to have a trial on the C I A. that's fine. But to
bring a public institution to a halt so he can do that is unjust "92
Although most of those arrested for carrying out civil disobedience accepted
suspended fines, fifteen, including Hoffman and Carter, decided to challenge the charges
of trespassing and disorderly conduct by pleading not guilty due to the "necessity
defense" at the county court in nearby Northampton. The group's case was taken up by a
national organization called the "CI A on Trial Project" which hoped to turn the case
into a national cause celebre and use the trial as a showcase for exposing what it
regarded as the crimes of the CIA, especially in Central America. 93 Hampshire
District Court Judge Richard F. Connon agreed to permit a necessity defense on the
condition that the fifteen arrested protestors who insisted on a trial be tried together so as
90
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RadfcaJ attorney Leonard Weinglass who had defended Hoffinan and the
'H Chicago Seven" fa the bte 1960s and early 1970s headed up the defense, fa a strategy
thai bore many similarities to the Sam Lovejoy trial over a decade earlier, the defense
summoned several high profile witnesses on the defendants behalf such as 1971
Pentagon Papers whistle blower Daniel Ob berg, former CIA agenl turned Agency
critic Ralph Mc< Ihee, former attorney general turned radical activist Ramsey ( fa*, and
ex-eontra leader Edgar ( lhamorro, all ofwhom were to testify to ( ma. crimes in ( lentral
America and around the world, Meanwhile, the «< m a. on Trial Project" raised $15,000
for the defense including $7,000 ofHoffinan's own money.96
Thomas Lesser, the Northampton lawyer who in 1974 had defended Sam
Lovejoy using the necessity defense, joined Weinglass in his defense. Their strategy was
to use the national press and media attention thai new focused on Northampton to pul the
( M A. on trial. Especially damning were ( m.a. insider Ralph Mc( ihee's testimony on
(MA. misinformation and the testimony offormer < lontra Edgar ( lhamorro, who
detailed ( M.A. instruction given to the ( ontras on how to assassinate local officials ...
such a way as to make if appear the Sandinistas had committed the murders.97 As
'" Valley Advocate. April •>(>. I «>X7.
'"'
Daily Hampshire (ia/clte, April K>, |»>X7.
'"' New York l imes, April M, 17 and IX, l<>X7
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Leonard Weinglass repeatedly referred to instances of what he described as C.l.A.
crimes around the world, the prosecution stuck to a strategy of not countering the
defense witnesses and arguing that C.l.A. behavior was irrelevant, that the case hinged
on the narrow question of whether trespassing and disorderly conduct had taken place.
(After the case, Distnct Attorney W Michael Ryan, after the case said he believed the
narrow technical focus was the best strategy, but added, "If it came to defending the
CIA or losing, I'd rather lose.")98
The case turned the town of Northampton upside down as news crews from
around the country set up their cameras and satellite trucks outside the court and anti-
and pro-C I A protestors countered each other with rival chants ("Hey hey, ho, ho, the
CIA has got to go!" was met with "Hey, hey, ho, ho, Amy Carter has got to goi")99
Carter spent much of her time dodging much of the national press. She did, however,
speak with a local journalist from IMV^Myocm, telling the reporter, "Whenever
someone sacrifices a part of themselves for justice, it aids the cycle of change"' 00 Asked
when her activism came to focus on the C.I. A., the former first daughter responded,
"They'd always outraged me, but I guess I decided to make it a priority when I was
researching South Africa during my senior year of high school. I found out that the
C.I A. had given information on the African National Congress to the South African
government, and that a C.l.A. agent was present when Nelson Mandela was arrested." 10 '
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On the final day of the trial, Abbie Hoffman addressed the jury as part of fhe
defense's closing argument:
This trial is about many things, from trespassing to questioning act, hv
dCcomrn w> ^
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"
the defendants act ™ th di8n«y ande rum Witnesses, many ofwhom occupied high positions ofcower
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In her closing statement. Prosecutor Diane Femald thejury of six, "We're talking
about crimes that were committed down the road in Hampshire County We're not
talking about illegal activities of the CIA in Central America or elsewhere.»«" But on
April 15, 1987, i, was C I A crimes in Central America and not the protestors' illegal
activities, which most moved the six jurors. The panel pronounced the defendants 'no.
guilty', acquitting them of all charges. Upon the jury's announcement of its verdict, the
courtroom erupted into cheers and hugs and was only with great difficulty calmed by
Judge Connon's threat to clear the courtroom. '« The Hampshire County district attorney
W Michael Ryan, referring to thejury of six, which ranged in age from thirty-four to
seventy-seven conceded, "If there's a message, it was that the jury was composed of
Middle America. It was a great jury for us. They weren't kids. There were a couple of
senior citizens. And they believed the defense. Middle America doesn't want the C I A.
1 02
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dohtg wha, ,hey area^- Leonard Weing(ass^ wj(h champagne ^ _ after
« vic.ory party, declared, ean only be read one way.
. . the jury bad t0M tha( fc
defendants had a right
,„ oecupy tha, building and the ftlegal activities of the C.I.A.
justified a no, guilty verdict."- A jubilant Amy Carter exclaimed, "A jury of six in
Northampton found the CIA guilty of larger crimes than trespass and disorderly
conduct and decided that we had a legal reason to protest.-' Upon learning ofthe
verdict in Northampton, former President Jimmy Carter described himself as a "very
proud father tonight", adding, "Amy's been arrested four times, three times protesting
apartheid and this las, time for wha, she considers, and
. consider, illegal activity ofthe
C.I.A. in Nicaragua." 108
interviews with jurors after the trial revealed the defense had badly miscalculated
in not trying to counler the defense's witnesses against the C.I.A. Walter LaFrenicre, a
seventy-seven year old cutlery worker and former union shop steward told a reporter,
"We know that these kids |and Hoffman) committed a crime which I'm totally against.
But they did i, for a reason. These young people, they weren't violent. They were there
for a reason and one reason alone, and that's to get rid of that C.I.A... There wasn't one
C.I.A. agent that came there to deny these charges." 10' A thirty-seven year old registered
nurse from Ware named Donna Moddy stated, "I think anybody that would've sat in that
New York Times
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The Sanctuary Movement Critics to Massachusetts
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half< Antral Americans were displaced by
*e region', dvil wart Although many settled in refugee camp, w ,,„ Miw
°0UDtrie8
"
r 1,1 m'"' h
'
- ««. ha. been estimated thai a. many aa 750,000
< Antral Americana made their way to the I rnlted States, ofwhom 400-500,000 were
Salvadonms. Many ofthe refugees, specially those from El Salvador, contended that
they were seeking asy ft persec n and thai death would awai! them s Id they
return In El Salvador such claims carried a good deal ofcredibility. Vet, unlike political
refugee, ftom ( luba, Vietnam, the Soviel 1 Inion or the Easi Bloc, who were traditionally
welcomed into the 1 lofted States, those lie,-,,,, persecution by 1 1.S.-supported regimes
were routinely denied asylum. According to the Reagan administration, the vasl majority
ofthe refiigees ftom ( entral America were motivated by economic fetors, 1 he
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INS was committed ,o returning the ever growing How of refugees back to their
countries oforigin. 112
Beginning
,„ ,980 in the southwest of the United States, chureh groups near the
Anzona-Mexico border began provtding church "sanctuary" for Central Amencan
refugees fleeing persecution Tucson became the center of the sanctuary movement,
which soon spread to New Mexico and up into the west coast The movement exploded
by 1 983, as churches of various denominations throughout the United States began
providing asylum for predominantly Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees The
sanctuary movement quickly became an embarrassment for the Reagan administration as
refugees shared accounts of terror at the hands of their anti-communis, governments and
paramilitaries. By 1983, the FBI had infiltrated the growing sanctuary movement with
numerous informants and by 1984, in a high profile national trial, the Justice Department
began the prosecution of eleven members of the original sanctuary church in Tucson,
Arizona 1 1
1
The movement had a special appeal to those with religious sensibilities
(Protestant, Catholic and Jewish religious leaders were all well represented) and the
movement's resemblance to the nineteenth century Underground Railroad resonated
powerfully with radical clergy and lay people alike. Declared one national spokesman
for the movement, Rev. Peter J Sammon of St. Theresa's Roman Catholic Church in
Th^y^""* ??C",bCr 23 ' ,985 ' 1 and 1 1; Rcnn> Go,den and Mchael McConnel, SanctuaryP^y^cj^^ (Maryknoll, New York. Orb.s Books, 1986); Ann Cntlcnden, Sanctuary
AStoixoLAinencan Conscience and Law in Collision (New York Wcidcnfeld and Nelson, 1988)
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Sacmmento, California, «,„ our view, sendmg these people back ,o H Salvador or
Guatemala is the same thing as putting Jews on^^ for^ „ „
By early 1985, the sanctuary movement expanded from churches to whole
municipalities. Earlier that year, Berkeley, California and St. Paul, Minnesota become
•he firs, two cities whose city councils voted to declare their municipalities official
"sanctuaries" for those fleeing persecution in Centra, America, and enjoined municipal
officials, as far as legafly possible, no, to cooperate with federal efforts to deport such
refhgees. Chicago became the third city to declare itselfa sanctuary through
proclamation of its mayor. The Reagan administration strongly condemned these
sanctuary resolutions, arguing word would spread throughout Central America and give
rise to a mass exodus for the United States by economic refugees fabely believing these
cities could provide them with legal safe haven." 5
Cambridge, Massachusetts, which had led the way in its effort to declare itself a
nuclear free zone in 1983, sought in May of 1985 to become the next city to declare
itselfa sanctuary. The campaign was spearheaded by Cambridge solidarity activists,
especially those with the Old Cambridge Baptist Church, which had been providing
sanctuary for refugees from El Salvador. On May 8, 1985, before what the JkSfiriGJobe
described as a "packed and partisan audience", the nine-member Cambridge city council
considered a resolution proclaiming Cambridge to be a sanctuary for refugees from El
Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti. 1" Witnesses included sanctuary workers from the Old
114 New York Times
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Cambridge Baptist Church, local academics, a representative from Cen.ro Presenle a
refugee assistance organization, several Salvadoran and Haitian refugees and Richard
Bell, aid to Senator John Kerry, Estella Ramirez, a Salvadoran trade unionist and refugee
told the city councilors, "It is not for economic reasons that we have come here. We
have been forced to come by the political situation in our country. For us, there is no
justice and no food. And ifwe demand them, we are tortured or killed."' 17 Speakmg for
Senator Kerry, Richard Bell denounced the administration's refusal to grant asylum to
Salvadoran refugees as "a stain on this country's honor." 118
Supporting the resolution, council member Alice Wolff declared, "many things
start at the local level, and we can't wait for the federal government to come around.
. . I
believe we have an obligation to shelter people who are being persecuted in other
countries," adding, "We cannot help send people back to countries where they are
persecuted and killed."" 9 Cambridge Mayor Leonard Russell objected to the resolution,
arguing it would mislead Central American refugees into thinking Cambridge could
offer more safety than it actually could, to which council member Wolff responded, "We
can send them a message that we will do what we can. If we don't, we will be sending
them a message of despair."' 20 Finally, the Cambridge city council voted narrowly, 5-4,
to proclaim itself an official sanctuary, adding to the national momentum of the
sanctuary movement.' 2 '
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opportunity to speak about theh lives and experience,- Pedro and ioaquin
to do just that, doing interviews for press and tnedia throughout New England, htcludhrg
a Hartford television station and the Bo^aGfe, as well „^ numerous^
before audienees at Mt. Toby. Wearing masks for ,^ ^ ^
anonymity and thereby protee, loved ones in Gua,emala from government retahation, the
brothers dramatically and personaUy brought to life for many New Englanders the
horrors confronting so many of the poor in Central America. Speaking through an
interpreter, Joaquin told of his work with a small Christian group which sough, to help
Guatemala's poor. After five members of his group were killed, including a nun who
was raped, Joaquin fled to Honduras. When members of the Guatemalan military could
not discover his whereabouts from his wife, they assembled the children of the house
and shot the family dog.' 2' Meanwhile, Pedro had gone into hiding within Guatemala,
sleeping at a different house every night, wanted by the military for poetry about the
poor he'd read over the radio. Speaking to 1 50 people at Mt. Toby on one occasion,
Joaquin explained, "We are tired of the terror.
. . We have a duty to our people to speak
out . .
.
the wave of terror unleashed by the army is against the entire people. Only the
army and the rich are not suspected of being subversive." 127
One ofthe Western Massachusetts residents moved by the brothers' accounts
was their interpreter, Julie Rappaport, a young activist in her twenties who'd recently
become active in the solidarity movement with the Central American Working Group.
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Raised in an educated, non-political Jewish middle-class home, Rappaport's political
awareness began in the early ,970s when her older brother was nearly drafted to fight in
the Vietnam war and the family discussed options such as moving him to Canada. By
high school, Rappaport had a general political awareness, which deepened during her
years at Harvard from 1980 to ,984, where she became involved with feminist groups,
including battered women's service groups and participated in some Central American
and anti-apartheid activism. It was with her move to Western Massachusetts in 1984,
however, that Rappaport's activism came to focus intensely on Central America.' 28
Rappaport's role as Joaquin and Pedro's interpreter led her deeper into the
movement. Discussing her role as interpreter, Rappaport stated, "There's nothing like
having to repeat atrocities, horrors, in the first person, to really give someone pause.
It's one thing to. read a book or a newspaper. It's another thing to be standing next to a
person [saying] this is what happened to me, or this is what I saw. And so I became more
and more personally affected by what I was hearing, so I decided I wanted to go to
Guatemala. I wanted to see what he [Joaquin] was telling me.
.
,"
129
Thus, from her role
as interpreter in the sanctuary movement, Rappaport was drawn deeper into the
movement, joining the hundreds of North American and Western European
internationalists who trekked to Central America during the decade in support of the
region's popular and revolutionary movements.
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The InternationalktQ
During the ,980s, tens of thousands of U.S. international traveied to Centra,
America as par, of a heightened eommi,me„, to solidarity activism. El Sa.vador and
revolutionary Nicaragua were by far the most common destinations for such activists.
According to some journalists, over 100,000 U.S. citizens traveled to Nicaragua alone
during the decade, many to participate for a few weeks in the coffee harvest or merely to
show support for the Sandinistas and protest Reagan administration policies by their
presence. While most remained only a few weeks or months, a pertnanen, presence of
approximately seven thousand internationalists emerged by the mid- 1 980s in a Managua
neighborhood known as "Gringolandia". A few of the most committed internationalists
left the relative safety of Managua for the war ravaged countryside. Among them was
Portland, Oregon native Benjamin Under who became a martyr of the solidarity
movement in 1 986 when he was killed during a contra attack in Nicaragua's northern
Jinotega province where the young engineer had helped remote villages build hydro-
electric dams. Meanwhile, other internationalists traveled to El Salvador where the
Salvadoran armed forces eyed them warily. The murders of the four U.S. church women
and two AFL-CIO labor organizers at the beginning ofthe decade signaled that even
U.S. citizens were not safe in that war-torn nation. Later, in 1990, an internationalist
named Michael Divine disappeared in Guatemala, a victim ofthat nation's rightist
paramilitary. Thus, although most internationalists partook in some of the hardships and
376
poverty known to most Central Americans for a eouple of weeks, a smaHer number
literally put their lives on the line.
130
The internationalists of the 1980s represented many shades of commitment, but
all embraced a global outlook and activism with deep roots in the U.S. left. After the
1917 Bolshevik Revolution, scores ofU S citizens like journals John Reed traveled to
the Soviet Union to witness what many on the left hoped would be a new birth for
humanity. The Soviet Union continued as the revolutionary beacon for much of the
Old Left until the late 1930s when Republican Spain, at the fronthne of the war against
fascism, became the Mecca of the Popular Front Tens of thousands ofU.S. citizens
volunteered for the Lincoln Brigades and headed to Spain in what they viewed as an epic
struggle pitting the forces of oppression against the global crusade for democracy and
socialism. 132
As the Soviet Union became a less appealing focal point for leftist
internationalism, many young people in the U.S. turned to the more religiously
influenced civil rights movement in the 1960s as the vehicle through which to fight for a
more just and humane world. Thousands of idealistic northern college students, black
and white, joined SNCC and CORE and headed into the heart of the Jim Crow south to
share the hardships and poverty of oppressed African Americans and fight for freedom
and equality in a part of the United States that to many had the feel of a foreign country.
Paul Berman, "In Search of Ben Linder's Killers", The New Yorker . September 23 1996 John
Brentl.nger, The Best of What We Are: Reflections on the Nicaraguan Revolution (Amherst University of
Massachusetts Press, 1 995).
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In many ways, the civil rights stmggle was a return to the egahtanan spirit of the
abolitionist movement a eentury earlier, whieh likewise vtewed the world in terms of a
global humanity.
Largely due to the impact of Liberation Theology, the internationalism of the
1980s Centra. American solidarity movement represented a confluence of the religiously
motivated civil rights movement of the 1960s and the secular Marxism, which
influenced those in the Lincoln Bngades of the 1930s, and the Venceramos Brigades
which traveled to Cuba in the 1960s and early 1970s. Among the internationalists of the
1980s were those whose activism was predominantly faith based, such as the activists
who traveled to Nicaragua with Witness for Peace, others whose politics grew out of a
broad democratic and secular humanism, and others whose politics grew out of an
ideologically orthodox Marxism. In this, the internationalists of the 1980s mirrored the
revolutionaries and popular movement activists of Central America themselves. 133
By the latter half of the 1980s, Julie Rappaport had formed a more personal
connection with the suffering people of Central America through the first person
accounts she translated and a romantic relationship that blossomed with "Joaquin"
Rappaport hoped to go to Guatemala but was prevented due to complications in the
arrangements. So instead, Rappaport departed for El Salvador where she spent a year in
Chaletenango province, an FMLN stronghold and scene of some of El Salvador's most
savage fighting. It was a trip that dramatically altered the way she viewed the country
and its conflict. Before going to El Salvador, Rappaport had what she later described as a
more "facile view" of the war in which the FMLN guerrillas were the "good guys" and
133
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.he Salvador army the "bad guys, Her sympalhies did „„, change^^ ^
Rappaporfs words, "more complex".^ civil war wasn't exacdy „hal
, had in mind
recalled Rappapon. "Something that became dear the longer 1 was there was how
complicated the situation | was]
... war is a shitty thing, war is bad for everybody... i,
doesn't make anybody into good guys... it's ugly [and] that was hard." 1"
Rappaporfs views on many things changed while in El Salvador. Rappaport
soon came to see the U.S. financed Salvadoran military as being even worse than she
had envisioned in her most Manichean imaginings. Rappaport no, only witnessed Army
atrocities, but also was herself subject to frequent and humiliating sexual harassment a,
.he point ofM-l6s by uniformed soldiers of the Salvadoran Army. Describing the Army
as "hideous", Rappaport summed up her changed view of the conflict, stating, "This is
,he pure evil and this is what has to be done to confront a profound, profound, profound
evil and it wasn't always admirable... but necessary." 1" Rappaport was especially
saddened by the numbers of youth impressed into the war by all sides of the conflict.
Despite being saddened by the coercive and sometimes brutal tactics employed by the
rebels, Rappaport nevertheless felt the atrocities ofthe government forces eclipsed
anything done by the guerrillas, and if the FMLN weren't the "good guys" she once
naively hold them to be, she still felt "the side that had dignity was clearly the FMLN."
Rappaport described the Salvadoran armed forces as led by "horrible evil murderers...
and you don't get to be Glenda the Good Witch in the face of that." 156
' Interview with Julie Rappapon, December 10, 1996.
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Before going ,o E, Salvador, Rappaport said she "fe„ compeUed in a we,rd way
•o look evi, ,n the faee In El Salvador, she had many opportunities to do so One
example among many whieh she would later reiate to North Ameriean audiences dealt
with a small Salvador town where she was staymg doing hteraey training. One day the
body of a loeal young man was found dead in the middle of the street, the victim of a
right-wing death squad killing Salvadoran death squads routinely left the tortured and
disfigured bod,es of their vicfims in public places as gnsly calling cards reminding
peasants of their ever-watchful presence Recalled Rappaport, "They beheaded it and
just left it there. They made clear to the whole town that noone was to touch his
body." 138 Despite great personal nsk, however, a young female Salvadoran literacy
volunteer collected his body and took it up into the mountains for a furtive burial.
Describing herself as profoundly moved upon learning of this act, Rappaport asked the
woman why she did it at such personal nsk to herself "People aren't animals to be left
dead in the road and he was my friend," responded the woman Rappaport, describing
the incident with the distant stare most often associated with combat veterans, stated that
she was deeply moved by many such examples of "tremendous human dignity in the
face of homble, horrible events " 139 For Rappaport, as for other internationalists who
experienced the tragedy of war ravaged Central America first hand, it was no longer
possible to look at the conflict in a detached or abstract manner Rappaport observed,
"It's one thing to hear the army did X, Y and Z It's another thing to look at k " ,m
"'mi
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Returning to Western Massachusetts aft« he, vea, ,„ El Salvador, Rappaport set out to
do all .he could to»«*^l«fcii.
€o^ tateli^ fi| tingher
experiences at nume.ous chu.chcs and meeting houses throughout the Pioneer Valley
(JuKe ^PP^ lat« »«»»«« "Joaquin?', whose real name is ( arlos Oliva The couple
M ,w
° Childr^ one ofwh™ "-v named in bono, of Siste, Qabrielle Victoria de la
Roca, Carlo.' friend and fellow activist in Guatemala who had been raped and murdered
by member, ofthe Guatemalan armed force. )' 11
Lot. Ahrens, a Northampton residem and fellow activi.1 with Me rappapon in
the Central American Working Group decided aftei nearly a deed, of Central American
lolidarity activism to travel to the region herself Well into ho thirties, Ahren. viewed
herselfa. a movement veteran les. susceptible to the widened romanticism and naivete-
thai she believed characterized the outlooks ofmany youngei people ... the movement
Although deeply committed to a humanist and progressive politics, Ahrens prided
herselfon her skepticism, which she traced to hei Qunily's experience ... the Old Lefi
Born to a working class, Jewish New Y«>,k City family ... 1947, Ahrens was raised ... the
Mc< larthy era where she witnessed family friends and relatives cope with the 1950s Red
Scare Ahrens was close to aunts and uncles who, though still committed to leftist
politics, had quit the Communist Party in disgust in 1939 due to the infamous I Brier-
Stalin Pad Ahrens believed these relatives helped instill ... hei a healthy iconoclasm in
1962, during the Cuban Missile ( Irisis, Ahrens shocked hei sixth grade English teachei
by expressing support fot Fidel Castro Later, upon learning ofCuba's persecution of
' " Ihul
.1X1
"0 "',>S"M" IS >'"'~
Ahrens w d discos
will, harsh denunciations of< aiba's human rights policies. 143
For someone so steeped in a left-wing background, Ahrens was remarkably
""
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v
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™'" ls
'
M, '' ,K;I
' currents ofthe i960,. , >„,„,, ,„„ s , ,„ ,„,
decade she worked for the prestigious New York < „y publishing firm of Mot a„„
Erikson Eventually, however, the spin, ofthe sixties caugh, up with her, and Ahrens
ask,,, herself, "Whe, am l ,1,,,,,,.. barer ,70 she quit. . fnlik, many ofher generation
who were ted into radical politic, through the civil rights or anti-war movements, for
Ahrens a was the more personal politics ofthe gay rights and feminist movements thai
W tot too left-wing activism. Alter struggling to come to terms with her identity as a
lesbian and several foiled relationships with women, Ahrens entered a state ofdeep
depression triggered by the death ofa particularly dose grandmother. Seeking therapy,
Ahrens like so many gay men and lesbians ofthe fine, was ,,,1,1 1„ orientation
was a personality disorder akin to alcoholism and drug addiction which could be ^cured"
wiih therapy.H
1
Gradually, Ahrens moved into a growing circle ofprogressive clergy and
psychiatrists who sought to combat the stigmatization ofhomosexuality and help gays
and lesbians accept and celebrate themselves. Ahrens thus progressed through the 1970s
with a renewed sense ofconfidence and commitment tt» political and social change. In
1971, Ahrens moved to Aust.n, Texas with a new lover and got involved with the anti-
war movement and Austin's last-growing feniinist/Iesbian community, Including one of
43
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the nation's first battered women's shelters. Of all her years of activism, Ahrens
remembers the 1 970s most fondly as the time of the most radieal and exhilarating soeial
change, a time when women, gays and lesbians made their greatest strides. 144
In 1980, Ahrens moved to Northampton and got involved with the local
NMMltari**, and other women's group, Coming from the veteran AusUn
feminist movement, Ahrens found the incipient Northampton feminist movement
"unsophisticated" and full of "separatist crap" and stuck at a "terminally early stage".-
Disillusioned with Northampton's militant style of feminism, Ahrens moved into the
freeze movement and produced a successful local play, "Handy Dandy", which dealt
with the nuclear arms race. Just as many women in the 1960s and early 1970s moved
from the anti-war movement into the feminist movement, in the 1980s many like Julie
Rappaport and Lois Ahrens moved from feminist activism into more broad-based
political activism. Shortly after moving to Northampton, Ahrens was scooped into the
Central American solidarity movement by what she describes as the "iron jaws" of
Frances Crowe, who discerned in Ahrens a potentially invaluable recruit for the
movement. As Ahrens learned more about U.S. policy in Central America, she began to
devote more and more time to the movement, including the material aid campaigns and
committing civil disobedience during the massive 1985 anti-embargo protests. Unlike
many in the solidarity movement, who had "country affinities" (for instance, Julie
Rappaport felt an affinity for Guatemala), Ahrens always described her "affinity
country" as the United States and evinced a certain skepticism toward the Sandinistas
144
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and other revolutionary who she felt were often infected wrth a coercive machine.
Considenng herself less naive than some of the more ardent supporters of Centra.
Amencan revolutionaries, Ahrens focused on the complicity of U.S. policy in the
region's hardships and in personalizing the victims
of war and poverty. It was Ahrens' idea to circulate Polaroid photos of ordinary
Salvadorans during local material aid campaigns. Ahrens told one local newspaper, "If
people do give something, it tends to make people more connected to the situation." 146
On another occasion, Ahrens extolled the virtues of local activism, stating, "If people see
their next door neighbor, their teacher, their doctor expressing their opinion in a public
way, it might encourage them to be more open " 147 For Ahrens, as for Rappaport,
feminism helped shape the personal focus of their activism For Ahrens, staying the hand
of the male batterer was similar to staying the might of the United States against its
weaker, impoverished neighbors to the south.
From this background, Ahrens girded herself in 1989 for a two and a half week
trip to Central America Ahrens spent seven days in El Salvador and eleven days in
Nicaragua In El Salvador, Ahrens took part in a practice known as "accompaniment" in
which internationalists would "accompany" threatened Salvadorans and hope thereby to
deter their abduction or murder. Upon returning, Ahrens, like Rappaport, sought to share
her experiences with local Massachusetts residents. To one local reporter Ahrens offered
the following observations on El Salvador after nine brutal years of war: "While there
isn't mass slaughter [like the early 1980s] there are incredible amounts of people being
146
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killed,
.cured and kidnapped every day. It's like Nazi Germnny except potential*
embody is a Jew- Short!, after Ahrens' visit, E) Salvador was again front-page
new, as ,he FMLN unleashed another
"Final Offensive" in which the guerrilla army
entered sections ofthe capital, San Salvador. During the offensive, pro-govemmen.
death squads unleashed a wave ofterror, which included the widely publicized murder
Oftee Jesuits,
.heir housekeeper and her young daugh.er. The death squads no, only
...urdered the Jcsui.s hu, also meticulously removed
.heir brains from .heir skulls in a
symbolic act, which spoke volumes abou. the men.ali.y ofthe Salvadoran right.'"
AHhough numerous internationalists
.raveled lo El Salvador (and a .s,naller
number to (iua.emala) during
.he 1980s, the most popular dcs.ina.ion for U.S.
in.erna.ionahs.s remained revolutionary Nicaragua. Al.hough many internationalists did
no. suppon the Sandinis.a government wholeheartedly, many others found in Nicaragua
at. opportunity to go beyond opposing U.S. policy in the region ,„ actually becoming
par, ofa revolutionary effort lo create a new society. One ofthe ...any Massachusetts
activists drawn to Nicaragua in search ol'dccpcr commitment lo radical principles and
personal lulfillmen. was University ofMassachusetts, Amher.s. philosophy professor
John lirenllingcr. A self-described small-m "marxis. and atheist", Brenllinger embraced
a deep humanism thai often seemed to verge on Ihe spiritual as he sought what he
described as
-Ihe sacred" in a secular world. "Philosophy", wrote Brentlinger, "...
should move away from the old task ollhinking about Ihe selfand Ihe world - as if these
arc linished and (here lo be known - and toward (he lask ofcreative activity and work
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onto, to bring back md lransp|anl: ^ ^^^^^ ^
^
lives and change the course of history." 150
Be.ween ,985 and ,992, Brenner made ,x lrips ,„ Nlcaragua each rf^
months duration. Prom Nicaragua, Brendinger wrote, "Many North Americans who
come here say they oppose U.S. policies against Nicaragua hu, do no, support the
Sandinistas, whi,c
,
,
came here with a positive attitude and i, continues to grow
stronger. When
,
had personal encounters with right-wing critics of the Sandinistas,
,
sometimes wondered if, ,00 much identified myse,fas a supporter ofthe revolution ,„
be a responsible observer."'" Despite these reservations, Brentlingcr recounted his
experiences in a book entitled aLrkstoHM
involution, a collection ofessays, journal entries and photographs that documents daily
lift in Nicaragua and which balances the author's idealism with realistic descriptions of
daily life that do no, shy away from showing the Sandinistas or the revolution in a
negative light.
Brentlinger first arrived in Nicaragua in the spring of 1985, shortly after
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega's ill-timed trip to the Soviet Union and the
imposition ofthe economic embargo on Nicaragua by President Ronald Reagan. On his
first day in Managua, Brentlingcr was startled to find what he described as "shocking
IS0
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Poverty- On, hours inlo his May hc_^ ,,,^
_^ ^
for an cx.endcd stay, befcendiug numerous Niearaguans and spcaking to many^^
view. ofthe Sandinistas and the revo,u,,o„.
,>un„g hi,^ v,ils, BrentUnger
becan* more fam.har with the land and its peopie, traveling from urban Managua (()
renxrte rural areas, spending ttae in hotbeds ofsupport for the Sandinistas sueh as
Condcga, others sympa,he,ie to the eontras snch as Matagaipa, and towns in between
sueh as Ya,i and Jinotega. Brcntfingcr's travels eame during the latter halfofthe deeade,
"
'hC C°ntra^ " S ™*»W> and Sandinista mistakes had begun to sap the
revolutionary enthusiasm ofthe firs, halfofthe deeade when the San.lini.stas won
in.erna.inna, aeelaim for .heir early, successful li.eraey and inoeula.ion eampaigns and
claimed over 60% of the vote in the in.erna.ionally monitored 1984 elections. The
Nicaragua BrentKnger witnessed was one increasingly exhausted with daily hardships
•such as scarcity, empty store shelves, eu.s in social programs, escalating draft calls, draft
evasion, tightened social control by the government, flagging revolutionary ardor among
large
.sections of a war-weary population and dogged dcterminalion to carry forth the
revolutionary struggle by others.
In The Best of Wha. We Are
,
Bren.linger eloquently evokes the appeal ofthe
Sandinista revolu.ion fi.r U.S. radicals. Wri.es Bren.linger, •the decision to help a
foreign country with its revolution looks romantic and quixotic. In the States, I often
have the sense offloating in a huge becalmed ocean. Most people do not believe in
change. The privileged white majority is complacent and self-indulgent, the poor.
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disenfranchised minorities seem despairing. The left is small and fragmented- By
contrast, Brentlinger writes, "Revolution to N.caraguans was not a pohtica, speetaele or
a med.a event
., was their Ufe.
,
was made to feel I was par, ofthis revolution that 1
had a role to play.
.
was someone the revolut.on needed in its struggle to survive This
was hard to resist
.
would do anything
, could for them
. could write about them and
do my bit toward reducing the ignorance and misconceptions. I could try to involve
others and raise money for material aid I could go back and strengthen in a small way
the bonds between them and us." 155
Like Brentlinger, many internationalists sought in Nicaragua the promise of
community, of brotherhood and sisterhood in a transcendent endeavor. In Nicaragua,
writes Brentlinger,
"Revolutionary spirit breaks down walls that separate us, that hide
misery from us, that protect us by excluding those who are in need." 156 Brentlinger sees
many analogies between revolution and religion. Brentlinger describes twentieth century
radicals like the Sandinista's namesake, Augusto Cesar Sandino, as akin to the
Hebrew prophets and their jeremiads against corruption and injustice "The prophet like
the revolutionary," writes Brentlinger, "has a sense of connectedness that breaks down
barriers created by a system of exploitation.
. . Sandino is a modern prophet." 157
Despite Brentlinger's compelling articulation of the communal and religious
elements that motivated many internationalists, his descriptions of daily life belie the
glowing accounts of the Sandinista revolution by more starry-eyed internationalists, as
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we„ as the si„,ster depict ofa "totalitarian dungeon" by the Reagan adnllnis(ration
Brenner me. Nicaragua, whose iives appeared to be very positively transformed by
•he revolution, sueh as the campesino on a cooperatjve h^^^
We all think alike... all members of the cooperative it is simple Th.revolufon has taken the power away from the
. aTd'g ve„ , tothe campesmos. I used to work for Sonwa I haH .„ , 1, i8 ,
z^z:xiexx at the bank and can buud a h°- *™
In Managua, Brentlinger spoke frequently with a mMdle-class woman named
Norma who praised the impaet of the revolution on women while deerying the ongoing
sexism in Nicaraguan society. Norma informed Brentlinger,
The
j
revolution builds more schools and needs more teachers. It buildshealth centers and needs more nurses and doctors. The revolution greatlvincreases the demand for all kinds of workers. And because of our
strength and independence, we Nicaraguan women are ready to study andimprove ourselves. We need this revolution. We identify with it. 159
Yet, Norma explained to Brentlinger, as has been the case with many leftist revolutions
in the twentieth century, machismo and sexism persisted. According to Brentlinger, "The
Sandinista ideology of complete equality for women was achieved at a relatively high
level during the revolutionary struggle and after, in contexts where women were needed
for certain tasks... Yet Nicaraguan men, including many Sandinistas, continue to lord it
over the women they work with, and continue to expect women to serve them in the
house, because they don't consider equality in these areas to be a revolutionary
necessity." 160
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Brentlinger is candid about the many Nicaraguans he encounters who are critical
Ofthe Sandinistas In Managua, Brentlinger met a working class man who when asked
about the impact of the revolution on the poor, retorts, 'They [the poor] are still poor, it
hasn't changed Aren't there poor people in the United States? There's always poor
people. But they [the Sandinistas] want to make everyone poor like in Cuba?" 161
Brentlinger responded,
"I've been to Cuba In Cuba, everyone has enough to eat and
they have the best health care, the best education in Latin America I wouldn't say they
are poor."
1 " 2
The Managuan in turn replied, «] like freedom, I want to be able to work
and buy what I want They don't have freedom in Cuba."- Throughout his travels,
Brentlinger meets Nicaraguans who complain about shortages, the draft, and Sandinista
repression of outspoken critics In the north, Brentlinger was surprised to meet
Nicaraguans openly supportive of the U S
-backed contras and recounts these
experiences candidly, even developing a certain sympathy for the campesmos among the
COntras. Of the group so demonized by the U S left due to their egregious human rights
record, Brentlinger states, "I began to lose my image of the contras as the other." 164
Between those who openly supported the revolution and those who openly
opposed it, Brentlinger found many more nuanced attitudes during his time in
Nicaragua In one poignant account, Brentlinger describes one of the increasing number
of funerals occurring throughout Nicaragua in the late 1980s, in which revolutionary
Ibid. 41.
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, 42
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rhetoric increasing,,, rang hollo* again* ,hc painful realities 0f a seemingly
interminable war:
The family sat together on a raised grave The father, a fat kindly
.looked straight ahead with a frown, hisS3 themother. I he boy s brothers and sisters sat looking out at noth.nu Ayoung man stood by the casket and read a short poem Lament in astrong loud vo.ee: "With this death we affirm again, ye, again oucomnn.men, to defend Nicaragua from the counterrevolution, and we
P^JmT^ °T W ' lh ,h° Sand ' nista Na— 11 Li^tion"ont. lalna Libre, he shouted, and a few answered, "OMorir " After a
fi&'Sr «r Sa 'd ' hav° l° say y™« « speakSfoh, boy^ He had no ideology. I le was a boy who died fo, h,s country^
-s all Alter a moment the young man responded again by shouting
again, Patria Libre" No one answered, "0 Morir." 165
Brentlinger also describes the impact of the ubiquitous internationalists roaming
"-ugh Nicaragua in the 1980s. His work describes West German work brigades, young
Basque radicals working on a cooperative farm and many more North Americans criss-
crossing the country Brentlinger witnessed positive contributions, misplaced idealism
and even a certain gringo condescens.on Although many internat.onahst projects, like
Hen Linder's electric generators, actually improved real Nicaragua.^ lives, in other
cases internationalists missed the mark, as was the case with a bread oven built by a
West German work brigade in a mountain area where the campesinos ate tortillas and
the oven lay dormant Often, internationalists, especially those who remained only a
short tune, viewed the revolution with rose-tinted glasses that missed the nuances and
i o.nplex.ties of the Nicaraguan revolution. One campesino in the rur al north conf.ded to
Brentlinger, "Sometimes internationalists come here and talk to people, but the people
" ,s
Ibid., 222.
Granger (hey are very independent and suspicious." 1 "'
Another prohlem BrentUnger observed was rentiniscen, ofexperiences of
northern civil rights workers in the Deep South during .he
,960s, where they often
experienced a deferential attitude from local blacks. The work ofthe intern, mlls„
BrentUnger observes, while we,, tatentioned, would often
"perpetuate the hierarchical
relations they are hoping to overcome.- Many international,,* unintentionally
perpetuated a cau^K, like relationship with the peasants hy setting conditions on the use
»!' material aid and becoming bossy on construction project,. According to BrentUnger,
"We internationalists think we arc different we are conscious ofthis imperialist history
and actively reject its racist assumptions. Ye, we are no, different m one rcspct, wc
possess and control resources that others do no,, because we belong to the oppressor
societies. It is sharing the Icliovcrs from the table ofimperialist*." 1"
Despite his criticisms ofthe Sandinistas, internationalists and himself
BrentUnger remained committed to the Nicaragua,, revolution and people (he was one of
the lew internationalists who returned to Nicaragua aller the Sandinistas' fell from
power), [fthe revolution did no, live up to the most uncritical accounts ofsupporters,
neither did it match the highly ncgalive accounts in most ofthe U.S. press and media.
Brenl linger wri.es:
me, "When you go baek to the I Inited
States tell what it is like here, so they will know our reality." Others have
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so many criticisms of the government and heard so many people lalk
out
y
'whL
C
n
ar
r
Ua
'
d0n ' , bCliCVe any°ne lhere isS o sp kW e I open a magazine on the flight home, like Time or
TrlZ tTZ ? ^ eXPerienCe fedS " dan«er of bei"8 obl^ra,ed
"fe^w«^'^
SynCrat 'C PerSpCCtive of«* ™^le-aged hippie
Upon returning to the United States, Massachusetts internationalists like John
Brentlinger, Lois Ahrens and Julie Rappapor, sough, to share their experiences with Bay
State audiences and thereby convey the complexities of the region and counter the
stereotypes which dominated the U.S. debate on Central America, especially in the
mainstream media and in Washington Like many internationalists from around the
United States and the world, Brentlinger, Ahrens and Rappaport, seeking to work for
change in Central America, found themselves and their views transformed by the
realities they encountered. Beyond offering alternative perspectives on the region,
providing material aid, and helping with harvest work and literacy and health campaigns,
by their presence the internationalists were seen as an embarrassment to the Reaaan
administration Further, given the outcry that had accompanied the murders oflta Ford,
Dorothy Kazel, Maura Clark, Jean Donovan and Benjamin Linder, the prospect of
numerous U.S. citizens dying in a direct U.S. invasion of El Salvador or Nicaragua was
not one the administration would have relished. Thus, the internationalists, by their
presence, acted as a deterrent to an expanded and more direct U.S. military role in the
region
169
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Ite-Soiidaria Movement I Inrier gyrvgfflgiigg
In 1987 i, was revealed that the F B I had condueted widespread infiltration and
surveillance of the solidarity movement throughout the 1980s, centered on the
Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES, and the Maryknoll
Order Beyond secret surveillance, internationalists often complained of unfriendly
F.B.I, interrogations upon returning to the United States. Conservatives defended the
investigations, arguing that the two organizations acted as from groups for the FMLN;
however, with memories of COINTELPRO during the 1960s and the Church
Committee revelations of other FBI and CIA abuses in the mid-1970s, numerous
lawyers, journalists, liberal politicians and activists were alarmed a. what appeared to be
a resurgence of F.B.I targeting of dissent under the Reagan administration 170 Lois
Ahrens of (he Central American Working Group in Northampton, upon learning of the
FBI probe into the solidarity movement, decided out of curiosity to do a routine
Freedom oflnformation Act (FOIA) request for her files'" Ahrens was stunned when
she learned that the F.B.I, indeed had a file on her, but that they would not release it "for
reasons of national security." Finally, with the assistance of the local Amencan Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), Ahrens filed suit against the FBI to obtain her files After
more delay and obstructions, in 1990, the F B I finally released Ahrens' twelve page file
which had so many redactions (black outs) that the only tangible information Ahrens
could glean from the file was the FBI s general source of information: a "confidential
1 70
Gar> Stem XbcFBFs Misguided Probe of CISPES, The Center for National Security Studies. Report
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source who has furnished reliable information in the past." Outraged, Ahrens pressed on
with her suit for full release of her files. 172
In 1990, the case came before U.S. magistrate Michael A. Ponsor of the U.S.
District Court in Springfield. The FBI's obstruction carried over into the court. Before
allowing Ponsor to review Ahrens file, the FBI insisted Ponsor himself undergo a
security check. Ponsor initially denounced the FBI's demand as "superfluous, time
consuming and intrusive upon the judiciary." 173 Nevertheless, Ponsor gave ground and
though seemingly sympathetic to Ahrens, ultimately ruled against her. Realizing the next
judge to hear the case was a conservative even less likely than Ponsor to order the
release of her file, Ahrens and the ACLU dropped the suit. 174
Although Ahrens had initially undertaken the suit out of outrage, she soon
realized the case's value in terms of drawing the public's attention to the federal
government's spying on political dissent in the United States. In this, Ahrens was
successful. Her suit against the FBI drummed up huge local publicity in Western
Massachusetts and was even mentioned in a Jack Anderson piece for the Washington
Post denouncing FBI surveillance of U.S. citizens. 175 To one local newspaper, Ahrens
declared, "The double standard is the glorification of dissent in other countries
[especially Eastern Europe] and the denigration of dissent in this country as being
unpatriotic" In another local newspaper article on her case, Ahrens observed, "My
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political work has included organizing legal demonstrations, public meetings and
educational programs, leafleting, arranging petition campaigns, lobbying and working in
political campaigns If there is surveillance on mc, how many other people doing this
sort ofwork is the FBI watching?"'" Frances Crowe declared, "What Lois has been
doing is the very highest tradition of democratic action She's extremely responsible, a
true patriot
" 178
Support for Ahrens moved beyond the solidarity movement to the community at
large. Denouncing FBI surveillance of a respected and well-liked member of the local
community, the moderate Dajlyjian^^ in an editorial entitled «Spying Qn
Citizens" concluded, "Before we call for democracy in other parts of the world, let's be
sure it's practiced here"' 79 Letters of support flooded the local press, and Ahrens herself
received letters from local conservatives expressing shock at her being spied upon for
the exercise of First Amendment rights To the Valley Advocate Ahrens said, "I've
never had a wider range of people be more supportive than with this effort to force the
FBI's hand, to make them reveal what they do and how they do it," 180 The support for
Ahrens, like the sympathy of local jurors for Sam Lovejoy in 1974 and the CIA
protestors in 1987, stemmed not just from Western Massachusetts' progressive political
climate, but also more broadly from a strong streak of localism which extended as far
back as Shay's Rebellion in 1 786 Just as Crowe and others in Western Massachusetts
recoiled from the efforts of Boston-based activists to centralize the solidarity movement,
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so too did Pioneer Valley residents react viscerally to attempts by distant Washington,
D C. to spy on their local and familiar neighbors.
Jhe Decline of the Solidarity Movement
Despite ongoing Central American solidarity activism in Massachusetts in the
late 1980s, the movement, which had struggled to emerge from the shadow of the freeze
movement m the early 1980s, saw ,tself increasingly eclipsed by the anti-apartheid and
divestment movements The anti-apartheid movement, tracing its origin as far back as
the Chase Manhattan protests in New York City in 1964, had begun gathering steam in
1985 when a number of campuses across the nation witnessed student building takeovers
and construction of makeshift shantytowns in support of the South African liberation
struggle. The 1985 anti-apartheid actions coincided with the massive wave of anti-
embargo protests that swept the nation in the spring of 1985. The solidarity movement
was very supportive of the anti-apartheid movement, and welcomed the opportunity that
the focus on U.S. support for the white minority regime afforded for critiquing U.S. cold
war policy. Yet as the decade progressed, the anti-apartheid movement continued to
gather momentum as events in South Africa increasingly crowded events in Central
America off the headlines. Some solidarity activists drifted off into the burgeoning anti-
apartheid movement. Lois Ahrens felt somewhat betrayed when in 1985, Frances Crowe,
who had played such a crucial role in recruiting her into the solidarity movement, shifted
her focus to the movement against apartheid (throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Crowe
repeatedly shifted her interest to incipient movements, acting, in many ways, unwittingly
397
as a fairly accurate bellwether for the rise and decline ofthe decades' successive
movements.) 181
Although the rising tide of anti-apartheid activism in part accounted for the
solidarity movement's slow decline, more than anything it was the gradual de-escalation
of cold war tensions ushered in by Mikhail Gorbachev and the negotiated end of the
region's civil wars in the early 1 990s which marked the end of the solidarity movement.
For many solidarity activists, the most important event occurred in 1990 when the
unthinkable occurred
- the electoral defeat of Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua to their old foe, Violeta Chamorro and the United Nicaraguan Opposition
(UNO) just at the time when the contra war had all but ended, marking the seeming
victory of the Sandinistas over a decade of U.S.-backed counterrevolution. U.S.
newspapers predicted a Sandinista victory in the internationally monitored election, and
the new Bush administration seemed resigned to co-existence with the leftist government
in Nicaragua. Thus, the defeat, in which the Sandinistas received a little over 42% of the
vote to UNO's 58%, sent shock waves through the movement. 182 The demoralization
and disillusionment following the Sandinista defeat ranks the event with other low points
for the U.S. left in the twentieth century such as the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939,
Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin's crimes at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956
and the forty-nine state re-election of Richard Nixon in 1972. Across Nicaragua,
internationalists packed up their backpacks and began a mass exodus out ofwhat for the
better part of a decade had been a Mecca to the radical left.
181
Interview with Lois Ahrens, December 8, 1996.
182 New York Times
. February 26, 1990.
398
Among the crestfallen activists was Frances Crowe, who recalled, "People were
really sad, let down Maybe the Sandinistas made some mistakes by going too
vigorously" 1 *" Julie Rappaport was more defiant, viewing the Sandinista defeat as the
result of the contra war making it impossible to fulfill the promises of the revolution,
seeing the Sandinista defeat as another example of "the goddamn U S just needing to
get its way. It made me nuts!" 1 *4 Lois Ahrens was introspective:
After the election in Nicaragua, I mean I remember the day of that
election, I remember talking to this friend of mine on the phone who'd
been working in Esteli
| Nicaragua) we were crying
. we were on the
phone crying We were shocked we were crushed. How could this have
happened compared to what we thought was going on, what we had been
told was going on, what we thought we saw was going on? In that way
1 was much more of an unquestioning believer than I thought I was 1
thought I had some critical distance from what was going on [andl that
really shook me up 185
John Brentlinger wrote of the day
I was in Massachusetts the day the Sandinistas lost the election to UNO:
February 25, 1 990, ten years and eight months after the triumph of the
revolution. My friends and I were taken by surprise The polls
consistently showed a strong Sandinista majority, and we thought anyway
that the UNO coalition was such a bizarre collection of political
tendencies that it couldn't have much credibility in Nicaragua We had
already circulated posters and fliers and sold tickets for a Sandinista
victory dance We held the dance, but we also held gatherings in friends'
houses to talk about our shock and dismay and how to react. 186
Brentlinger tried to be optimistic, noting that with the Sandinistas in opposition,
Nicaragua could never slide back to the days of Somoza and that millions of poor
Nicaraguans who supported them would still have a voice even in a more conservative
Interview with Frances Crowe, December 3, 19%.
' Interview with Julie Rappaport, December 10, 1996.
' Interview with Lois Ahrens, December 8, 1996.
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Nicaragua I Mike mosl internationalists, BrentKnge. '» bond with the Nicaragua., people
survived the defta, ofthe Sandinistas and the activis. * „„«! to visit the country
throughout the 1990s
I" the early 1990s, .he civil war in El Salvado. came to a negotiated end leaving
a wasteland ofdeath and destruction beyond even thai experienced in Nicaragua Some
estimates put the dead Iron, El Salvador's eivil war as high as 90,000 In national
elections, the FMLN-FDR won a minority of seats in the Salvadoran legislature foi the
Inst time n, El Salvador's history. The leftist forces failure to win a majority was less
devastating than the Sandinistas defeat in Nicaragua in that the FMLN-FDR had pretty
much abandoned the hope Ofrevolutionary triumph as early as 1982 when the civ.l war
became mired
... stalemate and had committed itselfto a position ofa negotiated end to
the war In the wake ofthe I Jn.led Nations hrokered peace, a U.N, Truth and
Reconciliation Commission was set up to investigate the abuses ofthe previous decade
The worse charges of atrocities against the Salvadoran government were found to be
accurate, as well as charges that the U S administration had actively worked to cover up
massacres such as the 1981 ArmV massac.c at El Mo/.ote, and that the inu.de, oflta
lord, Maura Clarke, Dorothy Ka/.el and Jean Donovan had been ordered by high ranking
Officers m the Salvadoran National Guard
lx;
In the wake ofthe collapse ofthe Soviet Union and the proclamation ol victory
m the cold war by the United Slates, the lefl suffered another blow, although few
identified with Soviet-style communism Where did the decline of revolutionary
lx
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was immense.
movements in Central America leave solidarity activists and the left, asked John
Brentlinger in Th^Be^t_oX\\QiarWeAre?:
The question is made more difficult by the collapse of the so-called
socialist reg,mes in Europe, who gave so much economic support and
encouragement to Nicaragua and other liberation struggles in Latin
America, as well as a context of larger meaning. The world socialist
movement, such as it was, for which Nicaragua's revolution signaled a
new opening in Latin America and a qualitatively higher form of
democracy ,n the evolution of socialist societies, now seems as devastated
as Nicaragua itself Marxism teaches that hope should base itself on
objective conditions. Where is hope to find its way? 188
Despite the left's disillusionment at the failure to realize its highest dreams in the
1980s, the impact of the solidarity movement on U.S. politics in the 1980s
far greater than generally credited By keeping the specter of Vietnam alive, the
solidarity movement helped re-invigorate liberal opposition to the Reagan
administration's foreign policy, especially in Massachusetts, where the state's
congressional delegation, alongside its liberal governor, transformed the Bay State into
the nation's most solid political block of opposition to Reagan's interventionist policies
in Central America Throughout the 1980s, Tip O'Neill, Ted Kennedy, Gerry Studds.,
John Kerry, Michael Dukakis, and Republican Silvio Conte continued to question the
administration's policy, keep the issue of human rights alive and oppose any sign of
direct U.S. military involvement. It was the Reagan administration's illegal
circumvention of Massachusetts' Democratic Congressman Edward Boland's 1982
amendment prohibiting military aid to the Nicaraguan contras, which led to the Iran-
Contra Affair. Just as in many ways U.S. policy in Vietnam and the anti-war movement
had set in motion the events that led to Watergate, so too in the 1980s, the Reagan
administration's obsession with fighting the cold war in Central America, and the
188
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growing opposition ,o that policy, led to the chain of events that cnlmina.ed ,n the
biggest political scandal of the Reagan era
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CHAPTER VI
MASSACHUSETTS POLITICS AND CENTRAL AMERICA, 1979-1990
In mid-December of 1979, Jim Fairchild and George Allen, staff assistants to the
I louse Appropriations Committee, wrote a letter to Representative Silvio Conte, the
moderate Republican from western Massachusetts and ranking Republican on the
Foreign Operations Subcommittee, concerning an upcoming fact finding trip to
Nicaragua Just months into the Sandinista-led revolution that toppled Anastasio
Somoza, the Carter administration was seeking to influence the direction of the new
government through U.S. economic aid tailored to strengthen the Nicaraguan private
sector and promote political pluralism. Carter proposed "reprogramming" (transferring
already appropriated funds from one country to another) $75 million to Nicaragua,
thereby re-instituting aid that had been cut in the waning days of the Somoza
dictatorship Fairchild and Allen wrote Conte that during his trip he should focus on 1
)
who was in charge in Nicaragua; 2) the status of the economy, 3) who would administer
U S aid, 4) whom the aid would benefit, and 5) the extent of Soviet and Cuban
influence in Nicaragua and what threat that might pose to the United States and the
region The staffers concluded: "Since action on this [aid] request will be based mainly
on political impressions of the new government, personal observations would be helpful
in forming a position on the issue. We prepare to travel to Nicaragua on or about January
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2, 1980, to discus, the situ; *itoVi^aMmwdHmn^lM*m**
observe lirsi hand the physical, economic and p cal result, ofthe revolution there." 1
(>M h ; " v 1
"
K
" westera ^sachusetta Republican bog. , .even day trip to
Nicaragua, Throughout his stay, ( ionte jotted down his impress on a yellow lined
notepad, win, first struck the congressman was the extent oi the damage to Managua
the surrounding countryside, Assessing the political situation, ( ! e scribbled on his
pad, "S[andinistas] enjoy 90 «>s% popular support definitely ... command";
"S|;,,uimisi 1 ,s|,,H,vi.,
>
..iow : ,,«ii,,i.,ioH,i,or.
"moderates privately nervous", Regarding
the rebel army thai had recently deposed Somoza, ( lonte jotted down, "S[andinista]
Army ,s the Army" and that theii "Presem equipmenl would delighi the American
Legion «>i World Wai n bufl
( !onte witnessed s Nicaragua still iwepl up ... revolutionary fervoi and optimism
He observed thai the Sandinistas' highly touted literacy campaign was immensely
popular, that many captured members oi Somoza's despised National ( hiard had been
freed, thai the Sandinistas stayed true to theii promise oi no executions, and thai radio
and television aired criticisms oi the new government with relative freedom Although
relations with the Sandinista dominated government were often strained, opposition
political parties nevertheless operated openly,
1
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<>...<• on (,„>,„, Soviet mllucMccwns.nixHl, however; C • ,,
"" k''-'-—
-
"Nicaragua hai few alternative, [to working with the
, "" ,,,,N,;
'M Cuba will .,, ry [theS( ,M]couldtl8 n
beitievw further bawd on populaj sup,
,
how long is quei able." indeed, given
thi te "«»' Nicar^.uf s prime exports, iuch ai cattle and coffte, di, , ip„ v ,,
,lr " ,; "
' nl«bl0C,aCCeilt0U.S ,nm kels was nnnnpc, nlive for the new
B0VW which gave the United State, i
, influence over it But the tong history oi
"s Intervention In Nicaraguajiaintirs pinyni
.si,omK role i ; ,Sai itas'bri i
" ; " ,0 ";,lr 'm ;m<l
"
u,,y
" wen MnmM, ai Ir i, the Soviet I fnion teemed
unwilling i«> bankroll ihe n.« ;.,;,,.,.„, revolution, ( loot, did observe a large ( luban
i"™™ < II*
< ountry rn 1978, Fidel ( astro had played b lignifl. ant role a. mediator
between ihe ih.ee K «ierrilln in, tions that eventually unified ai the PSLN, and although
( iuban arm. ihlpmenti were meagei ( luban advisors abounded i he ( ubana advised the
Sandinisois i<> move
... moderate diret tion Wrote ( onte ... hi. memo pad, "( !ub.
moctoation, bui i ,200 1< luban] tew hers, i ,000 medfi. ,i personnel], and 100 600
l
other.' (« ommunicatlon., etc ) present and 600 n.« [araguan] kids ... ( luba 1 1 he
( lubans were] ...ayix too visible n.< araguan people tell ( luban |okei "'
Assessing .mi i.<- had seen, < onie » «„.< [uded, "We have >.<» i hol< e support [the
new government] oi gel out Although 4,concernedM about the Sandinista trend toward
<<>..< entrating powei and the ( i >- > present e, ( lonte decided i«> give ;> "firm
ret ommendation i<» grant the loan
' iin, i
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Back in Washington, D.C., before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, Conte
outlined the dilemma he and the other members of the committee faced: "What this
committee must decide is, will this aid help the United States to gain access and
influence in the direction of Nicaraguan development, or will this aid assist the eventual
economic stability for a Marxist dictatorship? Even for those of us who will probably
gamble and vote for this aid, it is a difficult question." Despite these reservations, the
committee voted to approve the $70 million loan requested by the Carter administration,
with 60% earmarked for the Nicaraguan private sector.6
The Carter administration's modus vivendi with Nicaragua unraveled in the final
days ofthe administration, when reports of Nicaraguan arms shipments to the FMLN in
El Salvador during their "Final Offensive" of January 1981 led the administration to cut
U.S. aid to Nicaragua. By the end of 1981 the new Reagan administration made the
cutoff permanent and began its secret operations to destabilize the Nicaraguan
government. Events in Nicaragua were quickly overshadowed by developments in El
Salvador, which for the next few years became the frontline in the Reagan
administration's anti-communist policies in Central America. 7
For Silvio Conte, who had generally felt comfortable with the Carter
administration's approach to Central America, the hard right turn of the incoming
Republican administration posed some dilemmas. Although Conte shared Reagan's
stated goal of containing communism in Central America, he nevertheless remained
6 SOC, Draft Statement, "Nicaragua and Honduras Supplemental, FY 1980", Series 3e, Box 64,
Folder: "Nicaragua - Contra Aid, 1980-86", MS 371, Subgroup II, SOC Papers.
William LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America. 1977-1992
(Chapel Hill and London: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1998) 29-32, 69.
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committed to the prineiple of promoting human rights in the region, a poliey from which
the new administration emphatically departed with its highly public firing of
Ambassador Robert White. Further, Conte shared the concern of many that Reagan's
new, hard-line policy could lead to the introduction of U.S. troops in the region,
something he adamantly opposed. Conte was further torn by his dual loyalties: one to his
party which had just reclaimed the White House and was moving to the right; another to
his constituency in the Massachusetts First District, which was fast becoming a hotbed
of activism and moving to the left. Throughout the 1980s, Conte would be increasingly
caught in these crosscurrents. As Activist Lois Ahrens recalled of the solidarity
movement's relationship with Silvio Conte, "We were on his ass."8
The Republican: Silvio Conte. El Salvador and Human Rights
Silvio Conte was shocked to learn in early December 1980 of the murders of Ita
Ford, Maura Clarke, Dorothy Kazel and Jean Donovan. For Conte, a Catholic, the fact
that three of the women were nuns made the atrocity especially abhorrent. Responding to
a letter about the murders from Rev. Thomas W. Olcott of the Council of Churches of
Greater Springfield, Conte outlined his position on human rights in El Salvador:
I strongly supported the Carter administration's decision to suspend
military assistance to El Salvador following the savage murders of
American missionary workers. It has been my view that barring massive
outside intervention, resumption of such assistance should be contingent
upon a full and complete investigation of the recent killings of innocent
Americans, an abatement of violence, the construction of needed social
and economic reforms and a moderation of extremist elements within the
junta. I have felt that renewed military assistance at this time could
exacerbate divisions within El Salvador, contribute to the worsening
Interview with Lois Ahrens, Decemher 1996.
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violence and dangerously escalate U.S. involvement in what is essentiallyan internal struggle within that strife torn country 9
As Conte responded to constituents in January 1981, events in El Salvador were
spiraling out of control The Salvadoran right, anticipating the end of the Carter human
rights policy, had dramatically escalated its violence after the U.S. election in
November Death squad killings reached a crescendo in January, including two more
U.S. citizens, Michael Hammer and Mark Pearlman, members of the AFL-CIO affiliated
Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), an organization dedicated to promoting
non-communist unions in Latin America Pearlman and Hammer had been meeting with
one of the few remaining moderates of thejunta, Jose Rodelfo Viera on an Agency for
International Development (AID) project to help Salvadoran peasants set up
cooperatives On January 3, 1981 masked paramilitaries burst into the restaurant where
Pearlman, I Jammer and Viera were meeting and sprayed the three with machine gun
lire
10
As right-wing violence grew, the FMLN, likewise considering the implications
of Reagan's impending inauguration, launched its "Final Offensive", hoping to topple
the Salvadoran government before Reagan took office The strength of the leftist
offensive took many by surprise, and the Carter administration responded by re-instating
emergency military aid to El Salvador 1
1
Conte assured constituents he would continue
to oppose such aid. In a reply to State Representative John Olver, Conte wrote, "... I
SOC lo Ray Miller and Rev. Thomas W. Olcolt, January 19, 1981. Series 3e, Box 64. Folder
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opposed the [Carter] Administration's decision ofJanuary 14 to resume military aid to
El Salvador My views wee conveyed by telephone to both the White I louse and the
State Department as soon as news ofthe impending decision reached my office, these
views were reiterated in a telegram to President Carter on January 16 »u Conte
promised to go even further in the coming session
Under the new Reagan Admm.slral.on I am CO-sponsoring legislation
which would suspend military assistance to El Salvador pending hearings
in the l louse Committee on Foreign Affairs on progress in the
'
investigation Ofthe murders ofthe six Americans, and on ways to
strengthen forces of moderation in Id Salvador to bring about reforms and
to achieve a negotiated settlement 1
1
Conte's haul hue began to soften by March 1981 The Reagan administration
had juSl authorized $20 million in emergency aid to El Salvado, and now sought an
additional $5 million in rep.og.a.n.ned aid from the f oreign Operations Subcommittee M
As the ranking Republican on the Democratically controlled committee, Conte did not
relish casting what would have been the deeding vole against the new Republican
president Although relatively small, the $5 million was a highly symbolic ea.ly test for
the new administration's policy in El Salvado. Conte cast the deeding yes' vole Torn,
Conte fell compelled to justify his vole at length before the committee on March 24.
Conte began with more rigid cold war rhetoric than was customary for the moderate,
declaring, "Mr Chairman, I will vote for approval solely because of my great concern
that the failure to support the President and his policy tO stand up lo international
I
'
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lerronsm and aggression would send the wrong signal to the Soviet Union and Cuba
which could have adverse repercussions on the United States and its all.es around the
world." 15 Having staked out common ground with the administration, Conte then
qualified his vote in words more in keeping with his human rights concerns:
However, I do not believe a military solution is the answer to an end in
the Violence in El Salvador, which remains my major concern I want to
make it absolutely clear to the El Salvadoran government the
Administration, the people of this country and my colleagues in the
Congress that I will not support any further military assistance for the
government of HI Salvador unless and until the investigation of the
killings of the Americans in El Salvador late last year has been completed
and I have assurances that the El Salvador government will no longer
permit its military and security forces to indict violence on innocent
civilians in that country
.
Contc's stair prepared for the backlash that was sure to follow his March 24 vote
In a memo entitled, "Speaking Points on HI Salvador", Conte and his staff set down
r esponses that would be included in replies to constituents' letters, phone calls and
reporters' questions The "basic position" outlined in the memo was that Conte hoped to
build up the Salvadoran center against the extremes of left and right, and that he felt he
needed to support the new President on his first major foreign policy test to uphold the
<«lministration's credibility around the world "Given the situation and my basic
position, 1 was torn over which way to vote last week," the memo read 17 Conte argued
that his vote would have had no impact on the larger military aid package "I was not
"Remarks of Hon. SOC before the Foreign Operations Subcoinniiiicc of the l ull House
Appropriations Committee", March 24. 1981 Scries 3c. Box 64, Folder "El Salvador Lcllcrs
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give
willing ,o take this risk [ofembarrassing the president] i„ a TOte whicl, would ,U)1 havc
any meaningful effect in halting military assistance to El Salvador."
Yet, while arguing his vote would have had no affect on changing administration policy.
Conte and his stall simultaneously laid on, an argument that asserted his vote would g
him influence over future policy: "My vote was justified, both on hroad foreign policy
grounds in avoiding potentially high costs elsewhere in the world, and iu increasing ,ny
leverage over the administration and the El Salvador™ government to insist that the
violence he reduced and the investigation of the killing ofthe Americans be
completed."'"
In a section ofthe memo entitled "IfAsked Only" Conte's staff set about finding
a response should anyone ask the Congressman about any
"inconsistency between
^sponsoring I l.Con.Res. 67, whieh calls for a suspension ofmilitary assistance and
your Mareh 24 vote." Ifthese contradictory positions were raised, Conte was to reply
that the $5 million in military aid was lor uniforms, vehicles, communications, and
patrol boats, which were "defensive" in nature, and he would "not support sending
weapons, ammunition or advisors to that country - barring massive outside
intervention." 19
Conte's subtle distinctions were lost on his constituents, who inundated his
offices with letters, telegrams and phone calls. "I was shocked and saddened to read of
your vote in favor of sending additional military aid to El Salvador," wrote one
constituent, "What on earth were you thinking? Was it so long ago that the Vietnam War
18
Ibid.
19
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began under almost the exact circumstances? Have you learned nothing from recent
history? Chile, Vietnam, Iran and now El Salvador..." 20
Then on April 1 1, local solidarity activists printed an ad in the Daily Hampshire
Gazette, entitled, "An Open Letter to Silvio Conte". It addressed Conte stating:
MR CONTE you cast the determining vote to send $5 000 000 of
additional military aid to the governing terrorists in El Salvador You saidyou wanted to send a signal to the Soviets and Cuba and to support the
administration. You admitted this went against majority sentiment in your
district. But we can't blame the Soviets and Cuba for more than 50 years
of oppression ,n El Salvador, Nicaragua and the rest of Latin AmericaWe bear responsibility for that. We understand your feeling of party
loyalty, but in this case it is misplaced We must cease propping up
militarist regimes which rule by terrorism... U.S. Rep. Gerald Studds (D -
Mass.) recently back from an investigating trip to Central America told
your committee, Mr. Conte, that "most of the terrorism in El Salvador has
oeen perpetrated by the forces now receiving U.S. arms training We are
sending to the military in El Salvador a signal that any acts committed in
the name of anti-Communism are acts committed with the prestige and
power and blessing of the United States..." MR. CONTE we believe the
evidence is overwhelming: The El Salvadoran revolution is supported by
the great majority of the people - peasants, church leaders, businessmen
and professionals. The army controls the government and paramilitary
terrorist forces. The revolution has arisen out of decades of what our own
State Department concedes has been "repression, widespread poverty and
concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few families "21
The ad included a photograph of Maryknoll nuns praying over the bodies of the
murdered U.S. churchwomen, with the caption, "El Salvador Government Terrorism "
As the uproar grew Conte went on the offensive. Responding to one constituent,
Conte reiterated, "I am convinced that my vote was justified - and is in line with the
desires of the majority of the First District - in avoiding potentially high foreign policy
David J. Hocy to SOC. Received April 24, 1981. Series 3e, Box 64, Folder: "El Salvador
Letters and Statements", MS 371, Subgroup II, SOC Papers.
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costs and m increasing my leverage over the El Salvadoran government and the
Administration. In a lengthy letter to Susan Klein-Berndt, the Northampton
organizer of the signature ad, Conte wrote that he was "disappointed" with the piece,
which he felt Ported his position. Conte again asserted, "I was concerned about
misinterpretation that could arise from the failure of Congress to support a new president
in his first foreign policy test and which could result in adverse repercussions for the
United States and its allies in areas other than El Salvador."23 Conte also objected to the
ad's depiction of him as someone blindly adhering to cold war dogma Stating that he
had long held the region's problems were rooted in a history of poverty, Conte wrote,
"To imply I 'Blame the Soviets and Cuba for the past 50 years of aggression in El
Salvador', is a major distortion " 24 Conte then took issue with what he felt was the ad's
embrace of the FMLN-FDR as "the forces of tomorrow", stating, "I was surprised to
read your claim that 'the evidence is overwhelming' that the Democratic Revolutionary
Front (FDR) is supported by 'the great majority of people "'25 (In actuality, the ad stated
"The El Salvadoran revolution is supported by the great majority of the people ") Conte
then referred to recent discussions he had with Salvadoran Archbishop Rivera y Damas,
in which the cleric avowed support for Duarte and the moderate elements in thejunta
and declared the left and the right "arch enemies" of the current government. Conte then
_
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embarked on an impassioned defense of Duarte tha, would gradually cool over the
coming years:
The reasons why you insist upon abandoning President Duarte and theJunta
- probably the only realistic hope for a democratic government
without a mass;ve and protracted civil war - which would mean a
resurgence of the extreme right oligarchy, a reversal of land reform
progress and mcreased violence, escape me. It would seem that the
qualified support for President Duarte's government given its reforms thegreatest civilian control of any El Salvadoran government in recent
history.
.
.
and it s offers to negotiate with the FDR, conforms with your
appeal in your advertisement for an 'identification with the forces of
Conte's assertive defense of his March 24 vote did little to mollify his critics in
the First District. Letters, telegrams and calls continued to pour into the congressman's
offices. Despite the occasional note of support, Conte's advocacy of human rights in El
Salvador was being lost amidst the chorus of criticism. Concerned, Conte's staff sought
to get the congressman's message out. In an interview with the Daily Hampshire
Gazette, Conte aide Bruce Benton insisted the March 24 vote "is not a reversal of
Conte's previous stand against military aid" and that the equipment to be purchased was
"defensive". Benton argued that Conte would not support weapons or U.S. military
advisors, emphasizing, "That's military aid."27 Benton's efforts at damage control
extended to participating in a panel discussion held by the Northampton Committee on
El Salvador at the Unitarian Church before an audience of 1 50. Benton argued the
United States needed to support Duarte not just against the leftist rebels, but even more
against the extreme right, which frequently threatened to topple thejunta. A right-wing
26
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coup, Bemon told the group, would lead to violence "far bloodier than anything ,ha, has
gone on so far."28
After the storm over Conte's $5million military aid vote subsided, Conte worked
hard to mollify his many angry constituents. In the spring of 1981, Conte voted for the
Solarz-Brigham Amendment sponsored by New York Democrats Stephen Solarz and
John Bingham, which required the president to certify to Congress every 180 days that
five conditions were being met m El Salvador. To receive further congressional military
aid for El Salvador, the president needed to certify that the Salvadoran government: 1)
was not carrying out "a consistent pattern of gross violation of internationally recognized
human rights; 2) was achieving control over the military; 3) making progress in land
reform; 4) committed to holding national elections at the earliest date and 5) showing a
willingness to negotiate an end to the war. Although the amendment lacked the teeth of a
legislative veto and only required the administration to claim progress toward the five
stated objectives, the amendment kept El Salvador on the congressional agenda and
provided a yardstick by which to measure progress in El Salvador and administration
veracity. Proponents further argued that by threatening to stop military aid, the Solarz-
Bingham bill provided the administration a tool with which to extract concessions from
the recalcitrant Salvadoran government. 29 Conte embraced the Solarz-Bingham
amendment, proclaiming, "... I will not vote another nickel until these conditions are
28
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met." When the administration issued its firs, certification m early 1982, Conte was
skeptical, declaring,
«... ] was dismayed to Learn thai the President had certified on
January 28 .hat these live conditions had been Complied with Information as to progress
OH human rights lor El Salvador's citizens, the land reform program, Iree elections and
Civilian control over the security and armed forces appears to he arnh.guous at hest »31
Conte remained committed., however, to seeking to holster Duartc with non-
military aid In this, Conte disagreed with left-leaning activists ,n his district who saw
the Christian Democrat as an iiieflfectuaJ facade of civilian rule, which masked the real
power ofthe military and oligarchy so that U S aid continued to flow Yet Conte
emphasized that he supported negotiations and not a mUitary victory by eithei side as the
only way out ofthe crisis In the fall of 1981, Conte responded to one constituent, "Let
me assure you that I continue to support and work lor a settlement in El Salvador which
would solidify and expand the base of a moderate government, and cult the senseless
violence from both the right and left In my view this requires that the Duaite
government demonstrate more flexibility toward the prospect of negotiations with the
opposition " ,2
Conte continued to walk the tightrope between the Republican administration
and his district in 1982 Upon completion ofanother Central American fact-finding trip
in ,,
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by Appropriations Committee staff*! JimFairohild,C e issue e foliowing statemenl
to the Foreign Operations Subcommittee:
Increased mMaiy assistance would risk strei^ii.c.,.,,,. repressive
e •nKn.sHMlK-nnl,,„ y; „
;
dse(11(1,vN > ,ee.. Also, a uniiaieral withdrawal
oi .11
1
i s. support from the Duarte governmenl prioi to any noUtical
^lement would risk the killing oi many more iilcenl JLJS
church leaders through b seizure ol power by the extreme right and an
escalation ol fighting by the extreme left. I fence, i reaffirm my position
opposing any increase ol military assistance to El Salvadoi undei theP"" circumstances. However, I continue to support ecoi lie and
l " ,
;;
,;
;
,,l,; " ,
;
m ***** to *» government, While support foi total
withdrawal ofU.S presence from El Salvador may be politfaSy
appealing i must take a responsible position and avoid those steps which
mignt lead to an increase in the violence in El Salvadoi 13
'" the BPrin8 01 19»2, Mexican President Lopez Portillo set forth a peace
initiative in what would be the firsl ol many regional efforts to end the bloodshed in
( antral America [n 198 1, Mexico, Venezuela, and ( olumbia put forth the ( lontadoro
Peace proposal, which was followed by the peace plan proposed by ( losta Rican
president Oscai Arias, Many in Congress eagerly embraced these regional eflforts The
first effort by President Portillo emboldened ( !onte, who declared:
M>ove all, a majoi eflfort is needed to achieve a negotiated, multilateral
political settlement in Bl Salvador. To this end i have sent a lettei to
President Reagan expressing my strong support oi Mexican President
Lopez PortihVs recent peace initiative.., i am also an original co sponsoi
oi II i R es 405, introduced by Congressman Barnes and Solarz, urging
the President to press foi unconditional negotiations among the major
political (actions in El Salvador,
"
"Statement of U.S Rep, S< >< <i< Masi ) .... the < pletion ol a Bu I findng mission In I tatral
America <>i Foreign < Operations Appropriations Subcommittee stafl membei Jim Fairchild",
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(M position distanced him more from the administratbn, which generally
ofnegotiations, For the administratu egotiations ma he limited
ofreaching terms whereby the rebels would pul down their arms and participate ...
government run elections, The FMLN FDR stuck to the position thai without power
sharing and restructuring ofthe armed forces, conditions would remain unsafe fo, those
on left- The administration argued thai power sharing ... afiect would allow the
FMLN FDR to"shoo1 theu way to power".33
1 however, like many ofhis colleagues and much oi the U.S. press and
media, was enthusiastic aboul the Salvadoran elections held ... March 1982. In the
electi0M,Duejte»sO1ristian Democrats squared offagainsl a coalition ofconservative
parties led by the newly formed National Republican Alliance (ARENA), .... extreme
right wing party founded by ex Army Majoi Roberto D'Aubuisson, s ....... reputed to
have ties to many death squads, and described by Robert White as pathological
kfltor", Leftist parties, citing the impossibility ofcampaigning openly i»>. foai <>i theu
lives, boycotted the election and the FMLN sought i<> disrupt the elections, which they
denounced as illegitimate.
l "
I., ii.c- i failed States, the elections were hailed as triumph ol democracy, ...
which votei turnout w;.s unexpectedly high ;...<i many Salvadorans braved rebel sabotage
and bullets ... order to vote (lefl liberal periodicals in the I faited States pointed out thai
voting was mandatory whereas nol voting was a criminal offense ) The results, however,
Hi some like Conte uneasy, a right wing coalition including aki na won a narrow
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-".haled and (he war draped on. " Hy eaj ly I *>h I, ('onto became more vocal in his
^limotBdml^lonpolfcy TWi was due primarily «o ,wo eauses ,„,,,,.
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- Pi e calls and telegrams aii are opposed ... airthei
" lll,,:,,v ;,,<l 1,1 re< e the letters have come outside ol the traditional liberal
hotbeds ol Amherst and Northampton 1,1
Aa concern from the distrii i made itscli lelt, the < use against ii„- „e< used
murderers «»i the foui us, hur< hwomen pound to hall In May <.i 1981, abt membera
-i the Salvadoran National ( hiard had been arrested .. . auspet ta ... the women's ikylnga
(o,k- was subsequently ordered released ) i Respite i ompelling ballistic, nngerprinl and
polygraph evident e obtained by the FBI Unking the ( hiardsmen to the murdei
. and
reporta that the guardsmen had acted on ordera from highei up. ... Novembei 1981 the
1
1
s Embassy and Salvadoran government dex tared Che investigation al .< <ir..<i end 19
a aimilai impasse had been reached ... the i ase oi am i d workers Mark Pearlman and
Michael i lammei
.
despite strong evident e that theii deaths had been ordered i>v two
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high ranking military officers and a prominent, wealthy businessman with elose ties to
D'Aubuisson. 40
The Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, which pursued the case
in close cooperation with the victims' families, took up the search for justice in the
murders of the four U.S. churchwomen. Heading the case for the Lawyers Comm,ttee
was Michael H. Posner, who publicly declared that the difficulty in prosecuting the case
was due to the unwillingness of any Salvadoran judge to hear the case for fear of reprisal
by the military Wnting to L. Craig Johnstone of the State Department, Posner declared:
Lawyers in El Salvador have grave, and probably justified fears that if
they become involved in this case their lives may be jeopardized. In
part because of these fears, no lawyer appears willing to help conduct a
thorough invest.gation of the possible involvement of higher authorities
in ordering the killings or covering them up. . 41
Due largely to the persistent efforts of the Lawyers Committee, U.S. Ambassador
to El Salvador Deane Hinton pressured the Salvadoran government to re-open the case.
Finally, in late November 1982, a Salvadoran court agreed to commence a murder trial
of the four accused National Guardsmen. But the courts, backed by the U.S. Embassy,
refused to consider evidence that orders for the murders came from higher up the chain
ofcommand. Posner complained to Johnstone, "A number... of [Salvadoran] lawyers
have stated to us that they do not believe the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador supports a
40 New York Times . October ? 1 1982
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more thorough investigation of the case "42 The limited foeus of the trial divided the
relatives of the victims, some ofwho denounced them as a "sham" 43
The renewed case bogged down further in the early spring of 1983 when the
Salvadoran judiciary announced that FBI ballistic, fmgerprint and polygraph evidence
would be inadmissible under Salvadoran law Without this evidence, the court
announced that there was insufficient evidence to try the case. 44 The ruling set off a
storm of protest in the United States During this time, Posner contacted Johnstone at the
State Department and inquired whether Conte would "act as a 'good faith broker'",
citing the congressman's "(I longtime interest in the case" and position of "no more aid
till [the case wasj resolved " Conte agreed and began corresponding with the Lawyers
Committee and receiving regular updates on the case 45
Posner appeared at hearings before Conte's Foreign Operations Subcommittee in
March 1983 and described the obstacles the Lawyers Committee encountered while
pursuing justice for the churchwomen when he last traveled to El Salvador the previous
January with William Ford, brother of Ita Ford Posner described for the committee the
"shocking pattern of official indifference, incompetence and ill will" toward the case he
encountered from Salvadoran officials. 46 According to Posner, the highest Salvadoran
42
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Washington Post March 17, 19X1
judicial figure, Prosecutor Genera, Dr. Mario AdaJberto Rivera "... and his staffare both
shockingly uninterested and wholly unprepared for trial... [and]... continue to ignore
existing evidence that there were orders from superiors to apprehend the women."47
Speaking of the judge hearing the case, Posner complained, "Salvadoran judges - those
who survive
- seem to find ways to avoid bringing homicide charges to trial. As of last
summer, we were told that Judge [Bernardo] Rauda [Marcia] had sixty murder cases
pending before him and not one had been closed. Each week he inspects five or six
bodies
-
new murders in which no investigation is even opened."48 Posner concluded his
testimony with an impassioned plea to the committee:
Mr. Chairman, in the two years since the deaths of the four women, their
case has taken on a special significance. To be sure, only a narrow
parochialism could judge these murders worse or even more important
than the tens of thousands of murders of Salvadoran citizens by
government forces. But the case of the four churchwomen has come to be
symbolic oi the brutalities that mark the daily life in El Salvador. These
killings (and the murders of the two United States Labor Advisors) have
also become symbolic because in a period when 30,000 civilians,
including the country's Archbishop, have been murdered, many by
government armed forces, only the cases of the North Americans are
being investigated. For this reason, the demand to fix responsibility in this
case becomes part ofa far wider demand, that elementary respect for
human life and human rights may be restored and recognized as
obligations by those who govern li\ Salvador.49
Outside the hearings, at Posner's request, Conte agreed to contact the Salvadoran
Fiscal General Mario Adalherto Rivera about the stalled case. In a formal letter, Conte
expressed his concerns to EI Salvador's top judicial official:
47
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...
I am not an expert in Salvadoran law, by any means, but I amconcerned about v.tal evidenee apparently ignored andp« P_
Umted States askance to your country. I realize that you must upholdand enforce the laws of your country, but I urge you to useThe powTrs ofyour good office to admit this valuable information. The feVand^proper
Rivera replied to Contc's letter, "I feel honored to have received from you the
letter in which you refer to the case under investigation concerning the death of the
American nuns..." Rivera blamed the "formalities" ofthe Salvadoran justice system for
the difficulties in pursuing the case, insisting, "Our investigative system suffers from a
certain rigidity."51
Conte sought to pressure not only the Salvadoran government but the Reagan
administration as well. During the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, Conte politely but
firmly confronted Secretary of State George Schultz over the case, declaring, "...[This]
single case probably causes you more difficulty in selling [the administration's proposal
for additional aid]
... than any other issue... The only conclusion I can personally draw
is that we haven't got their [the Salvadoran government's] attention on this issue."52
Schultz, who sought to replace his predecessor Alexander Haig's confrontational style
with a more conciliatory approach to Congress, responded to Conte's remarks, "Before I
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can se.1 you,
.
have to sell myself Some of ,hese eases are deeply troubhng to me; there
just has to be a better job done on it."53
In June of 1 983, Conte look to the floor of the House of Representatives, and
announced his support for a resolution by Massachusetts Democrat Gerry Studds, which
added a verdict in the cases of the murdered U.S. citizens to the certification
requirements for U.S. military aid to El Salvador. In hi.s most impassioned remarks on
the case to date, Conte declared:
Mr. Speaker, this depressing story ol the six brutally murdered Americans
is not a new chapter in the unfolding saga of El Salvador On the
contrary these cases are a recurring story with no conclusion in sight
Maura Clarke, Jean Donovan, Ita Ford, and Dorthoy Ka/el were
murdered ,n December of 1980. Michael Kline and John Sullivan were
killed m 1 98 1
.
1 wo and a half years have passed since these events took
place and little measurable progress has been made to resolve the case
and bring the guilty to justice. The immediate question everyone must ask
is 'why'?
... But there's another question that bothers me even more
I low can a close and well-supported ally apparently ignore the cry of
outrage by the American public and Congress?54
Echoing a point made frequently by the Lawyers Committee and those in the solidarity
movement, Conte asked, "If the treatment of this highly publicized and crucial case is
any indication of the administration ofjustice in El Salvador, what chance do
campesinos have? How can villagers in Morazan or Santa Ana feel secure knowing there
is little to prevent indiscriminate murders or larceny?"55
Draft: "Remarks of the Hon. SOC in Support of H.R. 1271." Series 3e, Box 64, Folder: "El
Salvador: f ourth Certification, 1983-84", MS 371, Subgroup II, SOC Papers . The Studds
Amendment on behalf of which Conte spoke, was intended to reinstate the requirement, which
had lapsed.
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Conte's staff sought to amplify the Congressman's new outspokenness for
constituents in the First Distriet with press releases. Taklng note, the
Gazette in a pieee entitled, "Conte Toughens Stance", summed up Conte's trajectory o,
El Salvador over the eourse of the three previous years, stating, "The unresolved
murders have been a concern of Conte's since 1981 ... After eoming under fire for
casting a subcommktee vote that allowed military aid to continue to El Salvador, Conte
promised he would vote for no further aid until the murderers were brought to justice..
.
Nevertheless, yesterday's remarks represent another step by Conte to distance himself
from the administration's poliey in Central America and to appease constituents who
have pressured him since January to stop military aid to El Salvador."56
In November of 1983, Conte voted with a majority of Congress to withhold $19
million of a larger military aid package until there was a verdict in the case of the four
National Guardsmen accused of the churchwomen's murders. The case was reopened
and in May 1984, a five-member jury rendered a guilty verdict in the case of the four
Guardsmen, whom the court subsequently sentenced to thirty years (ironically, El
Salvador's had no death penalty). An attorney for the Lawyers Committee for
International Human Rights was ambivalent, telling a reporter for the New York Times .
"I don't want to undermine what has happened but almost everything about this case
makes me uncomfortable.
.. It's an American show. We - the Lawyers Committee
representing the family, members ofConfess, the American Embassy, the Justice
Department - have nudged them and shoved them every step of the way."57 Four years
56
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later, all but one of the convicted Guardsmen admitted to having received orders to kill
the churchwomen from high up the military chain ofcommand Three of the Guardsmen
were released later that year.
IheJJberal Crusader^Representative Gerry St.iHrk
Silvio Conte's remarks on the floor of the Congress in the spring of 1 983 came as
a rousing endorsement of an amendment reinstating a verdict in the churchwomen 's
murder case to the certification requirements for military aid A verdict had been part of
the certification requirements of the Solarz-Bingham amendment but had recently
lapsed The popular amendment to reinstate the verdict requirement was the work of
Gerald ("Gerry") E. Studds, a passionate liberal representing the Massachusetts Twelfth
District, which encompassed Cape Cod, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket. From the
outset of the debate on Central America, Studds had emerged as one of the most
outspoken critics of Reagan's Central American policies, joining other liberal Democrats
such as Michigan's John Conyers, California's Ron Dellums, Maryland's Michael
Barnes and Connecticut's Christopher Dodd in leading the opposition to the
administration's new direction. As a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Studds was strategically positioned to contest the new policy, and he earned a reputation
for challenging the president on both the arms race and Central America. 58
Studds political views were shaped in the cauldron of the 1960s. After graduating
from Yale in I960, he went directly into the Foreign Service Offices, and then
transferred to the staff of President John Kennedy where he remained from late 1962
s
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through
.963. ,n the mid-1960s, Studds went to work as a legislative assistant lor New
Jersey Democratic Congressman I farrison A. Williams, Jr. and was witness to the
mayhem of the ,968 Democratic Convention as a delegate in the Convention Hall. Over
the course ofthe next few years, Studds taught history and served in the Office ofthe
President ofthe University of Massachusetts. In
.972, Studds won election to Congress
from the Twelfth District, a bastion of liberalism in the only state to go for (ieorge
McGovern. Thereafter, Studds continued to win re-election, even in 1978, when Studds'
opponent leveled charges of homosexuality against him. After surviving that challenge,
Studds became one of the first openly gay members ofCongress.59
Studds became an ardent proponent of post- 1 960s liberalism, which sought to
change the cold war policies and ideology that had led the United States into the
Vietnam War. I lis unllagging liberalism remained unchanged alter the conservative
resurgence of 1980. Relatively secure in his district, Studds did not undergo the doubts
and soul searching of many liberals in the demoralizing aftermath of the 1980 election.
The election had seen the defeat of such liberal standard bearers as Senators Frank
Church and (ieorge McCiovern, and left the Democrats on the defensive. Observed
Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas at the time, "The last election changed things. Not
only did we lose Democrats and liberals, but those who are left are so weary. I weryonc
is running for cover from Reagan and the conservative trend."60 Studds emerged from
the debacle zealously committed to rallying liberal opposition to the new administration.
59 New York Times. July 15, 1983
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Like Silvio Conte, Studds became involved in the Central American crisis before
Ronald Reagan took office. Studds traveled to Central America from January 9 to 19,
1981 in a fact-finding mission sponsored by the Boston-based Unitarian Universalist
Service Committee. He was accompanied on his trip by Representatives Barbara
Mikulski (D-Md.) and Robert Edgar. On his trip, Studds gathered information on Costa
Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador, which he summarized in a
report for the House Foreign Affairs Committee chaired by Clement J. Zablocki.
Although the report began with a foreword by Zablocki stating, "The findings and
recommendations contained in this report are those of Representative Studds and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs," the
report became a benchmark document of left-leaning liberalism and was frequently
quoted by liberals and radicals alike, as it was in the 1981 Daily Hampshire Gazette ad
assailing Conte's $5 million military aid vote. 61
Studds' report was a combination of information summaries and policy
recommendations. The report was especially concerned with events in Nicaragua. In
descriptive prose, Studds began his section on Nicaragua:
Rising from the ashes of a devastating earthquake and civil war,
Nicaragua's future political course remains as yet unclear. The air and
airwaves continue to crackle with the exhilaration of revolution, the
boundless energy of an entire society set free at last to determine its own
fate. Able now to make their own mistakes, the Somozaless segments of
Nicaragua have forged a mixed record of social progress, economic ups
and downs and festering political discord. 62
Gerry E. Studds. "Central America, 1981
: Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, United
States House of Representatives." (Washington, DC: U.S. G.P.O., 1981); Daily Hampshire
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Like Conte before him, Studds perceived most Nicaraguans' support for the
revolution, writing, "Their accomplishment has been to create within Nicaragua a
universal commitment to greater social equity and concern for the country's multitude of
poor, ill-clothed, ill-fed and sick people. There is a fully shared sense the revolution is
necessary and just."63 Studds emphasized the indigenous nature of the revolution and the
insistence by most of those he met "that Nicaragua has the right to resolve its own
destiny absent the intervention of other powers, most particularly the United States."64
Yet, like Conte, Studds described a revolution of indeterminate direction, commenting,
"
-Nicaraguans do not agree among themselves on the nature of the revolution they
have made "65
During its sojourn in Nicaragua, the delegation made the usual rounds of
Sandinistas, political and business opposition leaders and ordinary Nicaraguans One
issue of concern to Studds, raised by many Costa Rican and Honduran officials he had
interviewed, was the rapidly expanding size of the Nicaraguan Army, then over 30,000.
When he inquired about this, Sandinista officials cited the fear of U.S. supported
counterrevolution. According to the report, "Nicaraguan junta members and those in the
Sandinista party, argue they must prepare for the counterrevolutionary attacks which
they believe will inevitably occur. They point to the precedent of the Bay of Pigs. . "66
Many seemed braced for the incoming Reagan administration. Studds wrote, "the entire
64
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Nicaraguan leadership is aware of the rhetoric used by caudate Reagan" which called
for "'the removal of the government in Managua."- Studds described one Sandinista
official who anticipated a Vietnam scenario: "One junta member told us that the size of
the armed forces was predicated on the need to hold offinvading American forces long
enough to cause U.S. public opinion to mobilize in opposition to the intervention."68
Like Conte, Studds was convinced the nature of the Nicaraguan export economy
moved the country toward cooperation with the United States and maintenance ofa
mixed economy. The report stated, "Nicaragua seeks aid from, and friendship with, all
nations of the world. Elementary economics permit them no choice. Fidel Castro's
demeaning and frustrating dependence on the Soviet Union is not seen by Nicaragua's
new leadership as a desirable model for their country to follow."69 Yet, in an argument
that would be echoed often in the coming years, the report argues that a U.S. economic
embargo would force Nicaragua to "rely on Cuba and the Soviet Union for the assistance
they must have to rebuild."70 Studds nevertheless reported the frustration of Nicaraguan
business leaders who complained of excessive Sandinista regulation and lack of
incentives for investment. 71
Although generally sympathetic to the Nicaraguan revolution, the Studds Report
was critical of the new government in several areas. Studds noted anger over an
67
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*H^^mmM*i*nu*toMd*to examples ofharassmel the
opposition; possible Sandinista involvement with the assassination ofan opposition
business leader, forge Salazai indefinite postponement oi elections; and the nation's
precarious press freedom Writing oi the selective concern ove. human rights thai
permeated the cold wai era, Studds, declared, "Nicaragua has become a I is test
ideally suited foi the separation ofhuman rights hypocrites of both the left and right
,m
'"
" ,,,SC; W,,,, fl *" 90 '<> "OCial and civO justice The.c arc many who now
express great angei and shock a, the shortcomings of the FSLN who nevei uttered a
whimpei ofconcern during the Somoza era Others exist, howevei . who accepl all too
willingly the rationalizations ofthc i si ,n. despite a propensity to criticize the same type
oi arguments bitterly when pui forth by regimes perceived as right wing /;
'" ll,r
"Recommendations" sectl his report «... Nicaragua, Studds advocated
what amounted to a liberalized version oi theearliei Cartel policy The report
recommended, The i United States musi be objective, patient and restrained As long as
b legitimate chance exists foi a pluralist Nicaragua, theU.S should continue a modest
economic aid program unadorned by gratuitous strings
M
Studds furthei warned against
a premature retreat into the national security* pretexts so often and tragically used to
justify intervention ... the past 1,74 Foi Studds, the Nicaraguan revolution needed to be
viewed outside cold wai lenses I he u poil Contended, "The I haled Stales needs lo keep
the Nicaraguan revolution in perspective n is. aftei all, a revolution different from any
' /w. 9
'/hi,/, II
M
Ihul
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other; far different, certainly, from CWs. There is no single charismatic leader, there
was no single force which won the victory..."75
The report concluded with a pica for the United States to respect Nicaragnans'
right to self-determination:
The most important result of the revolution in Nicaragua, after all, is not
m C entral America. 7 he most important result is that the people who
fought, and whose friends were bombed, and whose children and wives
were wounded or crippled or ripped apart, are now the ones that count indetermining the future political life of their own country. This is, after all
what revolutions are fought for, and this is why revolutions are won. 76
'
Studds^ ten-day trip coincided with the most fierce period of the Salvadoran civil
war; a period in which the FMLN launched its "Final Offensive" and right-wing death
squad killings reached a new high. The U.S. State Department thus advised Studds and
his entourage no. to enter El Salvador. 77 The group did, however, arrange to meet in
I londuras with a few Christian Democrats representing the Salvadoran government, non-
Marxist members of the FDR, and campesino refugees from the war. Studds spoke with
Jose Morales f-hrlich, the second ranking Christian Democrat in the Salvadoran junta
who told Studds "neither a pure capitalist nor pure Marxist approach will succeed in El
Salvador" and that the government aimed "to oust the oligarchy which has historically
dominated [El Salvador]..." Morales painted a picture of a government that was gaining
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control over the forces of the radical left and extreme right and promised «[t]he birth
pains of the new Salvadoran democracy
. . were almost at an end " 78
Studds also met with Social Democrats Ruben Zamora and Fabio Castillo, two of
the top ranking members ofthe FDR, who, while acknowledging the extensive role of
Marxists in the movement, described them as less than enamoured of the Soviet Union
but insp,red by the Cubans. The FDR leaders outlined a vision for El Salvador not unlike
that described by the Christian Democrat, Jose Morales Ehrlich: "The long-range goal of
the revolutionary movement.
..is to establish a mixed economy, with some
nationalization of basic services plus an active private sector The National Guard would
be dismantled but democratic elements in the army would be retained."79
Unlike the interviews with the political figures, which seemed to gloss over the
grim realities of El Salvador, the report included verbatim transcripts of interviews
conducted by Congresswoman Mikulski with Salvadoran women who had recently fled
the war zones into neighboring Honduras. The women of the refugee camp recounted
horrific incidents of savagery by the Salvadoran military that were by then becoming all
too familiar. At one point, the interviews were disrupted. The report transcribed
Mikulski speaking into her tape recorder: "While we were doing these interviews, an
airplane flew overhead, and the village immediately is upset because they are afraid that
some harm is going to come to them."80
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Although Studds was unable to enter El Salvador, Mikulski's interviews
confirmed his strong antipathy to aiding the Salvadoran military. Studds
recommendations on El Salvador were the strongest of any country in his report and
staked out a position from which the Massachusetts Democrat would not swerve over the
coming years. The report recommended, "the United States should suspend military
sales, training and assistance to the security forces of El Salvador on the grounds that
those forces are operating independent of responsible civilian control, and are
conducting a systematic campaign of terrorism directed against segments of their own
population." 81 Studds was unpersuaded by the argument that military aid bought time to
bolster the Salvadoran center, and declared, "Current assistance... is being used for
purposes abominable to any concept of democracy or respect for human rights or
dignity. It is granted on the false premise that the Duarte government represents a viable
middle ground in Salvadoran political life, and that the civilian government is both
willing and capable of controlling the baser instincts of the military whose arms keep
them in power."82 Instead, Studds called for a negotiated end to the war in concert with
regional leaders and restructuring of the Salvadoran armed forces. Studds argued the
United States must "respond to reality, not to dogma" and avoid "a desire to appear
tough or to save face by defending rigidly past policies which have clearly failed." 83
In the spring of 1981, Studds proposed the first ofmany "Studds amendments",
this one (H.R. 1 509) calling for an unconditional cut offof all future U.S. military aid to
Kl
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the Salvadoran military. Many opponents of Reagan's po.iey were uncomfortable with
such an overt challenge to the new president and sought instead to influence
administration policy through the certification requirements of the Solarz-Bingham
amendment In response to one of the many letters urging support for the Studds
amendment, Silvio Conte replied, ".
. . I have decided not to cosponsor H R 1509
(Studds Bill) because, the prohibition against U.S. military assistance at any time in the
future, as called for by M R. 1 509, would send a signal that the United States would be
powerless to deter outside intervention, thereby inviting external forces to fill the power
vacuum."
84
Although many liberal Democrats also felt the Studds amendment of 1981
went too far in tying the president's hands on a foreign policy issue, by staking out the
left-flank on opposition to Reagan's policy in El Salvador, Studds provided cover for
other liberal but less radical proposals that aimed to influence administration policy, and
established Studds' reputation as one of the administration's most inveterate foes. 85
In December 1981, the Reagan administration issued its first certification that El
Salvador was meeting the requirements set forth by Congress. The certification seemed
to defy what the press, human rights groups and first hand witnesses reported on the
meager progress of land reform and ongoing human rights violations in El Salvador.
Among the recent accounts of atrocities coming out of El Salvador that December was
the El Mozote massacre in which church and press sources estimated the army had
SOC to Edwin Gablcr, March 31, 1981. Scries 3c, Box 64, Folder: "El Salvador Legislative
Action", MS 371, Subgroup II, SOC Papers
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massacred between 700 and 1,000 peasants" Studds challenged Undersecretary of State
Thomas lenders at a certification hearing, exclaiming, "The president has just certified
that up is down, and in is out, and black is white. 1 anticipate his telling us that war is
peace at any moment.'" When the administration again certified progress on the five
conditions later that year, Studds, joined by thirty-three cosponsors, introduced a bill,
H-J-Res. 552, which declared "the president's July certification with respect to El
Salvador to be null and void" and imposed a two year suspension ofmilitary aid. Still,
fear of the political consequences should the Salvadoran government collapse kept
moderates and many liberals from supporting the Studds bill. 88
In 1983, opposition to the Reagan administration's policy in Central America
gathered momentum for several reasons. First, the Democrats had gained seats in the
November 1982 elections, deflating Reagan's aura of invincibility, which led to
reinvigorated efforts in Congress to support a nuclear weapons freeze resolution and
oppose the president more forcefully on Central America. Second, the legal impasse in
prosecuting the murderers of the churchwomen in El Salvador slowly strengthened
opponents of administration policy. And third, the solidarity movement continued to
expand and redouble efforts to end U.S. support for the Salvadoran military, including a
massive letter writing campaign to Congress. 89 Studds once again sought to mobilize
X.,
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more determined opposition to Reagan's policies by introducing yet another bill to "null
and void" the administration's most recent certification and exercise the congressional
power of the pnrse by terminating U.S. military aid to El Salvador. "At some point we
must be willing to cu, offaid," Studds pronounced at the first certification hearing of the
90
year.
Studds denounced the recent certification, beginning with the case of the U.S.
churchwomen: "Nowhere in the certification documents is there a determination by the
President that the government of El Salvador has made good faith efforts to investigate
and bring to justice those responsible for the murders of the four churchwomen and two
agrarian reform workers in El Salvador two years ago."91 Studds then raised the cases of
Michael Kline, a U.S. citizen found executed at point blank range in El Salvador, and
John Sullivan, a U.S. journalist who had recently disappeared there. In response to the
administration assertion ofhuman rights progress based on a reduction ofdeath squad
murders from an average of400 per month in 1980 to 200 per month in 1983, Studds
declared:
Before certifying positively with respect to El Salvador, the Reagan
Administration has accepted a ludicrously low standard of performance in
the area ofhuman rights... The President's certification should be
rejected because it is not in accord with the facts, and because it
contributes to a complacency in El Salvador, which is dangerous to
moderates in the government and fatal to prospects for peace. 92
"El Salvador: Third Certification Report", MS 371, Subgroup II, SOC Papers : also Daily
Hampshire Gazette. June 7, 1983.
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Studds concluded, "It is not ordinarily the role of Congress both to enact and also to
enforce the law, but with respect to El Salvador and the certification process, that time
has come
"93
Studds solicited cosponsors to his nullification bill in the hope of adding to the
•hirty-threc from his 1982 effort lie circulated a "Dear Colleague" letter throughout the
Mouse of Representatives, in which he detailed the evidence against the administration's
i 94
claims The letter argued that the administration had forced Congress to reassert itself:
Neither the civilian right wing nor the military of El Salvador have earned
continued U.S. support The Reagan administration is unwilling to
sacrifice its other policy goals in order to confront directly the extremists
in that country with whom it has chosen to deal As a result, little
progress toward ending the war or achieving a national reconciliation has
been achieved It is up to Congress, therefore, to act aggressively and to
guarantee that the legal conditions placed on our aid to El Salvador are
taken seriously - both by the government of El Salvador and by our own
executive branch.
The new nullification effort attracted almost one hundred cosponsors. Studds
admitted to the press that his bill had no chance of passing but pressed on nonetheless 96
Despite a Democratic majority in the House and the sympathy of Speaker l ip O'Neill,
Studds once again ran into the obstacle of Democratic moderates, especially from the
south and southwest, who feared an open challenge to the president on what they
regarded as a national security issue. Given the strong anti-communist sentiment in
93
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many members' districts, they were unwilling to embrace any p,„iey the, might email
the charge ofbeing sofl on communism Powerful Democrats such as James Wright of
Texas and David Boren ofOklahoma generally supported administration policy in El
Salvador. Others, though often critical ofthe administration, believed .he Democratic
Party stood more to gain by fudging .he differences between the two panics on Cold
War policies. 97
In late spring of 1983, Studcls decided to challenge what he saw as self-defeating
bipartisanship.
"It eludes me why people search lor bipartisanship at all costs," Studds
told an interviewer lor the NewYoilTime_s, adding,
"Bipartisanship is the code word
foal lets members go the other way on the MX [missile and] duck the problems of
Central America.""* In June, Studds decided publicly to lake on the advocates of
moderation in an op-ed piece in the New York Times, entitled, "Bipartisan Consensus?
A Mirage.""" Studds argued that despite polls showing public apprehension about the
Reagan nuclear arms build up and intervention in Central America, too many Democrats
were willing to support Reagan in these areas. On the MX missile, Studds asserted,
despite the fact that most Democrats "hope to kill it before it kills us", moderates in the
party supported it in the hope it would nudge Reagan toward arms control. Studds
argued that too many Democrats, especially moderates, seemed cowed by Reagan's
personal popularity:
LeoGrande, 157, 588.
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A number of Congressional Democrats seem to feel that PresidentReagan s personal popularity makes it unwise or unsafe toTppose hispolicies directly The President has effectively conveyed to^ Americanpeople a nostalgic and simplistic view of the world. Mr. ReagL^S
ST^ T* bGCaUSe m°St °f US haVe held s^Hewsuntil the clearly contrasting blacks and whites ofyouth gave way to thecomplex grays of adulthood. There are good guys (us) and bad guys(them). Those two sides fight over a kindhearted damsel with a
questionable past (El Salvador), and the winner must always be faster
with a gun
- or as MX defenders would say, must possess a prompterhard target kill capability. In reality of course, nothing is that simple. 100
With a presidential election coming the following year, Studds' piece argued that
Democratic bipartisanship was a mistake and that the party needed to accentuate its
differences with Reagan, not blur them. Studds defied conventional wisdom, which saw
national security policy as playing to Reagan's strengths, and called upon Democrats to
challenge the president head on. Studds wrote:
Barring further economic collapse, if the Democrats don't win on the
issues of war and peace in 1984, they will not win at all. The polls
indicate quite clearly that a majority of the American people oppose
Administration policy in Central America and desire a far more vigorous
effort to control the nuclear arms race. The personal popularity of the
President does not extend to his policies. Democrats can only lose,
therefore, by blurring the real distinctions between their principles and
judgments and those of the President. 101
Shortly after undertaking his public campaign to push the Democratic Party into
a more confident and confrontational direction, a sex scandal seriously slowed
Studds'efforts and exacted a painful political price. Due to widespread rumors
concerning sexual impropriety between members of Congress and congressional pages,
as well as reports of drug use on Capitol Hill, in the early 1 980s the House Ethics
100
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Committee established a commission to investigate the situation. Although the
investigate revealed far less m,sconduct than expected, its report singled out two
members of Congress for reprimands for engaging in sexual activity with seventeen-
year-old pages. One was Daniel B. Crane, an Illinois Republican, whom the commission
charged with having sexual relations with a seventeen-year-old young woman. The other
was Gerry Studds, who, according to the report, had had an affair with a seventeen-year-
old young man in 1973 and reportedly made advances toward two other pages. 102
Studds defended himself by arguing that the affair was consensual, private and
not improper, but waived his right to an Ethics Committee trial in order to protect the
identity of the page. As a consequence, the House Ethics Committee recommended
official reprimands for both Crane and Studds. Although Studds had been openly gay
since the 1970s, the taint of impropriety left him politically wounded and tarnished his
reputation as someone who sought to stake out the moral high ground on issues such as
Central America 103 Newt Gingrich of Georgia, the rising star of a more brash,
ideologically committed brand of right-wing Republicanism, moved to have Studds
expelled from Congress, a move that was squelched by Speaker of the House Tip
O'Neill.
104
Studds survived the scandal and continued to win reelection in the Twelfth
District; however, in 1984, due to Reagan's resounding reelection, the election of Jose
Napolean Duarte as president in El Salvador, and the growing stability of the Salvadoran
102 New York Times. July 15, 1983.
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government as the war settled into a stalemate, El Salvador became less debated and
divisive in the halls of Congress 105 Further, by m.d-decade, U.S. support for the
Nicaraguan contras supplanted El Salvador as the major source of debate when it came
to administration policy in Central Amenca. Although Studds continued to speak out on
both El Salvador and Nicaragua, the period of the early 1980s when he had become the
symbol of opposition to Reagan on El Salvador was slowly fading. By mid-decade, as
the U.S. proxy war against Nicaragua shifted to center stage, and as the Central
American solidarity movement increasingly emerged from the shadows of the freeze
movement, Democratic heavy-weights increasingly took up the mantle of opposition.
The Speaker: Tip O'Neill
Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill came from a very different school of politics
than Gerry Studds O'Neill was one of the last great New Deal-style liberals, a self
proclaimed champion of the "little guy" who unabashedly advocated redistributing
wealth toward the poor and working class. Reared in the backslapping milieu of
Boston's ethnic politics, O'Neill was a master of parliamentary maneuver and
cloakroom compromise. O'Neill was never completely comfortable with the new breed
of issue driven Democratic crusaders who began to flood the party in 1972. In 1988,
O'Neill spoke bluntly to Colorado Senator Gary Hart, a candidate for the Democratic
nomination for president in 1984 and 1988: "You're not my cup of tea... you're this new
105
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type ofliberal i 'm the old work and wages, take care ... the pooi and the I gry [kind
of liberal] I don't like youi kind oi politics "m
Although O'Neill was a product ol the cold wai
, he ... many ways became a
bridge between the "old" and "new" Democrats ... the 1960s when he came oui
relatively early against the Vietnam Wai which he as a tragic mistake that took -is worst
l(
" the P°01 working class O'Neill frequently stated that the one vote he
icwcitcd was ihc vote he cast in 1964 ... support oi the Gulfoi Tonkin Resolution "01
111 the voics i cast during thirty foui years ... the House ofRepresentatives the Gull ol
Tonkin Resolution] is the only one i regret,' said the Speakei ... 1986 ""
Despite the central role Vietni ayed ... shaping the future speakei 's views,
O'Neill remained predominantly interested in domestic affairs and ..eve. displayed a
great deal of savvy when n came to foreign affairs in the 1970s, O'Neill generally
supported entente and the Cartel human rights policy, but aftei the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan ... 1979, he became a staunch supportei ol the Cartel arms build up,
including the m x missile
l<,K
Although O'Neill supported and helped shepherd a nucleai
freeze resolution through the House, he nevertheless worked assiduously to win missile
contracts foi Massachusetts, despite the fact that his Cambridge district was a stronghold
ofthe freeze movement in foreign aiVans, ONeill worked ... the early Reagan years to
i reate an image oi bipartisanship O'Neill supported both Reagan's dispatch oi 1 1 S
marines to i ebanon and ins invasion ofGrenada in 1983, much to the chagrin of liberals
I Mill II (,!•>
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in the party. According to O'Neill biographer John A. Farrell, "If he did not share
Reagan's v,sion, neither did he employ his powers to foil it With a few key exceptions -
most notably U.S. intervention in Central America - the Speaker approached the
President's foreign policy from the mushy bi-partisan center." 109
As the 1980s progressed, O'Neill's opposition to Reagan's policies in El
Salvador and Nicaragua became increasingly adamant. O'Neill's opposition to Reagan's
Central American policies stemmed from two sources. First, like many Americans,
O'Neill feared Reagan's policies could embroil U.S. troops in a Vietnam type quagrmre
According to an aid speaking on Central America, "There's a sense ofdeja vu here for
the Speaker. To him, the question isn't 'Who lost Vietnam?' but 'Who got us into
Vietnam in the first place?"'110 The second source of O'Neill's position was a direct
result of the influence of the Cambridge solidarity movement Although O'Neill was
never completely comfortable with Quakers, academic radicals or others he regarded as
middle class reformers, the presence of numerous nuns and Jesuits in the Cambridge
solidarity movement had a major impact on the devoutly Catholic Speaker 111
In the early 1980s, a Cambridge based woman's solidarity group called the
Nicaraguan Action Group occupied O'Neill's congressional office twice in an effort to
move the Speaker into more forceful opposition to Reagan's Central American policies
Half of the group consisted of nuns who were deeply influenced by liberation theology
and profoundly affected by the murders of Ita Ford, Dorothy Kazel, Maura Clark and
109
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Jean Donovan. Sister Jeane Gallo of the Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur told a reporter
for the N^Tp^u^s in
. 984, "We realized Mr. O'Neill was key to what happened
in the House. Many of us were in his district. The group decided to work on educating
him about Central America and work on him to move things through Congress to help
end human rights abuses " 1 ' 2 According to Anne Shumway, another Nicaraguan Action
Group member, "We've been very pleased that he listens to us. He is a good Catholic
and trusts people in the church who give him information. He's also a humanitarian and
feels he should act on the things he learns." 113
The church had played an important role in shaping O'Neill's outlook since he
was a young man. He attended Dominican primary and secondary schools in Boston
graduated from Boston College, a Jesuit institution. The Speaker was perhaps most
influenced by his Aunt Eunice "Annie" Tolan, who was a nun in the Maryknoll Order
and died at the age of ninety-one in 1981 1,4 Through Sister Annie, O'Neill developed a
profound respect for the Maryknoll Sisterhood and eventually the faith based solidarity
movement. O'Neill told the New York Times "I have a connection with the Maryknoll
Order. I have great trust in that order When nuns and priests come through, I ask them
questions about their feelings, what they see, who the enemy is, and I'm sure I get the
truth. I haven't found any of these missionaries who aren't absolutely opposed to
[Reagan's] policy." 115
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O'NeiU's skepticism ever U.S. intervention had another personal sonree as well
The Speaker frequently told (he s.ory ofa friend Iron, his early years growing up in
Boston, Eddie Kelly, a Marine who went to Nicaragua to light the nationalist AugUStO
Cesar Sandino in the late 1920s. According to O'Neill, Kelly returned in a wheel chair
from a knife wound, embittered by his experience. When O'Neill asked Kelly what the
U.S. Marines were doing in Nicaragua, Kelly responded, "We're taking eare of.he
United Fruit Company" 1 16
In the early years ofthe Reagan administration, O'Neill personally spoke out on
Central Ameriea but took a relatively hands oil attitude toward the divisions in the
Dcmoeratie Party over the issue. Southern Demoerats led by Jim Wright ol l exas tended
to view Central America in a similar manner as Reagan and generally supported the
Republiean president's policies, especially in El Salvador. O'Neill's early Imssvz-fairc
approach toward Central Ameriea grew out ofa decision to try to maintain as much
unity as possible between centrists and liberals in the fierce budget battles of 1981 and
19X2. During this time, members ofthe solidarity movement, and liberals in the
Democratic Party like (ierry Studds worked to push the Speaker into a more assertive
role on Central America." 7
Beginning in 1983, the Speaker slowly began to exert more influence. On April
27, 1981, as debate on military aid to El Salvador became heated in Congress, Ronald
Reagan took his message directly to the American people in a televised address to a joint
session ofCongress given exclusively to the topic of Central America. Reagan called on
116
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Congress to put aside "passivity, resignation and defeatism" and meet "this challenge to
freedom and security in our hemisphere.""8 Comparing himselfto President Harry
Truman in 1947, but sounding eerily like Lyndon Johnson in 1965, Reagan declared,
"The national security of all the Americas is at stake in Central America If we cannot
defend ourselves there, we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere Our credibility would
collapse, our alliances would crumble and the safety of our homeland would be put in
jeopardy."119
It fell to O'Neill and Senate minority leader Robert Byrd of West Virginia to
choose which Democrat would give the ten-minute televised response to the president's
speech Despite southern moderates' opposition, O'Neill and Byrd chose liberal
Connecticut Senator Christopher Dodd to represent the party's response to the
president Dodd had been a driving force behind the certification requirements and a
frequent critic of administration policy. Traditionally, opposition responses to a
president's address seek to showcase rising talent in the party, and are usually relatively
innocuous and quickly forgotten In contrast, Dodd's televised response to the
president's April address created an uproar. Dodd denounced the president's policy as "a
formula for disaster" 121 Rather than pour endless amounts of military aid into Central
America with the risk of U.S. troops to follow, Dodd called for a policy which targeted
"the factors which breed revolution" through economic aid. Dodd proclaimed, "We must
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make violent revolution preventable by making peaceful revolution possible."' 22 In a
challenge to the cold war paradigm invoked by Reagan, Dodd declared:
rL
C
oi*ion
AmenCa WCre raCkCd P°Verty ' therC WOU,d be no
If Central America were not racked with hunger, there would be no
revolution.
If Central America were not racked with injustices, there would be no
revolution.
Dodd went on to detail his first hand experiences in El Salvador, stating, "I know
about the morticians who travel the streets each morning to collect the bodies of those
summarily dispatched the night before by Salvadoran security forces - gangland style -
the victim on the bended knee, thumbs wired behind the back, a bullet in the brain "' 24
Although the bulk of Dodd's response focused on El Salvador, he also denounced the
administration's covert operations against Nicaragua, which he argued would drive the
Sandinistas into the arms of the Soviets and Cubans. Dodd's impassioned conclusion set
Offa wave of anger among most Republicans and a number of southern Democrats.
Dodd quoted Senator Edward Kennedy, who had called the president's policy a
"prescription for a wider war", then inveighed, "When that day comes - when the ldogs
of war'
- are loose in Central America, when the cheering has stopped, we will know
where the President's appeal for more American money and a deeper American
commitment has taken us." 125
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What soon became known as Dodd's "Dogs of War" speech created a good deal
of controversy. Several prominent Democrats such as Jim Wright, Senator Lloyd
Bentsen of Texas and Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson of Washington, made known to
reporters that they were unhappy with O'Neill's choice and Dodd's speech. Jeanne
Kirkpatrick of the State Department denounced Dodd's speech as "demagoguery" and
added, "I know many Democrats didn't think it represented mainstream Democratic
positions " O'Neill stood solidly behind his choice. 126
O'Neill's bi-partisan cooperation with Ronald Reagan on foreign policy
continued to erode throughout 1983. From 1984 through his retirement in 1986, the
Speaker became increasingly outspoken in opposing Reagan's Central American
policies, and began working harder to push the Democratic Party to oppose what was
quickly taking center stage as the major foreign policy battlefield of the mid-1980s, the
U.S. directed contra war against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. 127
The Boland Amendments and Opposition to U.S. Proxy War in Nicaragua
From the time he took office, Ronald Reagan worked to subvert and destabilize
the government in Managua. Beginning in early 1981, the CIA worked to put together an
anti-Sandinista guerrilla army from the remnants of Somoza's old National Guard The
new "contra" army began making forays into Nicaragua from their bases in neighboring
Honduras in mid- 1981, attacking isolated villages in Nicaragua and scurrying back
across the border. Slowly, the covert war grew as the contra army expanded and
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penetrated deeper into Nicaragua's interior Soon, the northern contras were joined by a
southern contra army operating out of Costa Rica, led by a flamboyant former Sandinista
named Eden Pastora, and a rebellion by Mosquito Indians in N.caragua's remote eastern
Atlantic coast.' 28 CIA chiefWilliam Casey met secretly with the Senate and House
Intelligence Committees and assured their respective chairmen, Arizona Republican
Barry Goldwater and Massachusetts Democrat Edward Boland, that the contra army
numbered less than 500 soldiers, and its covert operations were limited to the goal of
interdicting Sandinista arms supplies to the guerrillas in El Salvador In no way was it
U S. policy, Casey assured the committees, to foment efforts to topple the government in
Nicaragua. 129
Elected to Congress in 1952, Ed Boland was hardly a crusader like Gerry Studds,
nor was he an old school liberal like Tip O'Neill. Boland had a reputation as a moderate
who shunned publicity, a foreign policy traditionalist who deferred to presidents but
believed strongly in the rule of law As the New York Times observed, Boland was "not
known for rocking many boats." 130 Boland was the type of circumspect member of
Congress ideally suited to chair an Intelligence Committee He was an establishment
figure who commanded respect on Capitol Hill Boland had been a personal friend of
John F. Kennedy and shared a Washington, D. C apartment with Tip O'Neill. When
William Casey assured Boland of the limited scope of the covert operations in
Nicaragua, Boland took the CIA chief at his word and authorized the secret funds for the
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operation, with the understanding that the goal remain limited to inierdie.ing arms
supplies. 131
In February of 1 982, them^mmm published (he first press reports ofthe
covert raids into Niearagua emanating from Honduras.- The story remained low key,
however, until November of 1982 when Newsweek published detailed reports ofcontra
operations, whieh put the counterrevolutionary army at 4,000 troops (Casey had told
Boland they numbered 1,500) and described reports ofatrocities that would grow
increasingly eommon over the eoming years." 5 In response to the reports, liberal
Representative Tom Hark in oflowa denouneed the eontras as 'Vicious eutthroat
murderers..
.[and| remnants of the evil, murderous National Guard..." and proposed
legislation to ban all I I S. support for any group undertaking military activities against
Niearagua.' 14 To head off what he regarded as a drastie measure, Boland offered a
substitute measure whieh earried the same language as the classified bill, staling that
US. support for the operation be limited to the goal of arms interdiction and not "for the
purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua." The first "Boland" Amendment
passed in December of 1982 by a vote of 41 1-0 and was accepted in conference by the
Republican controlled Senate. 135
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Reports of widening contra attacks and descnptions of contra cruelty continued
to grow in early ,983. Both the House and Senate Intelligence Committees sent fact-
finding delegations to Honduras and Nicaragua to discover exactly what was going on.
Their reports were not reassuring. Congressman Berkley Bedell (D-IA) declared, "If the
American people could have talked with the common people of Nicaragua, whose
women and children are being indiscriminately kidnapped, tortured and killed by
terrorists financed by the American taxpayers, they would rise up in legitimate anger and
demand that support for criminal activity be ended at once." 136 Robert Torricelli (D-NJ)
stated that U.S. officials with whom he had met privately in Central America told him
they regarded the Boland Amendment as a "legal triviality". 137 Senator Patrick Leahy
reported that the contra operations were far broader than anything the Intelligence
Committees had been led to believe, a verdict seconded by House Democrat, Wyche
Fowler of Georgia. 138
Despite protestations by Republicans like Barry Goldwater and Senator Howard
Baker of Tennessee, the cautious Ed Boland declared, "It is my judgment that there has
been an apparent violation of the law. If you look at the stories that have come out of
there, from reporters and members [of Congress] who have gone down there, the
evidence is very strong." 139 Reporters pressed President Reagan for a response to
Boland's comments. "We are complying with the law," insisted Reagan, "...Anything
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that we're doing in that area is simply trying to interdict the supply lines which are
supplying the guerrillas."' 40 Another reporter pressed the matter further: "But Mr.
President, what is the American public to think ifCongressman Boland, who as you
know is chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, says there's strong evidence that
we are violating the law?" Reagan responded by blaming the press, charging, "Well,
maybe some ofyou people misled him." 141
Boland and House Foreign Affairs chairman Clement Zablocki put forth a bill,
which would cut off all funds for the purpose of destabilizing the government of
Nicaragua, and replace the contra's "interdiction" money with $80 million in interdiction
aid for regional governments. Boland's determination grew over the summer when the
administration announced military exercises in Honduras called "Big Pine II" which
lasted six months and involved over 5,000 U.S. Army troops and a huge naval flotilla off
the coast of Nicaragua. Administration saber rattling during Big Pine II convinced many
members of Congress that the administration sought the overthrow of the Sandinista
government, and that the military exercises might even be a precursor to a U.S. invasion
of Nicaragua. 142 The House approved the Boland-Zablocki Amendment, but the
Republican controlled Senate passed $50 million in aid for the contras. Tip O'Neill
urged the House not to budge, but the joint conference committee settled on a
compromise $24 million for the contras. 143
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The foil scope of the CIA's covert activities came to light in the spring of 1 984
when international reports confirmed that the CIA had been mining Nicaraguan harbors
and blowing up coastal oil refineries. Over two dozen intemat.onal ships from around
the world suffered damage from striking the CIA mines, and the oil refinery fires
covertly set by U.S. Special Forces at Corinto necessitated the evacuation of over 20,000
residents and sent millions of gallons of fuel into the environment. Few believed the
Reagan administration's claims that the widespread sabotage was the work of the
contras. The government of Nicaragua took the case to the World Court in the Hague.
The administration quickly announced that they did not recognize the Court's
jurisdiction. Even the administration's most stalwart defender when it came to contra
aid, Barry Gold water, denounced the administration for its illegal activities and keeping
the Intelligence Committees in the dark. 144
Boland submitted yet another amendment to cut off contra funding and "end this
deadly war." In May of 1984, the House passed a third Boland Amendment 241-177.
The Senate voted $28 million, which was held up in conference. This time the
compromise tipped in the House's favor. Although the conference committee approved
$ 1 4 million, the funds were to remain frozen until March of 1 985, and could only then
be dispersed by a joint resolution of Congress. Further, the new Boland Amendment
forbid the channeling of aid to the contras through any government agency. For the first
time, the Boland Amendment of May 1984 cut off all U.S. funds for the contras. With
the cut ofT, a Marine Major named Oliver North, working under the auspices of the
National Security Council, began seeking alternative sources of funding for the contras
144
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who now numbered well over 1 0,000. Working under National Secunty advisors Robert
McFarland and then John Poindexter, North was confident he was carrying out the
president's wishes. In 1985, as part of his secret contra funding operations, North
illegally sold missiles to Iran and diverted the profits to the contras 145
The debates on contra aid during the spring of 1984 represented the apex of
opposition to Reagan's policy toward Nicaragua and forced the issues of Central
America onto the floor of the Republican controlled Senate, where no floor debate had
occurred since the 1981 Throughout the early 1980s, Massachusetts Senator Ted
Kennedy had spoken out against Reagan's policies in Central America but had remained
more focused on the campaign for a nuclear freeze resolution The waning of the freeze
movement and the escalation of the Reagan administration's campaign to destabilize
Nicaragua in 1983 and 1984 led Kennedy to assume a higher profile in the Central
America debates. 146
On March 28, 1984, Kennedy opened Senate debate on additional aid for El
Salvador and the contras with a strong denunciation of administration policies in Central
America, which Kennedy decried as "interventionist" and "imperialistic". "The time is
long overdue for pursuing the path of negotiations," declared Kennedy. 147 When the
Republican leadership sought to limit debate to two days, Kennedy inveighed, "This is
the most important foreign policy issue the Congress will address this year. If the Senate
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can spend two and a half weeks on school prayer and three days on oil mergers, it seems
to me that we can spend more than two days on the issue of Central America." 148
Working closely with Democratic Senators Patrick Leahy (VT) and Christopher Dodd
(CT), Kennedy proposed a series of amendments, which, although doomed in the
Republican controlled Senate, kept the floor open to a sustained debate on Central
America Kennedy's proposals included amendments to: 1) limit aid to El Salvador to
$2
1
million; 2) make all future aid to El Salvador contingent on the resolution of the
murder cases of the U.S. church women and labor advisors; 3) delete all funds to the
contras; and 4) ban the introduction of U.S. combat forces into Central America without
an explicit vote of approval by Congress. Kennedy pushed especially hard for the last
amendment. 149 In response to frequent reports of U.S. military advisors taking on combat
related missions in El Salvador, as well as the expanding military exercises in Honduras
and oft' the coast of Nicaragua, Kennedy wrote Secretary of Defense Weinberger to
protest that the administration was "systematically placing United States ships, planes
and personnel in harms way." 150 Kennedy's effort to forbid the use of U.S. troops
without approval from Congress failed 72-23. The Senator sought to put a positive face
on the vote, stating, "There were only two Senators courageous enough to vote against
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. We did considerably better than that /' 151
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The Reagan administration revived the issue of contra aid in early 1985.
Although Reagan had won a landslide victory over Walter Mondale the previous
November, winning forty-nine of fifty states, the popular president's coattails were
shorter than expected. The Republicans picked up fourteen seats in the House and lost
two in the Senate, neither of which changed hands. Nevertheless, hardliners in the
administration encouraged Reagan to go all out over the issue of contra aid. The
National Security Council's vast, secret, illegal funding network was only enough to
keep the contras in the field, not topple the Sandinista government. Thus, in the spring of
1985, the administration sought to have Congress vote to release the $14 million of
suspended aid set aside by the House-Senate compromise of 1984. 152
Liberals in the House were determined to defeat even the most innocuous
sounding bill for fear that a conference committee compromise would restore military
aid to the contras. The liberals received encouragement from the Speaker, Tip O'Neill
who grew increasingly outspoken against contra aid. The previous year, O'Neill
denounced the contras, stating, "These people have been down there as murderers,
marauders, and rapists.
.
What are we going to do? Reward them? What are they? Paid
Hessians?" 153 Although the Senate voted to release the $14 million in "humanitarian" aid
53-46, the House prevented any bill from passing, which in effect kept the restrictions of
the Boland Amendment in place. 154
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The tide seemed to be running again* the administrate when i, received help
an unexpected quarter. Jus, days after the votes tha, killed contra aid in | :„e Apri,
1985, Niearaguan President Daniel Ortega embarked up,,,, an ill-timed trip to .he Soviet
Union. Reagan administration supporters pointed to the trip as proofoftheir claims that
Nicaragua was moving into the communis, bloc The trip pu, opponents of contra aid on
•he defensive. Speaking ofOrtega, Tip < riH told a reporter. 1 fe-s embarrassed us, to
be perfectly truthful." "We're in a damaging limiting situation," an aide ,„ O'Neill told
another reporter. 155
The Ortega (rip opened up a floodgate of red baiting. White House
Communieations Director Patrick Buchanan declared, 'The Speaker and the House
Democrats, I think, have an obligation to tell the American people why they trusted the
words QfNicaraguan communists over the President ofthe United States, why they put
laith in the promises ofa .nan who heads a regime that is admittedly Marxist-
Leninist."' 50 Although embarrassed by the trip, O'Neill stood his ground in opposing
contra aid. The Speaker declared that Ortega's "visit to Moscow docs not justify an
American attempt to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. It does not justify aid to
the conlras." 1 57
Before the furor over Daniel Ortega's April trip to the Soviet Union died down.
President Reagan issued the executive order imposing a U.S. economic embargo on
New York T.mes
,
May 9. 1985. One of the reasons for Ortega's trip was to cement an oil deal
With the Sov.et Union. Until recently, Nicaragua had received the bulk of its oil from Mexico
which stopped extending Nicaragua oil credits under pressure from the United States LeoGrande
426-28.
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Nicaragua. In response, Tip O'Neill asserted (ha, the , Inited States "musl stop acting like
the elephant that reels in terror every time the mouse scoots across the floor.'""
Meanwhile, the embargo set offa massive wave ofPledge of Resistance protests and sit-
ins across the country. Although the embargo sparked an explosion ofactivist protest
and sharpened liberal opposition to Reagan's policies, the fallout out from Ortega's trip
had turned the tide. The administration moved to have Congress reconsider contra aid.
On June I, 1985, Speaker Tip O'Neill took to the airwaves to respond to
President Reagan's Saturday morning radio address. The Speaker dedicated his radio
time to two topics close to the hearts of radical activists and liberal rclormers: apartheid
in South Africa and U.S. intervention in Central America. In the spring of 1985, huge
campus protests lor university divestment from South Africa swept the country. The
explosion of anti-embargo protests later that spring soon joined the ascendant anti-
apartheid movement. The two movements frequently combined their messages into a
general assault on what they viewed as the hypocrisy of U.S. cold war policy. In his June
I
s
' radio address, the Speaker echoed the movements' linkage of the two issues in a
general broadside against the direction of the Reagan administration's foreign policy at
mid-decade. 159
O'Neill blasted the President's policies in Central America as "a retread version
of gunboat diplomacy", and declared that apartheid had become "a symbol of our policy
in Africa." O'Neill denounced the administration's policy of "constructive engagement"
with the white minority government as "nothing more than a gentleman's agreement to
1,8
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hear no evil, see no evil and speak no evil of South Africa " In Nicaragua, O'Neill
continued, the "gunboat has become a symbol of our policy " The administration, he
added, had "fallen into a trap of believing power is a substitute for diplomacy .» O'Neill
called on America to stand "tall in support of the right of every nation to seek its own
national destiny and the right of every people to choose their own form of
government. Unfortunately in Central America and South Africa, our policies fall short
of that standard What we are doing contradicts what America stands for." 160
O'Neill's radio address received a good deal of attention and stimulated a
significant amount of commentary, but was not enough to defeat renewed contra aid. In
early June, the House of Representatives voted 232-196 against renewing the Boland
Amendment and passed instead a $27 million "non-lethal" aid bill identical to one
passed by the Senate. Congressionally funded aid to the contras, which the 1984 Boland
Amendment had cut for over a year, began to flow once again. O'Neill argued he had
won a partial victory since the aid was non-military and could not be delivered through
the CIA. His view did not take into account the millions of dollars of illegal covert
funds, which were now available for increased arms purchases. Further, the $27 million
maintained the contra army in the field and kept the door open to future U.S. military
aid The injection of aid was felt quickly as the contra war against Nicaragua again
intensified.
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The entire Massachusetts delegation voted against non-lethal aid, including
Silvio Conte who was one of only seven Republicans to buck the president
.
162
Shortly
after the vote, learned that the administration was closing the Agricultural Stabilization
Office in Amherst and relocating it to Providence, Rhode Island. The office, which
served farmers in Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut, employed only six
people, but the closing was a clear expression of the administration's displeasure with
the maverick Republican. In response to the slap on the wrist, Conte quipped, "Maybe
they'll take my beekeepers office away." 163
Other members of the Massachusetts delegation were more serious in the wake
of the vote. Senator Edward Kennedy believed the embargo and renewed contra aid
presaged a heightened commitment to the overthrow ofNicaragua that could easily end
with a U.S. military invasion. In a speech before an audience from the American Stock
Exchange, Kennedy warned:
In short, our present course is taking the United States toward unilateral
intervention in Nicaragua - toward a war which, whether we like it or not,
will inevitably involve American forces in combat
. . . [an invasion which]
would plunge us into the most unwanted, unnecessary and unjustified war
in our history. Internationally, Nicaragua would be portrayed as
America's Afghanistan. The single greatest beneficiary of an American
invasion of Nicaragua would be the Soviet Union.
.
.
164
Kennedy invoked the memories of Vietnam, at home as well as abroad, stating,
"Domestically some of the greatest damage would be inflicted on our own society,
which would be bitterly divided. Do we really want to relive an earlier decade of angry
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protest and the tragie days ofKent State?"'" The anti-embargo protests of the spring
made such a scenario credible. By calling to mind Vietnam, Kennedy touched on a
theme that permeated the entire debate over Central America throughout the 1980s
The Long Shadow of Vietnam
Throughout the 1980s, the debates over Central America fluctuated between two
poles that had come to delineate the boundaries of U.S. cold war foreign policy. The first
was the lingering fear of being accused of "losing" a country to communism. Observed
Texas Democrat Km Wright in 1985, "Nobody wants to be portrayed as fnendly toward
communism. That's been true for forty years." 166 Especially during the debates over El
Salvador, few congressional critics of administration policy wished to risk the political
backlash should the country fall to the Marxist rebels as a result of their cutting aid. Fear
of the charge "Who Lost El Salvador?" counterbalanced the distaste with which many
liberal and moderate members of Congress viewed the repressive Salvadoran regime.
Silvio Conte summed up the dilemma succinctly: "It's a Catch-22 situation. Congress
doesn't want to see El Salvador go down, but they don't want to further the killings
[through military aid] either.
.
There's no doubt about it, it's a very difficult, thorny
issue."
167
The other pole that shaped the debate was the Vietnam War, an experience that
had left deep and lasting scars in the national psyche, but from which, conservatives,
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liberals and radicals drew vastly different lessons. For many conservat.es, the lesson
was that political leaders should not put limits on the military in its pursuit ofvictory.
For those on the right, the war in Vietnam was not so much won by the North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong as lost by Amencans. For many liberals, the lesson was that
the United States should avoid the mistake of turning every regional conflict into an
east-west showdown, where the United States overextends itself by committing its
power, prestige and the lives of its youth to preserving a corrupt and unpopular
government. For radicals, the U.S. war in Vietnam was proof of the imperialist and
militarist dynamics of U.S. foreign policy that could only be stopped through mass
movements and ultimately transformative social change in the United States.
Throughout the 1980s, the Vietnam War haunted the debates over Central
America. The comments of Reagan's critics were replete with references to the
Indochina war. Ted Kennedy invoked the specter of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1984
and Kent State in 1985. In 1983 he echoed a phrase from the Vietnam era when he
charged, "The president's overall policy is a prescription for a wider war." When
Connecticut's Christopher Dodd spoke of "unleashing the dogs of war", the image he
meant to conjure up was that of U.S. troops sloshing through Central American jungles.
Yet many liberals remained paralyzed between fear of "losing" a nearby nation to
communism and failing to prevent another Vietnam War. Tip O'Neill caught the
dilemma in 1983 succinctly when he stated of El Salvador, "There's a strong feeling
around hear that it's another Vietnam situation.
. . At the same time nobody wants to see
that country go Marxist." 168
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Just as the fear of appearing "soft" on communtsm put opponents of Reagan's
poHcies on the defensive, the Vietnam syndrome forced the Reagan administration to
deny constantly that it was getting the country into "another Vietnam" The
administrate went to great lengths to sidestep language that might conjure up the
conflict in Southeast Asia. To avoid evoking the memory of the role U.S. advisors
played in drawing the military deeper into the war in South Vietnam, the Reagan
administration insisted on calling U.S. military advisors in El Salvador "trainers". 169
Fearing a rerun of Vietnam, Congress capped the number of U.S. advisors m El Salvador
at fifty-five. When asked if the administration was basing its policies in Central America
on the "domino theory", Secretary of State Alexander Haig descnbed Soviet designs in
Central America instead as a "priority hit list".' 70 Reagan declared, "Let me say to those
who invoke the memory of Vietnam, there is no thought of sending American combat
troops to Central America"' 71 And in a famous speech at Georgetown University in
1984, Reagan sought again to move beyond the "Vietnam syndrome" by criticizing those
in Congress who believed the U.S. was "still in the troubled waters of Vietnam" and
hamstrung U.S. policy with their reluctance to use force abroad. Alluding to the policies
of the Carter years, Reagan declared, "We will not return to the days of hand-wringing,
defeatism, decline and despair." 172
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The Reagan administration's defensiveness when it came to comparisons with
Vietnam was well founded. Throughout the 1980s, opinion polls continuously revealed
the lingering impact the Vietnam War had on pubkc opinion. Poll after poll showed
opposition to Reagan's policies in Central America and the fear that U.S. troops would
eventually find themselves fighting in Central America. 173 A Ne^YpjtTjmes, poll in
1984 showed only one in three supporting Reagan's policies in Central America, and
over halfexpressing fear his policies would lead to the introduction of U.S. combat
troops.
174
Polls also showed that many Americans were uninformed when it came to
Central America, and that opposition to administration policies grew the more informed
one became. Yale public opinion expert Edward R. Tuft noted a major shift in public
attitudes since the Vietnam War. Whereas before Vietnam, presidents could count on
"uninformed loyalty" when it came to foreign affairs, in the post-Vietnam era Americans
evinced "uninformed skepticism and informed hostility". 175
The solidarity movement sought to appeal to these widespread public doubts.
Although relatively few Americans shared radicals' enthusiasm for the revolutionary
forces of Central America, they shared their fear of U.S. military intervention. Among
the movement's slogans were "El Salvador is Spanish for Vietnam". Unlike the Vietnam
era, however, when the movement against the war grew slowly, the solidarity movement
hoped to stop direct U.S. intervention before it began. In many ways, the Pledge of
imperatives, more than the Soviet threat, Fidel Castro's menace, or the Nicaraguan and
Salvadoran revolutions, shaped U.S. policy..." LeoGrande, 590.
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Resistance hoped to keep the threat of V.etnam-era mass protest ,n reserve as a deterrent
to a U S military invasion of Nicaragua or El Salvador.
Indeed, the movement against U.S. intervention in Central America included
many familiar names from the Vietnam War era, such as Benjamin Spock, David
Del.mger, Rev William Sloane Coffin, Dick Gregory, Angela Davis and many others
Often overlooked, however, was the large presence of Vietnam veterans in the
movement ,7" Although political outlooks ran the gamut among Vietnam veterans, by the
late 1960s and early 1970s, the Vietnam War produced a growing number of vets
opposed to the ongoing war in Indochina Vietnam Veterans Against the War, founded
in 1967, continued to grow until in 1971, the organization commanded national attention
with a week of protest and educational activities in the nation's capital, which included
hundreds of veterans throwing away their medals on the steps of Congress. After the
war, many vets stayed politically active, lobbying the government on issues of concern
to veterans such as health care, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse and
homelessness Others, radicalized during the late 1960s and early 1970s, remained active
with leftist organizations opposed to U.S. cold war policy. 177
Some of the most well-known and committed activists against U.S. intervention
in Central America were veterans of the Vietnam War Among them was Dr Charles
Clements, an Air Force pilot during the war in Vietnam who subsequently became a
Quaker and a doctor and went into Salvadoran rebel "zones of control" to treat victims
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of the war. Clements documented his experiences in El Salvador in a famous book
entitled, Witne^sto_WM and was a frequent witness at congressional hearings 178
Another veteran, S. Brian Wil.son, was a guard at an Air Force base during the Vietnam
War. In the 1980s, he worked with veterans in Massachusetts and received a special
commendation by Governor Michael Dukakis. Willson became active in the solidarity
movement and went to Nicaragua. In 1987, he and three other veterans attempted to
block a naval troop train carrying weapons bound for El Salvador. Willson lost both of
his legs when the train refused to stop. 179
When Congress passed $27 million in "non-lethal" aid to the contras in June
1985, six Vietnam veterans occupied the Boston office of fellow veteran, Senator John
Kerry. The vets were apparently unaware of Kerry's strong opposition to contra aid.
Upon learning the news of the occupation by the vets, Kerry placed a call from
Washington to his office in the Boston Federal Building. Kerry spoke with his fellow
veterans for over an hour. According to forty-one year old protester, Jim Packer, "We
spoke to Kerry in a conference call and . . . realized that many of our goals are
similar. We agreed to leave peaceably at 1 1 p.m." Packer told a reporter, "We are not
connected with the Pledge of Resistance.
. . The idea was that we were upset at the
Senate vote and what we see as an escalation toward war in Central America. We did
Charles Clements. Witness to War (Toronto, New York: Bantam, 1984). A 1985 documentary
on Dr. Clements life. "Witness to War: Dr. Charlie Clements" won the 1985 Academy award for
best short subject documentary.
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and we don't want another generation of vets." 18 '
John Forbes Kerry was born to a Jew,sh father and a blue blood mother. His
mother hailed from the Forbes family, whieh was among Boston's most prestigious and
elite families. As a young man, Kerry grew up in affluence. In the early 1960s, Kerry,
like many of his generation, was inspired by President John F. Kennedy and took great
pride in the fact that the two shared initials. Educated at St. Paul's and Yale, Kerry began
speaking out against the Vietnam War in 1966 in debates while a student at Yale. After
graduation, Kerry learned he was to be drafted, so he enlisted in the Navy in order to
avoid combat as an army infantryman. Kerry entered the Navy, however, at a time when
it was expanding the use of Navy patrol boats, or "swift boats", in South Vietnam's
rivers. Kerry found himself in command of a patrol boat on the Mekong Delta, and in
February 1969 saw fierce combat in which he was wounded. The young lieutenant
received three bronze stars, a silver star and a Purple Heart during his tour in Vietnam. 18 '
Kerry received an early discharge in January 1 970 in order to run for Congress.
The Massachusetts Fourth District seat was held by a pro-war Democrat, and Kerry, who
always harbored political ambitions, hoped to unseat him running as an anti-war
candidate. Kerry's plans were changed when anti-war activist Father Robert F. Drinan of
1 80
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Boston College decided to run Kerry joined Father Drinan's
seat
campaign, which won the
182
In 1970, Kerry joined the fast growing Vietnam Veterans Against the War
Kerry's rise in the organization was meteoric due to his outstanding oratorical abilities,
his political connections and his skill as a fundraiser He appeared on the DK^Cavett
Show as well as MeeUhe Press where he criticized the war and the Nixon
administration's treatment of veterans 183 Kerry became a leader of the liberal wing of
VVAW, which sought a single-issue focus on opposing the war and working within the
system He experienced tension with the smaller, radical and revolutionary wing of
VVAW, which pushed for more confrontational tactics and believed only sweeping
social change could end the war or prevent new ones 1X4
The young veteran rose to national prominence during the April 1971 VVAW
protests in Washington DC At the last minute, William Fulbright, chair of the House
Foreign Relations Committee, asked Kerry to appear as a witness At the hearings, Kerry
spoke passionately and eloquently against the war Kerry asked the senators: "How do
you ask a man to be the last to die in Vietnam? I low do you ask a man to be the last one
to die for a mistake?" 183 After his testimony, Kerry put his name to a compilation of
stories by members of VVAW entitled The New Soldier Within a year, however, Kerry
lefl the VVAW To his supporters in VVAW, Kerry had helped establish the
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organization'* national reputation and conferred a mainstream respectability upon the
group With his moving Senate testimony and his many speeches ,K" To his cnt.es, Kerry
was merely using VVAW as a launching pad for a future political career A radical
WAW critic said ofKeny, "he came, he saw, he conquered, and he splil »187
In 1972, Kerry ran for Congress and lost ,n an elect.on yea, that saw George
Mc(iovern win Massachusetts and Gerry Studds rule an ant,-war message to victory.
Throughout much ofthe 1970s, Kerry worked quietly as a Distrid Attorney in
Massachusetts' M.ddlesex County Then, in 1982, Mrchael Dukak.s tapped the Vietnam
Veteran as Lieutenant Governoi in his second run fol the governorship ,x * In 1984,
Kerry ran lor the Senate seat vacated by the popular centrist Democrat Paul Tsongas Hi
Republican opponent was conservative husmessman Raymond Sharn.c, who positioned
himselfas an ideological twin ofRonald Reagan The race was contentious and Kerry
fared better than expected In a national election that witnessed the landslide re-election
OfRonald Keagan, Kerry won election 56% to 44% 189
Kerry quickly took up the issue ofCentral America, frequently invoking the
lessons of Vietnam
One ofthe greatest errors of Vietnam was our inability to read history
We were unwilling to look at the long-term process that was playing itself
out between North and South and among Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and
other areas Today, in (he same way, we arc not looking at the insiory of
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American involvement in Central America as well as the aspirations ofthe indigenous population. 190 i
In his first months as a U.S. Senator, Kerry focused on opposing aid to the
COntras. The freshman senator worked to cultivate ties to the Massachusetts solidarity
movement by having his aid Richard hell read statements ofSupport to solidarity
protestors, including building occupiers, during the spring anti-embargo protests. Kerry
voted twice against "non-lethal" aid, and m April of 1985 went on a peace mission to
Managua with fellow freshman Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA). The senators met
personally with Nicaragua* President Daniel Ortega, who asked Harkin and Kerry to
bring back a ceaselire proposal ,n exchange lor bilateral talks with the I I S. and an end
to M.S. funding Ofthe COntras. The State Department denounced the proposal as
propaganda and demanded that the Sandin.sta government open direct talks with the
eontras, whom the Sandinistas regarded as I IS. puppets. I larkin, lor years one ofthe
most outspoken critics ofReagan's ( lentral American policies, stated ofthe Nicaraguan
government, "... it became clear that they desire peace and not only normal but friendly
relations with the United Slates." 1
'"
Kerry's loray into international peacemaking was a bold move so early in his
career as a I Inited Slates Senator. The Reagan administration denounced Kerry and
I larkin as tools ol Sandinisla propaganda. Senator Barry ( loldwaler accused them of
breaking the law, and lar right conservatives decried them as traitors. Kerry remained
unruffled. When a reporter for The Advocate asked Kerry ifthe administration wasn't
U.S. News and World Report, April IS, |<)X ,
'"' New York Times, April 22, 1985.
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more interested in a military solution than negotiations, Kerry answered, "That's exactly
why they reacted the way they did. It's a case of if you don't like the message, kill the
messenger. We put them in a very embarrassing position because we exposed their
policy. We wanted to stop the killing, to bring about some stabilization." 192 Upon his
return, Kerry declared, "We are treating the nations of Latin America as our Eastern
Europe. Pluralism of views in our hemisphere apparently has no place in this
administration's policies, just as pluralism in the Eastern Bloc is not allowed by the
Soviets " 191 In May, 1985, Kerry denounced the embargo, declaring, "This unilateral
display of arrogance is unpardonable The action will only weaken our position in the
hemisphere. We are undermining the very hemispheric institutions which are so vital to
our ability to marshal solidarity in the face of any real threat of Soviet intrusion into our
sphere of influence." 194 Despite Kerry's arduous efforts, Congress passed $27 million in
non-lethal aid
In the spring of 1986, contra aid again came before the Congress By this time,
the Sandinista government had taken increasingly repressive measures in response to the
escalating war, and the Reagan administration hoped to take advantage of the growing
hostility to the Sandinistas in Congress to push for $100 million in lethal aid The
administration employed new levels of red baiting and the president furiously lobbied a
handful of centrist Democrats and Republicans. Meanwhile, Tip O'Neill had recently
announced his retirement at the end of the year, and made clear he wished to see an end
192
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t« the contra war as part ofhis legacy Democrats rallied to "win one for the Tipper" in
what many in the press billed as a final showdown between the President and the
Speaker. In the first test of strength, the Speaker prevailed and the Mouse narrowly
defeated the contra aid bill 222-2 10.' 95
Shortly thereafler, however, the Sandinista army followed the contras several
miles into I londuras Although the Sandinistas had undertaken similar incursions before,
the Reagan administration magnified the incident to the level of an invasion, and in the
ensuing hysteria turned enough swing votes to procure I louse passage of contra aid 221
209 The fate of the contras now fell to the Republican controlled Senate where the
energetic newcomers Kerry and Narkin launched a filibuster, which was soon joined by
Ted Kennedy and others Fearing being tarred as obstructionists, however, some liberal
Senators worked to end the filibuster and focus on winning back the Senate in 1986. 196
Kerry's crusade against the contras went beyond his visit to Managua in 1985
and his filibuster in 1986 In the spring of 1986, Kerry urged Republican chairman of the
Foreign AfVairs Committee Richard Lugar to allow him to conduct hearings into
allegations of contra drug smuggling and gunrunning. Investigations carried out by
Kerry's start" led them to believe that there was ample evidence to conduct hearings.
Kerry aide Richard McColl stated that although the stafThad found "no smoking gun.
.
.
there are enough people telling the same story" to warrant hearings Lugar continued to
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deny Kerry the hearings and argued tha, the test way ,o elimi„a,e any eontra eorrup.ion
was to make sure the contras were fully funded. 197
In their research, Kerry and his staffstumbled upon a secret arms supply
network, the scope of which became apparent at the end of 1 986 when a Lebanese
newspaper broke the news ofa vast covert operation run out of the National Security
Council in which profits from missile sales to Iran in exchange for promises to release
U.S. hostages were diverted to the contras. These illicit operations had grown in direct
response to the 1 984 aid cut offof contra aid by the Boland amendment. In late 1 986,
under public pressure, Attorney General Edmund Meese appointed Lawrence E. Walsh
as Independent Prosecutor to investigate the illegal arms sales to Iran and diversion of
the profits to the contras. In 1987, the House and Senate set up a joint "Iran-Contra
Committee" and Oliver North, Robert McFarland, Richard Secord and John Poindexter
became household names as members of Congress sought to learn the scope of the
operations and what the president knew. Although much of the public embraced North
as a hero during his televised testimony before the committee, the marine's popularity
did not translate into support for Reagan's contra policies. As the extent of high-level
involvement within the administration became evident, Reagan's poll ratings reached
all-time lows.
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The Iran-Contra scandal and the 1986 elections, which turned the Senate over to
Democratic control, opened the door for Kerry to pursue his allegations ofcontra drug
smuggling. In the spring of 1988, Kerry began holding several weeks ofone-man
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hearings on the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and
International Operations. The committee interviewed numerous witnesses and took
video recorded affidavits from individuals in Central America. Richard J. Bronneke, an
arms smuggler, told Kerry he had been approached by Israeli Mossad agents to
coordinate a drug and gun running scheme with the Columbian Medellin Cartel and
Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega. According to Brenncke, the Israelis assured him
the plan had the lull knowledge of Vice President Rush's national security advisor,
Donald (iregg who, they claimed, was coordinating the efforts to arms the contras.
Benneke's testimony was corroborated by former Panamanian Consul Jose Blandon who
described drug laden planes owned by the Medellin cartel receiving safe transit from
Manuel Noriega in Panama in return lor kick backs and promises ofbetter relations with
Washington. Blandon claimed he had secret information that "could affect the [1988]
elections of the United States..."199 Drug smugglers Michael Palmer, (ieorge Morales
and Gary Betzner told the Kerry committee that they would regularly refuel in Costa
Rica at contra camps. The latter two claimed they took drugs out of Columbia and
returned with arms, which they delivered to the southern contras by landing at the
private airstrip of rancher John I lull, a U.S. citizen with well-known ties to the CIA.
Convicted Medellin Cartel money launderer Ramon Milian Rodriguez testilied he
delivered approximately $10 million to the contras. 200
Kerry's hearings had many problems. First, the majority of his testimony came
from crime figures, most of who were convicts. Despite the similarities of their stories,
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there was no smoking gun to prove the sensational charges. Second, since the hearings
were public, Kerry could not divulge classified information that might have been in his
possession. As one aid told IheJiation, "The issue is how Kerry can get the maximum
amount of information out without generating a political reaction that will cause
everything to end up with the Intelligence Committee and closed hearings "201 Kerry had
to abandon many leads presumably because they led to classified CIA fronts and assets
Kerry went out on a limb. To be sure, a number of the allegations made at the hearings
had first appeared in the press, and some reporters continued to follow up on charges
made at the hearings. But in Congress, Kerry's investigation was fraught with problems
and most members of Congress kept an arm's length In an election year, the Kerry
hearings carried too much potential risk of coming across as partisan, despite the lengths
to which Kerry sought to avoid that image. Some of the allegations that emerged led to
the office of Vice President Bush, then the front-runner in the race for the Republican
nomination for president. No one stood to gain more from such allegations than the man
who had made John Kerry his running mate in 1982, the front-runner in the Democratic
race for president, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis.
The Presidential Candidate: Michael S.Dukakis and Central America
After generating a stir in the spring of 1988, Kerry's hearings quietly wound
down. As the 1 988 presidential campaign took on momentum, however, suspicions of
inappropriate ties between Republican nominee George Bush and Panamanian
strongman Manuel Noriega continued to surface. The issue of Central America remained
476
in the headlines, but Ronald Reagan's drive to topple the Sandinstas had suffered a
serious setback due to the Iran-Contra affci, Furthermore, a peaee proposal made by
Costa Riean president Oscar Arias had grown into a peace process known as Esquipulas
in which Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, El Salvador and Costa Rica agreed to work
toward regional stability and internal reconciliation. In 1987, Congress vastly reduced
contra aid, and limited their appropriation to itemized lists of non-lethal aid. In 1988,
Congress failed to pass even a modest proposal for humanitarian aid, and the contras
began peace talks with the Sandinistas who wished to put the war behind them so they
could try to revive the seriously ailing Nicaraguan economy prior to the 1990 elections
required by Esquipulas. 202
Michael Dukakis won the 1988 race for the Democratic nomination in a race
against several prominent Democrats such as Senator Al Gore, Jr. of Tennessee,
Representative Richard Gephard of Missouri and activist Rev. Jesse Jackson, who
campaigned against Dukakis from the left and proved his most serious challenger.
Dukakis sought to portray himself as a good government progressive and a skilled
technocrat rather than a traditional "liberal". In many ways, this was an accurate
description. As governor between 1973 and 1979, Dukakis had rooted out a good deal of
corruption but infuriated old school liberals who accused him of balancing the budget on
the backs of the poor through draconian welfare cuts. In his second term, he softened his
image, but made his name nationally through the success of modest programs in job
training for the unemployed and a program to increase the collection ofdelinquent taxes.
His image as a skillful economic administrator benefited from a high tech boom,
202
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.o the movemenl againsl nuclea, powe, by refusmg ,o dispatch
state troopers lo New Hampshire durmg .he 1977 Scab.ook .hu e acl.on protests In ihc
1980s, Ihcgovcnoi held up the Seal,, ook planl from going online by refusing to
subni.l an evacuation plan Dukakis had embraced Ihc nuclea, weapons free/e
.Movement l, v publicly endorsing Ihc freeze resolution, refusing lo lake pari in federal
ensis relocation planning, appointing an Adv.so.y ( ommillee on ihe Impacl ofthe
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Much of Michael Dukakis' outlook on politics was shaped dining his student
years al Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania in theearly i9sos The Quake, college
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but a trip to Latin America in 1954 moved the young man's views of U.S. foreign policy
considerably toward the left. Dukakis recdved a summer fellowship to study at the
University of San Marcos in Peru. He arrived in June at a university that was a hotbed of
politics. As Dukakis later recalled,
..it just so happens that 1954 was the year the
United States government overthrew the popularly elected government in Guatemala "204
Dukakis watched the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz from a much different vantage point
than those in the U.S., whose views were largely shaped by the anti-communist
fulminations of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and the publicity campaign of the
United Fruit Company. According to Dukakis, "Everyone in Latin America knew that
the United States was in the process of overthrowing the democratically elected
government of Guatemala "205 Dukakis discussed this formative experience in numerous
speeches during his presidential campaign In a speech entitled, "Building a New
Partnership for the Americas" at the City Club of Chicago, Dukakis said:
During the summer of 1954, I had the opportunity to live with a
wonderful family in Lima, Peru and to study at the oldest university in
our hemisphere. That's where I learned to respect the Latin American
people and their history and culture. It's where I learned to speak
Spanish And it's where I first confronted the inconsistencies in our
policies towards our neighbors to the south. For it was in 1954 that the
United States government, operating right out of the Embassy in
Guatemala City, engineered the overthrow of the democratically elected
government of Guatemala.
.
.
The result of the U.S. directed military coup
in Guatemala was thirty years of the most brutal repression any country in
this hemisphere has ever endured. In this century, the United States has
mounted nineteen major military expeditions to Latin America. Five
times, we sent troops to Honduras. The marines occupied Nicaragua for
twenty years And we helped overthrow a democratically-elected
204
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government not only in Guatemala, but in Chile in 1973 Every time wed.d so m the name of democracy and freedom. And almost wuW
freedom"2
'
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^
^
'ntervention has been tyranny, not
During 1954, Dukakis had also been taken aback by what he saw in Peru itself.
Peru was ruled by dictator Manuel A Odria, who was popular with the Eisenhower
administration but not with many Peruv,ans Dukakis recalled the dread inspired by the
U.S. supported military, "those troops with the German bucket helmets."207 He was also
moved by the deep poverty he witnessed throughout the region, recalling, "There was
incredible poverty in Latin America in the face of tremendous wealth at the top.
. . I have
never gotten over walking through the squatters sections in Lima: people living in shacks
and in the sides of mountains, people literally living in holes."208
In the 1980s, Dukakis was not persuaded by the Reagan administration's
argument that Soviet subversion was the main source of unrest and revolution in Central
America. Further, Dukakis believed that what he described as Reagan's "trigger-happy,
reach-for-your gun, communist-under-every-bed ideology" would lead the U.S. to
war. Dukakis condemned the administration's contra policy as "illegal and
immoral". He denounced the contras as "thugs and mercenaries" and charged, "Our
Michael Dukakis, "Building a New Partnership for the Americas", City Club of Chicago,
September 17, 1987. Michael S. Dukakis Presidential Campaign Papers, Manuscript 32, Box 6
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tax dollars [have been] used to blow up health clinics and farm cooperatives."211
Instead, Dukalas argued the U.S. would achieve its objectives "... not by overthrowing
governments we don't happen to agree with, not by cozymg up to Latin American
dictators as we have so often done over the past century, but by demonstrating every
day. the powerful force of our ideals."212
As governor, Dukakis expressed his opposition to U.S. policy in the region
directly to the Reagan administration itself. In 1985, amidst the Nicaraguan embargo
crisis, Dukakis wrote to Jayne Plank, Reagan's Director of Intergovernmental Affairs, to
express his strong opposition to administration policies. "I believe that what the
Administration is trying to do in Nicaragua is both morally and legally indefensible and I
think you and the President are entitled to know why," Dukakis wrote. 213 Dukakis drew
attention to the 1947 Rio Treaty: "The Rio Treaty was not an insignificant event.
Coming after decades of U.S. interventionism.
. . it was a major event in the history of
US-Latin American relations." Dukakis pointed out that Article 18 of the Organization
of American States prohibited the use of armed force to intervene in the internal affairs
of member states, adding, "The language of Article 18 is clear and unequivocal. It does
not say that it can be waived when we don't like the government of a particular Latin
American nation. It does not say that it applies in the case of a right wing dictatorship,
but has no effect if the dictatorship is of the left ." Dukakis denounced the interventions
in Guatemala and Chile, and declared, "Today, Guatemala has one of the most
:I
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'cp.css.vc regimes
... the hemisphere one, I might add, bo brutal thai ii makes
Sandkifta violation of civil liberties look like a Sunday School picnic by comparison "
Dukakis concluded, «] hope the Administration will abandon ,h,s foolhardy and lawless
course I hope
,1 will eons.de, senously the p.oposals fo, peace with wh.eh Senators
Haridnaiid Kerry returned from Nicaragua " Dukakis sen. copies of his lettei to
President Reagan, Secretary of State Cicorge SchultZ and each member ofthe
Massachusetts congressional delegation 214
liy ea.ly l<)K <>, Dukak.s confronted an issue lacing a growing numbei of
governors; namely, whethei to send the siaic s National Guard to i [onduras to lake pan
"< military excuses The Defense Department argued thai the exercises were done to
acclimate Guard troops to the type ofenvironment they might have to 6ghi ... one day.
but ...any critics of administration policy argued that the deployment ofthe National
Guard was part ofan ongoing campaign to intimidate the Sandinistas, and thai much of
the Guard's wo.k while ... I [onduras consisted ofbuilding roads neai the Nicaraguan
bordei that could he used fol a II S invasion Dukakis asked his staff to look into legal
grounds loi refusing to comply with the federal ordei An aide reported to the governoi
thai "except in lime ofwat 01 national emergency, a membei ofthe National Guard may
not he ordered lo active duly without the consent of (he (iove.no. '"' I he memo pointed
at that fo. the president to federalize the National (iuard of any stale, one of three
conditions needed lo he met I ) an invasion 01 dangei of invasion by a foreign nation; 2)
told
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rebellion or danger of rebellion against the Government of the United States; or 3) the
President is unable to execute the laws of the United States with regular forces™
Dukakis and several other governors decried what they saw as an unwarranted
politicization of the National Guard. WWle acknowledging the right of the federal
government to call up state National Guards for operations, they argued that the
administration, by deploying the National Guard for "training" was bypassing Congress.
Arizona governor Bruce Babbitt wrote, "The president wants the freedom to conduct
military operations without the nuisance of debate and Congress wants to spare itself the
responsibility for stopping him/'217 Maine's Democratic governor Joseph E. Brennan
refused to send his state's National Guard, stating, "Basically, I don't believe Honduras
is a very safe place to train. Secondly, I personally do not happen to agree with our
Central American policy. I think we're inching our way into another Vietnam "218
Michael Dukakis decided in 1986 to refuse to send the state's National Guard to
Honduras as well. A Dukakis spokesperson stated, "These are citizen-soldiers, and they
ought not to be placed into a potentially dangerous situation on allegedly friendly
training exercises. If the U.S. wants to send troops into Central America, that ought to
be something that the president asks the Congress and the Congress debates and votes
on. Barring that, I don't think there ought to be this subterfuge of sending Guard units
down from the various states."219 In a few states, decisions by the governor to keep the
216
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Guard home resulted in tensions with Guard commanders and troops, who regarded a
trip to Honduras as an adventure. Massachusetts National Guard spokesman Lt. Col.
Donald Consolmagno was more conciliatory, stating, "I would never say the governor
made the wrong decision. He's the commander in chief, and we as good soldiers carry
out the policies and directives ofthe commander in chief."220
In late 1986, Congress passed an amendment by Mississippi Democrat G.V
Montgomery, stating that governors could not withhold troops from exercises unless
there was an emergency in the state. The National Guard dispute took on something of a
federal vs. states rights dimension, and created some tension between governors and
Congress. The 1986 National Governors' Association meeting adopted a resolution
reaffirming governors' right to control National Guard training in peacetime.221
Minnesota's Democratic governor Rudy Perpica then decided to challenge the new law
in court, arguing that although the federal government could call out the militia, the
training of the Guard was still vested in the states. Massachusetts, Maine, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont and Iowa joined
Minnesota in its suit. When a U.S. District Court upheld the Montgomery Amendment,
Dukakis appealed the decision, declaring, "Today's decision is unfortunate but it is not
the end of the battle to reaffirm the right of each governor to be responsible for the
training of his or her state militia in peacetime."222 Dukakis added, "The Reagan
220
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Administration is using National Guard training in Central America as par, of an ill-
advised and illegal strategy to overthrow the Niearaguan government.-' Dukakis and
other governors lost the appeal. In the summer of 1 987, Federal District Court Judge
Donald Alsop ruled that states had no right to withhold the National Guard and Congress
eould exereise authority over state Guards as part of the federal reserve system,
including training. 2" The governors lost, but government resistance to the Reagan
administration's Central American policies that had begun with cities passing sanctuary
laws had now reached a state level.
When Dukakis announced his intention to run for president, he was better known
nationally for his innovative economic policies as governor than for his stands on
nuclear power, the arms race or U.S. intervention in Central America. Nevertheless, his
liberal positions on these issues helped him in the primaries, and especially when it came
to Central America, Dukakis appealed to activist elements in the party. At Marquette
University, Dukakis proclaimed, "I want to build a Central America that is free from
civil wars and secret wars.
.
.
where our energy and our resources are devoted to building
and educating and investing, not killing and sabotaging and tearing down."225 Dukakis
quickly became the Democratic front-runner. By the early summer of 1988, all other
contenders except Jesse Jackson dropped out. On July 20, 1988, Governor Bill Clinton
of Arkansas nominated Michael Dukakis for president at the Democratic Convention in
223
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Atlanta. Although Jackson had no chance of winning the nomination, William
Winpinsinger, head of the International Association of Machinists, nominated the evil
rights veteran. Winpinsinger had been active in the freeze movement, the campaign
against nuclear energy and the movement against U.S. intervention in Central
America. 226 For many social activists on the left, Jesse Jackson was the Democrat who
most embodied their ideals. Throughout the 1980s, Jackson's Rainbow Coalition worked
to build bridges between movements for civil rights and minority empowerment, and the
predominantly white environmental and peace movements. 227 In 1988, Jackson called
for an end to U.S. intervention in the Third World and a five-year freeze on military
spending. 228
Dukakis, by contrast, sought to move toward the center of the foreign policy
spectrum. To be sure, the governor continued to oppose numerous weapons systems and
called for deep cuts in the Reagan administration's SDI program ("Star Wars"); yet,
Dukakis surrounded himself with "defense Democrats" such as Madelaine Albright and
Joseph Nye and endorsed the D-5 Trident missile, the Stealth and B-l bombers and
called for an expansion of conventional forces. 229 In a speech in Dallas, Texas entitled,
g a Strong Defense", Dukakis sought to synthesize his advocacy of a strong
conventional defense with his opposition to the nuclear arms race: "We know if it is
necessary to use military force, it will almost certainly be our conventional forces, rather
R.uMin
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than our nuclear forces that will be tested. We need a strong nuclear deterrent We
have a strong nuclear deterrent But we also need strong conventional forces if we are
serious about reducing the risk of nuclear war..."230
Dukakis rarely distanced himself from his positions on Central America,
however, and wove references to the issue throughout his campaign speeches Early in
his acceptance speech in Atlanta, the Democratic nominee proclaimed:
It's time to understand that the greatest threat to our national security in
this hemisphere is not the Sandinistas - it's the avalanche of drugs that is
pouring into this country and poisoning our kids.
. . Because this election
is not about ideology It's about competence It's not about overthrowing
governments in Central America; it's about creating jobs in middle
America
As his running mate, Dukakis opted for a traditional ideological and geographical
ticket balancing strategy, and chose moderate Texas Senator Lloyd Bentson On several
issues, most notably Central America, there was a large ideological chasm between the
two Bentson had called the Sandinistas 'Violent revolutionaries... dedicated to
spreading their brand ofcommunism anywhere they can reach "232 The Republican
ticket of George Bush and Indiana Congressman Dan Quayle sought to accentuate the
difference between the Democratic running mates, but were somewhat encumbered by
the fact that their advisors had told them to play down the issue of contra aid, which
remained unpopular with the public 2"
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The presidential campaign of 1988 was one of the most negative in recent
memory. Bush campaign manager Lee Atwater undertook an aggressive campaign
strategy to paint Dukakis as a "card carrying member of the ACLU" who furloughed
black rapist Willie Horton, banned the Pledge of Allegiance and was a "McGovern
Democrat" on defense The Dukakis campaign My anticipated the Bush campaign's
strategy. Dukakis's staff scoured the Bj^ojiGlobe for the past three decades in search of
anything that could be used against the governor. In one memo, an aid wrote, "Terry
Bergman told us that our aim should be to uncover or shed new light on incidents in
Michael Dukakis's career that might help members of the Bush campaign typecast the
governor as a radical liberal, as she believed they would."234 The staff member covering
the early 1970s reported "very little about the future governor, and certainly nothing
that could be cited as support for the view that Dukakis is a dangerous left-leaning
radical."
2115
But the campaign expected trouble when it came to Dukakis's second term as
governor and the issue of Central America. The campaign put together charges
anticipated by the Bush campaign and responses for the governor. The practice charges
pulled no punches:
FACTS: MSD for the past five years has worked with the Boston
Coordinating Council on Central America - a left-leaning coalition of
U.S. -based ecumenical and political solidarity groups His work with
them included proclamations on Central America Day and endorsement
of a November 6, 1984 referendum they put together. The groups are
committed to a variety of causes, including disarmament, non-
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interventionist American policy and Third World revolution [The
ba vador (CISPES), a sohdanty group that essentially endorses theSalvadoran guernlla platfonn. The group was a target of an FBI
C^TTJ^T™4 PlanS 10 aH the " El Salvador.
groups Uke mPF<! hftr^'™
°f*** indud« A—like CISPES, wluch has openly endorsed the Salvadoran
guemllas agenda, and even a Salvadoran labor union almost certainly
tied to the guerrillas. y
RESPONSE: Mike Dukakis has always made a point of talking with
many different groups and organizations to get a thorough view of anyissue. These groups were among the organizations involved in Latin
American policy in Massachusetts... In no case has there been illegal
activity. The same cannot be said of vice-president Bush whose
dicIatT'"
1 $200,00
°
t0 3 drUg-Smu88lin8 Panamanian
The Bush campaign generally sought to put some distance between itself and the
current administration on Central America. Lawrence Walsh hadn't directly implicated
the vice president in the Iran-Contra affair, but leads did indicate Bush might have been
more involved than he claimed. 237 Although the Bush campaign challenged Dukakis on
his Central American policies, it did so only half-heartedly. Americans had grown
exhausted with a decade of proxy war in Central America that had shown few results and
led to the biggest political scandal since Watergate.
The race between George Bush and Michael Dukakis came to hinge far more on
symbolism than issues. Bush campaign manager Lee Atwater devised a strategy that
portrayed Dukakis as a radical liberal who furloughed black rapists, stood against the
Pledge of Allegiance and was a "card carrying member of the ACLU". Dukakis's failure
"Central American Groups", circa July 1988. This and several similar documents anticipating
charges against Dukakis along with responses can be found in the Michael S. Dukakis
Presidential Campaign Papers, Manuscript 32, Box 4, Folder 229 and Box 6, Folder 326.
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to aggressively counter the attacks hurt the campaign. His continued insistence that the
campaign was about competence not ideology alienated the Democratic Party base and
left uncommitted voters cold. Dukakis acquitted himself well in the debates, but his
technocratic demeanor came across as aloof and distant to an electorate used to the
charismatic Ronald Reagan
One can attribute the desultory results of the 1988 Dukakis campaign to many
factors. Whatever the cause, many saw the ill-fated Dukak,s campaign as the last hurrah
of post- 1960s "Massachusetts liberalism" in the same way as the 1984 Mondale
campaign marked the demise of the old blue collar New Deal liberalism. By 1988, the
moniker "liberal" had become stigmatized. After 1988, the centrist, southern-based wing
of the party led by Al Fromm's Democratic Leadership Council increasingly took
control of the Democratic Party. In 1992, self-proclaimed "New Democrat" Bill Clinton
took back the White House for the Democrats for the first time in twelve years
But if Michael Dukakis sought to distance himself from the liberal label during
the campaign, the vice president in a similar fashion attempted to put distance between
himself and the zealous ideological conservatism of his predecessor. By 1988, the
"Reagan revolution" had run out of steam As early as 1986, ideological conservatives in
the Republican Party grumbled as Reagan undertook serious arms control with Mikhail
Gorbachev It was the Iran-Contra Affair, however, that gave the coup de grace to the
rightward thrust of the Reagan years Popular use of the term "Contragate" conjured up
memories of Watergate, and although Reagan, unlike Nixon, was not forced from office,
there were many similarities Both Watergate and the Iran-Contra Affair ultimately came
down to the imperial presidency clashing with a left-liberal opposition movement Just
490
as the illegal wiretaps that grew into Watergate began with Richard Nixon's desire to
conceal illegal U.S. military incursions into Cambodia in the face of a powerful antrwar
movement, so too did the illegal arms sales to Iran and money transfers to the contras
grow out of the Boland amendment, which was an expression of the solidarity
movement's impact on Congress. And as with the Nixon administration, numerous
Reagan administration officials were convicted of illegal activity. John Poindexter,
Robert McFarland, Oliver North and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger were only a
few of the Reagan administration officials convicted for illegal activities, including
deceiving Congress. As one of his final gestures as President, George Bush issued
pardons to all the convicted and accused Iran-Contra conspirators. 238
Walsh; Kornbluh and Byrne. Oliver North had his conviction overturned on a technicality
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CONCLUSION
The End of a Decade
In the spring of 1989, trucks carrymg material aid for El Salvador set out from
Boston, Detroit and Vancouver on a cross-country journey to converge on San Antonio,
Texas before continuing to El Salvador. Traveling with the Boston convoy was Robert
Wilson, an employee of a Springfield, Massachusetts software firm who had spent six
weeks raising $4,000 across western Massachusetts. Along the way, the solidarity
activists stayed at homeless shelters and women's shelters, gathering national publicity
for their cause. Their mission was to deliver $3 million worth of humanitarian aid to help
recovery efforts from the 1986 earthquake. According to Wilson, "[The U.S.
government] is sending all kinds of money to El Salvador and it's not helping the people
it's meant to help. It's being misused, stolen and expropriated by the military." 1
From San Antonio, the caravan of eighteen trucks and forty solidarity activists
began a trek through Central America. The trip through Mexico was peaceful, but their
welcome in Guatemala far less sympathetic. A military escort accompanied the activists
across the country and left them just inside the Salvadoran border, where they were soon
stranded. The caravan had hoped to enter El Salvador before the spring elections, when
the FMLN announced a transport stoppage ("paro") to protest the vote. "We broke our
necks to get there before the paro," Wilson told a reporter. 2 As days went on, the
difficulty was no longer the rebels, but the hostile Salvadoran government. Wilson later
1
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m "I assume the U.S. embassy and the Salvadorans conspired to keep us out of the
country. It was mean spinted. They wanted us to rot and they did not want us in El
Salvador."3
Unbeknownst to Wilson, Congressman Silvio Conte learned of the caravan's
plight and sent letters of concern to the U.S. and Salvadoran governments. Eventually,
the reluctant Salvadoran government allowed the caravan to complete its journey and
deliver the aid. Back in Massachusetts, Wilson wrote to thank Conte. "While I was in El
Salvador, I had no idea ifmy own family, never mind my Congressman, knew ofmy
troubles there."
4
Conte's intercession on Wilson's behalf symbolized the close
relationship the western Massachusetts Republican had developed with his activist
constituents over the course of a decade. Conte and solidarity activists from the First
District had reached a mutual acceptance despite the solidarity movement's
unconditional opposition to the Salvadoran government and Conte's qualified support.
The common ground was their mutual concern for human rights.
As the decade wound to a close, Conte's constituents called upon him one more
time on behalf of human rights in El Salvador Robert Wilson wrote to Conte seeking his
help in preventing the deportation of a Salvadoran woman named America Sosa. 5 In July
1 989, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) arrested Sosa at a Washington,
D C. church Sosa headed a Salvadoran organization called COMADRES (Committee of
Mothers and Relatives of Political Prisoners, Disappeared and Assassinated People ofEl
3
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Salvador). Sosa was a garment factory worker whose husband had been mistakenly
arrested by the Salvadoran military and killed while in prison. Fearing for her life, Sosa
came to the U.S. and spoke across the country on behalf ofCOMADRES. Months before
her arrest, she had spoken to western Massachusetts audiences as part of Robert
Wilson's fundraising campaign. Although COMADRES was formed in 1978 under the
auspices of Archbishop Oscar Romero, the U.S. government considered it sympathetic
to the rebels and now sought to deport Sosa. But the organization won the hearts of
human rights supporters and in 1 984 received the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights
Memorial Award Said one solidarity activist of Sosa, "She is the Sojourner Truth of El
Salvador."6
Conte received numerous letters regarding America Sosa and met with Wilson
and other western Massachusetts activists regarding the case. Conte sent a letter to the
INS on behalf of America Sosa's appeal for political asylum. 7 He wrote, "The problems
that the Sosa family and COMADRES have encountered since 1978 are, we believe,
sufficient to demonstrate that she faces genuine threats to her safety if she is forced to
return to El Salvador." 8 Conte then sent a "Dear Colleague" letter to members of
Congress inviting them to a forum on the Sosa case to be held in his office, where
members of Amnesty International and America's Watch briefed the lawmakers on the
Sosa case and human rights in El Salvador. 9 Conte also used the forum to solicit support
6 USA Today, March 30, 1989; Greenfield Recorder. April 4, 1989; Berkshire Eagle
. May 21. 1989
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for a bill he was sponsoring that would prevent the deportations of Salvadorans or
Nicaraguans seeking asylum in the United States. 10 Letters of thanks streamed into
Conte's office. An Amherst resident wrote, "I just want to express my appreciation for
your efforts, which... go beyond just support to the realm of leadership"" Sara
Ciborski of Great Barrington, speaking for the Committee on Central America, told the
B^toEagle, "We're very pleased that he's taking this action It's a wonderful step
he's taking " 12 The letters of thanks differed dramatically from the angry letters that
flooded Conte's office in the spring of 198 1 when Conte had cast his deciding vote in
support of military aid to El Salvador. The combined efforts of Conte and the national
solidarity movement on America Sosa's behalf paid off. In the summer of 1990, the INS
judge hearing the case surprised everyone by ruling in Sosa's behalf. 13
While Conte labored on behalf of America Sosa, the 1980s ended in El Salvador
almost exactly as it had begun In November 1989, the FMLN launched a massive "Final
Offensive", and for the first time since early 1981, held several large sections of San
Salvador. The offensive revealed more support for the Marxist rebels in the capital than
the U.S. or Salvadoran government expected, but not enough to spark an uprising that
would topple the government, as the rebels hoped The Salvadoran military extricated
Un ion News
.
July 21, 1989.
11
Albert S Woodhull to SOC, July 22, 1989, Scries 3e, Box 64, Folder "COMADRES", MS 371,
Subgroup II. SOC Papers
.
12
Berkshire Eagle
, undaled newspaper clipping, circa July 1989, Scries 3c, Box 64 Folder
"COMADRES", MS 371, Subgroup II SOC Papers .
13
America Sosa to SOC, July 25, 1990, Scries 3c, Box 64, Folder: "COMADRES", MS 371, Subgroup II
SOC Papers
.
1CK
the FMLN from their positions in the city only by massive and indiscriminate artillery
barrages that caused wide spread casualties among the civilian population 14
The Offensive also triggered a paroxysm of death squad killings, which had
leveled off since 1984 During the offensive, the world learned of the murder of six
Jesuit priests, their cook and her fifteen-year old daughter at the University of Central
America on the outskirts of San Salvador. They had been pulled from their beds, shot
execution style, their brams removed from their skulls and left on display on the ground:
outside their dormitory The Jesuits openly sympathized with the poor, embraced tenant
of Liberation Theology, and had worked to promote a negotiated end to the war. They
were bitterly resented by officers in the Salvadoran military Many members of the U.S.
Congress had known the Jesuits personally. Several of the Jesuits were internationally
known authors and had met with members of Congress in Washington, DC, and at the
University ofCentral America where many congressional delegations had stayed during
feet-finding missions over the previous decade Recently elected Salvadoran President
Alfredo Cristiani, who had worked to disassociate the ARF.NA party image from
Roberto ITAubuisson and the death squads, now implied the killings were the work of
the leftist rebels seeking to discredit the government U.S. Ambassador William Walker
gave credit to the insinuations
ls
Witnesses who identified the Salvadoran military as the guilty party were joined
by a low-ranking U S. Army officer who reported hearing high-ranking SaJvadoran
officers claim responsibility for the act The murders of the Jesuits propelled one final
" William LeoGrande. Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America. 1977-1992 (Chapel
Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). 568-72.
Is
Ibid ; New York Times
. November 17. 1<)S9. l
4%
Massachusetts congressman to the lore on Central America Speaker ol the » louse Ton,
Foley (D-WA) appointed a Special Task Force on El Salvador to investigate the killings.
Foley appointed Representative Joe Moakley as chair ofthe Task Force. Moakley
represented the Catholic working class district of South Boston. 16 Throughout the 1980s,
he had kept a low profile on foreign affairs. Moakley now played a key role in helping to
end El Salvador's decade long civil war 17
Moakley set out on his investigation with a zeal fueled by his Catholic faith.
Further, Moakley had known two ofthe Jesuits personally He said, "Up until their
murders, I never personally knew anyone who was killed in El Salvador Because they
were friends, I am especially outraged at the brutal nature of their deaths I grieve lor
them. Moakley \s Task force visited El Salvador, interviewed witnesses and pushed
up against obstruction by the Salvadoran government and reluctant cooperation by the
U.S. Embassy All evidence pointed in the direction of Colonel (iuillermo Alfredo
Benavides In May, Moakley denounced what he described as a cover-up by the
Salvadoran military and declared the investigation at a "virtual standstill". On South
Boston streets, constituents yelled their support to Moakley "Don't let those guys
murder priests and get away with it!" and "Get the Jesuit killers!" Moakley told a New
York limes reporter, "It used to be there wasn't half a vote in the 1:1 Salvador issue
Then they killed the Jesuits."19
16 New York Times . January 1(>, 1990. 8.
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As the investigation reached an impasse, Moakley enlisted in the effort by
Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT) to eut military aid to El Salvador
by fifty-pereent. The Dodd-Leahy bill sought to promote negotiations by requiring the
elimination of the remaining military aid should the Salvadoran government refuse to
negotiate and the restoration of the eliminated aid should the FMLN launch an offensive.
Moakley took to the floor of the House and proclaimed, "Enough is enough. The time to
act has come. They killed six priests in cold blood. I stood on the ground where my
friends were blown away by men to whom the sanctity of human life bears no
meaning."20 To the astonishment of the Salvadoran military, the House voted 250-163
for the Dodd-Leahy bill. Moakley said after the vote, "You know what really bothers
me? Ifsome Speaker had organized a task force when Archbishop Romero was killed to
challenge the administration, the aid could have been cut a long time ago."21
In 1991
,
the Cristiani government and the FMLN began negotiations under the
auspices of the United Nations. As the cold war drew to a close, congressional pressure
on the Salvadoran military and pressure by Latin American governments on the rebels
kept the negotiations moving. In early 1992, a peace accord was signed. The Salvadoran
military would be cut in half and purged ofhuman rights violators. The FMLN would be
disarmed under U.N. supervision and integrated into the Salvadoran police force. A U.N.
"Truth Commission" was to investigate atrocities from a decade of civil war. In early
1992, a Salvadoran court convicted two officers for the murder of the Jesuit priests, their
cook and her daughter. Col. Benavides was convicted ofordering the murders. The
20
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convicted officers were sentenced to thirty years Seven other officers who were widely
believed to be involved were acquitted Still, the convictions marked the halting end of
the era of military impunity in El Salvador 22
The negotiated settlement in El Salvador brought to a close one of the darkest
chapters of the cold war's final decade Over 80,000 Salvadorans, mostly civilians, died
in the civil war Over 30,000 Nicaraguans died during the U.S. sponsored contra war.
Tens of thousands died in Guatemala.23 The solidarity movement, by keeping alive the
fears of another Vietnam and civil unrest at home, had helped prevent a mil scale U S
invasion ofEl Salvador or Nicaragua The Massachusetts congressional delegation to
Congress had put up the strongest opposition of any state delegation to the Reagan
administration's policies in Central America. Constrained by the "Vietnam syndrome"
from intervening more directly, the Reagan administration pursued a policy of proxy war
and low-intensity warfare The Sandinistas survived the contra war only to go down to
narrow defeat in the 1990 elections And the U.S. never achieved its long sought military
victory over the Marxist rebels in El Salvador In the end, only negotiations could end
the deadly stalemate in that long-suffering land As the cold war ended, Central America
lost its significance for the U.S. During the 1990s, the U.S. disengaged from Central
America, dramatically cutting all forms of aid and leaving the region to recover from a
decade of war largely on its own. 24
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The End ofanEra and a "New World Order"
During the 1980s, (he United States supported a panoply ofundemocratic
movements and regimes in pursuit of its global objectives. To eounter the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan the U.S. supported the Islamic mujaheddin; to oppose the
Vietnamese invasion ofCambodia, the U.S. supported the deposed Maoist Khmer
Rouge, responsible for the "killing fields" of,he 1970s. In 1989, President (icorge Bush
ordered an invasion of Panama to topple the dictator Manuel Noriega, a long-time U.S.
client, on charges of drug smuggling, although the reason was more likely that the erratic
dictator was now viewed as an unreliable custodian ofthe Panama Canal. In August
1 990, Iracp dictator Saddam I lussein invaded Kuwait. During the Iran-Iraq war of the
1980s, the U.S. had worked to build up the Iracp regime as a bulwark against the Islamic
fundamentalism of Iran, which was viewed as a threat to the oil kingdoms of the Persian
Gulf Now (icorge Mush deployed 500,000 U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia as the bulk of an
international coalition to oust Iraq from Kuwait. 25
A large activist movement grew in the United States in opposition to the
impending war in the Gulf, taking up the rallying cry, "No Blood for Oil!" Bush had set
a January 15, 1991 deadline for Iraq to leave Kuwait, vowing to go to war with or
without congressional approval. Three days before the deadline, Congress llnished days
o I impassioned debate to vote on whether to continue economic sanctions on Iraq or to
endorse a war resolution. Echoing the antiwar movement, Senator Kennedy proclaimed,
"Not a single American life should be sacrificed in a war for the price of oil."'" The
26
Waller LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-2000 (New York: McGraw Hill, 2002)
Roston (ilobe, January I 1, 1991,
500
House approved the war resolution 250- 1 83 and the Senate passed it 52-47. Going into
the vote, the only member of the Massachusetts delegation who remained a question
mark was Silvio Conte. 27 On the day of the vote, Conte joined the rest of the
Massachusetts delegation and only two other Republicans in voting against the
authorization to go to war, making Massachusetts, fittingly, the only state delegation to
cast all its votes against the war. It was one of the last votes Conte was to cast in his four
decades in Congress 28 On February 8, 1991, Silvio Conte died from a blood clot in the
right side of his brain His vote against the war resolution helped cement the affection
many western Massachusetts activists had begrudgingly developed for the maverick
Republican. 29
The successful war against Iraq, at the cost of fewer than 150 U.S. lives, led to a
tidal wave of patriotism Yellow ribbons and U.S. flags adorned front yards across
America and George Bush's popularity ratings passed eighty-percent. Bush proclaimed a
"New World Order", one in which the U.S. would shape the post-cold war world. In
early March, still basking in the glow of victory, the president declared, "By God we've
killed the Vietnam syndrome once and for all."30 For a decade and a half, advocates of
an interventionist foreign policy chafed at the constraints the Vietnam syndrome placed
on U.S. president's ability to deploy troops around the world. As William LeoGrande
observed, "We went to war in Central America to exorcise the ghosts of Vietnam and
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renew the national will to use force abroad »' Although the American public would
moat certainly not countenance the body count in 1 I S lives dun occurred du„„g the
Vietnam War, the GulfWar of 1991 did open up a new era ofU.S willingness to assert
its military might around the world
The Vietnam syndrome, however, enla.led far more than fear of incurring large
casualties in a military misadventure abroad The war in Vietnam had broken the cold
war consensus and ealled into question American institutions To be sure, the civil rights
movement was the progenitor of 1960s activism and the training ground for a whole
generation of activists But unlike the victories of the civil rights movement, which in
many ways was the culmination ofpost-World War II liberalism, the war in Vietnam,
over time, legitimated the radical left which in turn affected a split in cold war
liberalism The war in Vietnam produced a whole new generation of liberals who came
to Congress in the early 1970s determined to prevent any replay ofthe Vietnam War and
to Steer the nation in a new direction In 1982, Congressman Gerry Skidds took part in
one of his many adversarial exchanges with Secretary of State Alexander I laig
,
during
hearings on El Salvador by the House Foreign Affairs committee The interchange, as so
many before, turned to Vietnam
Haig: Were you there, Mr Studds, in Vietnam?
Studds: No I was here trying to get us out of there
I Laig: Where were you at the time, just for my personal interest.
Studds Where was 1 when'''
Haig During the Vietnam conflict?
Studds Which part of it?
I laig Start to finish.
" LcoGrandc, 590
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Studds: That, unfortunately, is how I goi myself in my cuirenl mess i ranfor this institution because I thoughl .1 was a tragic mistake ,;
The Vietnam Wai made
.1 possible foi many mainstream Americans and
politicians to question the dominant institutions and premises ofAmerican society and .0
cons.de, alternatives The war had discredited .he American political establishment, and
by raising doubts aboul the "best and brightest" in government helped legitimate grass
roots progressive activism Movements on the left reverberated within segments of
liberalism during the 1970s and 1980s The movements against nuclear power, nuclear-
weapons and U s intervention in Central America all percolated up, in Randall
Forsberg's phrase, to influence mainstream politics
The Vietnam War had also accentuated the apocalyptic qualities ofthe cold war
During the post-Vietnam eia, nuclea. power, nuclear weapons and U S involvement in
Central America all held the threat of some type Of apocalypse that fueled the search lor
an alternative world order based on a global humanity that transcended the cold war
dualities of modern capitalism and Soviet-style authoritarian socialism Activists sought
to create a new world free ofthe shadow of potential self-destruction Many on the left
continued to pursue the ideals of participatory democracy, international self-
determination, world peace, racial and gendei equality and the liberation of humankind
from economic exploitation In 1968, many believed such a new world was on the verge
Ofsweeping over the globe In the 1970s and 1980s, activists sought to move toward that
new world from the bottom up in what Baibara lipstein calls "pre-figurative politics".
"East-West Relations li S Security Assistance." Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House ofRepresentatives, Ninciy-Scvcnili Congress, Second Session, March 2, 1«>K2. pg, is
Activists summed up the post-Vietnam era with the phrase, "Think Globally, Act
Locally."
Although the Vietnam War helped pave the road into mainstream politics for
those on the activst left, each movement in this study had its own relationship to the war
and the movement against it The antinuclear energy movement, in many ways, sought
to return to the community politics of SNCC during the early 1960s, which had been
derailed by the campus-based sectarian politics of the revolutionary New Left during the
late 1960s. Antinuclear energy activists shaped an interpersonal movement heavily
influenced by feminism and the counterculture
The freeze movement sought to return to the early 1960s disarmament
movement, which was eclipsed by Vietnam for over a decade The freeze campaign,
however, in many ways mirrored the tactics of those who sought to take the anti-
Vietnam War movement into the mainstream during the late 1960s The freeze
movement continued the community and feminist politics of the antinuclear energy
movement but distanced itself from the previous movement's counterculture influence.
For activists like Sam Lovejoy, the freeze movement, symbolized by the clean cut Randy
Kehler, lost some of the subversive fun of 1960s and 1970s activism Lovejoy recalled,
"Let me put it to you this way, no one ever offered me a joint after a SANH meeting."33
The Central American solidarity movement continued the community politics of
the other post-Vietnam movements, but opened space for more militant activism and a
return to the Third World revolution focus of the late 1960s New Left. But still, even
with the wave of direct action during the 1985 anti-embargo protests, the solidarity
movement avoided the pitched streets battles of the late 1960s. The movement pursued a
13
Interview with Sain Lovejoy, May 24, 2003
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range of other tactics, from letter writing and lobbying, harvesting coffee in Niearag,
civil disobedience. For the solidarity movement, "No more Vietnam*'" was the guiding
motif
The 1960s not only opened up space for movements on the left, but those on the
right. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a bifurcation of American politics The New
Right, exploiting the social and cultural alienation of many Americans toward the
movements of the 1960s, the economic dislocations of the 1970s, and anger over the
decline of American global power, gained a slow ascendancy that resulted in a major
political re-alignment in 1980 This placed activist movements and liberal politicians in
oppositional roles. Although liberals and activists on the left could not stop the rightward
shift of the nation, they blunted the trajectory of nuclear energy expansion, helped move
a reluctant conservative president back towards arms control negotiations and prevented
more direct U.S. military action in Central America
When President George Bush pronounced the death of the Vietnam syndrome, he
hoped his victory in Iraq would end not only national self-doubt that inhibited the full
assertion of U S. military power abroad, but the alternative vision for America and the
world embodied by the left-liberal movements of the 1960s and after It was these
movements, and the alternative path they represented, that most inhibited the right from
fully realizing its own vision of a New World Order, one in which "free markets" and
"capitalist democracies" spread across the globe under the aegis of U.S. power.
The end of the cold war had a profound affect on the American left. Although
few activists on the left were anxious to follow the Soviet model, many hoped
revolutions such as the one in Nicaragua might provide a new model of revolution
leading toward social justice The failure ofrevolutionary movements in the developing
world left many activists disUlusioned The end ofthe cold wai removed .he frame of
reference for many activists, who after a decade of seeming disorientation in .he 1990s,
slowly regrouped around .he anti-[corporate] globalization movemenl ofthe late 1990s
Although much ofthe new
"anti-globalization" movemenl pursued rion-violeni tactics
rooted in .he 1970s and 1980s, .he anti-World Trade Organization protests in Seattle and
anti-International Monetary Fund and World Banks protests elsewhere witnessed a
return ofthe st.ee. fighting militancy ofthe late 1960s The anti-globalization movement
was sidelined by the tenons, attacks on Seplembe. I I, 2001 The attacks on the
Pentagon and World Trade Centers accelerated the neo-conscrvahve unilateralist
policies Ofthe George W Bush administration But in 200 5, in .espouse to the
impending wai ... Iraq and the new doctrine of"preventive war", .he world witnessed an
unprecedented wave ofpeace demonstrations around the wo. Id Not s.nce the mass
peace ...arches against the Ku.om.ss.lcs
... the early 1980s has Europe experienced such
large scale protest, 1101 s.nce the llee/.c movement have so many Americans from all
walks of life participated in a peace movement on such a large scale The
Communications revolution ofthe 1990s has put in place the tools lor activists to
coordinate global protests on a scale unimaginable during the 1900s, 1970s and l9K0s
As global power continues to drill to the right, act.v.s.n on the left seems in the process
Ofredefining itselfonce again and shows all likelihood of playing an important role on
the world stage
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